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In this dissertation I interrogate colonial state formation in the Netherlands 
East Indies between 1870 and 1939, using the lens of land appropriation sanctioned by 
colonial laws. Drawing on archival sources from the Netherlands and Indonesia, I 
dissect the constitution of the colonial agrarian regime as a distinctive project of state-
making in which the colonizer and the colonized actively participated. My key 
objective is to foreground the role of the colonized subjects and the autonomy of their 
enunciations and strategies in the everyday making of “the state,” a contrast with 
many accounts of state-making in the Netherlands East Indies.  
I argue that the constitution of the colonial agrarian regime involved not only 
lawmaking, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the making of subjects. I also 
argue that it was human agents having myriad forms of association with state 
institutions who carried out these practices, such that they blur the boundary between 
“the state” and “subjects.” Drawing on Abrams and Foucault, I focus on a number of 
critical subject—Native intellectuals, Dutch planters, and Native and Indo-European 
politicians among others—and their discursive battles to showcase how the complex 
relations of state formation and practices unfold.  
This focus, away from the state as a reified object of study and into the various 
processes of state-making, offers an understanding of the tensions and convergences 
between the colonizers and the colonial subjects. Training the gaze upon colonial 
subjects renders visible a process of colonial state formation that was not consisted of 
a continuous stream of one-way domination. Rather, colonial state formation emerges 
as pulsations of power—one moment contracting, the next expanding—and as 
interplays of power rife with ambivalence and contestations in which a wide spectrum 
of the colonized subjects played indispensable roles.  
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INTRODUCTION 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, optimism blanketed the Netherlands East 
Indies. The war in Aceh was largely quelled, and a relatively peaceful atmosphere had 
made possible prospecting for natural resources in the Outer Islands (Tagliacozzo 
2010), the flourishing of inter-island transportation (Campo 2002), the spreading of 
new technologies that promised modernity (Mrazek 2002), and the booming of 
agricultural commodities as a result of the agrarian policy introduced in the previous 
century (Lindblad 2002). The optimistic outlook was amplified by the Dutch pledge to 
implement Ethical Policy as outlined in Queen Wilhelmina’s opening speech of the 
Dutch Parliament in May 1901.1  
The exhilarating development notwithstanding, the agrarian issues in Java 
remained a central interest of the colonial administrators. The Agrarian Law of 1870 
had transformed the Javanese landscape into agricultural estates that dotted the terrain. 
To expand agricultural estates further, the government enacted laws to facilitate the 
renting of land under native usufruct rights with an amended version decreed in 1900. 
Alongside this ruling, the government issued a 177-page guidebook that explained the 
regulations in careful detail, complete with samples of contracts for easy reference in 
Dutch and Malay. The guidebook was an essential roadmap for any enterprising Dutch 
persons who aspired to establish an agricultural estate in the face of the agrarian legal 
maze.  
1 C. Th. van Deventer, a Dutch parliament member, wrote in De Gids in 1899 reminding the Dutch of 
their moral and financial obligations to the colony’s native population after reaping spectacular profit 
from the Cultivation System in Java. As a response, in her 1901 annual speech Queen Wilhelmina 
endorsed the Ethical Policy to improve the welfare of the natives. The policy comprised three areas of 
activity—immigration, irrigation, and education—to be implemented by the newly installed liberal 
cabinet of Abraham Kuyper (Fasseur 1992). 
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Carried by the optimistic spirit of the new century, in a remote area of East 
Java, a Dutchman began to prospect for land to start his agricultural estate. Bernard 
Ledeboer (b. 1875) came to the Indies as a young man to work in an agricultural 
venture made possible by the Agrarian Law of 1870. Having gained experience as an 
administrator of a rubber plantation in Banjoewangi, East Java, he was ready to build 
his own estate. By this time, most virgin lands under government control had thinned 
out, grabbed by early entrants to the area. His best chance was to rent land available 
under Native usufruct rights directly from the landholders. Armed with the guidebook 
and facilitated by the Banjoewangi controleur, he managed to secure 150 bouws 
(106.4 hectares) of land in 1912, which he planted with coffee. But owning and 
managing an agricultural estate in East Java was not easy. He had to fend off 
competitors who were lurking to take over his rent. Fueled by frustration with the 
allegedly incompetent officials, Ledeboer soon found himself in a passionate, one-
sided war of words with the authorities.  
Around the same time as Ledeboer’s search for land, the government carried 
out preparatory work to establish the first vocational school for native law clerks, the 
Training School for Native Jurists (Opleiding School Voor Indisch Recht, henceforth 
the Rechtsschool). In 1909 the Batavia Rechtsschool admitted its first pupils, sons of 
Native elites from all around Java, Madura, and the Outer Islands. The school 
administrators’ ambition was to train native law clerks who embodied “independence, 
impartiality and integrity,” law clerks who had the moral courage to stand up against 
powerful Native and European officials (Gedenkboek 1929).2 The curriculum included 
Malay, customary law, native forms of contract, and—significantly—laws regarding 
native land rights, apparently to guarantee continued familiarity with the legal milieu 
                                                 
2 I capitalize the word “Native” when it refers to a particular group, but use non-capitalized native when 
it refers to the population in general. At the end of the introduction, I provide a detailed note on this. 
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the pupils were prepared for. Many graduates continued their education in the 
Netherlands. Some became intellectual anchors for various movements in the colony, 
while others returned to work in the colonial judicial system. Among this latter group 
were a number of scholars who left an imprint on the colonial agrarian legal discourse.  
While people in the colony went about their daily lives, colonial agencies 
gained ground as authoritative institutions in managing people’s lives. They projected 
as concrete a colonial state that was the legitimate ruler in the Indies through various 
means: by building a network of railways, by consolidating the territory through postal 
services, or by establishing a colony-wide judicial system. In the agrarian arena, 
colonial state formation assumed various expressions, the legislation of legal codes to 
regulate land and property rights, implementation of agrarian reorganization in Java, 
and collection of native’s tenure regime information, among others. Eventually these 
ensembles of law and legal practices gained purchase as a superior means to resolve 
land conflicts to which the colonized population frequently resorted.  
The colonial agrarian laws and legal practices quickly entangled the lives and 
daily reality of peasants and aristocracies, agricultural estate managers and their 
laborers, Indo-Europeans, Dutch controleurs, Residents and Assistant Residents, 
bupati, wedono, students of law, and Native politicians and lawyers. These were 
individuals who made and remade aspects of the colonial agrarian regime through 
practical and discursive means. They demanded rights, fought depictions of rights 
sanctioned by law, attempted to change laws and legal codes, and challenged the 
premises that underlined certain legal arguments. Coming from extremely diverse 
backgrounds, playing different roles and exercising distinct expressions of agencies in 
their involvements, these individuals nevertheless shared the same stage in shaping the 
agrarian regime in small and large ways. They did not always succeed, but their 
ventures remained as imprints of social actors’ autonomy in the complex maze of legal 
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discourse. Even though each one of them was a subject constituted through relations 
of power, they were devoid of neither autonomy nor agency in the constitution of the 
agrarian regime.  
About the Dissertation 
In my research, I aim to interrogate colonial state formation using the lens of 
land appropriation legally sanctioned by colonial law in the Dutch East Indies between 
1870 and 1939. More specifically, drawing on historical sources and deploying 
qualitative methods, I dissect the constitution of the agrarian regime as a distinctive 
colonial project3 of state-making in which the whole spectrum of the colony’s 
population actively participated.  
The term colonial agrarian regime as used in this work refers to the complex 
ensemble of laws, legal practices, and specific enterprises such as agrarian 
reorganization that underpin the rearranging of social relations and property rights in 
the colony. For the Dutch, the end goal was to achieve two contradictory objectives: to 
provide land for commercial agriculture and to prevent the native population from 
losing their use rights.4 For the colonial subjects who intervened in this massive 
project, the end goal was less straightforward, and most likely clashed with that of the 
official line. 
My key objective in this research is to foreground the colonized subjects and 
the autonomy of their enunciations and strategies in the everyday making of “the 
                                                 
3 I borrow the term “colonial project,” a conceptual framework that reconciles the seemingly 
incompatible theoretical genealogy of discourse versus praxis, from Nicholas Thomas (1994). This 
reconciliation enables a “productive analytical tension,” resulting in a more creative reading situated 
between the abstract “regimes of truth” and the concrete, practical moments of reformulation and 
contestation in practice (Thomas 1994, 58). By paying close attention to the “colonial project,” Thomas 
diverts our focus to “a socially transformative endeavor that is localized, politicized and partial, yet also 
engendered by longer historical developments and ways of narrating them” (1994, 105). 
4 See Fasseur (1993) for a partial account of how these contradictory objectives—however absurd they 
sound as a pair—came to materialize.  
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state,” which I do by privileging micro-history. I argue that the constitution of the 
colonial agrarian regime involved not only lawmaking, but more importantly subject-
making. I also argue that it was human agents—subjects constituted through power 
relations—having myriad forms of association with state institutions who carried out 
these two practices, such that framing a boundary between “state” and “subjects” was 
no longer tenable. Colonial state formation, thus, is not a uniform process 
administered by a single entity, but a project in which the whole spectrum of colonial 
subjects and citizens took part.  
This dissertation is in conversation with and in contrast to a body of literature 
about colonial state formation that has revolved almost exclusively around macro-
processes, which tends to downplay interventions by colonial subjects.5 It focuses on 
individuals who had the capacity to engage the colonial legal discourse. In this 
dissertation, I address three central questions. First, to untangle how colonized 
subjects were constituted by power relations, I ask what the pedagogical strategy was 
in implementing colonial legal education and how it shaped the ways Native scholars 
made sense of the world. I answer the question by examining the development of legal 
education in the Dutch East Indies and the ways in which the philosophy underlining 
the pedagogical strategy shaped Native lawyers in particular ways.  
Second, I ask how colonial subjects, native and non-native, negotiated land 
laws in everyday forms of agency and what it meant to the notion of lawmaking in 
colonial conditions. This question is concerned less with lawmaking in the strict sense 
of the term than with how colonial subjects understood, interpreted, and then 
presented law back to society. 
                                                 
5 Counted in this literature are works by Berman and Lonsdale (1992), Young (1994), Day (2003), and 
Steinmetz (2008), among others. 
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Last, I ask about the ways in which the reciprocal formation of subject and law 
inextricably influenced the constitution of colonial agrarian regime. This question 
infuses five of the six chapters in the dissertation.  
This dissertation is built around a series of vignettes that explore specific 
events at various times, places, and scales. Each vignette aims to illuminate the 
complex interlacing between subjects and lawmaking in the constitution of the 
colonial agrarian regime; each vignette employs a specific theoretical approach 
inspired by the Foucauldian line of inquiry. In their entirety, they offer layered insights 
into colonial state formation that emerged via discursive and practical struggles over 
land rights. 
The dissertation is divided thematically into three parts, but chapters are laid 
out in chronological order to demonstrate the interconnection of events as they move 
forward in time. The first theme, explored in chapter 1 and chapter 3, is concerned 
with subject formation. Colonial subjects were products of power relations; they were 
shaped by particular discursive and sociocultural conditions at a given historical 
location such that their subjectivity, their being-and-knowing in the world, was 
bounded by the existing universe of reference. However, being embedded in and 
constituted by power relations does not negate their capacity for critical deliberation 
and intervention. The subjects manifested these capacities in acts of taking up existing 
relations of power and subjection in a transformative way.  
The next theme, dealt in chapter 2 and 5, probes lawmaking regarding land and 
property rights. Lawmaking in a colonial setting involved a more intricate process than 
the imposition of colonial masters: subjects and citizens engaged with law at various 
levels of contact, from directly challenging a rule and demanding execution of legal 
decisions, to questioning a particular reading of a legal code at a highly abstract level. 
Conceptualizing lawmaking as such pushes the probe beyond the subjects’ legal 
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consciousness into the actual act of taking ownership of and engaging with law in 
everyday life, both practically and discursively. In turn, this active process of taking 
ownership of law and practicing it shaped the colonial subjects.  
The last theme examines the reciprocal constitution of subjects and lawmaking 
in the evolution of the colonial agrarian regime, which I present in chapters 4 and 6. 
Colonial historiography tends to impose a rigid boundary between colonial subjects 
and colonial law, imposing the idea that the former were mainly a product of the latter 
through legally sanctioned bio-power. The core of my argument, this last thematic 
focus helps me to depart from the presumed unidirectional effects of colonial 
conditions.  
Through these six chapters, I demonstrate that the constitution of a colonial 
agrarian regime involved not only lawmaking, but—equally importantly—subject-
making. These two colonial practices were carried out by human agents having a 
variety of forms of association with state forms and institutions, such that assigning a 
boundary between “state” and “society” is no longer tenable.  
Theoretical Anchor 
I build my dissertation on the intersection of various themes of inquiry: state 
and state formation, coloniality and postcoloniality, law and colonialism, subjectivity 
and agency, and knowledge production. In building my analytical framework, I draw 
from the repository of many disciplines. Starting my journey from historical 
sociology, I benefit from explorations of the above themes in anthropology, history, 
colonial and postcolonial studies, and feminist and gender studies. With cues from 
these disciplines, I examine the densely intertwined processes of colonial state 
formation as materialized in the agrarian regime and the reciprocally formed subjects 
and law that bring it into practice. In so doing, I expand the analysis of colonial state 
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formation by privileging the vantage point of the Natives who were engaged in 
practices not as subalterns, but as members of the bureaucratic elite. By investigating 
their role in colonial state-making, my research illuminates the obscure space where 
state-making takes its concrete form through everyday practices exercised not only by 
Europeans, but, equally importantly, by Native intellectuals. This is by no means an 
attempt to downplay the role of non-Natives in colonial state-making. In fact, I pay 
close attention to the intricate web of relations among three groups in the Dutch East 
Indies—Europeans, Foreign Orientals,6 and Natives—and the oft-forgotten orphan of 
the colonial society, the Indo-Europeans.  
Studying the Elusive State 
As an object of study in social science, the state has made a steady comeback 
since the 1970s.7 During the same period, the rise of colonial discourse theory, 
pioneered by Edward Said, has brought forth thriving explorations of colonial and 
postcolonial predicaments.8 These parallel developments heightened interest in 
rethinking the colonial state using concepts borrowed from, but not limited to, the 
tropes of the two areas of study, bringing forth new and exciting explorations of 
colonial state formation.9 The rising influence of Michel Foucault that began in the 
                                                 
6 Foreign Orientals, from Dutch word Vreemde Oosterlingen, refers to Chinese, Arab and other Asian 
population in the Indies. 
7 Much has been explored on this topic. For a succinct narrative of the revival of the state as an object of 
study, see Aronowitz and Bratsis (2002) and Aretxaga (2003). On the gradual dismantling of state 
power and the remarkable resilience of state forms, see Harvey (2005) and Jessop (2002), and the 
transformed role and functions of state forms in Aretxaga (2003) and Kapferer (2005). 
8 Among the influential works on this topic are those by Cohn (1989), Young (1990), Thomas (1994), 
and Cooper and Stoler (1997). 
9 A pioneering work on the colonial state was offered by Cohn and Dirks (1988). For works in historical 
sociology, see Go (2008) and Steinmetz (2003, 2008). 
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1980s and intensified in the 1990s added a new strand to the study of the state.10 
Foucault conceives power as a web of relations with multiple forces, a conception that 
liberates analysis of power from a focus on a fixed, singular, concrete institution.11 
Foucault’s concept of “technologies of domination” and “technologies of the self,” 
respectively manifested through governmentality and bio-power, invigorated 
rethinking of the state as a “contradictory ensemble of practices and processes” 
(Mitchell 1991, 1999). By the last decade of the 20th century, the idea of dispersed 
power had permeated deep enough into scholarly debates that it became much harder 
to consider “the state” as a coherent and unitary concentration of power. 
Scholars who reject reified states as proposed by grand theories owe their 
theoretical scaffolding not only to Foucault but also to Philip Abrams, who traces his 
theoretical genealogy differently from Foucault. In his seminal paper, Abrams (1988) 
points out that the state is not a reality behind political practices; rather, the state is 
itself the mask that hides political practices as they actually are. In place of studying 
the elusive state, Abrams urges examination of the “state system,” the institutional 
structures and practices centered around government, which are interconnected in a 
complex web of networks and which compete against one another to dominate the 
exercise of power. The state system is complemented by the “state idea,” the ideology 
about the state, projected in order to lend legitimacy and an aura of unity to the said 
institutional structures. It is the “state system” and the “state idea” and the 
                                                 
10 For much of the 1970s and 1980s, study of the state was largely dominated by the perception that the 
state existed as a concrete entity capable of exerting forms of agency. For detailed discussions on the 
state as a capitalist instrument, see the famous debate between Poulantzas and Miliband, and added to 
by Laclau in the New Left Review between 1969 and 1977. For a classic neo-Weberian argument on the 
state as a strictly administrative and bureaucratic system the objective of which was to regulate 
relationships within civil society, see Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol (1985). 
11 Foucault never carried out a focused study of “the state,” and writes only one paper that directly 
touches the subject, titled “Governmentality.” To embark upon a Foucauldian study of state power, 
scholars draw from Foucault’s mélange of studies, with the most frequently cited being his explorations 
of the dyad of Power/Knowledge in The Archeology of Knowledge and bio-power in The History of 
Sexuality. 
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relationships that linked the two to other forms of power that should be the subject of 
investigation.  
Although seemingly coming from different traditions, Foucault’s and 
Abrams’s views of the state overlap on many fronts. Foucault’s oeuvre on 
governmentality and bio-power has continued to influence a wide array of scholars in 
thinking about the state, as exemplified in the works of Timothy Mitchell (1991, 
1999), Akhil Gupta (2001), and Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001), to name a few.  
Mitchell rejects the perception that the state is a coherent and distinct entity 
with clearly drawn boundaries vis-à-vis society. He argues that 
The state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial 
organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision 
and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally 
divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies 
formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but 
the producing and reproducing of this line of difference. (Mitchell 1991, 95; 
emphasis added) 
Thus, to Mitchell, in studying “the state” the gaze should be cast upon the construction 
and maintenance of ideology that sustains the distinction between the conceptual and 
the empirical. In asking how power is produced and in downplaying the concept of the 
state as an entity, Mitchell underlines Abrams’s and Foucault’s key message to pay 
close attention to practices and processes that shape both the appearances of “the 
state” and the subjectivities of the subject, which create the illusory boundary between 
state and society, an illusion that Mitchell coins “state effects.”12  
If frameworks inspired by grand theories and the Foucauldian lines of inquiry 
are too distinct for reconciliation, they are not necessarily incompatible: the tension 
                                                 
12 For an expanded theorization on state effects, see Trouillot (2001). He identified four effects that 
create the illusory presence of “a state,” effects that are not caused by any fixed institutions: isolation or 
individualizing effects, identification or totalizing effects, legibility effects, and spatialisation effects 
(2001, 126).  
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between them allows a broader perspective in grappling with ambiguities of the state. 
This in-between-ness in the theoretical realm allows the paradoxes constitutive of the 
state in the postcolonial world to become discernible. Hansen and Stepputat deftly 
amalgamate the variety of approaches when they encourage studying,  
 . . . the state, or discourses of the state, from “the field” [cf Thomas 1994] in 
the sense of localized ethnographic sites [cf Thomas 1994], whether “inside” 
or “outside” of the evanescent boundary between society and the state [cf 
Mitchell 1991, 1999] that usually crumbles when subjected to empirical 
scrutiny [cf Abrams 1988 (1977)].” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 5; quotation 
marks and information in brackets added) 
As an analytical tool for their tenet, Hansen and Stepputat propose analyzing 
the “language of stateness,” understood as various practical and symbolic techniques 
of governance and authority deployed to project the state as the ultimate arbiter of 
justice. Through symbols, texts, iconography, and significations, “the state” 
materializes itself as concrete and tangible. One expression the language of stateness is 
symbolic, expressed among other ways in the institutionalization of law and legal 
discourse. This is a strategic means to assert the presence of the illusory state, because 
law and legal discourse render the state as having a discursive presence and as the 
ultimate arbiter of justice.  
Theorizing Colonial State  
While literature about the state continues to flourish, the colonial state as a 
conceptual category remains under-theorized. Several studies have attempted to 
expand an understanding of the colonial state (Steinmetz 2008; Day 2003; Young 
1994; Berman and Lonsdale 1992), but remain in transporting conditions particular for 
the metropole into the colony and extrapolate theorizing colonial state from those 
conditions. State theories emerging from the metropole are a poor lens for theorizing 
the colony because conditions that constitute the bases for theorizing in the former 
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were often absent in the latter: sovereignty, nation, and presence in the international 
arena as an actor, to mention a few (Young 1994).13 Most particularly, the assumed 
attempt of the state forms to create an appearance of equality and to conjure the 
appearance of the hyphenated “nation-state” is not applicable in the colony. As civil 
society blossomed in Europe and the population struggled for citizenship, the 
colonized population remained as subjects; the colonial state is a state without a 
nation, and this is the fundamental difference between metropolitan and colonial 
governance. If metropolitan governance is driven by the “ideological work of 
manufacturing sameness” and encouraging a sense of horizontal identity, colonial 
governance, in contrast, was concerned “with the production of difference,” which led 
to the contradictory project of “doubling” (Comaroff 1998, 329). On the one hand, 
colonial state forms were occupied with producing “civilized” subjects who could 
assume a role in capitalist relations of production. They introduced and administered 
proprietary rights to land, mobilized laborers for factories and plantations, and 
maintained some form of legal supremacy. On the other hand, colonial state forms 
were also engrossed in upholding racial inequality, translated for example in the 
constitution of a racially based agrarian regime.  
The absence of nation in a colonial state, however, does not address the 
question of what is “the colonial state,” how it works, and whether it deserves the 
definite article. We can, however, start from the fact that colonial state defies 
essentializing. Practices across colonial societies demonstrate considerable possible 
permutations with concrete political, material, and cultural forms constantly made and 
remade along a historical timeline. A colonial state is many things at once,  
                                                 
13 Despite a promising beginning, Young’s attempt eventually wobbles. His focus on the comparative 
perspective seemed to have diverted his focus away from formulating a succinct theorization.  
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less [a] singular definite article than an indefinite, variably integrated ensemble 
of sites, institutions, narratives, and material processes, it was the political 
frame (i) in which power, qua human agency, sought to authorize itself, against 
resistance sometimes, thus to speak and act for a politic community, for its past 
and its future; (ii) in which executive and bureaucratic cadres ruled with 
differing degrees of autonomy, entering into common cause at times with 
various social fractions, usually defined by (if not named in the language) 
class, race, and/or gender; (iii) in which taken-for-granted cultural conventions, 
their coercive aspect camouflaged in the habits of everyday life, were posited 
as a precondition of collective being-in-the-world” (Comaroff 1998, 341; 
emphasis added).  
Comaroff argues for the necessity of understanding the colonial state as an 
ideological project. In agreement with Corrigan and Sayer (1985)14 and anticipating 
Hansen and Stepputat (2001), Comaroff posits that, using the language of the law, the 
colonial state “gives voice to an authoritative worldview” (1998, 342). Cultural 
revolution in colonial states took place via the widespread institution of the language 
of law and legal provisions. And it was the hegemonic ascent of this language of the 
law that projected the coherence of colonial states; it lends colonial state legitimacy 
and justifies its presence as the source of social order and stability.  
The role of law in colonial state notwithstanding, questions remain open about 
how colonial state forged its endurance despite the dissociation between “the state” 
and “the nation”; about the particularities of colonial state formation; and whether 
there were substantial differences between state formation in the Metropole and in the 
colony. Comaroff is surprisingly silent on these questions except for a line 
acknowledging Corrigan and Sayer’s contention that modern state formation is a 
“cultural revolution.” In a similar disposition, numerous studies of colonial state 
formation in the Dutch East Indies and its immediate surroundings take the term for 
                                                 
14 Compare Comaroff with Corrigan and Sayer (1985), who concluded that state formation is cultural 
revolution, a deep, profound shift in the ways in which people altered their assigned meanings to events 
into ones that are more amenable to “cultural forms . . . of particular centrality to bourgeois civilization” 
(1985, 3). 
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granted (Zanden 2010; Ravesteijn 2004, 2007; Tagliacozzo 2005, 2000; a Campo 
2002).15 Others who attempted to theorize colonial state formation only manage to 
offer a tentative construction. Berman and Lonsdale (1992), of Marxist tradition, for 
example, define colonial state formation as a “largely unconscious and contradictory 
process of conflicts, negotiations, and compromises [which] constitute the 
‘vulgarization’ of power” (5).16 What they mean by “vulgarization of power” remains 
vague. Young (1994) begins promisingly but falters in theorizing colonial state 
formation as he becomes occupied with expansive comparisons of African colonial 
states’ experiences. Day (2003) undertakes an adventurous exploration of state 
formation in precolonial Southeast Asia and focuses less on the colonial period and its 
impacts. 
Here, I tentatively propose a sketch on colonial state formation. I begin from 
Corrigan and Sayer’s classic argument that state formation is essentially a process of 
cultural revolution, understood as a deep, profound shift in the ways in which people 
assign meanings to events (1985). From here, I follow Comaroff’s suggestion that 
colonial state formation was concerned with the production of “difference,” that is, 
turning subjects into modern citizens while at once constructing and maintaining racial 
difference (1998). I thus propose that the process producing difference in the colony 
was shaped by newly introduced cultural practices that defined, determined, and 
regulated what was considered normal. They rendered natural social forms that were 
in fact derived from particular ontological and epistemological premises. As a result, 
                                                 
15 This literature is from the discipline of history and science and technology studies (STS). Sociology, 
anthropology, and political studies on state formation focus mainly on modern and postcolonial states. 
Literature dealing with colonial states tends to be in discipline less inclined to deal with theorization 
(Sewell 2005). The articles quoted above take state formation as a presumably understood concept, that 
is, as a process of colonial state having a more increased presence and unifying the colonial territory. 
Further, they tend to be silent on the agency of the colonized subjects. 
16 This definition is markedly different from colonial state building, defined as the “conscious effort [by 
planners and state-builders] at creating an apparatus of control” (5). 
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these new cultural practices constituted the subjects’ very subjectivity in ways that 
would presumably be useful to the colonizers’ need to consolidate power, exploit 
resources, and legitimize their rule.17 What’s missing from this tentative sketch, as is 
the case with the literature cited above, is a space for the agency of the colonized and 
other population groups in colonial society.  
I refrain from fully theorizing colonial state formation at this stage and will 
revisit the topic in the conclusion after I lay out the cases and experiences of the Dutch 
East Indies through the constitution of the colonial agrarian regime. For now, we shall 
focus our attention on what Comaroff coins “the vernacular language” of the colonial 
state forms: the law.  
Law and Colonialism  
Scholars have generally agreed that law and legal discourse lie at the heart of 
the colonial project of domination (Cohn 1989; Moore 1986; Channock 1985). In its 
early development, the study of law and colonialism took as its primary concern the 
importance of legalities in European conquest over Europe’s various “others” (Cohn 
1989; Channock 1985). As the discipline evolved, scholars began to train their gaze on 
a more complex form of engagement between subordinated people and colonial law 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Starr and Collier 1989). Recent inquiries have moved 
beyond the linear assumption that colonial law was imposed on the subjects with 
straightforward effects (Lazarus-Black 2008; Merry 2000; Hirsch 1998; Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1997; Mamdani 1996; Merry 1994a, 1994b; Comaroff 1994; Lazarus-Black 
and Hirsch 1994) and investigate how the newly introduced legal regimes were 
responded to through processes of accommodation and appropriation in various 
                                                 
17 In the Netherlands East Indies, for example, the first education institutions founded for the natives 
were medical, technical, and legal schools designed to supply workers with rudimentary knowledge to 
serve the native population who, in turn, labored at recently established plantations. 
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colonial societies: British India (Benton 1999), British Borneo (Doolittle 2001), 
Hawaii (Banner 2005), and South Africa (Karekwaivanane 2011), among others. 
Subjected people such as those in colonial conditions actively engaged with law, even 
though asymmetrical power relations limited their maneuvers. The engagement with 
law, thus, summons a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between the colonized 
and colonial law, where law took a role as a “common discursive framework” 
(Roseberry 1994). Colonial law eventually became the shared episteme, the universe 
of reference, for the colony’s population, through which all parties struggled to further 
their interests. This was what took place in the arena of the colonial agrarian regime in 
the Netherlands East Indies. 
Colonial Legal Provisions on Land 
Colonial authorities introduced agrarian regimes not only through legal 
provisions regarding land rights but also through regulations regarding the body. Laws 
on land were introduced for myriad reasons, not least as a means to legitimize the 
colonizers’ presence and their appropriation of resources. It was through law that 
landscape was transformed into territory and real estate. Legal provisions re-
categorized land previously managed under native regimes of property ownership into 
plots prime for agricultural estates and other forms of exploitation.  
Colonial law also extended its reach to the body (Stoler 2002). New categories 
of persons based on racial delineation defined entitlement and deprivation such that it 
forged new relationships between subjects and land, and altered colonial societies’ 
way of seeing and being in the world. In other words, colonial law introduced a 
reordering of relations between race and property ownership.  
On the flipside of the coin, newly introduced proprietary rights and the 
“sanctity of ownership” made it possible for the subordinated population to envision a 
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long-term relationship between man and land, even though they were the last to 
benefit from it. Yet, the provisions of law which facilitated conquest and control at 
once offered the colonized the possibility of resisting land appropriation based on 
law’s emphasis on rights, and of challenging colonial and village authorities (Merry 
2004).  
Law in colonial societies cemented the presence of “the state.” As diverse 
parties in the colonial society invoked legal provisions and used them as a means to 
advance their interests, the image of law as an extension of “the state” became 
reinforced, if only indirectly, and state authority appeared very visible, real, and 
concrete. Through both straightforward interactions and conflicts over cultural, racial, 
and ethnic boundaries, “the ‘rules about rule’ that had always formed the subtext of 
the colonial legal order were simultaneously challenged and reified as part of a state-
centered institutional structure” (Benton 1999, 587). As a consequence, a network of 
state forms and institutions and their practices emerged as a concrete “colonial state” 
with ultimate authority to arbitrate justice and political identity. Yet, far from stable, 
the “colonial state” remained challenged and contested, most ironically in the colonial 
courts themselves. Indeed, the process and dynamics of invoking colonial law at once 
confirmed and questioned the law as a legitimating narrative of the colonial powers. It 
is under this theoretical construct that I situate my inquiry of the constitution of an 
agrarian regime in the late-colonial Dutch East Indies.  
Moving more specifically into research on law and land rights in late colonial 
Indonesia, a quick survey brings into focus interesting facts: First, the study of law and 
land rights in late-colonial Indonesia lags behind research on the same topic in 
postcolonial Indonesia. Most studies—excepting those produced during the colonial 
period itself—were carried out in the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, available 
literature has mainly focused on a limited, albeit interconnected, number of issues: 
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Adat law and land rights (Burns 2004, 1989; Benda-Beckman 1979), cultivation 
systems (Clarence Smith 1994; Elson 1994; Fasseur 1992; Boomgaard 1989; Niel 
1964) the village (Breman 1983, 1980; Kano 1970) or plantations and peasant struggle 
(Stoler 1985, 1988). An attempt to analyze the constitution of adat law in the former 
Dutch East Indies (Burns 2004) falls silent on the agency of the Native intellectuals. 
Ben White’s (2005) treatment of a booklet by S. Dingley (a pseudonym of Iwa 
Kusuma Sumantri) about the agrarian struggle in the colony is perhaps an exception, 
although his argument that Dingley’s was the only worthwhile venture of such can 
easily be contested.18 
One can also detect similar silence on the role of Native intellectuals in the 
construction of adat law, the topic of law and colonialism in Indonesia in the recent 
waves of literature on the history of adat, adat law, and adat land rights (Davidson and 
Henley 2007; Burns 2004; Zerner 2003; Li 2001, 2000).19 The case of Supomo is 
illustrative: Well studied for his role in drafting the Indonesian constitution of 1945 
and in legal developments in Indonesia (Bourchier 1999; Drooglever 1997; 
Simanjuntak 1994; Lev 1985, 1965), Supomo leaves an intellectual legacy on adat 
land rights that remains largely unexplored.20 Earlier dismissal of his position on and 
                                                 
18 At least two Indonesians wrote PhD dissertations at Leiden touching upon the subject of law and land 
rights, namely Soepomo and Gondokoesomo. Perhaps White uses a much narrower definition of 
“agrarian studies.”  
19 Resink (1974) writes about personal relations between the professors at the Bataviasche 
Rechtshoogechool—who belonged to the progressive group “De Stuw”—and their Indonesian students. 
In this article, Resink speculates on the influence of “De Stuw” professors over their students. However, 
there is no account of how the students might have influenced their professors in return. This implies an 
assumption that influence is only unidirectional: it flows from European scholars to the native 
intellectuals and not vice versa.  
20 White’s (2005) essay on the history of agrarian studies in Indonesia laments the lack of interest in 
agrarian issues among Indonesian intellectuals in the colonial period. He nominates only two works 
worth discussing: one by S. Dingley (pseudonym of Iwa Kusumasumantri) written on commission in 
1923 by the Soviet government, and another by Sukarno on Marhaenism. There is no mention of 
Supomo’s dissertation (1927), which critically addresses agrarian reorganization in Surakarta, or 
Gondokusumo’s dissertation (1922, praised by van Vollenhoven as original), on the de jure legislation 
of village autonomy that was not followed by actual empowerment.  
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role in the constitution of adat law as a discipline may have dampened interest in 
pursuing his (possibly) wider contribution to colonial knowledge production. He has 
been charged with being a “conservative . . . [with views] . . . rooted deeply in colonial 
Indonesian side establishment” (Lev 1985: 26), a “turncoat” (Lev 1985), and 
“Hegelian” (Simanjutak 1994), and with being “inspired by fascist ideas” (Bourchier 
1999; Simanjuntak 1994). Upon the last label, Drooglever (1997) casts a skeptical 
observation—which I share—noting that Supomo’s other works on indigenous land 
tenure contradict this characterization.  
Engagement between a subordinated population and colonial law took many 
forms, not the least of which was the production of law and legal knowledge. 
Although colonial law had its roots in European legal tradition, it was never isolated 
from open contestations. In the Indies, the law was continuously shaped and reshaped 
by various social actors in the colony, by Natives, Foreign Orientals, and even 
Eurasians, who frequently found themselves marginalized from both European and 
Native society. Various media took the role as a platform for knowledge-making in 
law and lawmaking: Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht, Koloniaal tijdschrift, Malay-
Chinese newspapers, internal bulletins of civic organizations, and many others. There 
was enthusiasm and excitement in voicing one’s point of view regarding land rights, 
and it included members of a women’s association on the West Coat of Sumatra, who 
voiced their disapproval of the plan to grant Indo-Europeans a form of rights to land. 
In this light, the “success” or “failure” of remaking law and legal knowledge are less 
compelling than exploring the imprints colonial subjects left on the sedimented legal 
discourse.  
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Subjectivity and Agency  
The recognition of law as the vernacular of the colonial state signals an 
acknowledgement of colonial subjects’ capacity to intervene in colonial discourse. 
Studies have demonstrated how the colonized engaged with colonial discourse and 
intervened in the proceedings of legal discourse of property (Merry 2000, 2003; 
Benton 1999, 2002), and this was not limited to the elite, educated colonized (Djalins 
2007; White 2005) but also included peasants (Doolittle 2005) and pastoralists 
(Cederlof 2005, 2006). However, the process of how subjectivity of the colonized was 
constituted, subjectivity here understood as the capacity to deliberate and to reflect 
critically that undergirds the capacity to exert intervention, is still in need of 
theorization.  
Frantz Fanon—and to some extent Aimee Cesaire—has largely been referred 
to as an important theorist of the colonized subject. However, I find questionable the 
extrapolation of his experience as the global experience of other colonized subjects. 
Fanon’s treatise on colonial subjectivity is heavily tinged with spatial and temporal 
contexts: his being a Martiniquan-French transplant in Algeria, his being black, his era 
of struggle in the second half of the 20th century, among others, all defined his 
experience of colonialism that does not quite work when transported to other colonial 
settings such as the early-20th-century Dutch East Indies. Cesaire’s situatedness is not 
that much different. Fanon should not be read as a global icon, but should be 
understood as a product of “his own historical particularity” (Gates 1991, 470).  
The lack of fit illustrated above means that analysis of colonized subjects 
needs to come from a more deductive base, that is, by taking into account how the self 
emerges. And for this, I rely on Foucault. Foucault’s subject is constituted in and 
through his or her historical, cultural, and social particularity, forces that can be 
analyzed empirically by dissecting power/knowledge regimes (Foucault 1982a). But 
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Foucault’s conception of the immersion of the subject in power relations has been 
misunderstood as proclaiming the death of the subject (Benhabib et al 1995). A 
scholar adopting the Foucauldian notion of the subject is often taken for as agreeing to 
relinquish the subjects’ autonomy.  
A careful heeding of Foucault’s statement that his project is about the subject 
and not about power, and an even more careful reading of his project as a conversation 
with Kant instead of anti-Kantian, reveals that what Foucault meant as the “death of 
man” is actually a rejection of the Kantian transcendental subject (Allen 2008, 36). To 
Foucault, the subject is thoroughly immersed in a shared universe of reference, 
established by and through power relations, which defines the being-and-knowing 
capacity of the subject (Foucault 1980, 1982a). But this is no denial of the subject’s 
autonomy, which Foucault conceives as a dual capacity: the capacity for critical 
reflection and for deliberate self-transformation, capacities that are always embedded 
in a network of power. 
Foucault understood power as a strategic relation, that is, as strategies by 
which “individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others” (Foucault in Allen 
2008, 50), implemented through technologies of domination (as manifested in 
disciplinary power) and technologies of the self (as expressed in ethical 
subjectivation). Further, power is neither centered in an entity of the sovereign or the 
state nor do individuals control it; power is spread throughout the social body, all the 
way to the extremities, where it becomes “capillary.” If disciplinary power and ethical 
subjectivation are so inherent in the shaping of subjectivity, then how does a subject 
resist power when his or her very constitution depends on the very power itself? The 
way out, in this particular construction of subjectivity, is that resistance “has to take 
the form of taking up existing relations of power and subjection in a transformative 
way” (Allen 2008, 63). Autonomy manifested in questioning and challenging the 
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universe of reference presented to us as the only possibility of thinking-knowing-and-
being, thus making possible subversive transformation of those limits that, in reality, 
are contingent. The glaring flaw in this construction of the Foucauldian subject, 
according to Allen, lies in Foucault’s impoverished reading of social interaction. 
Foucault acknowledged relations only as strategic, thus missing the possibility of 
social relations that are nurturing, reciprocal, and based on mutual recognition. 
Turning to a Habermasian intersubjective account of subjectivity and autonomy can 
complement this limitation.  
It is beyond the scope of this section to dig deeper than the sketch offered 
above. Suffice it to say that I agree with Allen that taking a position on subject as 
constituted by relations of power and subjection does not deny us subjectivity, agency, 
or autonomy. With regard to colonial conditions, it acknowledges that for colonial 
subjects, there is “no outside to power,” that their capacity for practical reason and for 
autonomy were inescapably shaped by their historical and spatial situatedness, which 
was at once entrenched in power relations. It means that the colonizer, the colonized, 
and those equated with them were capable of critique, that their critique was not futile, 
and that their autonomy was not impossible. 
Training the Gaze in Two Regions of Java  
Of the entire East Indies that it ruled after the British interregnum, the Dutch 
maintained its longest continuous presence in Java. The uninterrupted presence 
resulted in a deep penetration of Java in terms of governance and legal administration. 
As soon as the Dutch took over Java from the British, they implemented a dual system 
of governance consisting of the Dutch-staffed Binnenlands Bestuur, the powerful and 
influential Department of the Interior, and the Native-run pangreh praja (Sutherland 
1979, Fasseur 1993). The administration of justice took longer to implement, but by 
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the early 1900s a relatively developed plural judicial system was in place (Lev 1985). 
Three courts existed for the Javanese in the directly ruled areas: the district courts for 
minor cases, the regency courts for more important cases, and the Landraad, situated 
in each regency, which tried criminal and civil cases for the Natives and those 
assimilated to the Native legal status. Appeals were addressed to the Raad van Justitie, 
the appellate court for both Dutch and Native subjects, located in six major cities. The 
final appeals went to the Supreme Court, the Hooggerechsthof. 
Thoroughly under Dutch control, Java became a virtual laboratory for testing 
laws and legal codes regarding land rights before they were decreed for the Outer 
Islands. Java (and Madoera), for example, was the first to be enclosed under the state 
territorial domain in 1870, while other regions followed suit a couple of years after.21 
Sediments of regulations, early institutionalization of the administration of justice, and 
deep governance penetration made Java a particularly attractive case to interrogate 
lawmaking on land rights.  
The Principalities in Central Java and the Banjoewangi division in the 
Residency of Besoeki, East Java, were two of the numerous regions with a large 
presence of Dutch agricultural estates. Both hosted immensely successful sugar and 
tobacco plantations, but the similarities ended there. Historically, geographically, and 
socio-culturally, the two regions were quite distinct.  
Surakarta and Yogyakarta Principalities descended from the Sultanate of 
Mataram. After the death of Sultan Agung, the last king of unified Mataram, decades 
of bloody conflicts and rebellions plagued the central Javanese landscape. They lasted 
for more than fifty years, until the Javanese princes invited the Dutch East Indies 
                                                 
21 The government decreed domain declaration for the Outer Islands in 1875. Three special domain 
declarations were also issued for the government’s areas in Sumatra in 1874, Manado in 1877, and the 
South and East division of Borneo in 1888. Domain declaration was not valid in areas where self-
governed area existed, such as regions under the jurisdiction of the Principalities in Central Java and of 
the Sultanate of Riau in East Sumatra (Regeerings Almanak 1938).  
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prevented them from intensively exploiting the landscape. The altitude, however, was 
ideal for highlands crops like tea, coffee, and rubber, and the relative abundance of 
virgin lands meant that the peasants could still reclaim land, while the local customary 
law acknowledged their individual rights (Vollenhoven 1931, 625–626). It also meant 
that after the Agrarian Law of 1870 was implemented, these lands came under the 
Government jurisdiction as free state land leasable to investors. By the early 1900s, 
Besoeki had four divisions (afdeeling): Bondowoso, Sitoebondo, Djember and 
Banjoewangi (see Map 2). 
Large agricultural enterprises began their long history in the Principalities 
quite early, thanks to the then Resident who pioneered large-scale land leases between 
several Indo-European families and the patuh in 1820 (Bosma 2007).23 Sugar 
contracts from the Dutch trading company NHM (Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij) brought immense wealth to these families, who maintained a lavish 
lifestyle not unlike the Javanese kings and princes with whom they kept intimate 
relations.24 The business grew so fast that by the early 1880s they produced seventeen 
percent of the Javanese supply of sugar from twenty-seven factories. Coffee, tobacco 
and, decreasingly, indigo were also widely planted. In contrast, in Besoeki few estates 
existed in the 1850s. In the Djember division, some Dutch entrepreneurs began 
planting sugarcane only in the mid-19th century, renting land from the Native peasants 
in a rolling system. Sugarcane planting practices in Djember frequently imposed 
delays on the natives’ paddy planting season that resulted in failed harvests and caused 
                                                 
23 Bosma and Raben (2008) examined the role of Indo-European families in the Principalities in 
maintaining large agricultural enterprises. These families descended from around 113 European men 
who had settled in the Principalities beginning in the early 19th century. Many had children with local 
women, and their descendants made up the influential estate families who intermarried, ensuring tight 
control over the extended family fortunes. 
24 One patriarch, Johannes Augustines Dezentjé, was married to a close family member of the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta (Bosma 2007).  
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deep resentment among the native population. Cane burning was frequent. In the 
Bondowoso division, Dutch planters began cultivating tobacco also in the 1850s. They 
expanded to the southern slope in 1859 (Padmo 1994).  
Despite these pioneering cultivations, agricultural enterprises boomed in the 
region only after the government enacted the Agrarian Law of 1870. Virgin lands on 
the southern slope of the mountains were auctioned off for seventy-five-year leases, 
and by the turn of the century the supply had dried up (Schagen van Soelen 1918). Of 
the ten rubber and coffee estates in Banjoewangi in 1910, nine had leases beginning 
between 1875 and 1898, and only one in 1900 (Swart 1911). Latecomers who tried to 
acquire land after 1900 were out of luck (Schagen van Soelen 1918). Some had to 
resort to short-term rent of land under Native usufruct rights for up to twenty years. 
These lands were by no means insignificant, but the complexity of getting contracts 
from each individual owner, exacerbated by the legal maze one had to navigate, was 
enough to deter less adventurous investors.25  
In terms of population, the Principalities were one of the densest regions in 
Java. In 1917 they were home to 3,450,000 residents: 2,070,000 in Surakarta and 
1,380,000 in Yogyakarta. The population consisted of Javanese—all of whom were 
the legal subjects of the Principalities—as well as Chinese, Arabs, and Europeans, 
including Indo-Europeans. Surakarta had around 4,000 Europeans, and 14,000 
Chinese, Arabs, and other foreign orientals (Encyclopaedie van het Nederlands Indie 
1921). These latter groups were the legal subjects of the Dutch government. In 
contrast, the Besoeki residency was much sparser than the Principalities. In 1905, total 
residents amounted to 966,472 souls, consisting mainly of Madoerese and East 
                                                 
25 Land on short-term rent was usually planted with annual crops like tobacco or sugarcane. The 
Besoeki Plantations Limited controlled Native land under these lease terms. They planted the land with 
tobacco, and apparently allowed the natives to plant paddy in between crops. They also owned a rice 
mill in Djember, established to purchase and husk the paddy produced by the natives (Swart 1911, 49-
50).  
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Javanese; around 4,000 Chinese and Arabs; and around 3,000 Europeans (Tennekes 
1930, 335). By the 1920s, however, the number had jumped to almost 1.5 million 
people. The Banjoewangi division had 84,398 in 1895, which grew to a whopping 
269,599 in the 1920s (Tennekes 1930, 335). The structure of native society in the 
Besoeki residency was relatively simple: On top of the pyramid were the wedono and 
assistant wedono, native officials who were appointed and salaried by the Dutch to 
assist the controleur, the lowest bureaucrat in the Dutch service. Next were the village 
headman and his staff, the village scribe (carik), village messenger (kabayan), and 
village imam (modin). At the bottom of the pyramid were the common folk (Padmo 
1994).  
Agricultural-related industry in the Principalities and Besoeki mainly 
concentrated on sugar refineries and low-technology but labor-intensive tobacco 
factories. In Banjoewangi, the most advanced industry was rice-milling, owned and 
operated by the Arabs, Chinese, and to some limited extent, Europeans. The Resident 
complained that rice-milling factories impoverished the local population: rice-mill 
owners bought paddies well before harvesting season at very low prices and then sold 
husked rice back to the peasants at inflated prices (Schagen van Soelen 1918).  
During the years in which agricultural estates began to reap the fruit of their 
investments through a phenomenal spike in exports (Lindblad 1994, Lindbad et al 
2002), nationalist awakening simmered in Java. Surakarta was the birth place of 
Sarekat Islam (SI), an organization founded in February 1912 by batik traders and 
manufacturers. Initially set up to provide security and protection against skirmishes 
with Chinese batik traders, SI quickly transformed into a modern organization of 
Muslim traders (Kahin 1952). Tensions and conflicts frequently flared between SI 
members and Chinese thugs. In the rural areas, emboldened peasant members refused 
to do corvee and carried out strikes on sugar plantations. Nervous about the SI’s 
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growing influence, the Resident of Surakarta refused to ratify SI’s statute, which 
ended up limiting SI’s maneuvers in Surakarta (Shiraishi 1990, 47). But it didn’t stop 
the organization’s expansion in the rest of Java, such as in Soerabaja and other towns 
in East Java.  
Soerabaja at the time was a bustling trading center that served the 
mushrooming agricultural estates in East Java. It was the largest city in the entire East 
Indies, even larger than Batavia, equipped with a major seaport to export agricultural 
commodities. European, Chinese, Arab, and Native traders rubbed shoulders in the 
downtown area, selling sugar factory machines and parts and buying commodities for 
exports. As was the nature of a cosmopolitan city, Soerabaja was susceptible to new 
ideas. When Sarekat Islam in Surakarta needed to bypass the Resident’s constraining 
imposition, the central committee looked to the head of the SI branch in East Java, 
H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, to register a new SI statute in Soerabaja. It was easily ratified 
in September 1912 and enabled branches outside Surakarta to continue their activities 
legally (Shiraishi 1990).  
H.O.S Tjokroaminoto, a graduate of the school for pangreh praja, (Opleiding 
School Voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, OSVIA), in Magelang, quit his government job 
and reinvented himself as a sugar factory engineer. He led SI from Soerabaja and 
assisted its transformation into a Java-wide organization. Branches continued to open 
in towns and cities across Java, including one in the Residency of Probolinggo in 
1913, which bordered with Besoeki. In 1915 the Probolinggo branch elected as 
president a 21-year old young man, R.P. Soeroso, a teaching-school dropout who 
worked as a journalist. We will hear more about Soeroso in chapter 5.  
A more radical movement than Sarekat Islam, Surakarta Insulinde also called 
Surakarta its birthplace. Revived from an inactive Insulinde branch in December 1918 
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by a circle of Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s friends,26 Surakarta Insulinde quickly 
attracted Haji Mohammad Misbach, a Muslim preacher turned Insulinde’s key 
propagandist. Misbach assisted Surakarta’s peasants in addressing their grievances 
against unjust Dutch plantation operators and native officials who became more 
involved with the peasants’ daily life after an important agrarian reorganization took 
place in the Kasunanan. After a strike in April 1919 Misbach was arrested by the 
government (Shiraishi 1990). This event launched Mangoenkoesoemo’s bitter protests 
against the government and the Surakarta Principality. An unprecedented open 
challenge to the monarch, Mangoenkosoemo’s crusade inspired many young Javanese 
with its elegant defiance.  
Even though Besoeki was quite a distance away from Soerabaja, it was not 
isolated from the rising nationalist sentiment that Sarekat Islam incited. Resident 
Schagen van Soelen warned Batavia in his 1918 Memorandum of Transfer of the 
danger that SI posed to the peasants in Besoeki. One way to curb SI influence, he 
suggested, was to contain the expansive planting of cash crops in the natives’ lands, 
and to curb the illegal land occupation that prevented them from cultivating the land. 
These policies would allow the peasants to provide themselves with enough food 
crops and hence neutralized potential radical influence (Schagen van Soelen 1918).  
                                                 
26 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was a decorated native doctor who co-founded Budi Utomo with Dr. 
Soetomo in 1908. By now, he was a member of Indies’ parliament Volksraad, and a seasoned 
nationalist, having been exiled between 1913 and 1914 to the Netherlands for his activities with 
Suwardi Suryaningrat and E.F.E Douwes Dekker. The Dutch selected him to be a member of the 
Volksraad in order to convince skeptics that the Volksraad was not populated by politically impotent 
native figures. See Shiraishi (1990) for a detailed study of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s and Surakarta’s 
Insulinde activities in the late teens to mid-1920s.  
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The Volksraad and Colonial Lawmaking27 
World War I brought a sweeping change to the colony. Although the 
Netherlands escaped unscathed, the war severely halted transportation and 
communication with the Indies, causing reduced intensity in monitoring and control. 
For a brief period, the Indies entered a state of semi-autonomy. The severed 
connection, intensified by the lurking Japanese military in the North, triggered an 
anxious conversation in the Indies about the need for autonomy.  
In the meantime, observing the increased nationalist sentiments among his 
subjects, the Governor General van Limburg Stirum proactively sought a means to 
neutralize the explosive trend. He lobbied for a representative body to the Minister of 
the Colonies, Idenburg, who persuaded the parliament to discuss the matter. After a 
long deliberation, the parliament finally passed a law in November 1916 creating an 
advisory body in the Indies, the Volksraad (the People’s Council), which held its 
opening session in May 21, 1918. The Indies population welcomed the Volksraad with 
some reservation: The Europeans, whose interest in colonial policy was sparked by the 
period of isolation, considered the Volksraad to be an avenue to participation in 
colonial affairs. The expanding nationalist organizations took the Volksraad as an 
opportunity to exert pressure, however limited, on the government. Several sent their 
representatives, such as Sarekat Islam (Agus Salim), Insulinde (Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesomo), and Boedi Oetomo (Radjiman Wedyodiningrat). The honeymoon 
did not last long. Sarekat Islam and Insulinde pulled out in 1920, while the more 
moderate Boedi Oetomo maintained their presence and gained the nickname of “ko” 
organization as a result of being cooperative with the government.  
                                                 
27 Materials for this section are taken from a combination of sources: Helsdingen (1928, 1938), 
Furnivall (1944), and the Indonesian Department of Education and Culture research paper led by Drs. 
Ibrahim Ambong, MA (1985).  
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The Volksraad’s initial authority was limited to advising the Governor 
General, who was obliged to seek advice only on matters regarding the state budget 
and the state’s need for loans. The new 1925 Indies Constitution (Indische 
Staatsregeling) expanded the Volksraad’s authority to include an extended budgetary 
role and the rights to advise, to public deliberation, to freely express opinions, and to 
petition, and of interpellation, initiative, and amendment. Despite the acknowledged 
legislative rights, because the Volksraad was heavily populated with individuals 
having a close connection to the government, it was very difficult for independent 
members to sway the Volksraad to introduce more substantial changes to 
governance.28 Meanwhile, radicalism was on the rise. Led by the conservative 
Governor General Dick Fock, the government hardened against Indonesian nationalist 
movements after the disastrous Communist Party rebellion in 1926.29 Crackdowns 
were widespread. Many non-ko leaders were rounded up and exiled to remote corners 
of the Indies; surveillance and monitoring were increased; and permits for public 
events were severely restricted. The extremely limited room to maneuver made 
nationalist leaders appreciate more the strategic value of maintaining a presence in the 
Volksraad. The sentiment resulted in a slight ascendance of its prestige by the turn of 
the decade.  
                                                 
28 In the sixty-member Volksraad post 1927, eleven of nineteen elected Indonesian members were 
active or retired-and-pensioned government officials. Throughout the Volksraad’s existence, seventy 
percent of the members had worked at a government institution, two thirds of them with the 
Binnenlands Bestuur and the remaining one third with the Inlands Bestuur (Native bureaucracy). A 
smaller proportion hailed from political parties or had independent occupations. This proportion 
changed little over the years. 
29 This rebellion led to a crackdown on an Indonesian student organization in the Netherlands, 
Perhimpoenan Indonesia, in 1927. Student leaders such as Ali Sastroamidjojo, Nazir Pamoentjak, and 
Achmad Soebardjo were detained and tried, but were finally acquitted of all charges.  
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Table 1. Composition of the Volksraad Members Based on Political Orientation 
Years  Right  Center Right  Center Left  Left  Total 
1918–1921  8 (21%)  12 (31%)  10 (26%)  8 (21%)  38 
1921–1924  2 (4%)  27 (56%)  14 (29%)  5 (10%)  48 
1924–1927  5 (10%)  28 (58%)  10 (21%)  5 (10%)  48 
1927–1931  6 (12.5%)  36 (75%)  9 (19%)  9 (19%)  48 
1931–1935  10 (17%)  24 (40%)  14 (23%)  12 (20%)  60 
1935–1939  10 (17%)  27 (45%)  13 (22%)  10 (17%)  60 
Source: Helsdingen 1938. 
Prior to the expanded authority of the Volksraad introduced in 1925, 
lawmaking in the Dutch Indies took place mostly in the Netherlands. The introduction 
of the Fundamental Law in 1848 transformed the Netherlands into a parliamentary 
democracy. The new system of governance had an impact on the colony with the 
introduction of Constitutional Regulation (Regeeringsreglement) in 1854, a landmark 
for the Netherlands Indies because it recognized the supremacy of law (Furnivall 
1944). Detailed rules and legal codes for the Constitutional Regulation of 1854 were 
laid out in what the Dutch called “General Regulations” (Algemeene Verordeningen), 
and herein lies the conventional lawmaking. General Regulations could manifest in the 
form of laws, legal enactments by the Dutch Parliament, royal decrees, acts of the 
Crown, ordinances, or acts of the Governor General with or without the Council of 
Indies (Furnivall 1944). Only after the 1925 constitutional reform in the Indies could 
the Volksraad have a say in lawmaking. It was allowed to issue lower-level ordinances 
with the Governor General, particularly for laws not already in existence in the 
Constitutional Regulation or other bodies of law. Revisions to budgets and work to 
prepare proposed laws would be effected through a new organ, the College of 
Delegates (College van Gedeleergerden), consisting of 20 individuals, each voted in 
by three Volksraad members. The Volksraad was never a fully legislative body 
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because the Governor General and the department heads were never accountable to it. 
Nevertheless, it retained an undeniable role in increasing the awareness of the Indies 
population with respect to colonial politics and the dynamics of “statehood.”30  
Outline of Dissertation 
My dissertation consists of six chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. The 
first two chapters lay out for the remaining four my foundational argument that posits 
subject-formation and lawmaking as two essential pillars, equally important to the 
constitution of the colonial agrarian regime. Chapter 1 lays out the mechanics of legal 
education for the children of the Native elites as a part of colonial subject formation. 
The chapter covers the period from 1909, when the vocational school for native legal 
clerks was founded in Batavia, through the late 1930s, when legal training in higher 
institutions took place at Leiden University and the Batavia College of Law, founded 
in 1924. Chapter 2 examines the colonial agrarian regime and the ways in which a vast 
array of colonial actors negotiated the laws and legal practices of everyday forms of 
agency. The chapter does so by zooming in on a conflict over land under the control of 
Wadoeng West Agricultural Estate in Banjoewangi Residency, East Java Province, a 
control made possible by the law. The dispute involved numerous social actors who 
took ownership of the law, executed creative maneuvers, and negotiated their way 
around the law, such that they practically “remade” it. In this reading, lawmaking was 
not solely the occupation of colonial officials; rather, lawmaking was a fragmented, 
dispersed, and unpredictable process, yet it offered forms of engagement to the 
colonized who quite confidently grabbed the opportunity.  
                                                 
30 Neratja, an Indonesian language newspaper published during this period, regularly featured debates 
in the Volksraad, usually taking the materials verbatim from the stenographic records.  
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While the first two chapters present subject-making and lawmaking almost as 
two separate events, the remaining four chapters observe how the two were 
reciprocally formed and how they in turn shaped the colonial Agrarian Regime. In my 
interrogation of the colonial Agrarian Regime as a manifestation of colonial state 
formation, I pay close attention to individuals who were associated with a variety of 
state systems and civil groups, individuals whose very subjectivity was formed by 
power relations entrenched in colonial conditions. Chapter 3 dissects a dissertation, an 
intellectual product of a Native subject, to offer a glimpse of the overlapping 
connection between a subject, his hybrid episteme, and his role in the production of 
colonial legal knowledge. It considers a colonized subject as constituted by power 
relations, but nevertheless possessing a capacity for critical deliberation. Chapter 4 
interrogates the projected boundary between “the colonial state” and Native subjects. 
It does so by examining the role of Native scholars cum colonial judges in creating 
legal knowledge in their own vision by extending particular forms of property 
relations while contesting others. It brings to the foreground the porosity of the so-
called boundary between colonial state-system and native subjects. Actively 
contributing to colonial state formation, Native scholars at once extended and 
contested the force of the colonial state-system. Chapter 5 focuses on the struggle for 
land rights waged by Indo-Europeans, who claimed they had an “inherent right” to 
land just like the Natives since they, too, were landskinderen (children of the land). 
The ensuing discursive battles with Indonesian leaders and intellectuals demonstrate 
contestations of practices that propagated isolation and identification effects, the 
effects through which the presence of the illusory state is both constituted and felt. By 
advocating for their own vision of identity and by challenging existing legal codes on 
identity and property, Indo-Europeans attempted to “make the law” that was more in 
tune with their reality. The battles render visible how state effects are created not by a 
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fixed entity or a stable site, but by overlapping processes committed by various actors. 
The final chapter, chapter 6, surveys a debate about the Alienation Prohibition decreed 
in Staatsblad 1875 No. 179 that took place in the mid-1930s. It examines Native 
agency in a cacophonous discourse on native land rights by zooming in on an 
academic essay presented at the prestigious Indies Lawyers Associations’ Congress in 
1936 by Soepomo, a legal scholar and colonial official of native origin. In a 
meticulous analysis of legal jurisprudence regarding the prohibition to alienate 
natives’ land, Soepomo contested the government’s claim that it aimed to protect the 
natives from being deprived of their land rights. This chapter brings the argument full 
circle: A native, whose subjectivity was constituted in colonial power relations, 
exercised his autonomy in re-making the Agrarian Regime and, in turn, attempted to 
shape colonial state formation in ways he deemed fit. Yet, he was a part of a network 
of institutions that make up the colonial state system.  
In the concluding chapter, I wrap up the dissertation with a modest attempt to 
theorize colonial state formation.  
A Note on the Terms Used  
My usage of “Native” is an English translation of Dutch words widely used at 
the time: inlandsch, inheemsch, and sometimes autochthonous. These words acquired 
their pejorative connotation only in the late-colonial period. For a long time, they were 
perfectly acceptable terms, used to distinguish the indigenous Indonesians from other 
inhabitants in the colony who were Europeans or Foreign Orientals. I use the term in 
this historical sense, and with a capital “N” when it refers to particular groups or 
individuals. It is important to note, however, that Indonesian nationalists who studied 
at Leiden University would eventually use the word “Indonesian” while still retaining 
inlandsch and inheemsche in academic conversation. As my period of analysis moves 
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towards the last years of the Dutch Indies, I use the terms Native and Indonesian 
interchangeably.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
Legal Education in Late-Colonial Indonesia: 
Subject Formation, But Not Quite 
Above all, we will put on record, 
that the Rechtsschool has not missed its target: 
the creation of independent (native) lawyers, 
who are aware of their position as independent judicial officers 
in the indigenous social relations. 
—C.C. van Helsdingen, 
Gedenkboek Rechtsschool 1929 
Introduction 
In 1928 a school that had trained a hundred and eighty-nine Native jurists in 
Batavia closed its doors. A photograph printed in the event’s commemorative booklet 
freezes a moment in that fateful day: It was a sunny day in May, a tropical dry season. 
Despite the heat and humidity, European and Native men dressed themselves in suits 
and ties, and populated rows of carefully arranged seats in a medium-sized hall. 
Several women were also in attendance. Except for two empty seats, the hall was 
packed; a number of younger participants had to stand at the back, almost spilling 
outside. Everyone seemed to be in a reflective mood. After twenty years the Training 
School for Native jurists (Opleiding School Voor Indisch Recht, henceforth the 
Rechtsschool) would cease to operate. C.C. van Helsdingen, the longest-serving 
teacher and the acting director, gave a passionate speech recalling the school’s most 
important achievement: an army of Native jurists capable of delivering impartial 
decisions in the court of justice. As the school closed down, its role was to be taken 
over by the newly founded Batavia College of Law (Batavia Rechtshoogeschool), 
established four years earlier. 
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In this chapter, I explore legal education in the Netherlands East Indies as a 
project of subject formation, understood here as the constitution of subjectivity 
through power relations that defines the being-and-knowing capacity of the subject 
(Foucault 1982a). I survey legal education for the Indies natives between 1909 and 
1939, which included the Rechtsschool, Leiden University United Faculty of Law and 
Letters in the 1920s, and Batavia Rechtshoogeschool. I argue that the rationale behind 
the pedagogical strategy and the curriculum design in colonial legal education aimed 
at more complicated objectives than conventionally accepted, such as colonizing the 
minds or creating docile bodies. Moreover, I argue that the shaping of subjectivity 
through colonial legal education submerged neither the capacity for reflection nor the 
ability of the colonized for critical deliberation. In building my argument, I focus on 
the colonial authorities’ vision of ideal subjectivity to be embodied by Native lawyers 
and the technology employed to achieve this objective. This focus provides the stage 
for the subsequent chapters, in which I document how Native jurists and intellectuals 
“talked back” to colonial discourse. The term “talk back” refers to the ways in which 
jurists and intellectuals demonstrated agency and critical capacity to respond to 
colonial agrarian discourse through their engagement in land-related issues. 
To construct my narrative, I rely on the archives of the Ministry of the 
Colonies and the colonial government, records of the Netherlands parliament sessions, 
reports and essays written by administrators and teachers of the schools, personal 
archives of prominent individuals, and memoirs by Indonesians educated in these 
schools. I also include official publications such as school yearbooks, commemorative 
publications, and texts of ordinances related to the schools. To garner the reactions of 
the indigenous societies, I examine newspaper articles and, to a limited extent, 
published private letters. With this range of data, I hope to allow the overlooked 
subjective experience of individual actors to emerge. 
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I conclude the chapter by suggesting that far from colonizing their minds, 
colonial legal education provided Native jurists with intellectual capacities that 
allowed them to participate and engage in and shape colonial legal discourse. 
The Rechtsschool, the Rechtshoogeschool and Leiden University United 
Faculty of Law and Letters were the triad that trained practically every Native jurist in 
the Netherlands East Indies. Although they were colonial institutions, their role in 
constituting Native students’ subjectivity carries a complexity that defies monolithic 
categorization, because in the very act of subjection through teaching and training they 
also instilled the capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation. 
Earlier studies on colonial education largely adopted a structuralist-
economistic approach in their analysis. This strand of literature considers colonial 
education as perpetuating the colonized’s subordinate status. The colonizers educated 
the natives primarily to fill lowly administrative positions in capitalist enterprises or 
government offices (Amin 1976; Carnoy 1974; Rodney 1972); educational policy in 
the colonies was designed to preserve European hegemony (Carnoy 1974). Rodney 
(1972), for example, posits that colonial education alienated Africans from their 
authentic life and prevented them from thinking outside the frame of colonial relations 
they were trained under. Although this economistic approach captures the general 
characteristics of colonial education (Altbach and Kelly 1978), it fails to recognize the 
specificity of varied colonial situations and dismisses agency that diverges from the 
prescribed grand narrative. 
More recent scholarship has departed from this mechanistic approach, 
embracing cultural aspects that allow complex dynamics of engagements to emerge 
(Massier 2008; Seth 2007; Govaars-Tjia 2005; Kumar 2005; Wagoner 2003; Summers 
2002; Naregal 2001; Groeneboer 1998; Cohn 1996; Kuster 1994). Rejecting 
mechanistic explanations, this body of scholarship perceives colonial education as a 
 41 
mutually constitutive process where the forging of new identity involved the 
colonizers and the colonized, and where the colonized actively engaged in forms of 
agency more diverse than just resistance (Seth 2007; Govaars-Tjia 2005; Naregal 
2001). In this tradition the binaries of the colonized and the colonizers are challenged 
(Kumar 2005); ruptures within the colonized society are made visible (Dash 2009; 
Naregal 2001); the reordering of the cognitive map is laid out (Massier 2008; Seth 
2007); and the aspiration to acquire Western knowledge is made explicit (Govaars-
Tjia 2005; Groeneboer 1998). The surge of this scholarly tradition notwithstanding, 
surprisingly little has been explored on the colonial legal education considering its 
critical role in the reordering of cognitive categories of the colonized (Merry 2004, 
2003). While certain studies offer interesting insights into the process of subject 
formation (Massier 2008), others scarcely dig into it (Lazarus-Black 2008; 
Wignjosoebroto 1994). 
As the Dutch solidified their territorial grip throughout the archipelago in the 
early 20th century, the era began where colonial officialdom considered peace and 
order to be the main condition for establishing a modern colonial state. Law and legal 
discourse emerged as the arsenals with which to project an image of authority and as 
the ultimate arbiter of justice (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Comaroff 1998). The 
networks of colonial institutions that centered around governance needed to present 
themselves as the legitimate “state,” unified and coherent in their operation. They 
needed a contingent of lawyers who embodied specific forms of subjectivity to 
effectively maintain the projected authority via legal infrastructure. The need to 
produce a mass of lawyers by the most economical means possible made educating the 
natives a viable option. It meant introducing them to the world of European legal 
thought, its concept of justice, and its ideas about the constitutional state, as well as 
educating them on indigenous legal knowledge from the perspective of the European 
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tradition in order to govern the natives (Merry 2004, 2003). This new cognitive order 
transformed the educated natives’ way of recognizing structures, power, and the 
promising potential of the colonial legal order as a means the arbiter of justice. 
Ironically, it also made them acutely aware of the discrepancy between the theoretical 
concept of justice and the reality of colonial practices. 
The Beginning: The Rechtsschool 1909–1928 
On July 26, 1909, the Rechtsschool opened its doors in Batavia to seventeen 
Javanese and Madurese students (Rechtsschool 1929).1 At the Rechtsschool, these 12- 
and 13-year-old students would undergo a three-year preparatory education followed 
by a three-year legal education. Upon graduating with the title of inlandsch 
rechtskundige (Native jurist), they would serve as registrars to assist the Dutch 
chairman in the court for the natives, the landraad. 
The impetus to open the school began in 1903 when the Regent of Serang, 
Achmad Djajadiningrat, inquired about the possibility of qualified natives serving in 
the Netherlands-Indies judiciary institutions.2 His inquiry prompted the government to 
create a committee to explore the possibility. Chaired by the influential advisor for 
native affairs, C. Snouck Hurgronje, the committee recommended opening a 
vocational school to train Native legal personnel to relieve the increasing burden of the 
landraad chairmen, especially after the circuit court (rechtbank van ommegang) was 
abolished in 1901 (Massier 2008). The recommendation was attractive to the 
government for a number of reasons: First, it would be easier, faster and cheaper to fill 
                                                 
1 By 1915, the Rechtsschool began to admit students from the Outer Islands, and by 1922 it admitted 
Europeans and Foreign Orientals.  
2 Djajadiningrat ended up sending his younger brother, Hoesein, to Leiden to study Eastern Languages 
under the guardianship of Snouck Hurgronje. Later, Hoesein Djajadiningrat became a prominent 
professor at the Rechtshoogeschool. 
 43 
the landraad’s staff shortage with Native law clerks than with the trickle of Dutch 
lawyers willing to relocate to the Indies. Second, Native law clerks would understand 
the intricacies of native legal systems, languages, and thought processes and the 
dynamics between litigants and defendants. Third, educating the natives to fill these 
posts would reflect well on the government’s standing among the native elites. And 
finally, the lower salary of Native law clerks provided the government with substantial 
savings compared with employing Dutch lawyers (Massier 2008, Helsdingen 1929a, 
35). The Javanese society, determined to gain access to European education, 
enthusiastically welcomed the recommendation (Groeneboer 1998).3 
Between Intellectual and Moral Responsibility 
The colonial government founded the Rechtsschool in order to staff the 
increasingly busy landraad with legally trained Native personnel. They were to act as 
interlocutors between the Dutch legal officers and the native subjects in the court of 
law. Despite the support of the colonial government, skeptics dampened early 
excitement in the founding of the school. A teacher at the School for the Training of 
Native Officials (Opleiding School Voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, OSVIA) in 
Probolinggo, Mr. Haase,4 wrote an essay in 1907 in De Locomotief,5 a newspaper 
published in Semarang, Central Java, about the natives’ readiness to serve in the 
colonial judicial institution. Born and raised in the Indies among native children, and 
                                                 
3 Dr. G.A.J Hazeu, Snouck Hurgronje’s successor, traveled around Java to introduce this new 
opportunity. A Javanese noblewoman, a sister of Indonesia’s famous feminist, Kartini, reported this 
news to her friends in the Netherlands of Dr. Hazeu’s travel in 1909 as intended “to give Native 
officials opportunity to get the correct information about the latest plans for the establishment of a 
Native law school. . . .” (Cote 2008, 146). In August 1910, she wrote again, mentioning her and her 
husband’s plan to send their son to the Rechtsschool (Cote 2008, 151). 
4 Mr. is an acronym of Meester in de Rechten, the Dutch title for Master in Law.  
5 De Locomotief was considered to be a progressive newspaper. Its founder and editor, P. Brooshooft, 
was a supporter of the Ethical Policy (Locher-Scholten 1996).  
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having taught at OSVIA in Probolinggo, Haase presented himself as a credible judge 
of the natives’ capacity to implement a European-oriented administration of law. He 
doubted that the natives possessed the essential character traits to serve in the 
judiciary, characteristics such as integrity, independence, autonomy, and ethical 
courage, that would prevent “their own belief and conviction to come to the surface” 
(Rechtsschool 1929, 10). 
A supporter of the school in the Lower Chamber of the Netherlands parliament 
and a well-known Ethicist, Theodore van Deventer, argued that these alleged 
weaknesses could be overcome by “setting a student dormitory for the Rechtschool, 
with a good Dormitory Master and a pedagogue, who genuinely loves the Native 
students and who must win their trust” (Rechtsschool 1929, 43). The formative 
influence of a European woman, preferably the wife of the dorm master, would help 
nurture these values further. Van Deventer and his colleague Henri van Kol were 
convinced that the Rechtschool offered a win-win solution to the colonial government, 
but members of the Upper Chamber were not easily convinced. Echoing Haase, they 
were worried that the “peculiarities of native character” would prevent the natives 
from ensuring an “impartial and independent administration of law” (Rechtsschool 
1929, 45). They were also worried that this opening would eventually lead to the 
natives attaining higher and more influential positions such as that of landraad 
chairman. 
Despite the debates, the Netherlands’ parliament eventually approved the 
establishment of the Rechtsschool, but the widespread skepticism about the natives’ 
“defective character” had already haunted the school’s educators. By the beginning of 
the school year, the Rechtsschool’s pedagogical mission had crystallized not only to 
produce intellectual jurists, but more importantly to nurture the young Natives to 
develop character traits compatible with the modern administration of law. In the case 
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of the Indies, it included the ability to maintain autonomy and independence when 
confronted by intimidating powers in the hands of the Binnenlands Bestuur and the 
Native Regents and “soft power” such as familial obligations and requests (Helsdingen 
1929a, 11). The Rechtsschool staff had a very clear idea of what a Native Lawyer 
should embody: He should be independent and capable of making autonomous legal 
decisions despite the presence of powerful entities (Helsdingen 1929a, 15); he should 
be critical, but not too critical that he would disrupt accepted and stable norms, 
especially norms beneficial to sustain colonial rule (Helsdingen 1929b, 63); and he 
should not be morally corrupt like the natives in general (Helsdingen 1929a, 12). 
The conservative circle in the Binnenlands Bestuur hardly made things easier 
for the Native jurists. Van Helsdingen observed intimidating pressures from officials, 
who pounded on the Native jurists “that the desire of some European judicial officials 
to put themselves above the Assistant Resident was outrageous and condemnable,” 
creating doubts about their rightful position (Helsdingen 1929a, 18). Native jurists 
should be constant when confronting the powerful Binnenlands Bestuur officials such 
as the Residents, Assistant Residents, and Controller. They had on their shoulder an 
extremely challenging responsibility:6 
 . . . the judicial officer was certainly one of the direct Government bodies, and 
with regard to the Binnenlands Bestuur, has to take a completely independent 
position. He has to maintain that the Binnenlands Bestuur never interfere in the 
administration of justice other than what is adjudicated by the law as [its] 
distinguished function. [The Native jurist] has to recognize first that in the 
whole social interaction, the Binnenlands Bestuur is the direct representative of 
the Government, the Governor-General and therefore the Crown, but not as the 
boss. That is [the position] he [should] represent. Any disrespect as far as he is 
                                                 
6 These concerns were not unfounded. Many autobiographies by educated natives of that generation 
underlined the humiliation they had to endure in various levels of educational institutions, humiliation 
that strengthen their resolve to prove themselves (Algadri 1999, Djojohadikusumo 1973 Sastroamidjojo 
1979, Djajadiningrat 1936). 
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concerned, could weaken his position and apart from that should not be 
tolerated by a judicial official!7 (Helsdingen 1929a, 15) 
With these character traits, Native jurists should be able to understand and 
adopt the practice of modern state formation that separates legal and executive 
authority; they should gain the “courage” to avoid conflicts of interest between their 
profession as a part of the colonial administration of law and as the subject of the 
Native Regent.8 With such ambitious objectives for their young protégés, the 
Rechtsschool staff needed to implement effective pedagogical strategies. As it turned 
out, they were extremely well prepared for the endeavor. 
Technologies of Subject Formation 
The future Native lawyers would have to stand up to the skepticism and deeply 
rooted arrogance of the Binnenlands Bestuur officials and the Native Regents. 
Culturally rooted asymmetrical power relations between the younger generation and 
the already established Native officials further raised these hurdles. Understandably, 
the task of the Rechtsschool teachers and educators was challenging, a fact they were 
acutely aware of. Their reflections, recorded in the Rechtsschool Commemorative 
Booklet of 1929, revealed two pedagogical objectives they aimed to attain: to train 
highly intellectual Native jurists who were familiar with European legal epistemology 
and who could adopt it as their own, and to train Native jurists who were capable of 
maintaining autonomy and independence in their legal decision making, a trait that 
                                                 
7 Van Helsdingen mentioned one strategy of never allowing Native jurists to make courtesy calls to the 
Native rulers in an outfit other than European so that they could avoid having to perform Native forms 
of curtsy, such as “djongkok,” that is, dragging oneself in a sitting position when approaching native 
rulers (Rechtsschool 1929, 14-15).  
8 Eventually the colonial government decreed that government officials of native descent were legally 
subjects of the colonial government. This decree was especially relevant for semi-autonomous areas in 
the colony, such as the Javanese Principalities. I expand this in Chapter 3.  
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necessitated the capacity to be critical. To achieve these objectives, the Rechtsschool 
staff implemented a three-pronged approach: a stringent admission process to garner 
only the upper crust of native society, a rigorous curriculum and high-quality teachers, 
and assimilative conditions to encourage adoption of “European values” (Rechtsschool 
1929). 
The Rechtsschool admitted only those students who had successfully finished 
the European primary school (Europeese Lagere School, ELS), or whose cognitive 
development of Dutch was equivalent to that of ELS graduates (Rechtsschool Statute 
1909, Art. 10 clause 3). Such stringent criteria guaranteed that students came from 
families of high birth, a requirement for a native to attend ELS. To ensure that students 
attained a strong intellectual foundation and sound theoretical knowledge in law, the 
Rechtsschool divided its curriculum into two sections: three years of preparatory 
education followed by three years of legal studies. The latter admitted students from 
other secondary schools such as the five-year Meer Uitgebreid Lagere Onderwijs 
(MULO) if they passed the entrance examination.9 
Advised by the Hurgronje commission, it was the government that regulated 
the subjects to be taught at the school. The director of the Department of Education, 
Religious Affairs and Trade determined the final curriculum and teaching plan based 
on a proposal prepared by the Rechtsschool Supervisory Board, in consultation with 
the school’s director and the head of the colonial administration’s department where 
applicable (Rechtsschool Statute, Art 4, Clause 2). In the preparatory program, the 
subjects included Dutch and Dutch literature, French, general history, mathematics, 
and natural history. In the first year of the three-year legal program, students learned 
four subjects: introduction to jurisprudence, overview of the Dutch constitution, 
                                                 
9 The exam was to prove that the MULO graduates had “acquired at least an equivalent body of 
knowledge and reached at least the same level of mental development and had been judged suitable 
following an assessment of their ‘ethical progress’” (Rechtsschool Statute, Art. 10 clause 4). 
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constitutional law of the Netherlands East Indies, and Netherlands East Indies criminal 
law. In the second year, they learned the civil code and a part of the commercial code; 
native law (volksrecht), particularly native family law and inheritance law; the forms 
of contracts among native societies (Inlandsche contracten); and the native concepts 
of rights to land (Inlandsche rechten op den grond). In the third year, students focused 
more on native law (volksrecht), native rules and regulations (inlandsch reglement) in 
relation to civil and criminal law, and the Malay language. It is significant that as soon 
as students started their law program, they were introduced to the native concepts of 
law, forms of legal transactions and, surprisingly, rights to land. These courses 
reflected the harbinger of adat law as a legitimate discipline which, at the time, was 
being developed in the Netherlands.10 Aside from these specific courses, Dutch 
language and literature continued to be taught throughout the three years of the law 
program (Rechtsschool Statute 1909, Art. 4, Clause 1). 
The Rechtsschool administrators considered assimilation to be an answer to the 
natives’ “character defects.” Students stayed in the school dormitory or lodged with 
carefully selected European families who would ensure their assimilation into 
European habits, customs, values, and norms. They attended numerous extracurricular 
activities, ensuring close continuous contacts with school staff. The 1929 
Commemorative Booklet of the Rechtsschool explicitly stated the civilizing mission 
of the school as follows: 
The instruction at the Law School is meant to secure the necessary general 
education and the indispensable legal knowledge, while the instruction in the 
dormitory—in cases where students cannot be lodged with a European 
family—(ensures) the cultivation of integrity, independence and impartiality. 
(Rechtsschool 1929, 40) 
                                                 
10 During this time, Leiden academics established the Adat Law Foundation (Adatrechtstichting) in 
1909, and Cornelis van Vollenhoven had recently published his magnum opus “Adat Law of the 
Netherlands Indies” in 1905. 
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An Indonesian student, Sunario, confirmed this policy in his biography. Thirteen years 
old when he started, he lodged with a Dutch family for three years, an experience he 
found to have helped him overcome his inferiority complex as a colonized person 
(Sunario 1982, 12). 
With these three-pronged strategies—a stringent admission process, a rigorous 
curriculum, and assimilative conditions to encourage adoption of “European values”—
the staff and supporters of the Rechtsschool felt they were fully equipped to produce 
Native jurists who could live up to the “high standard” of European ethics and values, 
and who would be able to perform their duties in the landraad as individuals 
autonomous and independent in their legal decision-making.11 
The Paradox of Moral Education 
When the Rechtsschool graduated its last Native jurists in 1928, the teachers 
and staff were very pleased with the quality of their protégés. The good names of the 
Native jurists burnished the reputation of the Rechtsschool both in the colony and in 
the Netherlands. In the Indies, landraad chairmen reported their satisfaction with the 
quality of the graduates seconded to them (Helsdingen 1929a, 21). In the Netherlands, 
where they continued their education to master’s and doctoral degrees, the graduates 
gained the respect of their professors (Laman Trip-de Beaufort 1954). Well prepared 
to pursue further study, seven of the Native jurists finished their doctoral degrees at 
Leiden University. Indeed, the Rechtsschool prepared their students extremely well. 
The school commitment to nurture independent thinkers resulted in several 
endearing anecdotes that C.C. van Helsdingen quoted in his passionate farewell 
speech. He was impressed by the defiance demonstrated by a Native jurist when he 
                                                 
11 The Indonesian student, Sunario, reported that he felt he was extremely well trained by the 
Rechtsschool staff, and that the school’s educational quality was acknowledged by Leiden University, 
where he continued for his master’s degree (Sunario 1982, 14). 
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was requested to perform djongkok before a native Regent. Also known in Javanese as 
mlaku dhodhok, djongkok was a native form of curtsy whereby one dragged oneself on 
the floor in a sitting position as one approached a Regent who sat in a chair. The 
young rechtskundige rebuked the request, saying, “We have not learned that in the 
Rechtsschool” (Helsdingen 1929a, 14). Van Helsdingen observed, 
So [the need to humiliate oneself] is not felt by the chairman in waiting.12 He 
realized that his position as a rechtskundige, as a jurist who served an 
independent court, was separate from the government official. It was here [that 
he needs to] maintain his independence against the highest native official. It 
was here that his independence counts against the highest native officials. 
(1929a, 14) 
The vision of a quintessential Native jurist was generally projected in 
juxtaposition with the feudal lords and “degenerate” native customs, putting the 
ethically oriented mentoring and training philosophy at the Rechtsschool as an answer 
to the “character question.” The rationale was based on the principle that any 
education should “focus on the development of the intellectual capacity of the 
pupils . . . strive to sharpen their power of judgment, form their wisdom, expand their 
horizon,” with the desired objective to “gradually replace the authority of the master 
with students’ own insight,” replace “a certain timidity” with “a proper sense of 
independence,” and nurture the students’ desire “to continuously develop to ‘stretch 
one’s legs,’ continuously advance further in the society, wherein he is placed.” 
Education should fight “all sense of complacency” and educate a spirit of “healthy 
critique” yet ensure that “this spirit of criticism does not degenerate into a mad desire 
to break all that exists” (Helsdingen 1929b, 63). However, the school staff also 
understood too well the paradox, and the danger, of nurturing Native jurists’ strong 
                                                 
12 With the term “chairman in waiting,” Van Helsdingen was practically playing with the Dutch fear of 
the Natives’ gaining an influential position in the administration of justice. 
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taste for justice. Van Helsdingen underlined this paradox in his retrospective look on 
the Rechtsschool: 
If the accuracy of the above statements is acknowledged, then one can easily 
imagine that particularly in the teaching of constitutional and administrative 
law, history, etc., [it] would have been simply impossible and undesirable to 
prevent [the students from] judging the policy of the Government: impossible, 
because this [capacity to judge] arose entirely from the pursued teaching 
method; undesirable because it would not only build a wall of mutual distrust 
between teachers and students, which would poison the moral influence of the 
former to the latter, but also because it would appear as though the 
Government should be ashamed for what they do for the people of this region. 
(Helsdingen 1929b, 63) 
Nevertheless, Van Helsdingen attempted to defend the educational philosophy 
embraced by the Rechtsschool by stressing that its teachings were based on principles 
of loyalty, 
that whatever mistakes and failure may be attributed to the Government or its 
officials, the Netherlands’ leadership for the people of this country has been 
and still is a blessing; that once the students developed into young men in 
society, as might be expected, they will support the Government in its efforts 
for the country to gain greater prosperity and development; that the indigenous 
society is yet to have sufficient intellectual force and yet to be morally 
equipped to propel herself into the way of harmonious development. In short, 
[it has] yet to stand on its own legs and thus still needs the guardianship of “the 
oppressor” (overheerser), whose government is the only one that can protect 
the people from the selfishness of half-developed careerists (strebers). 
(Helsdingen 1929b, 63) 
Van Helsdingen’s ambivalent statements echoed his political stance on the 
relations between the East Indies and the Netherlands. A politician for the CSP and a 
member of the Volksraad since 1924, he was known to have supported a stronger 
Indies government—a position that explains his enthusiasm for a body of independent 
Native jurists—as greater independence was granted to its population (Schmutzer 
1979). But this was a treacherous position for a state-sponsored educational institution. 
It required constant delicate juggling between enough enlightenment to foster capacity 
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for independent thinking and enough subjection for the students to want to nurture ties 
with the Motherland. As illustrated in the case of two illustrious graduates, Sunario 
and Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, who eventually played key roles in the Indonesian 
independence movement, the juggling was not always successful. 
Sunario, a graduate of the Rechtsschool, looked back on these principles in his 
biography and remembered how—more than five decades after—many of van 
Helsdingen’s recollections were indeed implemented. He said, 
Rechtsschool was known to be the school for Dutch’s pets, different from 
STOVIA (School to Train Native Doctors). We were taught colonial law, and 
it was always vexing, equally vexing to keep listening to the argument that 
Indonesia “is not mature enough to be independent.” But the benefit of the 
Rechtsschool education is that we came to understand the meaning of 
colonialism. [There were] those who were politically advanced, such as Iwa 
[Kusuma Sumantri] and Budiarto. . . . What was important and immensely 
interesting was that we were also taught the Netherlands Constitutional Law, 
so it was very clear to us when we compared that with the East Indies colonial 
law. It was radically different: the Netherlands was a constitutional state, while 
here [the East Indies] the principles of constitutional state were largely 
ignored. . . . (Sunario 1982, 15, emphasis added) 
Sunario eventually finished his master’s of law education at Leiden. 
After Kusuma Sumantri graduated from the Rechtsschool in 1921, the 
government assigned him as an official seconded to the chairman of the landraad in 
Bandung, and then to the Raad van Justitie in Surabaya. After a short stint, he 
requested a transfer to Batavia, where he worked in the Raad van Justitie (Kusuma 
Sumantri 2002, 26). At the time an incident in Sarekat Islam had rattled the Indies. 
The incident involved communist infiltrators’ attempt to radicalize Sarekat Islam, and 
the Raad van Justitie were busy handling the case attention. Kusuma Sumantri, closely 
involved in the process, was outraged at the injustices imposed on Sarekat Islam’s 
chairman, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto. He was also deeply affected by a massacre 
committed by the Dutch in Ciamis in 1919, known as the Haji Hasan incident. Unable 
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to contain his frustration, Kusuma Sumantri resigned after two months of service. He 
eventually went to finish his master’s degree in Indies Law at Leiden University, 
during which he was active in the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the Netherlands East Indies 
students’ organization. After a one-and-a-half-year involvement with Comintern in 
Moscow that left him disillusioned, Kusuma Sumantri returned to the East Indies in 
the late 1920s. He opened a law firm in Medan and, together with Sunario, defended 
many coolies trapped under the harsh and oppressive coolie ordinance.13 
Sunario’s recollection and Kusuma Sumantri’s life trajectory illustrate a 
process of subjection that failed to muffle the capacity for self-reflection. Learning 
European law awakened the recognition of the discrepancy between the constitutional 
state in the Netherlands and the colonial state in the Indies. Kusuma Sumantri, by then 
equipped with a law degree from a prestigious Dutch university and disillusioned by 
both capitalism and communism, was capable of turning himself into a lawyer ready 
to defend the coolies in Sumatra. This sense of justice, nurtured and sharpened at the 
Rechtsschool and Leiden, undoubtedly had shaped Kusuma Sumantri and Sunario into 
individuals capable of self-reflection. 
Although paternalism still infused the general atmosphere of the Rechtsschool 
education, its pedagogical philosophy was progressive for its time, noted by the ways 
in which the educators encouraged students to acquire independent character traits 
amid the powerful domination of colonial bureaucratic institutions such as 
Binnenlands Bestuur and Inlands Bestuur. The progressive commitment 
notwithstanding, the school could not escape the engulfing colonial conditions: the 
school’s administrators felt the need to defend and justify its philosophy by 
summoning the loyalty of its graduates to preserve the existence of the colonial state. 
                                                 
13 See more in Kusuma Sumantri (2002). See also Stoler (1995) on capitalism’s confrontation with labor 
in North Sumatra, and Breman et al. (1987) on colonial politics with respect to coolies and plantations.  
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This ambivalence aside, the graduates of the Rechtsschool proved they were highly 
trained jurists and intellectuals ready to take on the challenging tasks ahead. 
Studying Law in the Metropole: 
Leiden University United Faculty of Law and Letters 
The Rechtsschool might have been a secondary school with graduates entitled 
only to a humble “Rechtskundige” title compared with the prestigious Meester in de 
Rechten from a proper law college, yet the school was successful in preparing their 
students for advanced intellectual endeavor: forty-three rechtskundigen continued on 
to Leiden University for master’s degrees, and seven of them finished with doctorates. 
In 1919, after intense lobbying by Cornelis van Vollenhoven,14 the Ministry of 
the Colonies and the Ministry of Education allowed Leiden University to waive 
candidaatsexamen for Rechtsschool graduates studying at Leiden (Poeze 1986). 
Candidaatsexamen, an equivalent of the modern examination for a bachelor’s degree 
in law, or LLB, was part of a two-phase examination system to attain the title Meester 
in de Rechten (Mr). A student usually took this exam after a year and a half of study. 
The second exam is the doctoraalexamen, taken two years after the 
candidaatsexamen, which, upon passing, granted an examinee with the Mr. degree. 
Along with scholarships from the colonial government, this ruling enabled many 
rechtskundigen to pursue a master’s degree in the Netherlands. The opportunity to 
obtain a prestigious Dutch degree proved to be so attractive that by 1921, fourteen of 
seventy-two Indonesian students in the Netherlands studied law at Leiden, and only 
three were on government scholarship (Poeze 1986). With the waived 
candidaatsexamen, students were expected to finish their studies after only a year and 
                                                 
14 This lobby was endorsed by the Indische Vereeniging and the Indies Chung Hwa Hui Association in 
the Netherlands. 
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a half to two years of study, providing the government with substantial savings in the 
scholarship budget. One brilliant rechtskundige, Soepomo, finished his master’s 
degree in Leiden within two years and took an extra year to crown it with a doctoral 
degree in 1927. 
A continued reform that culminated in the new Academic Statute of 1921 
streamlined further legal education in Leiden for those intending to serve in the 
Netherlands East Indies. It was in this decade that Leiden hosted most Indonesian law 
students.15 
Academic Statuut 1921: The Foundation for the Netherlands East Indies Law 
Study 
In 1919 the Minister of the Colonies and the Minister of Education, Arts and 
Sciences established a commission with the grand title of “The Commission for the 
Reform of Training for East Indies Judicial Staff.”16 Chaired by C. Snouck Hurgronje, 
the Netherlands Commission consisted of three Leiden law professors, among them a 
rising star, Cornelis van Vollenhoven. The Ministers assigned the Commission several 
objectives: 1) to reform the training for lawyers who intended to serve in the East 
Indies; 2) to advise whether there was merit in establishing academic training 
specifically for the practices of law in the East Indies, training that would admit 
students without a Latin school certificate (a requirement for the study of Netherlands 
law); and, upon answering these inquiries, 3) to design a curriculum and examination 
program for the Netherlands East Indies law study (Verslag 1920, 3). 
                                                 
15 The Almanak van het Leidsch Studenten Corps, various years, listed all Indonesians who registered in 
that year to study at Leiden University. Towards the end of the 1920s, their number had shrunk 
significantly from earlier in the decade, because by then students could study at the Batavia 
Rechtshoogeschool.  
16 The commission’s official name was Commissie voor de Hervorming van de Opleiding van Indische 
Rechterlijke Ambtenaar. At the same time, the Commission also worked on the reform for the study of 
Indology. See Warmenhoeven (1977) for a detailed narrative of this part of their work.  
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In their report, the Commission confirmed the pressing need to establish an 
academic training entirely directed at the study of the Netherlands East Indies law. 
The existing training forced students wishing to serve in the Indies to study either 
Netherlands law or Indology, which hardly prepared them for the Indies’ specific 
conditions. The Commission recommended admission of students with no classical 
training as well as Indies graduates from Hogere Burger School (HBS, equal to high 
school) and Algemeene Middelbare School (AMS, also equal to high schoo;l) section 
A1 (Eastern literature), A2 (Western Classics), and even section B (mathematics and 
physics). The recommendation reflected the race-based educational structure in the 
Indies: Classical education, or Latin school, a requirement for Netherlands law study, 
was available only in the Netherlands. There was Hogere Burger Schools, an 
education accessible only to Europeans and to the crème of native society; and then 
there was Algemene Middelbare Schools, a recent initiative to provide secondary 
education to a wider native elite circle. By allowing students from these institutions to 
be admitted, the Commission was trying to help more Indies students study law in the 
Netherlands (Groeneboer 1998; Wal, 1963). The commission considered each school 
adequately prepared students for higher education and equipped them for independent 
pursuit of knowledge. A deficiency in certain required courses could be complemented 
independently prior to university matriculation. 
Snouck Hurgronje and Cornelis van Vollenhoven insisted on including the 
study of local languages and ethnology in the curriculum because they considered staff 
of colonial judicial offices unfit to serve without these skills. They were adamant 
about hosting studies of the Netherlands East Indies law together with studies of 
Indology, and separately from the University’s Faculty of Law. Their position 
challenged that of the Ministers, who wished the training to focus on practical 
governing skills under the Faculty of Law (Warmenhoeven 1977). When the Ministers 
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eventually gave in, the United Faculty of Law and Letters in Leiden University was 
born, in 1921. The duo’s coup granted them wider authority in directing the new 
faculty. Many of the policies they enacted facilitated the process for Native students 
pursuing higher degrees in Leiden. 
To assist Native students, the Commission recommended “relaxing” the 
admission criteria, streamlining the examination structure, and allowing more elective 
courses to suit the students’ interests, all of which made the study more pleasant.17 The 
recommendation reflected Snouck Hurgronje’s and many Ethici professors’ policy of 
association to “elevate” the people in the East Indies; as Otterspeer puts it, “They 
acted in the conviction that the university was the conscience of the nation. . . . What 
they wanted to give to the Indies was some sort of Dutch civil service, based on 
Western education. What they wanted to share was a liberal sense of responsibility, 
based on rational training” (1989, 218). The recommendations spelled out in the 
Academic Statuut 1921 and its actual implementation at Leiden United Faculty of Law 
and Letters largely demonstrated their sympathetic gestures to Indonesian students. 
The Netherlands Indies Law Curriculum at Leiden 
In 1921, the United Faculty of Law and Letters started their academic year 
offering three majors: Law studies for the East Indies (Nederlandsch Indisch Recht), 
Eastern Languages, and Indology (Jaarboekje 1928). All majors followed the format 
of the two-stage exams of the Netherlands law, the candidaatsexamen and the 
doctoraalexamen. 
Adopting the Academic Statuut of 1921, the United Faculty decided to 
examine three courses at the candidaatsexamen: the historical formation of 
                                                 
17 This decision continued to be ridiculed in certain Dutch circles as creating second-rate lawyers for the 
Indies. Jong Java pointed this out in an article published in 1924 that welcomed the opening of the 
Batavia Rechtshoogeschool. 
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contemporary legal procedure (rechtsinstellingen), both public and private including 
introduction to jurisprudence, ancient law (oudvaderlands recht), and Roman law; the 
constitutional law (staatsrecht) of the Netherlands Indies, notably taught by Cornelis 
van Vollenhoven; and comparative ethnology of the Netherlands Indies (Jaarboekje 
1928, 35–38). These courses were complemented with a laboratory (practicum) of the 
Netherlands Indies Law, usually taught by a former resident in the Indies, meant to 
help students gain familiarity with real cases as published in official publications. For 
the doctoraalexamen, the United Faculty required students to prepare four courses: 
Adat law of the Netherlands Indies, usually taught by Van Vollenhoven; the Civil 
Codes of the Netherlands East Indies, in which students were encouraged to acquaint 
themselves with various court decisions and decrees published in the Indies Journal of 
Law (Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht, ITR); Javanese; and finally one elective 
subject from thirteen options (Jaarboekje 1928, 39–41).18 In this curriculum, the study 
for the Netherlands Indies Law differed markedly from the Netherlands law in that it 
taught students adat law and cases specific to Indies experience.19 
The Commission’s explanation of their proposed curriculum reveals their 
philosophy and their vision of an ideal lawyer for the East Indies. The Commission 
deemed that a Native jurist needed an in-depth knowledge of law in the Indies and its 
European genealogy. The required overview course of Roman and Germanic law for 
the candidaatsexamen would “provide the students with the opportunity to gain 
                                                 
18 These included Philosophy of Law, Private International Law, International Law, Constitutional Law 
of the Netherlands, Administration Law of Netherlands Indies, Colonial law for Outer Areas, Tropical 
or General Political Economy, Theory and History of Statistics, another Indonesian language aside from 
the required, Institutions of Islam, Archaeology of the Netherlands Indies or the History the Netherlands 
Indies, Comparative Colonial History, and finally any other courses picked by the candidate with the 
approval of the Faculty. 
19 Van Vollenhoven’s reading list for Adat Law included sections from his book Adat Law of the 
Netherlands Indies, sections from Wilkens’s Essays on Adat Law, sections from Ph. Kleintjes’ 
Constitutional Bodies of the Netherlands Indies, Snouck Hurgronje’s The Acehnese, Adat Law of Bali 
and Lombok by Liefrinck, Adat Law of Toeloeng Agoeng and Adat Land Rights of Ambon, both by J.F. 
Holleman (Jaarboekje 1928, 37).  
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insight into a legal system and its historical development” (Verslag 1920, 10). The 
study of Roman and Germanic law, however, “must be contextualized within the 
contemporary Netherlands East Indies civil law” (Verslag 1920, 10), which derived its 
content entirely from those laws, because it fostered students’ interest more than if the 
ancient laws were studied purely for their own sake. Practical skills were also 
important: the Commission placed the Netherlands Indies Constitution at the 
beginning of the studies instead of examining it at the doctoraalexamen because they 
believed that towards the end of their training, students needed to familiarize 
themselves with practical legal issues as addressed by the civil law and criminal law 
examined in the doctoraalexamen. Re-examination on the Netherlands Constitutional 
Law in the doctoraalexamen was considered an unnecessary burden (Verslag 1920, 
10). The Commission recommended inclusion of comparative ethnology for the 
Netherlands Indies in the curriculum but dropped economics (staathoudhuiskunde) 
entirely. As a compromise, students were allowed to take economics as an elective. 
For the doctoraalexamen, the Commission structured courses according to 
major subjects that included adat law, civil law and criminal law, obligatory subjects, 
for example, Javanese, and an elective minor subject. Javanese, and not Malay, was 
obligatory, because 
the combination would make the already overflowing examinations much too 
heavy. Malay has to give in to Javanese because for the European society and 
the judicial officer serving in the Indies, it is easy to learn [it] without 
academic preparation through the practice of the language itself, while this is 
not the case with Javanese. Considered in terms of literature and the history of 
civilization, Javanese by far surpasses in importance all other languages of the 
Archipelago. While Malay is the mother tongue of a small minority population 
in Indonesia, Javanese is spoken by about half of the population. Finally, 
familiarity with the Javanese language facilitates acquiring several other 
Indonesian languages, such as Madurese, Balinese, Sundaneese, Batak etc. 
Those who would appreciate being scientifically literate in Malay can learn 
this language as an elective subject. (Verslag 1920, 13–14)  
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In retrospect, the Commission perhaps was right in their decision to make 
Javanese instead of Malay an obligatory course, because even without academic 
endorsements, the students eventually picked up Malay as the official language of 
their organization, Perhimpunan Indonesia. The growth of nationalist sentiment among 
the Perhimpunan Indonesia members might have accelerated much faster had they 
learned Malay instead of Javanese. 
Both the suggested and the actual curriculum implemented at Leiden strongly 
indicated an interest in nurturing intellectual growth in understanding larger and 
abstract processes. But the curriculum was certainly not innocent. The studies of law 
in colonial conditions were undeniably an imposition of European epistemology. The 
overarching umbrella of the colonial legal system traced its genealogy to Roman and 
Germanic law. By demanding that Native students acquire proficiency in this 
knowledge, Leiden professors might have wanted to lead them to the impression that 
ancient European law, particular and contingent at the core, possessed a universal 
character. Moreover, directing the students to focus on ethnology instead of economics 
was a curious decision. A charitable view of this decision may assign the bias to the 
expertise of the law professors. However, this decision led to an enormous void of 
Native intellectuals who had a grasp of economics, scholars and thinkers who could 
think about the Indies as an economic entity. It should not have been a surprise that 
postcolonial Indonesia limped for decades due to a lack of clear economic planning. 
Last, making Javanese an examined language signaled a cunning move. Javanese was 
a highly hierarchical language and strongly attached to Javanese ethnicity. Malay was 
radically different: by this time, vernacular newspapers in the Indies relied on Malay 
to reach a more diverse audience. Malay had also gained a reputation as the lingua 
franca of the Indies. Substituting Javanese for Malay as a language to be examined 
perhaps was a calculated attempt to put the brakes on what is now widely known as 
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“imagined community.” These strategic moves notwithstanding, with such curriculum 
the education could hardly be categorized as promoting a mechanistic and legalistic 
implementation of law as widely suggested by several researchers (Juwana 2006; 
Wignjosoebroto 1994). A Native student who undertook this curriculum would have 
gained a grasp of European and Dutch epistemology of law and the ways in which 
they related to the development of law in the Netherlands East Indies. 
Subject Formation or Self-Constitution? 
Despite the empathic gestures to Indonesian law students at Leiden, one is hard 
pressed to find reminiscence of warm student-professor relationships as is the case 
with Rechtsschool and later Rechtshoogeschool graduates and professors.20 Perhaps 
the charismatic reputation conditioned Snouck Hurgronje and van Vollenhoven to 
keep the students at bay. Different expectations for social relations between students 
and professors in the 1920s could partially be the reason, as was the heightened 
nationalist sentiments among Indonesian students. Van Vollenhoven reportedly 
stopped attending Indische Vereeniging gatherings once it changed its name to 
Indonesische Vereeniging and then Perhimpoenan Indonesia (Laman Trip-de Beaufort 
1956). 
                                                 
20 One rare note from van Vollenhoven about his Indonesian students was about the doctoral defense of 
Gondokoesoemo, the first Indonesian to earn a doctoral degree in law in Leiden. Van Vollenhoven 
wrote,  
Two weeks ago our first Rechtsschool- Javanese (Gondo) had his promotion ( . . . ). His book 
is very good with everything thought out by himself. As a surprise he came with both his 
panakawans to the promotion with headdresses, sarong, no shoes, one of his paranimfen 
[ceremonial supporters] even wore a kris. I had expected ten Javanese friends ( . . . ) instead 
the place was filled to overflowing, about fifty to sixty people I should say; girls, ladies, all 
kinds of students, some controleurs studying here, Mr. Abendanon, etc. ( . . . ) It was quite an 
event. After the promotion Snouck as rector said a few words about this first promotion. 
(Personal letter of Van Vollenhoven, cited in Laman Trip-de Beaufort, Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven 1874-1933 [Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1954] p. 180, cited in Pompe 193, f.16, p. 
71) 
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The pedagogical approach used by Leiden professors appeared to be more 
hands-off than the passionate nurturing at the Rechtsschool. The heavy study load 
indicated the professors’ greater interest in nurturing exponential intellectual growth 
than in building cozy relationships. Students coming to Leiden were considered 
mature adults capable of taking care of themselves, an attitude in line with the nature 
of college education in the Netherlands at the time: attendance at lectures was not 
mandatory; students could read assigned textbooks on their own with an occasional 
office appointment for clarification with the professor; examinations were held 
whenever students felt they were ready (Hatta 2002; Hasan 1999; Djojoadisuryo 
1978). Several memoirs of Indonesian nationalists studying at Leiden described how 
they navigated their way in the new place with help mainly from those who had 
arrived earlier (Kusuma Sumantri 2002; Hasan 1999; Djojoadisuryo 1978). Seniors 
helped new students find lodging, settle in, deal with the school administration, meet 
former colonial officials who lodged Indonesian students, even find teachers to tutor 
them in Greek and Latin. Students benefited greatly from the collegial help of fellow 
members of Perhimpunan Indonesia, which in the 1920s arose to become a prominent 
association of increasingly “radicalized” students belligerent towards colonial 
politics.21 As an organization, Perhimpunan Indonesia was exemplary in caring for its 
members. Relatively better-off members would assist those in straitened financial 
situations with food and lodging, even cash. Sick students were attended to. In the case 
of illness and death, which happened to one student in Switzerland, Perhimpunan 
Indonesia would arrange the visitation and funeral (Hatta 2002; Rivai 2000). For 
students receiving a government scholarship or whose parents were government 
                                                 
21 As they firmed their stance on a non-cooperative position, Cornelis van Vollenhoven stopped 
attending the association’s meetings (Laman Trip-de Beaufort 1956). This, however, did not prevent 
him from maintaining a professional attitude towards his students. Leiden professors allowed Ali 
Sastroamidjojo to take his doctoraalexamen at the time he was under arrest for alleged cooperation with 
the communist leader Semaoen (Sastroamidjojo 1979). 
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officials, the room to maneuver was more limited. The advisor for Netherlands East 
Indies students (Raadsman van Studeerende) monitored and controlled their activities; 
they were prevented from actively participating in Perhimpoenan Indonesia at the risk 
of losing their scholarship funding; such hard-handed ways of dealing with students 
garnered protests (Rivai 2000). 
The hands-off approach in fact also reflected the status of Indonesian students 
in the Netherlands at the time. Indonesians coming to the Netherlands were considered 
citizens of the Motherland, subjects of the Queen, and shared the same rights and 
obligations as any local Dutch persons, including the right to run for office.22 Several 
Indonesians noted the friendly and respectful treatment they received from the Dutch 
persons in the Netherlands, a stark contrast to the generally racist attitude and 
treatment as second-class citizens that was the norm in the Indies (Djojoadisuryo 
1978, 95, 106). After all, they were more sympathizers of the Indies’ cause in the 
Netherlands, ranging from the more association-oriented Ethicists to socialists to 
radical communist elements in the Netherlands that demanded a free Indonesia. 
Compared with the choking and increasingly oppressive rule of the colonial 
government in the Indies, the Netherlands clearly offered a freer atmosphere for the 
Native students. 
In a nutshell, by the time they attended law school in Leiden, students from the 
Indies had developed a strong sense of independence, autonomy, and justice richly 
nurtured at the Rechtsschool and other educational institutions they attended in the 
Indies. Thus, in contrast to the emphasis on character development at the 
Rechtsschool, at Leiden the professors’ focus was more on encouraging intellectual 
growth. This focus bore fruit in the intellectual staying power of Leiden graduates: 
                                                 
22 An Indonesian in the Netherlands, Roestam Effendi, ran for and won a seat in the Netherlands Lower 
Chamber (Hasan 1999), and http://www.iisg.nl/bwsa/bios/effendi.html (accessed January 19, 2011). 
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Most of the Indonesian scholars who contributed to the prestigious Indies Journal of 
Law (Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht), such as Soepomo, Soesanto Tirtoprodjo, and 
Wirjono Prodjodikoro, graduated from Leiden. The intellectual push extended by 
Leiden professors also materialized in the graduation of native doctors in law. 
Throughout the years, seven Indonesians obtained doctoral degrees. Of the seven, four 
wrote their dissertations on topics related to land issues: Gondokoesomo on the 
annulment of village decisions by colonial government (1922 ), Soebroto on the 
mortgaging of paddy fields (1925), Alinoeddin Enda Boemi on land rights in Batak 
land (North Sumatra) (1925), and Soepomo on the reorganization of land rights in 
Surakarta (1927). Cornelis van Vollenhoven promoted all four. The push for 
intellectual growth was also promoted through two prizes for the best master’s exam 
for Native students: the Kanaka Prize and the Gadjah Mada Prize. Soesanto 
Tirtoprodjo and Wirjono Prodjodikoro, who happened to be brothers, won the Kanaka 
Prize in 1925 and 1927, and Soepomo, who was the only person ever to win the 
Gadjah Mada prize, in 1927 (Poeze 1986). These three continued their intellectual 
journey in Indonesia for many years. Soesanto Tirtoprodjo wrote articles for various 
journals such as De Stuw, while Wirjono Prodjodikoro and Soepomo contributed 
numerous essays to the Indies Journal of Law long after they returned to the East 
Indies.  
As narrated above, tensions and struggles between the ethical-policy oriented 
professors and the Dutch government richly infused the foundation of the Faculty of 
Law and Letters in Leiden. The professors’ aim to equip Indies students with a well-
rounded knowledge of law clashed with the government’s pragmatic wishes, which 
was propelled by the need to man the administration of justice in the most economical 
way possible. Eventually the Leiden professors won the upper hand. The revamping of 
curriculum to balance intellectual enrichment and practical skills in governance, the 
 65 
laissez faire attitude towards the students’ political activism, the push for students’ 
excellence and intellectual advancement all suggest the professors’ encouragement of 
independent thinking among Native students. The increasingly defiant Perhimpunan 
Indonesia, whose membership was heavily populated by law students, attested to this. 
Thus, in contrast to the economistic argument on colonial education, law study in the 
Netherlands did not fit the stereotype of a hegemonic education. 
Dawn in the Colony: Batavia Rechtshoogeschool 
While the two ministries and the Netherlands Commission were busy 
revamping training for colonial administrative and legal officials, several initiatives 
began to take root in the Netherlands East Indies to establish an institution of higher 
education. In 1917 a number of private citizens initiated the foundation of a technical 
college, and by 1920 they launched the Technische Hoogeschool Bandung, West Java. 
The initiative inspired the colonial government to modernize the Rechtsschool. The 
government appointed J.H. Carpentier Alting, the president of the East Indies Supreme 
Court, to chair the Commission to Reform the Native Rechtsschool23 (henceforth 
referred to as the Indies Commission). 
Starting their work in 1919, the Commission was charged with investigating 
ways to reform the Rechtsschool to adapt to the changing conditions in the colony. 
Several attempts to unify the plural legal system had given the colony a vision of such 
a future.24 In this light, the Rechtsschool’s curriculum and the limited admission of 
Native students had become obsolete because it focused too much on the segregated 
administration of justice (Massier 2008; Rechtsschool 1929). After going through 
                                                 
23 In Dutch: Commissie tot Hervorming der Inlandsche Rechtsschool. 
24 Cornelis van Vollenhoven thwarted this attempt. He argued that a unified legal system would put the 
indigenous population at a severe disadvantage with respect to the Europeans (Burns 2004). 
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several exercises, the Commission recommended a full-fledged, college-level law 
school open to all segments of Indies society, Natives, Europeans, and Foreign 
Orientals. The college presumably would relieve the chronic shortage of jurists despite 
the presence of the Rechtsschool and returning lawyers from Leiden (Massier 2008; 
Fasseur 1993). 
In formulating the founding principles of the future law college, the Indies 
Commission was very critical of legal education in the Netherlands that mainly 
catered to the practices of law in the Netherlands. They decided that the Indies law 
college not only must be on a par with higher education institutions in the Netherlands, 
but also must be kept away from the “pitfalls” that had “tainted” the university system 
in the Netherlands.25 That is, it must persist in prioritizing the specific needs of the 
Indies society in its curriculum and teaching method, lest it uncritically adopt the 
Motherland’s weaknesses. More so than in the Netherlands, the study should be 
connected to and focus on the practice of law without the handicap of those coming 
from a narrow vocational training (Neytzell de Wilde, 1929). 
Although the Indies Commission members carried out their task concurrently 
with the Netherlands Commission, they were unaware of the Netherlands 
Commission’s existence until they were almost done with their report. 
Understandably, they were dismayed. As a matter of fact, they were unsettled by the 
Netherlands’ presumed authority in determining education policy that would deeply 
affect the colony:26 
                                                 
25 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 62 Beschouwingen Naar Aanleiding van het Rapport der 
Commissie voor de Hervorming van de Opleiding van Indisch Rechterlijke Ambtenaren. The 
Commission did not specify exactly what it meant by “pitfalls” and “tainted.” I speculate that they are 
referring to what the commission members considered to be courses “irrelevant” to the practice of law, 
such as comparative ethnology and languages.  
26 Carpentier Alting, the chair of the Indies commission, was a member of a commission that Snouck 
Hurgronje chaired in 1911 to reform the study of Indology in the Netherland (Fasseur 1993). This fact 
makes the “rift” even more interesting to dissect.  
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 . . . the commission in the Netherlands have not weighed the question of 
whether higher education legal study in the colony [itself] should be useful and 
necessary, but immediately assumed that the formation of higher legal study 
must be acquired in the Netherlands.27 
Divergence between the two commissions emerged on several issues, but in 
this section I focus on the formation of the curriculum for the future law college.28 
Curriculum for the college would affect a much larger society in the colony because 
Europeans and Foreign Orientals could also matriculate. What would be taught at the 
school would define the future legal discourse in the colony. Unsurprisingly, 
Europeans in the Indies felt they had a stake in the direction of the college. 
Teach Them No Latin 
In the 1920 recommendation for the training reform for the Indies’ judiciary 
officers, the Netherlands Commission proposed dropping Latin from the compulsory 
subjects and replacing it with Javanese. The United Faculty of Law and Letters at 
Leiden University adopted this proposal, and included Javanese as one of the 
examined subjects (geexamineerde leervakken) at either candidaats- or 
doctoraalexamen.29 The position of the Netherlands Commission reflected the 
recommendation for higher education given by the second Colonial Education 
Congress in 1916. Well attended by both Dutch and Indonesian educators, the 
Congress was concerned with education in the colony (Poeze 1986). As a group, the 
                                                 
27 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 62 Beschouwingen Naar Aanleiding van het Rapport der 
Commissie voor de Hervorming van de Opleiding van Indisch Rechterlijke Ambtenaren, p. 1. 
28 The discipline would be known specifically as the Netherlands-Indies Law, following the recently 
established United Faculty of Law and Letters in Leiden University mandated by the Academic Statute 
1921. 
29 Examined subjects (Geexamineerd vakken) covered essential subjects that required masterly 
proficiency and had to be examined with either oral or written exams. Compulsory subjects (Verplichte 
vakken), on the other hand, were not part of candidaats- or doctoraalexamen. A review with a 
designated professor would be sufficient. 
 68 
Congress believed that higher education in the Indies should cater to the local 
population and culture. To fulfill this ideal, they proposed two principles: the 
university should be open to all population groups in the Indies, and the quality of 
education and scholarly level had to be on a par with the Netherlands. The curriculum 
had to fit the Indies sociocultural condition; thus, in place of the teaching of Latin and 
Greek, the Congress urged the study of four main subjects: Hindu culture of the 
archipelago, comparative anthropology of the Dutch Indies, the history of the 
archipelago (mainly European presence), and Javanese. Hence, the Indies culture here 
was a code word for the Indic-influenced part of Javanese culture (Otterspeer 1989). 
The Indies Commission rejected these recommendations. They rejected 
making Javanese a compulsory subject since there were other ethnic groups whose 
mother tongue was not Javanese.30 Instead, because everyday Malay was a 
brabbeltaaltje, a “gibberish, low Malay” that was insufficient for academic work or a 
professional career, they insisted that a systematic study of Malay was absolutely 
necessary. With regard to abolishing Latin from the curriculum, the Indies 
Commission reacted with mixed feelings. Some members felt vindicated that their 
opinion of Latin in the East Indies was justified, but the majority felt it would 
deteriorate the quality of the education. Nevertheless, the Indies Commission was 
resigned to going along with the Netherlands, but not without lamenting, “[We] 
thought that, since the Netherlands is going in this direction, the Indies cannot remain 
behind, and thus the demand for knowledge of Latin for proper legal study—
regardless of how urgently it is needed—must be abandoned.”31 
                                                 
30 This opinion resonated in the ongoing debate in the Netherlands and in the Indies about the role of 
Javanese versus Malay in colonial education (Groeneboer 1998: 212). 
31 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 62 Beschouwingen Naar Aanleiding van het Rapport der 
Commissie voor de Hervorming van de Opleiding van Indisch Rechterlijke Ambtenaren, pp. 18-19. 
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The news about dropping Latin from the future law school curriculum created 
an uproar in the Dutch conservative circle in the colony. In an article published in the 
January 31, 1924, edition of De Nieuwe Courant, an author protested the lack of 
classical education in the Indies that had forced many families to send their offspring 
to the Netherlands at a tender age so as to be raised in “a classical upbringing.”32 The 
Netherlands should not shirk its responsibility to the European population in the Indies 
to provide “material and spiritual development in the interest of the Netherlands.” To 
maintain European dominance, the government had to ensure a steady influx of 
Europeans to the Indies by providing good income and pensions, and to encourage 
those already in the Indies to remain by ensuring a good education for their children. 
Since classical education was nonexistent in the Netherlands Indies, the author argued, 
establishing a law college was pointless. Law graduates without a classical education 
would only be inferior lawyers incapable of competing with graduates from the 
Netherlands.33 The author insisted that a law college was not necessary and was not 
demanded by Europeans because there was no need for more full-fledged jurists and 
certainly not of second-rate masters-in-law. Instead, the author demanded that the 
government 
install classical preparatory education by means of lycea! By proving the 
desirability [of a law college] and only after considering the probable viability 
                                                 
32 The tradition of sending offspring, especially male, away to the Netherlands traces back to the 18th 
and the 19th century East Indies. The intensity was such that the families who remained in the colony 
were essentially of matrilineal lines with a more entangled connection with their Asian roots (Taylor 
1983). They became “Indisch.” Education in Europe ensured the authenticity of Europeanness. 
Hollander (2008) observes a similar phenomenon in late-colonial Indonesia in her book Silenced 
Voices. What was meant by a classical education was the presence of a Latin school, popularly known 
as a “Gymnasium,” which trained its students in Latin and Greek. As mentioned in the earlier section, a 
gymnasium education was a requirement for legal study in the Netherlands until Snouck Hurgronje’s 
committee made an exception for the study of Netherlands Indies Law, as stated in the Academic 
Statuut of 1921. 
33 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 77, newspaper clippings. 
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can a law college be founded, [even then it] must give provide a competence 
completely similar to the universities in the Netherlands.34 
The Nieuwe Courant article made transparent the undercurrent desire for a 
particular sense of authenticity among the European population of the Indies. They 
were concerned about being diluted by the ever-encroaching Indies culture. An Indies-
oriented law school would erode the authenticity and would have positioned them with 
a footing much inferior to fresh-blooded Europeans from the Netherlands.35 On the 
surface, the debate over Latin appeared to be a pragmatic deliberation about an 
“irrelevant” subject, but upon deeper scrutiny it emerges as a pondering—even if only 
subconscious—of the value of European epistemology and universality. 
Paul Scholten and the Curriculum Development for the Batavia 
Rechtshoogeschool 
To establish the new law college, the Netherlands assigned as the coordinating 
expert Paul Scholten, a well-known professor of law from the University of 
Amsterdam. In executing his task, Scholten had access to the report of the Netherlands 
Commission, the Indies Commission, and the colony’s reaction of the law school 
establishment plan as published in local newspapers. These reports seemed to have 
prepared him to understand the dynamics within the East Indies and between the East 
Indies and the Netherlands, which he demonstrated in his diplomatic gestures to the 
various pressures in the colony. Paul Scholten came to the East Indies twice in 1924, 
                                                 
34 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 77, newspaper clippings. As a matter of fact, it was convenient 
for the article to forget that the only gymnasium ever opened in Batavia, the Koning Willem III School, 
in 1867, had to shut down its classical education section within 4 years due to low enrollment. Even 
though it continued to be called a “gymnasium,” it was never a proper Latin school after that (Nasution 
1995, Fasseur 1993). 
35 Drawing from Taylor (1983), Stoler (2002) explored this anxiety further through her interrogation of 
racial relations and dynamics in the East Indies. Fasseur (1995: 61) made a note of the same anxiety in 
the closing of a government training school in 1913 in Batavia after 50 years of service because “a 
candidate for European civil service—thus ran the argument—should study exclusively in Europe.” 
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totaling five months. He used his first visit starting in February 1924 to meet various 
officials, finalize his report, and present it to relevant parties in the Indies. By his 
second visit in September, he was ready to launch the law college. 
Indies residents met Paul Scholten’s assignment with mixed feelings. If the 
author of the Nieuwe Courant article was upset about the plan to establish a law 
college without a classical education, the Malay-speaking Neratja36 vehemently 
disputed the claim that there was no need for more jurists in the Indies, while the 
progressive De Locomotief defended the choice of an outsider to help founding the law 
college. Someone like Scholten who was not directly connected to Leiden University 
or any feuding parties in the colony was well suited for the task.37 If Scholten was 
disconcerted by the feuding noises, he kept it to himself. The report he submitted to 
the Governor General exuded confidence, and he tackled skepticism with diplomatic 
ease as recorded in the transcript of his meeting with the Indies high-ranking officials. 
In setting the curriculum for the Rechtshoogeschool, Scholten departed from 
the guidelines set by the Netherlands 1921 Academic Statute developed by the 
Netherlands Commission that defined the United Faculty of Law and Letters in 
Leiden.38 He found the statute too much of a compromise of various trends. The 
Netherlands Indies’ curriculum had to be developed independently of the Netherlands 
and with the Indies’ own unique conditions in mind, thus resonating the Indies 
Commission’s proposed principles. He laid out several principles informing his 
                                                 
36 Neratja was a Malay-speaking newspaper founded in 1917 with Abdul Muis and later Agus Salim 
acting as its editor-in-chief. Both were prominent leaders in Indonesia’s pre-independence movement. 
Neratja was critical of the colonial policy. Mohammad Hatta, later Indonesia’s first vice-president, 
frequently wrote for Neratja during his years in the Netherlands. 
37 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 77, newspaper clippings. The attempt of Leiden’s progressive 
line, brought home by their graduates, to reform the Binnenlands Bestuur was not well received by 
Binnenlands Bestuur’s diehard conservatives (Benda 1966). 
38 This statute was revised in 1921 following the advice of Hurgronje’s Netherlands Commission on 
reform of legal training for the Netherlands Indies (Fasseur 1993).  
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curriculum draft that marked the difference between the future law college and Leiden 
United Faculty of Law and Letters. 
First, in range and depth, the legal study in the colony must be equivalent in 
quality to those in the Netherlands. It must focus on educating jurists for the practice 
of law in a scholarly and scientific manner. On this, Scholten was on the same page as 
Snouck Hurgronje when the latter resisted the Minister of Colonies and the Minister of 
Education, who demanded strictly practical training for Indies lawyers. Second, unlike 
the sprawling courses offered in Leiden, legal-oriented courses should dominate the 
college’s teaching, because focus is acutely necessary for the formation of young 
minds.39 This was in juxtaposition with Leiden, since they considered language and 
anthropology to be essential elements of legal studies. Third, the dichotomy between 
Western- and Eastern-oriented subjects was irrelevant for the Rechtshoogeschool. In 
this, Scholten was alluding to the Congress for Colonial Education’s recommendation 
in 1919 for more “Eastern-oriented” courses. Instead, the Rechtshoogeschool must 
focus on the presently applied law in the Netherlands Indies regardless of its origin. 
Fourth, the pedagogical approach of the Rechtsschool should balance freedom of mind 
and structured discipline. This was a nod to the Rechtsschool pedagogical 
philosophy.40 
Scholten’s statement “Concentration is urgently necessary for the formation of 
young minds (jeugdigen geest)”41 is of particular interest here. This principle cleared 
the way for Scholten to reject a sprawl of courses that discouraged the “focus” or 
”concentration” that he deemed pressingly urgent to shape young minds. To ensure 
                                                 
39 In Dutch: Concentratie is voor de vorming van den jeugdigen geest dringend noodzakelijk. 
40 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 70, Report on Proposals for Batavia Rechtshoogeschool. 
41 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 70, Report on Proposals for Batavia Rechtshoogeschool. Geest 
in Dutch can mean consciousness, awareness, mind, spirit, soul, and character, even ghost. It signifies 
the inner subjectivity of the self. 
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focus, Scholten not only introduced study specialization, a move that was later 
adopted in the Netherlands, but also proposed abolishing Latin altogether, implying 
his lack of conviction about Latin’s relevance in the Indies practice of law. In other 
words, Latin was a distraction. He suggested Javanese or Malay or another ethnic 
language as a compulsory subject to be examined at candidaats- or doctoraalexamen. 
If Scholten’s idea to teach Malay or Javanese in the curriculum was not new, his 
reasoning was radically different from the earlier arguments, such as the one made by 
the General Dutch League that deemed Dutch too difficult to become the lingua franca 
in the Indies (Groeneboer 1998). Of his reasoning, Scholten wrote, 
The students of indigenous origin must learn to think scientifically 
(wetenschappelijk) in their own language. For the others, at least the language 
is necessary for an adequate knowledge for anthropological study. . . . It is 
important for students to understand the structure of the society in which the 
law is applied. Thus the choice of anthropology (volkenkunde) as a theoretical 
subject is because it is fundamental, not [simply] out of curiosity but (to 
provide) the bases of the study of society.42 (emphasis added) 
In this statement Scholten made explicit his view that a mastery of language 
was essential to the acquisition of a certain universe of reference. The requirement to 
study Malay was not intended simply to help future (native) officials communicate 
with their fellow compatriots, but, more importantly, to encourage them to think 
scientifically on their own terms, using their own subjectivity, and sourcing their own 
universe of reference. By association, eliminating Latin from the curriculum implied 
that the European thought world was less relevant for law education in the colony. 
Scholten defended his position by arguing that Roman law was “only relevant in the 
context of world history.” Although he acknowledged that in civil law there would be 
repeated reference to Roman law, Latin still “lies too far from the sphere of thoughts 
                                                 
42 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 70, Report on Proposals for Batavia Rechtshoogeschool. 
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of the Indies society for them to make use of it.”43 To him, the opinion that Roman law 
was law par excellence was no longer valid. 
Paul Scholten’s progressive stance on the curriculum captured the attention of 
high-ranking officials in the colony. In a meeting with them on March 19, 1924, 
Scholten faced their skepticism.44 The president of the Supreme Court, P.W. Filet, 
argued that since indigenous students were naturally familiar with their mother tongue, 
there was no need to provide academic training in Malay. On the contrary, he 
continued, a lack of Latin would be a handicap for those who later decided to pursue a 
career in criminal law. Filet was concerned that future judiciary leaders would be 
reluctant to appoint to the higher court “a criminal lawyer (who lacks Latin).”45 
Scholten countered Filet’s argument, proposing two criteria for judging Latin’s 
relevance to the Indies: by assessing the value of the classical upbringing that Latin 
would provide,46 and by assessing the practical usefulness of studying Latin. On the 
basis of both criteria, Latin failed the test. Latin was necessary only for an advanced 
study of Roman law; it was irrelevant for the study of criminal or private law. To 
require students to study Latin for the sake of appearance to Scholten was a 
“questionable wisdom.” 
                                                 
43 This statement lies in the interstices between practical and racist arguments. On the one side, it was 
indeed impractical to force students to study a language that would hardly benefit their practice of law 
in the Indies. This was the case especially in European commercial law—which he seemed to suspect 
would not be chosen by many of the students—that was closely linked to Latin and Roman concepts. 
On the other hand, Scholten alluded to the natives’ inability to grasp foreign concepts simply because 
their cultural reference was not that of Europeans.  
44 Among those present were the Governor General, M. Fock; Prof. Scholten himself; a member of 
Raad van Indie, Creutzberg; the president of the Supreme Court (Hooggerechtshof), Mr. P.W. Filet; the 
General Secretary, Ch.J.I.M. Welter; the director of the Binnenlands Bestuur, L.J. Schippers; the 
director Department of Justice, Mr. F.J.H.Cowan; the director of the Department of Education and 
Religion, J.F.W. van der Meulen; the chief official seconded to the director of Education and Religion, 
J. Hardeman; and Mr. Ed. Broens, Senior Official of the General Secretary.  
45 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 70, Notulen van de vergadering ten Paleize Ryswyk gehouden 
op 19 Maart 1924 ter bespreking van de oprichting van de Juridische Hoogeschool.  
46 Scholten did not mention it explicitly here, but I suggest what he meant by “value of upbringing” was 
its impact on the worldview of the student.  
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The public enthusiastically followed the debates and discussions about the 
Rechtshoogeschool. Articles in local newspapers were well informed of the 
preparatory works’ inner working. They were either made openly accessible or 
deliberately leaked to journalists to inform the public. Paul Scholten was informed of 
the public reaction to the Rechtshoogeschool initiative, proven by the newspaper 
clippings preserved in his personal archive at the National Archive in The Hague. One 
clipping in particular stands out, as it is the only one written in Malay. Along with this 
clipping is a typed translation in Dutch. 
Reactions in the Local Newspapers 
The article in Neratja appeared on March 1, 1924, more than two weeks before 
the important meeting took place between Scholten and the East Indies high-ranking 
officials.47 The author of the article was reacting to an earlier proposal prepared by the 
Indies Commission because Scholten’s report had yet to be finalized and presented to 
the Indies audience. Although supportive in general, the article criticized the rules for 
admission to the Rechtshoogeschool and the role of Latin in this admission and in the 
curriculum. He considered the admission rule discriminatory because it practically 
neglected the aim of establishing a law college in the Indies; the requirement for 
prospective students to have taken Latin would disqualify the Hogere Burger School 
(HBS) graduates unless they took an additional state exam to certify their fluency.48 
The author made his objection about Latin crystal clear: 
                                                 
47 Creutzberg, a member of the Directors of the Indies (Raad van Indie), suspected that the criminal law 
students would end up teaching themselves Latin. He deemed that facultative placement of Latin for 
criminal jurists was a good way to judge whether the practice was feasible. Scholten agreed that a 
facultative placement of Latin might initially be a priority for the students of criminal law, but still 
insisted that it should be gradually let go.  
48 To understand the nuances of the discrimination here, one needs to understand the two-track system 
of primary education in the Netherlands and the East Indies: one track for vocational training and the 
other to prepare for intellectual, university education. Classical training was considered to be the only 
legitimate track towards a legal degree (Nasution 1995) until the Hurgronje commission made it 
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In terms of fluency in Malay, Javanese, Sundanese, etc., masters (of law) from 
the Indies are much better than Europeans. Even if the Europeans are indeed 
fluent in the local languages, they still need interpreters. (With the stress on 
Latin fluency) does it mean the Indies population needs to study Latin because 
the judges speak in Latin, or does it mean the judges need to have fluency in 
the plaintiff’s native tongue?49 
For the author, Latin was irrelevant and useless for the Indies. This highly 
selective admission criterion was especially upsetting because of the acute shortage of 
jurists, the ineffective service of retired European officials at landraden, and the 
cosmopolitan nature of the East Indies that required legal training specific to the East 
Indies situation, which hardly needed fluency in Latin. Compared to the waiver policy 
at Leiden University, the Rechtshoogeschool requirement seemed absurd. With these 
facts on hand, the author pleaded to the government to admit the Native 
rechstkundigen, and to waive them from candidaatsexamen, as was the case in Leiden, 
thus saving them two years of duplicate study.50 Moreover, the author argued, unless 
the Rechtshoogeschool revised its admission policy to include graduates of the 
Algemeene Middlebare School (AMS) of both Western and Eastern classical 
languages divisions, it could hardly get enough students to populate the classes. 
The article in Neratja was clearly written by someone well versed in the nuts 
and bolts of Rechtsschool education and in the policy of higher education in the East 
Indies and in the Netherlands. The author’s suggestions were almost verbatim copies 
of the Academic Statuut 1921 and of the Leiden United Faculty of Law and Letters’ 
admission policy. He or she was aware of the exam waiver for native rechstkundige at 
                                                                                                                                            
possible for HBS graduate to study Netherlands-Indies law at Leiden after they had the Academic 
Statute revised in 1921 (Fasseur 1993, 1995).  
49 NL-HaNA, Scholten, 2.21.319, inv.nr. 77, newspaper clippings. 
50 The author nevertheless tried to appease the general anxiety about a possible flood of Native students 
in the Rechtshoogeschool by saying that even if the candidaatsexamen were waived, not every 
rechstkundige could afford to continue their study, for lack of funding. 
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Leiden University, of proposed rules of admission to the Rechtshoogeschool, and of 
the state of legal uncertainty in the landraad. Even though it is difficult to identify the 
author, the tone of the essay strongly suggests an educated Indonesian. Neratja 
published the article on March 1, 1924, well ahead of Scholten’s meeting with the East 
Indies luminaries on March 19; Scholten must have read a translation of this article 
before the meeting, and would have felt vindicated by the indigenous voice on the 
irrelevance of Latin in the East Indies. 
A Dutch-speaking newspaper published in Semarang, De Locomotief, printed a 
series of three articles a month later, between 12 and 14 April in 1924. By this time, a 
more refined draft of the Rechtshoogeschool bylaws must have been circulated among 
elite residents in the East Indies, hence the curiously detailed article that quoted some 
of the proposed draft. In this draft, it was clear that Latin was not going to be a 
compulsory subject for admission. The article lauded the innovative proposal of law 
specialization that was ahead of its time and was adopted only much later by the 
Netherlands. Students could specialize in criminal law, private law, constitutional law, 
or sociology/economy. Agreeing that the East Indies should be more independent from 
the Netherlands, and in this case in the direction of its higher education system, De 
Locomotief supported the idea that Latin should not be obligatory for admission. 
Latin as an object of study symbolized the classical European education that 
was absent in the Indies. The tentative proposal to abolish it from the Indies legal 
education evoked strong reactions from the European circle in the colony. Scholten, to 
his credit, never officially withdrew his position on the irrelevance of Latin for the 
Indies. I suggest that this was the influence of the Indies in deciding what knowledge 
was imperative for the Indies. 
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The Rechtshoogeschool in Action 
Scholten came back to the East Indies in September 1924 to finalize the 
launching of the Rechtshoogeschool. Between his first and second visit, discussions 
continued in the East Indies to finalize the school’s bylaws. In October 21, 1924, the 
colonial state gazette, De Javasche Courant, officially published the government’s 
regulation for the Rechtshoogeschool. It laid out regulations for admission, the 
calendar of study, costs, vacation time, and the courses and examinations to be taken 
by students. Although the final bylaws were officiated by the government, the 
Rechtshoogeschool was a relatively independent institution, having been put under the 
supervision of a board of directors, two of whom were professors of the school. 
In the 1924 bylaws, Latin was still a prerequisite for students with no classical 
background who opted for a specialty in private law (Art. 21). An entrance exam to 
demonstrate basic understanding in reading Latin prose was required but was 
gradually eased, so that by 1930 it became optional for students who wished to have 
their competence certified (Massier 2008, 134). At the candidaatsexamen Javanese 
and Malay became the language of choice as well as subjects to be examined for all 
students regardless of their specialty. The Rechtshoogeschool decision to introduce 
Malay as an academically acknowledged language led to an unexpected consequence. 
In 1928, students from the Rechtschoogeschool, along with students from other 
colleges, proclaimed the historical “Youth Oath,” where for the first time in history, 
ethnic identity was superseded by a national identity: they pledged to be one nation, 
Indonesia; to speak one language, Indonesian; and to consider one motherland, 
Indonesia. Learning Malay in an academic setting must have spurred the sense of 
nationalism among them. 
As an institution for legal education, the Rechtshoogeschool was decidedly 
different from the Rechtsschool. The Rechtshoogeschool was a college-level legal 
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education that admitted all segments of the Indies societies. As a college, the 
curriculum offered at the Rechtshoogeschool was far more advanced than at the 
Rechtsschool, and catered more to a modern state that had anticipated a unified legal 
system. The Rechtshoogeschool admitted older students of 17 to 18 years old, while 
the Rechtsschool admitted tender, malleable boys of 13 years for the preparatory 
section and of 16 for the legal education section. At the Rechtshoogeschool students 
were considered mature adults, capable of behaving responsibly, and were addressed 
as “Mister.” As a matter of fact, they basked in the respectful treatment they received 
from the professors, director of the dorm, and fellow students (Algadri 1999; Agung 
1993). A number of students in the mid- and late-1930s matured during their years at 
the Rechtshoogeschool, such as Hamid Algadri, Oei Tjoe Tat, and Anak Agung Gde 
Agung.51 Agung, a scion of the Gianyar Royal House in Bali, felt thoroughly at home 
in the dormitory because it allowed him to meet and interact with students from 
various backgrounds, races, and ethnic groups. He felt that the atmosphere nurtured 
his character and intellectual growth (Agung 1993, 93). Oei, Agung’s contemporary, 
felt the same (Beynon 1995). Both met and benefited from students who were far more 
advanced in their political education. 
One aspect that the Rechtshoogeschool retained from the Rechtsschool was its 
commitment to nurturing independent minds. The Rechtshoogeschool and the 
dormitory retained their progressive leaning until the end of the Dutch colonial period. 
Oei noted the extensive selections of newspapers available for students in the school 
such as Nieuws van de Dag, het Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, de Java Bode, De 
Locomotief, and Sin Po en Matahari van Semarang, including newspapers with a 
nationalist leaning. Oei’s sense of nationalism was awakened by a piece written by 
                                                 
51 Algadri, Oei, and Agung became involved in the Indonesian independence movement and in post-
independence Indonesian politics as ministers and high-ranking officials.  
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Sam Ratulangie, a member of the Nationalist Faction in the Volksraad, which was 
published in a nationalistic periodical the dormitory subscribed to, Nationale 
Commentaren. Students were encouraged to attend Volksraad sessions, an opportunity 
many like Agung and Oei took seriously. In Agung’s two years at the School—his 
education was disrupted by the Japanese occupation that began in 1942—he attended 
the Volksraad sessions regularly and was impressed by the nationalist members such 
as Sukarjo Wirjopranoto, Soeangkoepon, and Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin, Oei’s 
hero. The professors at the school were quite progressive. Oei remembered Prof. 
Scheper, whose article in the newspaper supported Soekarno when he was tried and 
convicted in the Landraad in Bandung. Other professors assigned Scheper’s article to 
students as study material. Prof. Logemann allowed Hamid Algadri to prioritize his 
party activity over his oral exam on Constitutional Law (Algadri 1999). 
The narrative I presented above demonstrates how curriculum formation was a 
battleground for control of what can be known and how to know in the colony. The 
revealing fact here was the involvement of Indonesians in the discourse of language 
politics for the Rechtsschool. Paul Scholten and the native voice as represented by the 
author in Neratja shared the belief that students of indigenous origin must learn to 
think scientifically in their own language. Indeed, a mastery of language was essential 
to epistemic knowledge, and a mastery of one’s own language in the least would retain 
one’s cognitive order and one’s connection with one’s own culture. The government’s 
endorsement of Paul Scholten’s proposal to include Malay as one of the examined 
courses in the Rechtsschool could also be seen as pragmatic colonial technologies of 
rule. Nevertheless, I suggest that this official inclusion of Malay demonstrates that the 
rationale behind the curriculum design implied pedagogical objectives more 
complicated than simply shaping subjectivities to be fully submissive to European 
epistemology. 
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Discursive Spillover: Legal Discourse among the Native Population 
Even though legal education was available only to a small section of 
Indonesian elites, the idea of modern administration of law eventually spilled over to 
the nsociety, especially the reading masses. From the early 20th century on, the 
vernacular press enjoyed a robust growth with an increasing number of readers (Adam 
1995). In this new age of motion and progress (Mrazek 2002; Shiraishi 1990), the 
press enthusiastically amplified what the editors deemed signs and opportunities for 
progress. Law particularly symbolizes this sign, and the vernacular press diligently 
published articles that touched upon law, rights, and the administration of justice. I 
suggest that the ubiquitous publication of law-related articles was prompted by the fact 
that during this period Rechtsschool graduates had immersed themselves in society at 
large since the first graduation in 1912, Leiden graduates had begun to return home, 
and the Batavia Rechtshoogeschool was fully operating and had graduated its first 
Meesters in de Rechten by 1929. During this period, the Rechtshoogeschool students 
were active in political parties and were intensely involved in various nationalistic 
events, most decisively in the Youth Oath of 1928. 
The 1920s were electric and pulsating years for Indonesian legal scholars. The 
vernacular press printed articles addressing legal issues that awakened an awareness of 
law throughout the native society. The native’s cognitive categories of law and justice 
now included European-rooted law, rights, and justice. In this section, I aim to offer 
only a sketch of the articles and essays printed in selected publications between 1920 
and 1929. These are by no means representative of the full spectrum of legal discourse 
in the vernacular press; nevertheless, they give us a sense of the intimate connection 
between legal education and the spread of legal consciousness among the general 
population that promises an opportunity for further research. 
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In 1924, a Malay-speaking weekly, Bintang Hindia, published a series of 
articles about the administration of justice. It was published weekly between March 29 
and April 19 and titled “Our Administration of Justice” (Onze Rechtspleging). Jong 
Java, the newspaper published by the organization of the same name, Javanese Youth, 
and run from the dormitory of the Rechtshoogeschool, published articles about 
natives’ land rights on April 1, 1923, titled “Inlandsch bezitsrecht op gronden op Java 
en Madoera” and on September 15, 1924, titled “Inlander en zijn grond,” authored by 
one Pati Soemirat. In 1928, Bintang Timoer, a well-read Malay-speaking newspaper, 
printed articles that went on at length about the native land-rights issue. Published on 
21 January 1928, an article titled “Erfpacht yang akan habis” (Expiring Erfpacht) 
discussed the long-term land leases offered to Dutch agricultural enterprises that were 
expiring and identified opportunities to wrest them away from those private hands. 
This article responded to articles in Dutch-language newspapers—Java Bode, De 
Sumatra Post, and Het Nieuwe—and the discussion at the Volksraad. In that year, 
Bintang Timoer continued to publish articles discussing erfpacht, long-term land 
leases to Dutch agricultural enterprises. On 18 September 1928, it published a report 
about a gathering of Indonesian political parties to discuss the erfpacht issue. PSI, 
PNI, Boedi Oetomo, Pasoendan, Serikat Soematra, and Kaoem Betawi were well 
represented in the gathering. A couple of days later, on 25 September 1928, Bintang 
Timoer published another article about a gathering to propose a motion about erfpacht 
in the Volksraad. Three thousand people attended the gathering where Mr. Sunario, a 
graduate of the Rechtsschool and Leiden United Faculty of Law and Letters, who by 
then worked as an advocate for Iwa Kusuma Sumantri’s law office in Medan, 
explained the concept of Domain Right at length.52 The newspaper published separate 
                                                 
52 Domain Right, or Domeinrecht, was a fundamental concept in the Netherlands East Indies legalese 
that “justified” the colonial claim to land in the Archipelago. This concept will be discussed at length in 
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articles on 25 and 26 September 1928, again about erfpacht. The year after, in its July 
1–5, 1929, edition, the Jong Java bulletin reprinted Cornelis van Vollenhoven’s 
famous and decisive piece “Indonesians and Their Land” (Indonesier en zijn Grond), 
which was originally published in 1917. This was the essay that stopped the parliament 
in the Netherlands from approving a proposed amendment to the Agrarian Law 1870 
that would have excluded land in Sumatra from the prohibition of alienation to non-
natives. 
The vernacular press was equally enthusiastic about Indonesian jurists. 
Graduation and success in attaining a degree was always considered a piece of good 
news. For example, Bintang Hindia in 1924 announced a graduation of Rechtsschool 
students complete with well wishes. Jong Java on 15 November 1924 published an 
essay on the launching of the Rechtshoogeschool with a critical eye on the rumors of 
the training inadequacy of the “Masters” trained in the Rechtsschool and the United 
Faculty in Leiden. Based on the speed and seriousness with which the Law College 
was established, and the budget allocated to enable this, the author judged that the 
colonial government was serious about helping the political development of the 
country. In its 17 March 1928 edition, Bintang Timoer announced Soepomo’s 
graduation from Leiden with flying colors, which earned him the first and only award 
ever granted, the Gadjah Mada Prijs. 
These selections are but a small sample of a wider conversation within native 
communities with regard to law, and the administration of justice, especially related to 
land rights. It goes without saying that other forms of engagement with the colonial 
administration on land exist (Kahn 1993). Although the selective articles above are 
inadequate to establish a clear and undisputable relationship between legal education 
and rising awareness of law and the administration of justice, all indications suggest 
                                                                                                                                            
the coming chapters.  
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that legal education, despite being enjoyed by a tiny slice of native elites, helped 
spreading colonial legal discourse within native societies, who in turn adopted and 
reworked them as their own. 
Conclusion 
Legal education in the Netherlands East Indies was a project of subject 
formation, which was simultaneously a dyad to colonial state formation. In this 
chapter, I define colonial state formation as the historical processes by which the 
colonizing power consolidates its grip on the colonized in a way that ensures their 
acceptance of the former through subject formation. Subject formation here, in turn, 
refers to the constitution of subjectivity through power relations, in this particular case 
by a network of colonial actors through legal education practices. One exists through 
the other. As the Dutch stabilized their territorial grip on the Archipelago, they needed 
to gain legitimacy through means other than military power, such as by 
institutionalizing law and legal discourse through which the network of government 
institutions projected the presence of a unified “state” as the ultimate arbiter of justice. 
This symbolic language of stateness required an army of lawyers and law clerks to run 
the mundane tasks of administering justice. In the Indies, a corps of Native lawyers 
economically provided this service. 
To law school educators, Netherlands parliament members, and the Minister of 
the Colonies, Native lawyers needed to acquire a specific form of subjectivity in order 
to uphold the impression of the projected authority as the guarantor of justice: Highly 
intellectual with a full grasp of both European and Native legal thought worlds; 
possessing the capacity to make independent legal decisions even in the face of 
menacing colonial bureaucracy such as the Binnenlands Bestuur and the Inlands 
Bestuur; competent to think scientifically in their own native language; and 
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empowered to challenge a feudal structure to bring the country forward to modernity, 
among others. This particular form of subjectivity was imperative for the colonial 
regime to sustain acceptance by the native population. 
In my narrative I demonstrate how the pedagogical strategy and the design of 
the curriculum in colonial legal education carried objectives more complicated than 
simply colonizing minds or creating docile bodies. From the Rechtsschool, to the 
Leiden University United Faculty of Law and Letters, to the Rechtshoogeschool, 
students’ autonomy and independence continued to be nurtured. Adat law remained 
not only an important discipline to master, proven by its status as one of the four 
examined courses for the doctoralexamen, but also a major link in maintaining the 
connection of Native jurists to their culture (or the culture of their compatriots, since 
the adat law taught was not necessarily that of one’s own). Continued study of 
Constitutional Law of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies both at the United 
Faculty in Leiden and in the Rechtshoogeschool in Batavia, for example, allowed for 
critical comparison of the stature of law and citizenship in the Netherlands and in the 
colonies, freely provoking various forms of self-reflection. 
These particular pedagogical strategies and curriculum designs were 
complemented by the practical knowledge of the everyday machinations of the state 
system as exemplified in Roestam Effendi’s successful run for the Lower Chamber in 
the Netherlands and in the Rechtshoogeschool’s students’ attendance at the Volksraad 
sessions. Language politics that materialized in Leiden and the Rechtshoogeschool 
introduced to Native students a new sense of and perspective on community. The 
decision to include Malay as one of the examined courses in the Rechtshoogeschool 
(in contrast to only Javanese in the United Faculty) and the debate around the 
relevance of Latin for a law study in the Netherlands East Indies diluted the primary 
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role of Dutch as the High Language. It also instilled in these students a healthy dose of 
skepticism of European culture as the ultimate reference point. 
As demonstrated by Sunario’s recollection, the career track of Iwa Kusuma 
Sumantri, Hamid Algadri’s brushes with his Rechtshoogeschool professor Logemann, 
merely three of many illustrious graduates from the educational institution triad, the 
shaping of subjectivity through colonial legal education submerged neither the 
capacity for critical reflection nor the ability to deliberate, an argument I will expand 
further in my next chapters. On the contrary, legal education equipped students with 
discursive arsenals to engage in and to shape colonial legal discourse. 
By my two arguments above, I acknowledge that the reordering of cognitive 
structure and hierarchies of the Native students did take place; however, I suggest that 
this reordering did not replace the structure gained through earlier indigenous rearing. 
Rather, there are sediments of cognitive orders with porous boundaries, reciprocally 
penetrating one another in a way that generated a unique form of subjectivity, a form 
that brought forth unconventional expressions of agency, especially in the discursive 
arena. Such cognitive order transformed the educated Natives’ way of recognizing 
structures, power, and the promise of the colonial legal order as the ultimate arbiter of 
justice. Ironically, it also made them more aware of the discrepancy between 
theoretical concepts of justice and the reality of colonial practices, a rising 
consciousness that I explore in more detail in the next chapters. With such conditions, 
it thus becomes imperative to understand the agencies of Native intellectuals as 
agencies bound in cultural processes, which, in themselves, are constituted in complex 
power relations, and to analyze them within their own historical context and specific 
colonial conditions. Accepting the subject as constituted through relations of power 
“ . . . does not commit us to a denial of subjectivity, agency, or autonomy” (Allen 
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2008, 177). Rather, it forces us to acknowledge that autonomy and reflexivity are 
historically and culturally constructed and inescapably shaped by power relations. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Becoming Wadoeng West: 
A Short, Entangled Biography of Land in Banjoewangi, East Java 
Introduction 
In the 1938–1939 session of the Volksraad, R.P. Soeroso,1 a Native member 
from East Java, spoke passionately about the fate of land illegally occupied by the 
Wadoeng West Agricultural Estate in Genteng district, Banjoewangi division, Besoeki 
Residency, East Java. This was the fifth time in as many years that he had demanded 
concrete measures be taken in response to the case, but: 
To my regret I must now put on record that after five years the Government is 
still at an utter loss with this illegal land occupation. It is said that difficulties 
have arisen in connection with the case. In the Memorandum of Response the 
Government said that . . . [the case] still needs a further verification of whether 
to wait for a more opportune moment, and then[to decide] whether an 
administrative solution is possible and desirable. This statement can not 
appease me because this issue has already been pending for five years. . . . 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1938/1939, 540 
The speech offers us a glimpse into the concrete process of colonial state 
formation through the constitution of the colonial agrarian regime. In this speech, we 
observe a Native member of the colonial proto-parliament who, by appropriating the 
colonizer’s legitimating instrument, challenged the government’s slow response to the 
case. By deploying the words “illegally occupied,” Soeroso implicitly referred to a 
particular concept of justice absent in the precolonial times but by then widely shared 
between the colonized and the colonizer. He delivered his speech under the watchful 
gaze of peasants sitting in the public gallery, peasants whose lands the Wadoeng West 
                                                 
1 R.P. Soeroso was a member of the Volksraad from East Java who served beginning in 1924, first as an 
appointed member, and from 1927 as an elected member. He was member of the College van de 
Geleedegeerden during the period 1930-1931 and during the period 1935-1936. Prior to serving in 
Volksraad, Soeroso had been a seasoned advocate for the Native population in East Java through his 
works in Sarekat Islam (Soeroso 1984). 
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Estate occupied. In this spectacle, together they evoked the “colonial state’s” presence 
and participated in the everyday making of its existence. Yet, at the same time, 
Soeroso signaled the “state’s” impotence when confronted with a legally sanctioned 
demand for native rights. After five yeasr, the fight seemed to be quixotic and futile, 
but I suggest that its significance lay less in the success of wresting the land back for 
the peasants than in the way it kept their struggle in the public view. 
This chapter narrates the life story of the land that became the Wadoeng West 
Estate. Using agrarian law and policy as a lens, I aim to underscore the pivotal role of 
land commodification in colonial state formation. It is the second part of my two-
pronged theoretical explorations on the topic. In chapter 1, I explore colonial state 
formation through the ways that education shaped and made the colonial subject. In 
this chapter, I examine the way colonial law determined the character of land as a 
commodity ripe for the market. Together, these chapters provide a stage from which to 
interrogate the reciprocally formed subject and law, and how the two sustained 
colonial state formation. 
Examining the impact of laws on landscape, I analyze the ways in which 
colonial subjects mediated everyday encounters between land and law and the twists 
and turns the mediation required. I begin in 1854, when the Dutch enacted the first law 
to regulate property relations in the colony and endsin 1938 when R.P. Soeroso 
delivered his final protest. Using texts of colonial agrarian laws, a protest manifesto 
written by a Dutch planter, records of the Volksraad sessions, and newspaper articles, 
I reconstruct the life story of plots of lands, which—by virtue of the laws—
transformed into the Wadoeng West Estate. I bring to the foreground the peculiar 
ways that law determined the entangled relationships between man and land and their 
intertwined roles as co-contributors to colonial state-making. Elevating everyday 
struggles over land waged by private citizens, state agents, judicial institutions, Native 
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peasants, and Native “politicians” to eye level, I argue that law “made” landscape into 
land, but its making was always tentative. The constant friction of all actors among 
themselves and against agrarian laws spurred the process into unexpected directions, 
effectively swerving colonial state formation from any predestined trajectory. 
The Law Made the Land 
In 1938, the last year Soeroso expressed his protest, the Wadoeng West Estate 
had become a prosperous agricultural enterprise. Pioneered by the high-spirited 
Bernard and Adriaan Ledeboer, the Estate cultivated coffee traded in the Amsterdam 
commodity exchange. The Comprehensive Atlas of the Netherlands East Indies 
(Diessen 2003) situates the Wadoeng West Estate in the village of Soember Salak and 
Soember Gajam, 44 kilometers southwest of Banjoewangi. The exact location, 
however, is not specified. At this location the Wadoeng West Estate managed 877 
hectares of land.2 
The Wadoeng West Estate was situated at the foot of a volcanic mountain 
chain: Gunung Raung, Gunung Kukusan, and Gunung Merapi. These mountains 
formed a south-facing crescent that cradles a swath of fertile lands. On his famous 
expedition of Java mountains, Junghuhn recorded the magnificent diversity of this 
mountainous region: at the highest altitude, bare sands from frequent volcanic 
eruptions covered the mountain top until at a lower inclination it was suddenly met by 
highland vegetation such as Casuarina, Acacia montana, and Antennaria javanica 
(Junghuhn 1844, 495). Further down, luxuriant forest vegetation covered the highland 
with valuable timber trees such as Tectona grandis (teak) for house and ships’ bows; 
pellet, segawi, laban, and suran for timber; pronosodo and sono for furniture; keppo 
                                                 
2 Wadoeng West Estate also controlled other plots of land in Soember Mangis (Diessen 2003, 334) and 
Jang Plateau that remained a conservation area for Javanese deer (Volksraad Handelingen 1931/1932). 
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and bayur for firewood; and many more endemic species. The local population logged 
wood, but they lacked the skills to saw wood properly so they wasted much of the logs 
(Aa 1857). A fear of tigers, the difficult terrain during monsoon seasons, a lack of 
water, and diseases had also prevented the locals from fully exploiting the forested 
areas. 
Banjoewangi was the easternmost division (afdeeling) in Java, bordering to the 
north with Soemberwaroe district, to the west with Djember division, to the south with 
South Java Sea, and to the east with the strait of Bali. Coffee was widely planted in 
Banjoewangi and neighboring divisions during the forced cultivation system between 
1820 and 1870. Under the supervision of the Native headmen, the local population 
planted and tended coffee gardens, producing substantial profit for the Dutch. 
Banjoewangi was famous in the Netherlands and was highly sought after (Aa 1857, 
593). 
The fame of Banjoewangi coffee must have captured the attention of aspiring 
entrepreneurs who dotted the East Java region, especially those knowledgeable in 
agronomy and agricultural enterprises such as the Ledeboers.3 Bernard Ledeboer (b. 
1875) and Adriaan Johan Marie Ledeboer (b. 1877) were the fourth and fifth children 
of Johan Marie Ledeboer and Anna Willemina van Meerten.4 Born and raised in 
Borne, the Netherlands, the two came to the East Indies in the late 19th century after 
graduating from the local Hogere Burger School. Bernard worked for a while at Kali 
Sepandjang Estate, acquiring skills and know-how to set up his own estate. He also 
managed a rubber estate in Banjoewangi for a time. Adriaan started his career at Koch 
and Suermondt Agricultural Estate in Soember Bokor, Malang, between 1897 and 
                                                 
3 Adriaan Ledeboer had contributed at least one article to the journal of Indies agronomy, Cultuur Gids 
Volume 1907-1908. Bernaard Ledeboer served as an estate manager of the Kali Sepandjang plantation 
in Kempit, Banjoewangi.  
4 Internet data http://www.chabot.demon.nl/genealog/chabot04/218.htm (accessed July 20, 2011). 
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1899 (Anon, 1931). He moved on to manage an estate in Soember Tengah, Besoeki, 
between 1900 and 1915 before joining Bernard, who started the Wadoeng West Estate 
in 1912. By the second decade of the 20th century, the two brothers had gained enough 
experience to start their own venture. 
Bernard and Adriaan Ledeboer were intellectually active. Adriaan wrote 
articles for academic journals, collected plant samples for Herbarium Bogoriense, and 
contributed animal specimens to the Zoological Museum in Bogor. Bernard, on the 
other hand, published an engaging, if passionate, personal manifesto about clandestine 
estates in the Besoeki Residency. This manifesto offers remarkable insights into the 
challenge of running an estate in the midst of ambiguous land policy and legal 
pluralism; it preserves the experience of an estate owner/manager and his encounters 
with state agents, lawyers, land brokers, and clandestine European landholders, in his 
effort to secure the survival of his estate. 
Bernard Ledeboer would not have had a chance to establish Wadoeng West 
had the Dutch not introduced an agrarian regime in the colony. I define the colonial 
agrarian regime as the complex ensemble of laws, legal practices, and specific 
enterprises that underpin the rearranging of social relations and property rights in the 
colony. As was the nature of colonial projects, this particular project was never a one-
way intervention: The whole spectrum of the colonial society—Europeans and 
Natives, colonizer and colonized—took part in the constitution of the agrarian regime 
with diverse objectives. For the government, the objectives were to provide land for 
commercial agriculture and to prevent the native population from losing their use 
rights. For the colonial subjects and citizens who intervened, it was less 
straightforward and most likely clashed with the official line. 
In the first half of the 19th century, the government-run forced cultivation 
system was the only “legal” agricultural initiative in the Indies. The Dutch tasked 
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Native headmen with leading the population to produce an allotted quota for the 
Netherlands Trading Company (Nederland Handels Matschappij, NHM). Although 
the Dutch left adat law to regulate property relations, the pressure to meet production 
and tax quotas forced the Native headmen to reallocate and reorganize land in a way 
that led to the demise of the native private property regime. The disarray misled many 
Dutch persons to believe that no private ownership existed in the native legal realm 
(Vollenhoven 1931, 620).5 
In reality, the indigenous population of Banjoewangi, and in East Java in 
general, acknowledged varied forms of property rights. They ranged from full 
ownership comparable to the Dutch eigendom, right of enjoyment (genotrecht), rights 
to crops and plants separated from rights to land (recht van gewassenen), to temporary 
rights to residential plots within village boundaries (Vollenhoven 1931).6 The 
reclaiming (ontginning) of virgin lands might lead a native to full ownership rights to 
land. Everyone had the right to reclaim land in areas outside the village boundaries. 
Within the boundaries, however, the village exercised rights of allocation 
(beschikkingsrecht) and distributed rights to reclaim only to village members. Those 
who permanently maintained the land could eventually gain full ownership. Non-
village members who cultivated land within village boundaries retained only usufruct 
rights (Vollenhoven 1931, 625–626).7 All usufruct rights were non-alienable and non-
inheritable; the rights dissolved as soon as crops were harvested. 
                                                 
5 See Breman (1983) for a narrative on how colonial pressures almost erased forms of private land 
ownership in 19th-century Cirebon, West Java.  
6 In agrarian law and legal documents, the Dutch were careful not to pass these rights over to the Dutch 
legal realm in order to maintain a separate system between the Native property rights regime and the 
Dutch one, a practice van Vollenhoven condemned as an injustice (1919). This section draws mainly 
from Cornelis van Vollenhoven’s (1933) treatise on adat law in East Java that includes Banjoewangi. 
7 As van Vollenhoven noted, turning the right to reclaim (ontginningsrecht) to the right of disposal/right 
of allocation was supported by law introduced in the Staatsblad 1916 No. 420 (on timber rights in 
Palembang) Article 2, paragraph 1A under I and Article 3 paragraph 2 sub b. 
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The indigenous property system seems straightforward at first, but the 
peasant’s habit of pawning land (Javanese: gade) as a means to raise cash complicated 
land administration. A typical pawning transaction would take place as an agreement 
to transfer land into another’s control while the original landholder retained the right 
to buy it back. The Dutch termed this transaction a koop en wederinkoop, a sale with a 
right to buy back. European leaseholders deeply disliked this native practice because 
they lasted many years without periodical recompense. The new Native landholder 
could re-pawn the land to others, even if the land was already leased, so many times 
that the original landholder could no longer be identified. Although pawning required 
the cooperation of the village elders, the lack of transfer documents created headaches 
in land administration. Van Vollenhoven even suggested that nullifying land 
registration for pawned land might be the only solution to the problem (1933, 627). 
Agrarian Laws in the East Indies 
After the forced cultivation system lost its luster, the Dutch parliament 
struggled to come up with a law to encourage private agricultural investments in the 
colony.8 Legal reforms in the Netherlands in 1848 and the increasing power of the 
liberal faction in the parliament brought about profound changes to the colony. The 
tug-of-war between the conservatives and the liberals colonial land policy was clearly 
reflected in the emerging laws. On the one hand, the liberals pushed for new laws that 
would promote private agricultural investment while reducing the role of the 
government in agricultural enterprises. On the other hand, the conservatives insisted 
that government-run plantations were still the best option to protect the natives from 
                                                 
8 Fasseur (1992) details the long struggle in the Dutch Parliament regarding the forced cultivation 
policy. 
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massive land transfer (Fasseur 1992; Furnivall 1944). As a result, the laws introduced 
in the colony contained inherent instability. 
A quick glance at the Indies Regeeringsalmanak 1938 (Annual Report of the 
Dutch East Indies) reveals the extent and complexity of land laws in the Indies. Laws 
for the directly governed areas (gouvernmentsstreken) were different from laws for the 
semi-autonomous areas (zelfbestuur).9 The laws narrated here were applicable only in 
the directly governed areas. 
Three basic laws provided the foundation for agrarian regulations: Article 62 
of the Regeeringsreglement (Constitutional Regulation)10 1854, the Agrarian Law of 
1870, and the Alienation Prohibition decreed in Staatsblad 1875 No. 179. Three 
clauses in article 62 of the Regeeringsreglement 1854 provided the legal basis for 
granting land leases. The first prohibited the Governor General from selling land, 
except small plots of land intended to expand towns and villages or to establish 
facilities for manufacturing. The second allowed the Governor General to issue land 
leases according to rules set by a general regulation.11 The third excluded from being 
leased land cultivated by the natives, land designated for public use or some other uses 
for the villages, and land belonging to villages (Nederburgh 1882). This early law was 
restrictive: the lease could not exceed twenty years, the leasehold was not eligible for 
loans, and land available for this lease was located in remote areas with limited labor 
supply. Understandably, it failed to attract investors’ interests. 
                                                 
9 Sem-autonomous regions included the Javanese Principalities and Native sultanates—most important 
being the Sultanate of Riau on the east coast of Sumatra. 
10 The Regeeringsreglement (Constitutional Regulation) set a new era in the Netherlands Indies with its 
“clear recognition of the supremacy of law” (Furnivall 1944, 158). It replaced the old system that was 
based on authority as had been exercised, for example, by Governor General van den Bosch, who 
established the Forced Cultivation system in 1820. In 1925 the Indisch Staatsregeling 1925 replaced the 
Regeelingreglements 1854. 
11 Known in Dutch as algemene verordeningen, general regulations could be issued in the form of laws 
or legal enactments by the Dutch Parliament, royal decrees or acts of the Crown by the King, and 
ordinances or acts of the Governor General with or without the Council of Indies (Furnivall 1944). 
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The Agrarian Law of 1870 offered more attractive possibilities than the laws in 
the Regeeringsreglement 1854. Land could now be leased for up to seventy-five years; 
the Governor General ensured that land transactions would not infringe on the rights 
of the native population; land cultivated by the native population for their own use, 
common pasture, or land belonging to the village was to be disposed of only with 
adequate compensation; land belonging to the natives under heritable usufruct rights 
could be transferred to the Dutch form of ownership, eigendom, with certain 
restrictions; and lease or transfer of use from natives to non-natives was to be ruled by 
a general regulation. This last ruling was popularly known as the Alienation 
Prohibition (het vervreemdingsverbod). 
The Alienation Prohibition was redacted rather vaguely: “That land use right is 
not susceptible to alienation by natives to non-natives, so that all agreements, such as 
alienation, directly or indirectly intended, are legally void” (Staatsblad 1875 No. 179). 
The decree gave legal form to the tradition of Dutch rule against the alienation of 
native land to foreigners. With a limited exception, the Alienation Prohibition 
practically ruled out any form of land alienation from the natives to non-natives, 
making leases from the government or rent from the natives the only ways to establish 
an agricultural enterprise in the Indies. 
The framework that ruled property relationships among the natives changed 
overnight after the government introduced the Agrarian Law of 1870: land in Java and 
Madura passed over into the realm of Dutch-oriented law and the realm of capitalist 
factors of production. If previously natives’ relationships with land were largely short 
term, noted by the expiration of usufruct rights when land was no longer cultivated or 
when vegetation had ceased to exist, relationships with land now acquired a permanent 
character that reached beyond an individual’s lifetime. 
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To implement the Agrarian Law of 1870, the government issued an agrarian 
decree (agrarische besluit) registered in St. 1870 No. 118. The government amended 
this decree extensively between 1870 and 1912.12 To legitimize disposing of land to 
lessors, the colonial authorities proclaimed a domain declaration (domeinverklaring) 
over Java and Madoera in the first article of the decree.13 The domain declaration 
stipulated that all land not under the Dutch eigendom was state land. Consequently, all 
land in Java and Madura passed over into the realm of “the state,” including forests, 
unclaimed and uncultivated areas, land governed under adat law, land under village 
rights of disposal, land belonging to individual farming households, and land under 
native usufruct rights. The government differentiated these lands into free (vrije) and 
non-free state land (unvrije staatsdomein). 
Free state lands included virgin lands (woeste gronden) and lands not already 
subject to native rights. The government could lease these lands under erfpacht 
leasehold for up to 75 years and in plots of no more than 500 bouw (354.8 hectares). 
This lease was limited to large agricultural estates for commercial crops such as 
rubber, tea, and coffee, although impoverished Europeans and charity organizations 
might lease smaller plots. Understandably, the erfpacht was the most coveted form of 
lease. 
Non-free state lands encompassed lands already cultivated by the natives or 
lands belonging to the village or under village rights of allocation. The government 
allowed short-term rent between Native landholders and Dutch entrepreneurs on a 
rotation system. The latter usually grew annual crops such as sugarcane or tobacco, 
while the former grew the native’s main crops such as rice, peanuts, maize, or cassava. 
                                                 
12 Between those years, the government introduced eleven amendments, including St. 1872 No. 116, St. 
1874 No. 78, St. 1877 No. 196 and 270, St. 1888 No. 78, St. 1893 No. 151, St. 1895 No. 199, St. 1896 
No. 140, St. 1904 No. 325, St. 1910 No. 185, and St. 1912 No. 235.  
13 Domain declaration for the rest of the colony came gradually over the next five years. 
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The length of the lease varied from one year for paddy fields to twenty-five years in 
cases where lands were used for railways or public purposes. For highland plant 
cultivation, the maximum lease was twelve years.14 The renting process involved the 
natives themselves with help from their local headmen and most frequently assisted by 
government officials such as the controleur or assistant resident. 
After proclaiming domain declaration in the first article of the agrarian decree, 
the government divided the remainder of the decree into three sections: the first 
regulated native land rights; the second, the acquisition of land for leases; and the 
third, miscellaneous issues of little relevance here. The first section contained six 
articles that regulated native rights to land, set in accordance with the newly 
established domain declaration. It promised a lease regulation that would take into 
consideration advice from the highest native officials and concerns of the local 
population (article 2). While the general regulation was being developed, the Governor 
General had the authority to establish temporary rulings (article 2). It assured the 
native population of a mechanism to acquire a written title of their inheritable right of 
use from the Governor General (article 3). It is significant that the form of property 
rights allowed for the natives was only “inheritable usufruct rights” (erfelijk 
gebruiksrecht) and not the Dutch form of full property ownership eigendom. A 
regulation would be established to transfer native use rights to the Dutch eigendom 
(article 4), to lease land to non-natives (article 5), and to encourage natives to cultivate 
land outside the original village boundaries (article 7). The Governor General was also 
authorized to grant landed property for each municipality (article 6). The colonial 
government amended these rulings only twice, in 1872 and in 1874. 
                                                 
14 Highland crops included quinine and coffee. The rulings for land lease between Natives and non-
Natives were decreed in St. 1900 No. 240, and later replaced by St. 1918 No. 88. 
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In 1872, the government amended Articles 3 and 4 in St. 1872 No. 116. The 
amendment to Article 3 introduced the court of law as a mediating body in settling 
conflicts over land compensation in cases where an amicable settlement could not be 
reached. The amendment to Article 4 guaranteed the natives who acquired eigendom 
to be protected by law, to have the free enjoyment of the land, and to be able to 
dispose of it freely within the limitation set by law. Although this ruling appeared as a 
guarantee of equal treatment for every eigendom holder, only natives who had 
acquired the legal status of Europeans were allowed the full benefit of eigendom. This 
ruling underlines the legal reality in the colony, that a subject’s legal identity 
determined the kinds of rights to land he or she could acquire. In 1874, articles 2, 6, 
and 7 were amended as decreed in St. 1874 No. 78. The government withdrew the 
promise of a participatory process in establishing legal codes for native land rights and 
replaced it with a ruling that put the authority fully under the Governor General.15 No 
further amendments for native rights took place after 1874. 
If the first section of the Agrarian Decree 1870 laid out regulations for native 
rights to land, the second section regulated the erfpacht lease available only to Dutch 
subjects, residents, or citizens of the Netherlands or Netherlands Indies; or companies 
registered in the Netherlands or Netherlands Indies as stated in article 11. Two articles, 
8 and 17, amended rulings in Article 62 Regeringsreglement 1854. Article 9 mandated 
that land eligible for erpacht lease be mapped and divided into parcels of around 500 
bouws each, for lease for up to seventy-five years. Seven categories of lands were 
excluded from erfpacht eligibility, among them were land under native use rights or 
under a village’s disposal rights, lands considered sacred by the native population, 
land used for public service, teak and other wood forests, and government coffee 
                                                 
15 St. 1874 No. 196 amended article 2, 6, and 7 as follows: General regulations are to be established by 
the Governor General regarding the rights of the Natives to cultivate land, not on common pasture or 
some other account of land belonging to the village.  
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plantations. Article 10 outlined the mechanism for public tender for erfpacht lease 
rights. Article 12 prohibited erfpacht land to be used for farming, cattle breeding, or 
opium planting, effectively guaranteeing their use for commercial agricultural 
commodities such as tea, coffee, and quinine. Article 13 and 14 ruled that erfpacht 
lands were subject to tax, and that the persons on the leased land were also to pay tax. 
Article 15, 16, and 18 provided room to regulate lands that did not strictly meet the 
criteria for erfpacht lease. 
Between 1870 and 1912, the Dutch amended the regulations for native land 
rights only twice and the regulations for land lease ten times, signaling that the 
agrarian decree was indeed designed to serve the need of private enterprises. The rosy 
promise to consult native officials regarding lease regulations that might have 
concerned the local population was quickly withdrawn, with the authority set fully 
under the Governor General. The guarantee for the native population of full enjoyment 
of eigendom was applicable only to natives who were assimilated to Europeans. 
The Dutch claim of domain rights over the archipelago did not go 
unchallenged. In his 1909 book Miskenningen van het Adatrecht, Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven laid out the argument for native rights of allocation (beschikkingsrecht), 
a right that had no place in the colonial agrarian law. He contended that lands without 
eigendom rights were not necessarily free lands to be summarily transferred to the 
government as free state lands; rather they were lands under the right of allocation of 
native villages. Van Vollenhoven’s challenge of the domain declaration solidified in 
1919, when he wrote the famous essay Indonesier en zijn Grond16 as a reaction to a 
legal maneuver by G.J. Nolst Trenite. A legal adviser to the agricultural department in 
                                                 
16 This essay was widely quoted, reprinted, and reproduced by the vernacular press in the Indies decades 
after it was first published. It was reprinted in full in the Jong Java newspaper on July 1, 1929. 
Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin, a member of the Volksraad, cited this essay in his rejection of the Indo-
European request for land rights in the colony. See chapter 5.  
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the Indies, Nolst Trenite promoted an amendment to article 62 of the 
Regeringsreglement 1854 for Sumatra. If approved, the amendment would have 
effectively revoked legal protection for native land rights granted by the article. In the 
essay, van Vollenhoven reasserted his argument that the Dutch government could 
not—and should not—deploy domain theory to ensure legal certainty over land rights 
because the native population had already exercised beschikkingsrecht (rights of 
allocation) on virgin lands (Vollenhoven 1919). This negated the government’s claim 
of free state land and the authority to lease it out. Van Vollenhoven’s argument was so 
compelling that the parliament dropped the amendment in November 1920. Although 
van Vollenhoven won this one battle, it was not the last he waged against Nolst 
Trenite, who eventually became his arch nemesis. 
Studies of colonial land policy in Indonesia have widely castigated the colonial 
agrarian laws as a blatant territorial takeover to facilitate capitalist agricultural estates. 
This is accurate on many fronts. However, the laws also introduced a new concept of 
land as property protected by formal law. As van Vollenhoven noted, the greed of the 
administrators during the forced cultivation era had forced village headmen to alter 
land allocation and land entitlement to fulfill the allotted commodity and tax quota 
they had to meet, a process that van Vollenhoven argued destroyed the fabric of 
private land ownership among the native population (Vollenhoven 1931, 619; Breman 
1983).17 In many villages, property ownership depended on the whim or wisdom of 
Native chiefs or village headmen, such that the peasants had no recourse but accepted 
the allocation of land stipulated by them.18 The Agrarian Law 1870 and its derivative 
                                                 
17 Breman provides a meticulous account using primary resources of the process of depriving Javanese 
landholders in Cirebon from their private property that, within a generation, created an image of a 
property regime that lacks private ownership. 
18 See also Soepomo 1927 for an account of the same issues in the Surakarta Principality, one of a few 
self-governing territories in the Dutch East Indies. 
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decrees introduced into the natives a sense that—within the limited colonial 
conditions—use rights and property rights were now regulated by law and that there 
were institutions to mediate conflicts regarding land, however partial they might have 
been. The Indies Journal of Law (Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht, ITR) records 
numerous native land conflicts that were brought to the court of law, a testimonial to 
the colonial legal system.19 Granted, the Agrarian Law 1870 was deployed mainly to 
address fostering private initiatives in the colony, which filled the state coffer with 
taxes and rents.20 Nevertheless, its role in introducing a new, modern sense of property 
relations protected by formal state structures cannot be denied. 
Becoming Wadoeng West 
On January 20, 1912, Bernard Ledeboer sent a letter to the assistant resident of 
Malang. He requested information on land he could lease for a coffee plantation. 
Fortunately for him, an enclosed complex of 150 bouw of land (106.44 ha) under 
usufruct rights in Banjoewangi was available. However, since these lands were 
categorized as non-free state land, Ledeboer could only acquire a short-term lease 
directly from the Native landholders. Undeterred, he moved quickly to acquire twelve 
years lease. By mid February, the Controleur21 of Banjoewangi, a certain 
Nieuwenhuijs, was ready to assist him (Ledeboer 1924). Controleur Nieuwenhuijs 
sent Ledeboer a letter explaining in detail the steps to acquire the lease: Ledeboer was 
to send him the completed form of lease contract with the related land survey; within 
two months, the Controleur would summon the Native landholders and Ledeboer to 
                                                 
19 See chapter 6. 
20 Agrarian Decree St. 1870 No. 118 Article 13 addressed taxes that land-lease holders had to pay the 
state. It included taxes on the land leased, taxes on buildings or factories built on the land, and taxes on 
the fruit of the land or the product of the factory built on the land.  
21 Controleur is the lowest level official in the Binnenlands Bestuur hierarchy, serving the assistant 
resident for tasks needed at the level of sub-district.  
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sign (verlijden) the contract at the closest village to the land, Soember Gondo; once 
drawn, and after the Controleur’s approval of its viability, the contract would be 
presented to the Assistant Resident for ratification (bekrachtiging) (Ledeboer 1924, 2). 
In the same letter, the Controleur advised Ledeboer to educate himself on the 
rules and regulations of land lease and the various prescriptions regarding lease 
payment, because “there are many prescriptions which cannot be violated unpunished” 
(Ledeboer 1924, 2). Ledeboer should acquire and read carefully a guide book titled 
“Explanation of the rules regarding the leasing of land by natives to non-natives in 
Java and Madura,”22 which meticulously explained in ninety-six pages the ordinance 
decreed in St. 1900 No. 240. The guidebook explained the ordinance in detail and 
gave samples of lease contracts and lease registers in Dutch and Malay. It was 
essentially a bible for anyone wishing to navigate the legal maze in order to rent native 
usufruct lands. Nieuwenhuijs assured Ledeboer that “if you read carefully you will 
find it worth knowing” (Ledeboer 1924, 2). Convinced, Ledeboer claimed that he read 
the booklet carefully to make sure “the character and spirit of the lease ordinance was 
followed” (Ledeboer 1924, 3). 
Carried out in small, discrete steps by individuals, these small exchanges of 
information and the subsequent attempts to follow rules and regulations illustrate the 
everyday making of the colonial state through the institutionalization of law and legal 
discourse. They were undeniably pervasive practices such that the networks of 
institutions centered on governance achieved a discursive presence as a state and as an 
authority in the arbitration of justice. It was through these numerous exchanges that 
citizens, in this case a state agent and a private individual, exercised their agency in a 
conscious submission to rules and regulation set by the state system; it was these acts 
                                                 
22 In Dutch: Toelichting der regelen omtrent de verhuuring van grond door Inlanders aan niet-inlanders 
op Java en Madoera. 
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that made the state appear real and legitimate. Yet, at the same time, the legitimacy 
was never stable. 
Despite the promise of the Agrarian Decree 1872 and the Land Lease 
Ordinance of 1900, acquiring land was no easy matter for Bernard Ledeboer. 
Confident in the outcome of his proposed lease, Ledeboer ordered his supervisors to 
speed up the planting of nursery beds. By June, four hundred thousand seeds were 
already laid out. In July, after submitting the necessary documents, Ledeboer received 
notice of a planned hearing with the local population. In August, he was informed that 
the lease ratification could not take place due to objections raised by a new district 
Controleur (Ledeboer 1924, 4). The delay caused him to miss a targeted planting, and 
he lost 18,000 guilders. Understandably, Ledeboer was upset: 
[I] only managed to learn that since August, a new Controleur had taken an 
action, that the lease contract for the land was executed [one month late], and 
that this Controleur had recommended that the Assistant Resident withhold the 
ratification. The reason remains concealed [to me], because the government 
considers that [I have] nothing to do with [it]. (Ledeboer 1924, 4) 
To overcome the hurdle, Ledeboer recruited an able lawyer from Surabaya, 
who explained to him what had happened: First, the lease price was so high that the 
Controleur could have suspected the transaction of being a disguised sale; second, the 
land-register entry made the natives appear to be leasing more land than they owned; 
and finally, there was no evidence that the Native landholders were provided with a 
certificate of land reclamation (ontginningsbewijzen), which guaranteed lands were 
legally reclaimed. Ledeboer remarked that anyone who was aware of the agrarian law 
and “the Banjoewangi reign abuse” would immediately understand that the delay was 
done deliberately to hinder the leasing process (Ledeboer 1924, 4). Nevertheless, he 
duly submitted to the delay and ordered a planting freeze until the authorities’s 
clearance. He even sympathized with the new controller, who had “in many ways seen 
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the growth of clandestine land ownership of land in his district and wanted to clamp it 
down, and saw in this lease one of the many forms of such ownership” (Ledeboer 
1924, 5). So, although he was convinced that he had sufficient rights to start 
cultivating the land, he did not “[risk] planting, because taking possession of the 
ground before the confirmation was obtained was explicitly stated in land lease 
ordinance as impermissible” (Ledeboer 1924, 7).23 Despite his frustration with the 
local officials, Ledeboer attempted to present himself as a good, law-abiding citizen 
who followed rules and regulations regardless of the heavy loss he had to absorb. His 
confidence in law finally bore fruit: he acquired the twelve year lease in 1913. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, the land was generous to the Ledeboers. By 
1919, roughly seven years after the first planting, the Wadoeng West Estate began 
exporting coffee to the Netherlands, where it was traded in the Amsterdam bourse.24 
Benefiting from the sterling reputation of East Java coffee, Wadoeng West grew to be 
a prosperous estate, inciting “rogue Europeans” to covet the land the Ledeboers had 
cultivated. Over the years, underhanded transfer of land use rights among the Native 
landholders—through pawning or other means—had caused the lands that Wadoeng 
West leased to be concentrated among only a handful of people. For example, in land 
register No. 1 in Kali Wadoeng village, Genteng district, within three years Native 
landholders had decreased from 53 to only 9 individuals. Only two of the original 
holders remained, and a certain individual named Doleah came to own 26 parcels 
(Ledeboer 1924, 18). Ledeboer noted that Doelah was a strawman for a European 
clandestine landholder who had already controlled more than a hundred bouws of land. 
                                                 
23 Ledeboer was referring to Lease Ordinance between Native and non-Native, which at that time was 
regulated in St. 1900 No. 240. 
24 “Handelsbericht,” Het Centrum, Utrecht, August 19, 1919, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010006141%3Ampeg21%3Ap003%3Aa0053 (accessed 
March 22, 2012). 
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There were many ways land could change hands undetected by the colonial officials 
for many years.25 There were simply too many loopholes in the law meant “to protect 
the natives.” 
These clandestine land acquisitions threatened the survival of medium-sized 
estates, especially those that planted perennial crops such as tea and coffee like 
Wadoeng West, since there was no guarantee that the new landholder would be 
willing to extend the lease upon its expiration. To make matters worse, the natives’ 
habit of repeatedly pawning land without transfer records made tracking ownership 
almost impossible. Moreover, a lease of native land could not exceed twenty years, 
putting the medium estate at a disadvantage compared with larger enterprises with 
seventy-five-year erfpacht leases of the free state’s domain. Ledeboer lamented the 
lack of middle-sized farmers and the rampant illegal land occupation in the fertile 
region of Banjoewangi. He blamed it on the Alienation Prohibition. He argued that as 
long as the law prevented the blijvers from owning and cultivating land, there would 
not emerge any strong small- or middle-sized farmers in the colony, an essential 
element for any land’s prosperity: “The law would not allow it” (Ledeboer 1924, 8). 
The Prohibition to him was simply a farce to protect big businesses in the Netherlands. 
The bureaucracy’s impotence was another sore point for Ledeboer. The 
Attorney General ignored the complaint he sent about the clandestine land occupation 
by rogue enterpreneurs. As he built his enterprise, he had to deal with controllers and 
Assistant Residents whom he accused of having wanted to thwart his estate. There was 
                                                 
25 Ledeboer listed the following among the illegal transactions:  
1. Sham lease. The lessee bought the land in advance, but let the previous owners appear before the 
Controller, and both lessee and lessor concealed the sale that had already taken place. 
2. Owning and tilling of the land as an agent of a native and by order of that native. 
3. Purchasing large complexes of land in the name of a native woman and then marrying this 
woman. 
4. Buying up land in the name of a child and then recognizing the child as European. 
5. Simple purchase of land from a native, then cultivating this land with no authorization or title. 
6. Buying land and then letting it be cultivated by any native, whom they pay with half of the land 
revenues. (Ledeboer 1924, 22). 
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nothing the bureacrats at the Binnenlands Bestuur could do, claimed Ledeboer. To add 
insult to injury, when the Assistant Resident sent out a circular to warn the clandestine 
landholders of their criminal offence, the latter no more than blinked their eyes. The 
Assistant Resident and other authorities proved to be powerless to their defiance, 
allowing all the illegal land occupiers to think that they could continue doing what 
they did. 
Ledeboer’s frustration with the bureaucrats and the confusing system of land 
lease was a stark contrast to promises in the agrarian laws to ease private investors’ 
access to land. The law’s mandate for public auction, for transparent process of land 
acquisition, and of support from colonial bureaucrats fell flat in the everyday reality of 
an estate manager. Ruptures persisted between discursive legal structures and the 
material implementation by state agents, putting in question the widely accepted 
narrative about collusion between capitalist entrepreneurs and the liberal colonial 
state. Through his vituperation of the agrarian laws and the bureaucratic class, 
Ledeboer created an image of himself as an anti-elitist, a pro-native, and a supporter of 
small- and middle-sized independent European-blijver farmers who were never 
allowed to prosper thanks to the Alienation Prohibition. To Ledeboer, the threat for the 
natives lay not in the presence of small- and medium-sized blijver farmers, but in the 
greed of the Native elites, facilitated by the hands-off Binnenlands Bestuur staff, who 
cheated their own people by buying land at rates much cheaper than the annual rents 
from ondernemers such as himself. 
Bernard Ledeboer published his public testimony in 1924. Two years later, he 
was killed on a hunting expedition in Mombasa, Africa,26 but not without leaving a 
special legacy that would later define the fate of the Wadoeng West Estate: a two-
                                                 
26 Anonymous, “Het Nimrod Geveld,” Het Centrum, July 3 1926, p. 11, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010001981%3Ampeg21%3Ap011%3Aa0177 (accessed 
July 11, 2012).  
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year-old daughter of mixed race. His brother, Adriaan Johan Marie Ledeboer, took 
over the management of the estate. Under his supervision the Wadoeng West Estate 
continued to flourish and to supply high-quality coffee for the Netherlands market. 
The rising profile of Adriaan Ledeboer as a blijver reflected the continuous prosperity 
of the Estate. He became a wealthy entrepreneur and took control of vast land in the 
Yang plateau, a highland between Mount Argopuro and Mount Radeng, northwest of 
the Estate, where he initiated a conservation site for Javanese deer. He became a 
legendary tiger-hunter, a pastime available only to wealthy blijvers in the Indies 
(Boomgaard 2001). He also initiated the hunting ordinance that was discussed in the 
Volksraad in 1931.27 
In the Netherlands Indies, valuable land plots began began their life story as 
landscapes. It was the abstraction of property relationships, materialized in a series of 
colonial laws and legal decisions, that converted these landscapes into commodities 
ripe for the market. The law gave landscapes identities that determined their eligibility 
and exclusion and their future life course as they entered the market. The law also 
determined the kinds of land transactions allowed for people with a particular identity. 
Being a European opened doors to certain land lease that promised some lavish return, 
but closed doors to another, such as buying land from the native population. 
Unquestionably, colonial law was skewed to the benefit of the colonizers, yet within 
that limited corridor, there was still room to maneuver for the rights of the native 
population. In 1934, a Native member of the Volksraad, R.P. Soeroso, began to 
challenge the Wadoeng West Estate. 
R.P. Soeroso was a seasoned politician with a strong grassroots political 
network in East Java. He was born to a minor aristocratic family in 1893 in Sidoardjo, 
                                                 
27 Anonymous, “Geheel alleen op de Tijgerjacht,” De Rijnbode, May 1 1940, 
http://rijnlandsmidden.courant.nu/index.php?page=1&mod=krantresultaat&q=&datering=01-05-
1940&krant=RB&qt=paragraaf&doc=1&p=2&y=83 (accessed May 21, 2012). 
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a small town outside Soerabaja. Kicked out of a teacher’s training school 
(Kweekschool) in Probolinggo after leading a student protest against the headmaster, 
Soeroso quickly became a political activist after he joined Sarekat Islam in 1912. By 
the time he was twenty-one, he was president of the Sarekat Islam branch that covered 
Probolinggo and Krasakan in 1915, and of the SI branch in Modjokerto 1919 until the 
branch’s demise in 1932. Soeroso’s leadership was widely acknowledged in East Java. 
Between 1916 and 1924, he was elected chairman of various labor and workers’ 
organizations across the region, such as the Association of Native Workers in the 
Department of Public Works (Vereniging Inheems Personeel Burgerlijke Openbare 
Werken, VIP-BOW) in 1919 and the Personeel Fabrieksbond (Factory Workers 
Union) in Modjokerto in 1921. He led a labor strike of twelve sugar factories in 
Modjokerto and negotiated with sugar factories for a better lease agreement for the 
Native peasants during his tenure in Sidoardjo, Modjokerto, and Djombang between 
1912 and 1923. 
Given his sterling career in political activism, the central government looked to 
him as a potential partner. In 1924 the government appointed him a member of the 
Volksraad. True to his nature, in his inaugural speech, Soeroso criticized the planned 
land tax in West Sumatra, which led Governor General Fock to disinvite him from the 
inaugural dinner. During his Volksraad career, Soeroso was a member of the National 
Faction established in 1927 by seasoned nationalist politicians. Among the members 
were Koesoemo Oetoyo, M.H. Thamrin, Soeangkoepon, Otto Iskandardinata, Sukardji 
Wirjopranoto, Dr. Rasjid, and Wiwoho, all leading Volksraad members. The Faction 
maintained a flexible position vis-à-vis government policy, sometimes cooperating, 
other times non-cooperating. They commanded a degree of respect from the 
nationalist and intellectual groups in the colony, even those who staunchly remained 
non-cooperative. 
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The Men Made the Law: Wadoeng West in the Volksraad 
R.P. Soeroso’s final remark in the Volksraad culminated a long struggle he had 
begun in 1934. From the outset, Soeroso recounted a different story from Bernard 
Ledeboer’s 1924 account. The following is Soeroso’s version as recorded in the 
Volksraad 1934–1935 sessions. 
According to Soeroso, twelve years after renting the natives’ land through a 
lease that started in 1915/1916 (as opposed to 1912 in Ledeboer’s account), the 
manager of the Wadoeng West Estate failed to renew the contract upon its expiration. 
An official investigation started soon after, and by 1934 the Raad van Justitie in 
Surabaya ordered the Estate to return the land they occupied in Semaoen village to its 
lawful holder, a peasant named Samingoen (Volksraad Handelingen, 
Afdeelingsverslag 1934/1935, Section 5, 17). The violation of Samingoen’s rights 
apparently was not an isolated incident; several other peasants in the villages of 
Kaligondo, Setail, Taman Sari, and Gambiran had also complained to the government 
about Wadoeng West’s refusal to return their land upon lease expiration (Volksraad 
Handelingen 1934/1935, 737). Soeroso criticized the Binnenlands Bestuur’s foot-
dragging, an act exceptionally disrespectful to the court of law when the Raad van 
Justitie and the Supreme Court had decided that Wadoeng West was at fault. He 
accused the Binnenlands Bestuur of neglecting to investigate the issue, and he found it 
odd that the regional staff in Besoeki were unfamiliar with the illegal occupation. 
When the Director of the Binnenlands Bestuur, F.A.E. Drossaers, dismissively said 
that the issue was being communicated to the Governor of East Java and the Resident 
of Besoeki, Soeroso roared back, 
It has surprised me greatly that on this issue, the Government [merely] 
declared that . . . it is trying to find a solution. I explicitly pointed out in the 
first Volksraad session that the illegal land occupation by the Wadoeng West 
Estate is [already] proven: Out of the [legal] process of Samingoen, one of the 
landholders, it has been established that Wadoeng West has occupied his land 
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illegally. Now I would like to hear from the Government that measures will be 
taken. I do not really understand the [Government’s] answer . . . when it is 
already proven that the illegal land occupation has taken place. I would thus 
like to ask why the Government has not taken any action in this case by 
evacuating the Estate out of the land. (Volksraad Handelingen 1934/1935, 
1080) 
Soeroso added that the people wanted their land back with what had been planted 
upon it, namely coffee, because “that is the property (eigendom) of the landholders.” 
It was strategic move by Soeroso to choose the word eigendom, which also 
meant “freehold estate,” a form of ownership privilege only for Europeans, in contrast 
to the legally proper erfelijk grondbezit (inheritable usufruct rights). By saying so, he 
signalled that the Native landholders should also benefit from full ownership of the 
land as enjoyed by Europeans and protected by law without having to be made equal 
to Europeans before the law.28 Thus, the return of their land should unquestionably 
come with the plants that were already growing upon it. This was a small but critical 
note, because Wadoeng West could have resorted to using adat law which 
distinguished rights to plants and vegetation from rights to land. By doing so, they 
could retain their rights to coffee gardens they had planted. Even so, Soeroso’s 
peculiar demand left a few question: Who would benefit from the coffee? The 
peasants themselves? Could they have been sponsored by European backers that 
Ledeboer had written about, who would undoubtedly benefit from the coffee trees 
already planted by Wadoeng West Estate? Was it possible that Soeroso had 
unknowingly waged a struggle for these clandestine landholders? 
To his credit, the Director of Binnenlands Bestuur skillfully defended his 
department. He denied the accusation of the government’s inaction to eject the Estate 
from the illegally occupied land. On the contrary, he reported, when the officials were 
                                                 
28 As demanded by Article 4 Agrarian Decree 1872 No. 116. 
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to execute the court order for Samingoen, no one, including Samingoen himself, could 
point out where his land plot was located. Further, he argued that Soeroso had 
misplaced his grievances, because, obviously “ . . . when there’s a dispute between 
two parties on land rights, the decision is not the Government’s, but [it is] the court 
that must pass the verdict, that the decisions of the judge must be executed by the 
appropriate authorities designated by law” (Volksraad Handelingen 1934/1935, 1128). 
His defense relied on the division of authority over the colonial state apparatus and 
implicitly denied the executive body any power over the case. 
New details emerged a year later during the 1935/1936 Volksraad session. 
They demonstrated that the matter was not as simple as Soeroso had assumed. 
Responding to Soeroso’s written request for an update on the case, the Director 
of the Binnenlands Bestuur reported that when the initial land lease expired, Wadoeng 
West claimed that the original owners had sold their rights to the land to another 
Native person, who in turn transferred the land rights back to the “daughter of one of 
the former managers of Wadoeng West,” that is, Bernard Ledeboer’s daughter with a 
Native woman, Romanti.29 After the transfer, this child, Adia Orrie Ledeboer, was 
recognized as Ledeboer’s legitimate daughter, and she became legally European and 
subject to European laws. With her new legal status, the daughter leased the land to 
Wadoeng West with a contract drawn between two European subjects, skirting the 
land lease ordinance (grondhuurordonnantie)30 for transactions between native and 
non-native subjects. The Director of Binnenlands Bestuur claimed that only one of the 
original owners of land had demanded a return of his land, while the remaining 
                                                 
29 Genealogy of Bernard Ledeboer is provided by 
http://www.chabot.demon.nl/genealog/chabot04/329.htm (last accessed July 21, 2011).  
30 By this time, St. 1918 No. 88 had replaced St. 1900 No. 240, which regulated land lease by a Native 
to non-Native at the time the Ledeboers signed their contract. And in both laws, a Native equalized as 
European was excluded from the definition of “Native” understood by this law. 
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claimants had declared under oath that they no longer had rights to the land plots 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1935/1936, 1020–1021). 
Wadoeng West skilfully manipulated legal loopholes to maintain their grip on 
the land. As discussed earlier, the Agrarian Decree in St. 1870 No. 118 guaranteed full 
enjoyment of land for a native who had transformed his or her use rights to eigendom 
rights, provided that the native was assimilated to European legal status. She or he 
“[could] dispose of them freely, subject to limitation set by law and subject to 
expropriation in the public interest with adequate compensation.”31 Whether Adia 
Ledeboer had requested a transfer of her land to eigendom as mandated by Article 3 of 
the Agrarian Decree was another issue, as was the fact that she was very young when 
this event took place. 
Soeroso struck back. The manner in which the land had come into the 
possession of Adia Ledeboer, he argued, was questionable: 
She came into the possession of the lands, which, in any case are occupied 
illegally by the Wadoeng West Estate. I should like to be informed how it is 
possible for one of the original landholders to win against such a company. Is it 
necessary, as was informed by the Government authorities, for the other 
original landholders to declare [under oath] to have renounced the land, if the 
sale of the land of the original landowners to the . . . child of the previous 
manager had been legal? For me it is still a mysterious case, and I hope 
therefore that the authorities will clarify the matter further in the second 
session. (Volksraad Handelingen 1935/1946, 1075–1076) 
The Director of Binnenlands Bestuur, however, skirted Soeroso’s demand, claiming 
that the issue was still under further investigation by the governor of East Java. 
Soeroso, he said, needed to be more patient. 
Another year passed. But Soeroso was unrelenting about the Wadoeng West case. In 
the Volksraad session of 1936/1937, again he asked the government about the progress 
                                                 
31 St. 1872 No. 116 Article 4.  
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of the case. More details emerged that leave an observer with more questions than 
answers when Soeroso revealed intriguing details to an already complex case: 
The Government will certainly have known that a certain Lunel,32 residing at 
Genteng, acted as an authorized con amore by the landholders to recover their 
land. This representative has written to the prosecutor in Surabaya, after the 
court verdict was published for the case of Samingoen against Wadoeng West 
to the advantage of Samingoen, to inquire whether a criminal proceeding could 
be charged against the Wadoeng West Estate on the grounds of illegal 
occupation. The prosecutor had responded to him in a written communication, 
that in conformity with the governor of East Java and the Attorney General’s, 
prosecution was suspended until the Government expressed its views, whether 
this will continue or whether another arrangement will be taken. (Volksraad 
Handelingen 1936/1937, 652; emphasis added) 
The Attorney General had apparently been consulted about the case, yet the 
government still had not taken a clear position on the issue. This was certainly 
scandalous, because if the information was true, it proved that the government had 
been dragging its feet. It punctured Drossaer’s defense that the Binnenlands Bestuur 
did not—could not—have a say in the execution of a legal decision. More 
dishearteningly, this fact demonstrated that the judicial system was hardly an 
independent body. 
Soeroso continued, 
This letter from the prosecutor was identified as dated in Surabaya 1 October 
1934 No. 5466. So it has been two years that the Attorney General has waited 
for further instructions from the Government on this case. (Volksraad 
Handelingen 1936/1937, 653) 
                                                 
32 We may never know who the “certain Lunel” was or what his motive was in assisting the 
landholders; how Soeroso got in touch with him and acquired information about this letter; what their 
relationship entailed; and what constituted Lunel’s political position. A search has brought out a certain 
A.W. Lunel, who was registered as a subscriber in the Cultuur Gids Volume 7 (1905-1906, 234) as a 
staff member of an estate in Somber Mangis Kidoel in Pasoeroean, Malang. His proximity to the 
location of Wadoeng West and his profession in the estate business that would have trained him on the 
matter of land lease regulation were a good fit; A.W. Lunel might have been the Lunel Soeroso 
indicated. But such a conclusion requires further investigation.  
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In response, the Director of the Binnenlands Bestuur said merely 
that land occupation by the company Wadoeng West has become a difficult 
and complicated agrarian question which would not bring an instant solution. 
Indeed, this case has for some time already captured the attention of the 
judiciary and the government, and should the opportunity to prosecute beyond 
doubt emerge, it would certainly be carried out. (Volksraad Handelingen 
1936/1937, 1065) 
He stated further that the case continued to be investigated by the governor of East 
Java and that the governnment would soon be able to make a decision. 
The Director’s promise remained mere lip service. A year passed without any 
ripples on the Wadoeng West case in the Volksraad. 
In the 1938/1939 session, again Soeroso inquired in writing about the progress 
of the Wadoeng West case and received only a tentative response from the 
government,33 which claimed it still needed more time to see whether an 
administrative solution was possible and desirable (Volksraad Handelingen 
1938/1939, Memorie van Antwoord, Section 5, 19). 
Soeroso used the Volksraad session to express his displeasure at the pace the 
government took in handling the case. He was utterly dissatisfied with the progress, 
especially because he had raised the issue five years previously; however, the 
government had never demonstrated a genuine interest in or resolution to solve the 
case. He appealed in the Volksraad session: 
Mr. President! Just now I saw the deputation of the peasants sitting in the 
gallery. It is clear, however, that this attitude of the Government still does not 
satisfy the sense of justice on the peasants’ part, especially after these people 
exhausted all efforts to try to regain their land. Sending such a deputation from 
Banjoewangi to Batavia has already cost them a lot of money. . . . It therefore 
                                                 
33 The government reported that a thorough investigation of the legal position that the state had taken on 
the case had been carried out. The investigation had cast doubt among legal experts about whether the 
claimed “ground breaking of the law” (inslaan van den weg van rechten) in the case deserved a 
recommendation. 
 116 
seems to me that this should finally be a valid motive for the Government to 
make a speedy and fair decision on the illegal occupation for the peasant’s 
sake. The Government should be informed that one of the peasants [here] has 
won his case. Here is proof that the occupation of the land was illegal. 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1938/1939, 540; emphasis added) 
Soeroso’s statement demonstrates how colonial law became a common discursive 
framework accepted by a Native politician and the peasants as a point of reference to 
protest injustice. Law—especially laws that promised to protect the native population 
from illegal takeover of their land—became the shared language through which the 
discourse of struggle was waged. 
The colonial agrarian regime had prohibited non-natives from buying land 
from the native population, but it did not prohibit an assimilated native from 
exercising European rights on the land she acquired as a Native, as was the case with 
Adia Ledeboer and her supposed lease to the Wadoeng West Estate. It was through a 
keen understanding and manipulation of the maze of colonial law, law that 
differentiated citizens from subjects, legal jurisdictions, rights to land based on 
identity, and the nomenclature of land and its legally sanctioned form of lease, that 
Wadoeng West could hold out for so long after Soeroso’s continuous barrage in the 
Volksraad. The emergence of the mysterious Lunel, who fought for Samingoen’s land, 
leaves more questions than answers. Who was Lunel? What was the motive for his 
involvement with Samingoen? Why couldn’t Samingoen point out the boundaries of 
his land if the parcel was indeed his? Regardless of these unanswered questions, one 
thing remains true: The call for justice at Raad van Justitie and Hooggerechtshof on 
the part of Samingoen, and at the Volksraad on the part of Soeroso, summoned the 
specter of the State and made its presence apparent. 
In this long exchange of demands and deflections from action, the Binnenlands 
Bestuur had the last say. But before we hear their final defense, we shall turn our 
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attention to reports from their own rank and file, the Residents, which reveal quite a 
gripping surprise. 
Reports from Besoeki and the Binnenlands Bestuur’s Last Say 
The Residency of Besoeki had long been plagued by the problem of illegal 
land occupation. The earliest government account comes from the 1913 Memorandum 
of Transfer (Memorie van Overgave) by Resident Bosman, the same resident who 
Bernard Ledeboer complained had withheld the ratification of his lease in 1912. 
Bosman reported a serious case in subdistrict Kali Baroe, district Genteng, 
Banjoewangi: a number of Europeans had acquired large expanses of land under the 
names of their Native housekeepers, some intending to plant Robusta coffee (Bosman 
1913, 32). This information coincided with Ledeboer’s account of his own search for 
land for a coffee estate, although it is not proof that Ledeboer was one of the culprits. 
Maintaining a hardline position, Bosman suggested that the central government adopt 
a forceful legal act to strike this offense at its root. In the meantime, he assigned the 
controller and the wedono of Genteng, a Native official at the district level, to 
investigate the case further, insisting that ”Without criminal prosecutions these abuse 
could not be curbed (Bosman 1913, 33).” However, there is no follow-up record of his 
initiative. 
Over the years, the amount of free state land available for lease in Besoeki 
decreased sharply. In his Memorandum of Transfer in 1918, Resident B. Schagen van 
Soelen reported that as much as 69,232 bouws (49,127 hectares) of land was already 
handed out in erfpacht, a steep increase from 40,602 bouws (28,811 hectares) in 1911 
and 48,002 bouws (34,062 hectares) in 1916. An additional 13,000 bouws (9,224 
hectares) of land under native usufruct rights were rented out for tobacco cultivation 
on a rotating base with rice and firewood. Besoeki was so crowded that many estates 
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could not expand their plantations unless they rented directly from the natives; this 
meant diverting land from the cultivation of food crops. 
Schagen van Soelen’s Memorandum of Transfer revealed a deep concern for 
the welfare and food security of the native population. He considered it important for 
the native peasants to plant food crops and not export commodities like coffee, tea, or 
quinine. “From a land management viewpoint,” he wrote, “the first concern of the 
government was to guarantee that the people can feed themselves. Rice, corn, cassava, 
groundnuts, and kedele, such crops should be prioritized (Schagen van Soelen 1918). 
A well-fed population, he argued, is a happy population, and this was especially 
important to counter the increasing influence of the “radical” Sarekat Islam in the 
region. Schagen van Soelen’s idealism was not an anomaly for colonial officials in 
this period, who were inspired by the principles of Ethical Policy. 
Illegal land occupation continued to plague the Besoeki residency. J. Ph. 
Fesevur, the Resident who served between 1919 and 1922, found himself continuously 
occupied by the issue, especially for cases in subdistrict Kalibaroe, district Genteng, 
Banjoewangi, the same area mentioned by Resident Bosman in his 1913 report. He 
noted that Europeans and Foreign Orientals had significantly expanded their 
landholding through their native maids and strawmen: 
Following an inquiry, a report was released by the Assistant Resident of 
Banjoewangi regarding the occupation of natives’ land by and on behalf of 
non-natives. I presented the report to the director of Binnenlands Bestuur, and 
it was forwarded to the Attorney General so that an attorney of the Raad van 
Justitie in Soerabaja could further investage this case in situ. (Fesevur 1922, 4)  
This was the first time on record that a Besoeki Resident had pursued a legal avenue to 
curb illegal land occupation in the region, although this was not the first time a 
Resident attempted to maintain a “hardline” position, as proved by Resident Bosman’s 
memorandum. 
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Resident Fesevur stated further, 
It is very desirable that the matter be adequately regulated and vigorous action 
taken against Europeans as well as Foreign Orientals. Further, to the Land 
Registry a statement of surveyed lands was requested, lands whose holders 
have not requested a title. I have commissioned the Assistant Resident to 
ascertain the reason for not applying title on those grounds. 
The land tax team, tasked with the revision of the interest assessments for land 
in the divisions of Djember and Banjoewangi, was in charge to ascertain which 
grounds were unlawfully occupied. The report can be seen shortly. [The 
assistant resident] experienced much cooperation in the investigation of illegal 
land occupation [from] the land registry and the land tax team. (Fesevur 1922, 
15)  
Beginning in 1913, Besoeki Residents consistently warned the central 
government of illegal land occupation in the region. But it was not until 1926 that a 
resident explicitly mentioned the names of the culprits. 
H.A. Voet, the Resident from 1922 to 1926, reported that by 1926 more than 
130,000 bouws (92,248 hectares) of long-term erfpacht lease existed in Besoeki, 
divided between Djember (60,000 bouws) and Banjoewangi (58,0000 bouws) 
divisions. The residency was so crowded that new entrants could no longer acquire 
erfpacht rights. Renting from Native landholders was not an option either, due to 
rampant illegal land occupation. Many involved only small pieces of land that were 
only temporarily illegal because the holders lack sufficient funds to process the 
paperwork, but many others were engaged in an open challenge of the law. However, 
in keeping with an amnesty program, many illegal landholders had begun to legitimize 
their plots by entering them into a lease agreement. He remarked that at that point, 
illegal land occupation, “at the request of the Attorney-General[,] is now no longer 
(criminally) prosecuted” (Voet 1926, 27). Perhaps this was intended to encourage any 
illegal holders to come forward and legalize their holdings. 
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Resident Voet then made a shocking revelation: In Banjoewangi division, two 
major illegal occupiers were Europeans. And one of them was the Ledeboers. 
Resident Voet noted that the case of the Ledeboers had been relegated to the 
judiciary, and at the time of writing in 1926, the matter was still pending (Voet 1926, 
28). Significantly, this was the same year Bernard Ledeboer published his manifesto. 
Reports from Besoeki Residents, the regional frontmen of the Binnenlands 
Bestuur, demonstrate that they were acutely aware of the offense. As early as 1913, 
Resident Bosman had already raised the issue. He appealed to the central government 
in Batavia to maintain a hardline stance and increase punishment to stop the offense at 
its root. In 1926 Resident Voet explicitly mentioned the Ledeboers as one of the major 
perpetrators of illegal land occupation. He had also followed up with the case of the 
Ledeboers in the judiciary. Having been reported in a Memory of Transfer, Wadoeng 
West’s violation could not escape the attention of the Binnenlands Bestuur’s ranking 
officials. It was during Resident Voet’s tenure that Bernard Ledeboer published his 
personal manifesto as an offensive tactic to defend himself. The fact that by 1926 the 
Ledeboers’ case was still pending in the judiciary indicated that the Ledeboers most 
likely did not participate in the 1924 amnesty, perhaps encouraged by the Attorney-
General’s position not to criminally prosecute illegal land occupiers. Hence, not only 
the Residents, but also the prosecutor and Raad van Justitie in Soerabaja, the Landrent 
team, the Land Register office, and the Tax office had extended their cooperation in 
battling the case. In this light, Soeroso’s accusation that the Binnenlands Bestuur’s 
regional officials lacked knowledge of the case signalled something else: Either 
Soeroso was not informed of the actual situation, or the officials had been ordered by 
their superiors not to talk openly about the case. If it was the latter, why? Why was 
this case never resolved, when the enthusiasm for and attention to the case over the 
years on the part of the Residents, the Controlleurs, the wedonos, and the related 
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colonial agencies in the region clearly signalled the seriousness of the offense? And as 
reported by Soeroso, why did the Attorney-General request a delay in the execution of 
Samingoen’s case? 
Fast-forward twelve years: not much had changed. 
In 1938 the Binnenlands Bestuur tried to close the case once and for all. In the 
Volksraad session, they acknowledged that the Wadoeng West Estate had leased the 
land from the daughter of Bernard Ledeboer. After this extraordinary lease took place, 
a number of the original owners claimed that no transfer had actually happened 
between them and the strawman of the company who had handed ownership over to 
Adia Ledeboer. The owners demanded that their land be returned as soon as the lease 
expired. Taking this narrative “to context,” the Director of the Binnelands Bestuur 
explained that the case came to involve two legal aspects: public law and civil law. 
From the civil law perspective, this was a conflict that involved two civil subjects, a 
company and a Native person; the government could not intervene and had to maintain 
its “neutral” position precisely because the civil law protected the sanctity of contract 
and property rights from governmental interference. Only the courts of law could 
settle a purely civil dispute between two claimants to land. Soeroso’s appeal for a 
speedy and fair decision by the government on behalf of the peasants was thus 
misplaced. The government could only advise that Samingoen pursue a civil case 
against Wadoeng West in court, because the government had no authority to deprive 
Wadoeng West of the land under its control or to force it to return the land to the 
original owners. The government’s responsibility was limited to the public law aspect 
of the case (publiekrectherlijk): it had set up a thorough investigation of Wadoeng 
West practices. Although a decision was yet to be made, the Director of the 
Binnenlands Bestuur reaassured Soeroso, the results of the investigation would inform 
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the pending amendment of the provisions to combat the illegal land occupation by 
non-natives. 
Conclusion 
The three basic laws that provided the foundation for agrarian laws and 
regulation—the Regeeringsreglement 1854, the Agrarian Law of 1870, and the 
Alienation Prohibition—transformed the conception of property relations in the Indies, 
particularly the native’s categories regarding relations between people and land. At the 
same time, these laws and their derivative regulations rendered the illusory state 
concrete and cemented “the state” as the ultimate arbiter of justice. Agrarian laws and 
regulations altered landscapes into commodities ripe for market; decided which lands 
were to be leased by the Government on long-term heritable leases (erfpacht) and 
which to be rented from the native on a short-term basis (grondhuur); regulated who 
could and could not acquire a certain form of lease; and prohibited Europeans and 
Foreign Orientals from alienating. But agrarian laws and regulations were only a part 
of the colonial agrarian regime, which also encompassed legal practices and specific 
enterprises that underpinned the rearranging of social and property relations in the 
colony. 
In the constitution of the colonial agrarian regime, the whole spectrum of the 
colonial society took part: estate owners/managers, government agents, residents, 
assistant residents, controleurs, wedonos, native politicians, judicial staff, European 
blijvers, and the peasants themselves took ownership of and engaged with various 
aspects of the agrarian regime. They pushed for certain legal practices to advance their 
interests and carried out attempts such as lease transfer or warnings in bureaucratic 
missives, concurrently extending and challenging the massive project to reorder social 
relations. 
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The role of law in commodifying land is demonstrated by the transformation of 
the Banjoewangi landscape into the Wadoeng West Estate. The Land Rent Ordinance 
made available to non-Natives previously inaccessible reclaimed plots under native 
rights. The Ledeboers rented land from the natives, set up a coffee plantation, and took 
a gamble that they could extend the rent beyond the maximum twelve years with a 
renewed contract. It meant that, at least theoretically, the Wadoeng West Estate was 
always vulnerable to rent termination by the Native landholders while at the same time 
threatened by “clandestine European landholders” who lurked to take over their rent. 
In turn, the Estate took an unconventional ways to secure its grip on land. When 
Besoeki Residents began to detect his practices, Bernard Ledeboer deployed an 
offensive tactic by protesting the “impotence” of officials in controlling illegal 
occupation. He waged a fight against the “hypocritical and elitist undertone” of the 
Alienation Prohibition. To him, the Prohibition’s true objective was a farce perpetrated 
by the Netherlands at the expense of the blijvers and natives, those who actually 
worked the land. The Prohibition caused illegal occupation and clandestine land 
ownership in Besoeki Residency; scrapping it would nurture the small- and middle-
sized farmer groups that were essential for Indies prosperity. 
The Binnenlands Bestuur officials in Besoeki rejected Ledeboer’s opinion. 
Over the years, successive Residents underlined the importance of law enforcement as 
a means to protect the natives from predatory land takeover. Not only did the 
Residents report the illegal land occupation, but they also cooperated with other 
colonial apparatus such as the land tax office and the Raad van Justitie to curb these 
illegal maneuvers. To them, the existing laws were already sufficient to fulfill the 
government’s objectives to promote capitalist agricultural estates and to protect native 
landholdings. It was the enforcement of these laws that they found wanting. 
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To a Native politician, R.P. Soeroso, the agrarian laws gave him a “common 
discursive framework” with the colonial government for determining what was legal 
and illegal. He and the peasants from Semaoen village mobilized the colonizers’ 
legitimating narrative to challenge unfair agrarian practices that sided with land 
leasers. Soeroso questioned the Attorney General’s new policy not to criminally 
prosecute those who alienated land from the natives—an interpretation that diverged 
from the law’s mandate to prevent massive land transfers. He demanded that the 
Binnenlands Bestuur react swiftly in response to Raad van Justitie’s verdict for 
Samingoen. He waged a tireless five-year crusade to right the wrong. In other words, 
Soeroso intervened in the conventional agrarian practices and the colonial agrarian 
discourse by presenting his alternative reading to the table. The five-year fight in the 
Volksraad seemed to be quixotic and futile, but its value lay less in the success of 
wresting the land back for the peasants than in the way it kept the struggle of the small 
peasants in the public view.34 
The colonial agrarian regime provided no stable framework for property 
relations, as proven by the responses of subjects and citizens of the Dutch Empire in 
Banjoewangi. A diverse mixed of social actors actively re-interpreted and challenged 
the agrarian laws. They were actively “making the law” in the way they engaged with 
law at various levels: from directly challenging a rule to demanding the execution of a 
legal decision. In their interventions, they helped shaped the colonial agrarian regime, 
understood here as the complex ensemble of laws, legal practices, and specific 
enterprises that underpin the rearranging of social relations and property rights in the 
colony. Within the time frame of Wadoeng West’s case, their actions did not result in 
changed laws, but they created enough ripples to put into question the stability of 
                                                 
34 The Wadoeng West Estate remained the steward of the Banjoewangi land disputed by the Native 
population until the end of the colonial period.  
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colonial agrarian laws and regulations. The story of the Banjoewangi land plots 
demonstrates how “law made the land” in the ways it shaped the character of land as a 
commodity, and how the law’s making was always tentative. Colonial subjects and 
citizens undermined this massive project through constant struggle and 
noncompliance, pulling the making of land in unexpected directions. In the process, 
subjects and citizens interpellated the state, affirming the presence of what in reality 
was merely a specter. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Constituted Subject and Autonomy: 
Soepomo, Adat Land Rights, and Agrarian Reorganization in Surakarta, 1900–
1920s 
Introduction 
The project of colonial domination encompassed both coercion and consent; it 
was made possible not only through violent conquest but also more ingeniously 
through knowledge production and other cultural technologies of rule (Cohn 1996). 
Forms of knowledge and modes of representations produced and deployed by 
European colonizers to preserve their domination were part and parcel of the colonial 
project of rule, powerful in the way they introduced European categories to the 
colonized and made them authoritative. They took forms, among others, in census, 
statistics, museum artifacts, reports from colonial officials, and legal discourse. 
Legal discourse here is understood as distinct ways of writing about law, which 
include production of legal knowledge, writing of legal codes and regulations, and 
founding a legal discipline. Legal discourse follows mostly unwritten rules that 
contain “a set of categories, a vocabulary for naming events and persons, and a 
framework for interpreting actions and relationships” (Merry 1992, 218). Legal 
discourse became an essential element in the legitimating narrative for colonial 
regimes (Merry 2000, 2003). It was deployed to conjure the myth of “the state” as the 
ultimate arbiter of justice; yet, true to the “doubling” nature of colonial projects 
(Comaroff 1998), it was also pregnant with inner tensions and contradictions, and its 
fractures made legal discourse vulnerable to contestations by both the colonizer and 
the colonized. The slippery position of colonial legal discourse as it sits precariously 
in the interstices between legitimating and fracturing narratives was exemplified in the 
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event when adat1 law, and along with it adat land rights, increased its purchase as a 
framework to constitute the Agrarian Regime in the colony. 
Within the large expanse of colonial legal discourse, here I focus on colonial 
legal knowledge production. I analyze how a native scholar, a subject formed by both 
colonial and indigenous discourses, exerted agency in constituting legal knowledge 
about adat law on land rights. I do so by examining a doctoral dissertation written by 
Soepomo that interrogates the agrarian reorganization in the Surakarta Principality in 
the early 20th century. The reorganization was a part of a project to constitute an 
agrarian regime. 
Trained in Dutch legal tradition at the Batavia Rechtsschool and Leiden 
University United Faculty of Law and Letters, Soepomo was a product of a colonial 
project of subject formation. At the same time, as a member of a minor Javanese 
aristocratic family, he was raised and thoroughly immersed in Javanese ethics. 
Because Soepomo was exposed to both worlds, his sense of personhood cannot be 
neatly delineated as thoroughly Javanese or Dutch; indigenous and European cognitive 
orders reciprocally penetrated each other in a way that generated a unique form of 
being-and-knowing. This hybrid subjectivity was the foundation of particular forms of 
agency Soepomo conveyed when negotiating legal knowledge on adat land rights and 
agrarian reorganization in Surakarta. I argue that Soepomo was not devoid of 
autonomy, the capacity for critical reflection and deliberate self-transformation, as he 
demonstrated his autonomy in challenging the underlying premises of the 
reorganization. I also argue that in the case of the colonized whose subjectivity was 
                                                 
1 A politically loaded concept, adat refers to the customs and practices of Indonesia’s diverse ethnic 
groups. It encompasses ritual conventions, marriage rules, kinship system, methods of conflict 
resolution, rules for resource use, rules of land acquisition and ownership, and other formally articulated 
norms and ideas (Zerner 1994; Tsing 1993). 
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constructed by heterogeneous discourses, discursive resistance can be more accurately 
detected using heterogeneous epistemic references: indigenous and European. 
To support my argument, I present the debate on adat land rights in the 
Netherlands in the dawn of the 20th century, focusing on several key actors and their 
positions in the debate. I situate Soepomo’s dissertation in the context of this debate, 
paying close attention to his position on land-related adat law and to the ways in which 
he responds to competing positions on native land rights. I borrow my analytical 
framework from South Asian debates on the role of native scholars in colonial 
knowledge production complemented by a recent theorizing of Foucauldian 
subjectivity and agency. 
Colonial Subjects as “Active” Natives 
Subjects, according to the Foucauldian line of inquiry, are not naturally 
occurring phenomena. They are constituted by relations of power. Power itself is not a 
thing possessed by a sovereign, readily disposed at his or her whim; rather, power is 
dispersed throughout the social sphere to a point where it becomes “capillary” in the 
extremities of local, regional, and material institutions (Foucault 1980, 96). At these 
points, the relations of power become tangible, and exist as exercises and means “by 
which individuals try to conduct, to determine the behavior of others” (Foucault 1988, 
18). In this light, subjects cannot be conceived as an antagonist to power. Instead, 
power is an a priori condition for the possibility of individual subjectivity, as Foucault 
explains: “It is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain 
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as 
individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of 
its prime effects” (1980, 98). 
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To justify its objectives, a system of power requires a regime of truth from 
which it derives a set of categories and vocabularies for its system of meanings. 
Termed the “episteme” by Foucault, this regime of truth is a historical a priori 
whereupon knowledge and discourse find their foundation. The episteme defines what 
one may know and can know; in other words, it represents the possibility of 
knowledge and discourse. Foucault wrote, 
I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which 
permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible 
those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field 
of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is 
the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the 
false, but of what may from what may not be characterized as scientific. (1980, 
197) 
As a construct constituted by power relations, subjects cannot escape the 
epistemic reference from which power derives knowledge and discourse. Indeed, as 
stated earlier, subjects are the effects of power in every aspect of their individuality. 
The subjects are “the things through which power finds is expression” (Allen 2002). 
This construction of power—in contrast to many claims against Foucault—does not 
deny autonomy. Expression of autonomy, in the Foucauldian realm, “has to take the 
form of taking up existing relations of power and subjection in a transformative way” 
(Allen 2008, 63). Autonomy manifests itself in questioning and challenging the 
universe of reference presented to us as the only possibility of thinking-knowing-and-
being, thus making possible the subversive transformation of those limits which are in 
reality contingent. 
Knowledge belongs to this constellation of episteme and discourse that 
constituted the subject. Colonial knowledge refers to the forms of knowledge and 
modes of representation that European colonizers deployed to preserve their 
domination over their colonized subjects. Recent debate on the nature of colonial 
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knowledge revolves around the role colonized subjects played in colonial knowledge 
production (Wagoner 2003), a debate that widely involved South Asianists. One 
position in the debate, supported by Cohn (1987, 1996), Dirks (2001), and Inden 
(1986), suggests that the colonized were at most passive actors who provided only raw 
materials to colonial scholars, who in turn analyzed them using foreign modes of 
knowing (Wagoner 2003, 784). In this sense, colonial knowledge production emerged 
as a form of epistemological violence imposed by the colonial state upon its colonized 
subjects (Dirks in Cohn 1996, xii). Thus, to understand the history of British India, 
one has to interrogate the “investigative modalities” such as published reports, 
statistical returns, legal codes, and encyclopedias deployed by the British to sustain 
their domination by regulating the knowledge produced (Cohn 1996, 5). 
The opposing view argues that indigenous intellectuals contributed actively to 
colonial knowledge production. The form of their engagement with European scholars 
was complex, particularly because the natives used their own cognitive regime and, in 
the process, co-produced colonial knowledge with a hybrid of native-European 
epistemic references. This position is endorsed by Bayly (1996), Trautmann (1999), 
Pinch (1999), Eaton (2000), Peabody (2001), and Wagoner (2003), among others. For 
the “active native” proponents, to understand British India means to direct the gaze at 
local processes of social, political, and economic changes that shaped knowledge 
production; one should consider epistemic references that both the colonizers and the 
colonized introduced in the process. The proof of active native contribution, thus, lies 
in the imprint of indigenous thinking patterns on the resulting knowledge. 
I depart from Wagoner’s (2003) view of the active native in two ways. First, I 
focus on a text written by a colonized scholar instead of a colonizer’s text. The text is 
still “colonial” because Soepomo produced it with guidance from van Vollenhoven 
and his construct of adat law on land rights, and in conversation with debates on adat 
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land rights in the Netherlands. Second, my attribution of active native relies less on a 
native scholar’s epistemological contribution and more on his capacity to 
autonomously respond to the internally fractured colonial discourse. This is due to my 
conviction that, to some extent, van Vollenhoven had attempted to introduce the native 
episteme into his construction of adat land rights and into the Dutch legal realm, thus 
laying a path for Soepomo and other native scholars to follow. 
Reflecting on the animated debate in South Asian scholarship on colonial 
knowledge production, the case in Indonesia is somewhat different. In contrast to the 
experience in British India, intellectual encounters between the colonizers and the 
colonized in the Netherlands East Indies were more limited. The transition from the 
mercantilist British East India Company to British rule in the 18th century required the 
massive deployment of investigative modalities to intensify colonial technologies of 
rule (Trautmann 1999; Cohn 1996). This meant recruitment of native scholars as key 
informants, thus the space for intellectual encounter. The Dutch, in contrast, took over 
the colony from the Dutch East India Company (Vereeniging Oost Indische 
Compagnie, VOC) only in the early 19th century after the British interregnum. 
Governing through local aristocrats for decades, the Dutch started their colonial 
investigative projects only in the second half of the 19th century. Rudimentary 
education for the native population did not start until the 1850s, and modern European 
college education began only in 1917 with the launch of the Bandung Technische 
Hoogeschool, and in 1924 with the foundation of the Batavia Rechtshoogeschool. A 
very short span of European education in the Indies had limited intellectual exchanges 
between European and Native scholars when compared to the experience of British 
India. 
Perhaps reflecting this relatively short period of intellectual exchange, the role 
of Indonesia’s native intellectuals in shaping adat law remains under-researched. 
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During his long tenure at Leiden, van Vollenhoven guided seven Indonesian doctoral 
students and many more master’s students. However, there is a lack of in-depth 
analyses of these works and their possible constitutive correlation with colonial 
discourse on adat law, even for a scholar such as Soepomo. Takashi Shiraishi in his 
book An Age in Motion (1990) summarizes Soepomo’s dissertation as a background 
for his discussion of the emergent nationalist movement in Surakarta. Peter Burns’s 
(2004) extensive study of Leiden’s adat legacy to Indonesia mentions only Soepomo’s 
influence on the 1945 Constitution. Elsewhere, Soepomo’s philosophical outlook that 
permeates the Indonesian Constitution has been well researched (Bourchier 1996; 
Simanjuntak 1994); yet, his intellectual project on adat land rights and his role in 
colonial knowledge production of adat law as part of the Leiden intellectual circle 
remain largely unexplored. 
In the following sections, I will explore how Soepomo responded to an 
inherently contradictory colonial discourse on agrarian reorganization and adat land 
rights, a discourse that was waged in the name of progress. How did Soepomo 
maneuver his way through the slippery arguments of the colonizers? What particular 
strategy did he deploy to avoid this slippery slope? How does Soepomo’s struggle 
inform our understanding of “an active native” in colonial knowledge production? 
Versed in both native and colonial worldviews, Soepomo was well equipped to return 
his own critical gaze on the debate on agrarian reorganization in Surakarta. 
The Making of Soepomo 
Born in 1903 in Sukoharjo into a family with ties to the Kasunanan Royal 
House, Soepomo had the requisite lineage needed to break into a successful priyayi2 
                                                 
2 Traditionally, priyayi was an elite group in Javanese society that had a claim to aristocratic lineage and 
conformed to the Weberian concept of the patrimonial elite group. During the colonial era, the Dutch 
employed the priyayi to run the low-level colonial administrative machinery. Nurturing their status as a 
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career since both his of grandfathers were regents in Kasunanan of Surakarta territory. 
Brought up in his paternal grandfather’s household, Soepomo grew up to be “quiet, 
polite, careful and without ambition to achieve fame” (Soegito 1984).3 He was a 
person who was “constantly exposed to classical values and traditions of his Javanese 
elders,” shaping Soepomo into a person who was “humble, respectful, obedient 
(patuh), tertib,4 polite and held strong to custom and tradition” (Soegito 1984, 7). The 
biography describes his fashion sense and physical appearance as “necis” (16), a 
curious borrowing from the Dutch word netjes that covers the concept of neatness and 
tidiness, smartness in dressing up, or decent, respectable, proper in social manners. 
The word necis is also used to describe Soepomo’s verbal expressions, which were 
“harmonious with his demeanor.” In short, Soepomo was the epitome of a Javanese 
gentleman, an ideal type of Wong Solo (16).5 Scant information is available on 
Soepomo’s traditional education. However, as a scion of two minor aristocratic 
families, he must have received the best of traditional Javanese education available to 
                                                                                                                                            
special class in the colonial society, the priyayi gradually built a sense of identity that was based on 
what they considered to be the best of Javanese culture (Geertz 1960, Anderson 1972, Sutherland 
1979).  
3 This biography is the only one available on Soepomo. His early death in 1958 followed by period of 
turbulent transition in Indonesia in 1965 has left Soepomo among the least researched and written about 
among Indonesia’s founding fathers, except perhaps for his thoughts that helped shape the Indonesian 
Constitution (Bourchier 1996; Simanjuntak 1994; among others). Commissioned by the Ministry of 
Education during the height of the New Order regime, this biography provides only a veneer of 
information about Soepomo. It includes more pages on Soepomo’s speech during the constitutional 
discussion in 1945 than on explorations of Soepomo’s life experience. Echoing the New Order politics 
on traditional values, the author venerates Soepomo as the epitome of the Javanese gentleman. This 
problem notwithstanding, the biography does offer a window—albeit small—to understanding 
Soepomo’s subjectivity.  
4 Tertib comes from a Javanese word that means disciplined conduct in maintaining order, structure, or 
rituals. It implies an internalization of rules set up by an external entity.  
5 Solo is the capital of the Surakarta Principality. Wong Solo literally means “People of Solo,” which 
distinguishes between the Javanese from the inner area of the kingdom who are halus (literary: smooth), 
refined, and sophisticated and the Javanese from the periphery who are kasar (rough) in manners and 
expressions.  
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continue his family’s service to the Surakarta Principality, shown by his 
accomplishments as a classical Javanese dancer.6 
Soepomo’s European education began in Europeesche Laager School (ELS) in 
Boyolali and Meer Uitgebreid Lagere Onderwijs (MULO) in Solo, which he finished 
in 1920.7 He continued his education at the Batavia Rechtsschool, a vocational school 
for educating native law clerks for services in the judicial system, from which he 
graduated in 1923. Upon his graduation, the colonial administration assigned him as 
an intern under the Landraad Chairman in Sragen regency, Surakarta, before sending 
him on a scholarship to study law in Leiden in 1924. Undoubtedly, his European 
education, particularly in the Batavia Rechtsschool, fundamentally shaped the ways in 
which he situated himself in the world and constructed meaning of his experiences. 
The pedagogical strategy and the design of the curriculum in the Batavia Recthsshool 
and at Leiden that encouraged independent thinking (see chapter 1) arguably were 
imprinted into Soepomo’s outlook on the world; it influenced the ways he understood, 
interpreted, and re-presented legal discourse to colonial society. 
Throughout his student years, Soepomo was closely connected with Budi 
Utomo,8 a Java-national movement founded by Soetomo, and Gunawan and Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo—native doctors educated at STOVIA (School tot Opleiding van 
Inlandsche Artsen, School for the Training of Native Doctors). He was also an active 
                                                 
6 Soepomo continued to train and perform classical Javanese dances while he was studying at Leiden 
with fellow Indonesian students. His performance in Paris in 1926 impressed the Netherlands’ 
ambassador so much that he asked Soepomo to perform again the next year (Soegito 1984). 
7 MULO was a less prestigious secondary school than the Hogere Burger School (HBS), reflecting the 
fact that Soepomo did not come from the crème of the crème of Surakarta’s aristocratic society.  
8 The ethical politics in the Netherlands affected the dynamics in the colony through education, as 
education nourished nationalist consciousness among the natives even though it started out as 
patrimonial consciousness. One of the earlier patrimonial movements in Indonesia was Budi Utomo, 
which, however, gradually became “very priyayi, drawing its members from the upper and middle 
classes of Central and East Java, and advocating a paternalistic program that emphasized the duty of the 
aristocracy to lead the masses towards enlightenment” (Sutherland 1979, 59). 
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member of Jong Java in Batavia (Miert 2003; Soegito 1984). His conservative9 
leanings, influenced by Javanese ethics and his involvement in Budi Utomo, defined 
his position in the debate about the direction Jong Java should pursue. As secretary of 
Jong Java in its 1921 congress, Soepomo rejected radical members’ suggestion to 
borrow the French revolution motto of Liberty, Equality, and Brotherhood, proposing 
instead to use Dutch theosophist Fournier’s principle of “cool-headedness and warm 
heart” (kepala yang dingin dan hati yang gumbira) (Miert 2003, 61–62). 
In this light, Soepomo represents a curious combination of the “new 
intelligentsia” and the “old priyayi.” He was thoroughly exposed to European 
education, ideas, and values, and at the same time—coming from families that had 
long served the Surakarta Principality—he was raised in the tradition of Javanese 
ethics which provided him with an alternative reference. His embrace of Fournier’s 
ideas, a theosophy that combines Western ideas with Eastern mysticism, popular 
among priyayi in that period, demonstrates his interest in East–West fusion. 
Soepomo’s subjectivity and epistemic reference thus were results of a hybrid of native 
and colonial discourses. I will briefly explore Javanese ethics in the following 
paragraphs to offer a glimpse into one of the influences on Soepomo’s subjectivity. 
Javanese ethics revolves around two basic principles: harmoni (conflict 
aversion) and hormat (respect) (Magnis-Suseno 1988).10 Harmoni manifests itself in 
                                                 
9 Conservative in this context is contrasted with the more radical approach waged by students 
influenced by Marxist-socialist ideology.  
10 Magnis-Suseno’s construction of Javanese ethics is based on literature reviews of others’ research. 
He offers a caveat that the Javanese he constructs is more of an ideal type following Weberian heuristic 
methodology. As was suggested by Anderson (1972) and Geertz (1960), the elements of Javanese ethics 
are predominantly drawn from the priyayi worldview and experience; thus it is not independent from 
colonial influences that the priyayi were heavily exposed to. Sutherland (1979, viii), for example, 
argues that hormat as a refined and over-elaborate principle was a defense mechanism built as a 
response to the native aristocrat’s impotence against the pressing colonial power. This construction of 
the Javanese ethic may be outdated for the contemporary situation, but I argue that it is still relevant in 
trying to understand the subjectivity of the Javanese aristocrat in the early 20th century. Geertz’s and 
Anderson’s research subjects in the 1950s and 1960s, subjects who were contemporaries of Soepomo, 
arguably shared Soepomo’s worldview.  
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the ways one carries oneself in social relations and how one maintains one’s mental 
state. In social relations, a Javanese man is expected to act in certain ways to avoid 
conflict, even if it is only to maintain a perceived state of harmony, peace, and 
contentment. Conflict aversion as a mental state demands giving up one’s personal 
interests for the sake of common agreement (kesepakatan bersama). It enforces 
compromises to maintain harmony, expressed in the exercise of self-control over 
emotional outburst, and in vigilance in controlling others’ responses through carefully 
measured actions and verbal expressions (Magnis-Suseno 1988, 47). Thus the essence 
of harmony in Javanese ethics is to regulate individuals from unmeasured and 
uncontrolled conduct that may lead to open conflict. 
Hormat relates to the treatment of others. A Javanese who understands hormat 
never carries himself above his social station and treats others in accordance with their 
status and hierarchy. This principle is based on the opinion that every social relation is 
hierarchically patterned and that such hierarchical patterns have inherent values 
(Magnis-Suseno 1988). Those of higher status deserve respect, and those of lower 
status deserve protection extended with a sense of paternal responsibility. In contrast 
to conflict aversion, the principle of respect only demands an outer expression in 
social relations, not an inner mental state; it acknowledges status, expressed in 
accordance with appropriate etiquette (Magnis-Suseno 1988, 68). The colonial regime 
benefited from the hormat principle, adopted and impounded it deeper into Javanese 
daily life by demanding the hormat treatments to their officials. 
Together, conflict aversion and hormat constitute the basis for achieving the 
quality of being halus (refined) that separates a priyayi from the commoner, the crude, 
the uneducated masses, the wong cilik. Clifford Geertz likens halus to the “pure, 
refined, polished, polite, exquisite, ethereal, subtle, civilized, smooth” (1960, 232), 
while Benedict Anderson draws various comparisons to represent halus: 
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Smoothness of spirit means self-control, smoothness of appearance means 
beauty and elegance, smoothness of behavior means politeness and sensitivity. 
The antithetical quality of being kasar means lack of control, irregularity, 
imbalance, disharmony, ugliness, coarseness, and impurity . . . Being halus, on 
the other hand, requires constant effort and control to reach a reduction of the 
spectrum of human feeling and thought to a single smooth “white” radiance of 
concentrated energy. (1990, 50) 
The quality of being halus in Javanese etiquette is “in itself a sign of Power, since 
halus-ness is achieved only by the concentration of energy” (Anderson 1990, 51). A 
man with true Power 
 . . . does not have to raise his voice nor give overt orders. The halusness of his 
command is the external expression of his authority. The whole Javanese style 
of administration is therefore marked by the attempt, wherever possible, to 
give an impression of minimum effort, as through the perintah halus. The 
ethics of halus-ness are at bottom the ethics of Power. (Anderson 1990, 54) 
As principles that infused the ideal type of Javanese ethics, harmony, hormat 
and halus were spectacularly torn to pieces by Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, himself 
deemed the epitome of the Javanese gentleman (ksatria) by his contemporary. Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo was a decorated native doctor who co-founded Budi Oetomo, the 
Javanese nationalist organization, with Dr. Soetomo in 1908. By 1919, he was a 
member of the Volksraad, and a seasoned nationalist, having been exiled between 
1913 and 1914 to the Netherlands for his activities with Suwardi Suryaningrat and 
E.F.E Douwes Dekker. The Dutch selected him to be a member of the Volksraad to 
convince skeptics that the Volksraad was not populated by politically impotent native 
figures.11 
                                                 
11 See Shiraishi (1990) for a detailed study of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Surakarta Insulinde 
activities in the late teens to mid-1920s.  
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Between 1912 and 1921, precisely Soepomo’s formative years in Surakarta, 
which was teeming with nationalist awakening,12 Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo rallied 
an attack against the Surakarta Principality after his lieutenant, Haji Misbach, was 
arrested by the Dutch government. A prominent Muslim inspired by Marxism, Haji 
Misbach assisted local peasants in addressing their grievances against unjust Dutch 
agricultural estate operators and native officials. These native officials became more 
involved in peasants’ daily life after the agrarian reorganization in the Kasunanan 
Surakarta.13 Clearly, the agrarian reorganization in Surakarta had caused restlessness 
among its population, not the least among middlemen (bekel) who lost their position. 
And Mangoenkoesomo responded to it. 
Mangoenkoesomo’s protest was essentially an anti-Principality campaign. He 
waged his criticism through the Javanese publication Panggoegah and through the 
Volksraad. He accused the Principalities of having overburdened the people in 
Surakarta with obligation to support and maintain two royal houses. He proposed to 
dismiss the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran and to pay the royal family a monthly 
pension, or to return Madiun to Kasunanan to help with financing their expenses 
(Shiraishi 1990).14 Mangoenkoesomo insisted that the agrarian reorganization in 
Surakarta would never achieve the objective of improving the welfare of the peasants 
because it was designed to keep them living at subsistence level. He openly attributed 
Javanese peasants’ misery to the royal houses, first because it was their obsolete and 
medieval agricultural system that sustained the peasants’ impoverishment, and second 
                                                 
12 For a detailed study of Surakarta and the nationalist movement, see Shiraishi (1990) and Elson 
(1984). 
13 Misbach never led the peasant’s strikes; the dismissed apanage holders organized the strikes because 
they resented the reorganization that demoted their social standing. Nevertheless, after a strike in April 
1919, Misbach was detained by the government, prompting Mangoenkoesomo’s protest.  
14 Ridiculous as it might have sounded to the royalists, it worried them nonetheless since the 
reorganization of the agrarian system was on its way, and Mangoenkoesoemo’s idea was controversial 
enough that it could have aroused the Dutch’s interests. 
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because it was the royal houses that issued the royal decree in the name of the Sunan, 
which obliged the “little men,” the Javanese coolies, to pay taxes, perform corvee 
labor, and hand over their land to Dutch agricultural estates—those very same estates 
that belonged to the Indo-European families who maintained intimate relations with 
the Royal Houses. These estates leased the land on a rotating basis, effectively 
granting the owners the legal bases to suppress the peasants’ protest. It was in Sunans’ 
name that Surakarta’s subjects became bonded to the Dutch plantation and from which 
the Sunan benefited financially (Shiraishi 1990).15 
Mangoenkoesomo’s open challenge to the royal houses was a controversial act, 
one that was shunned by old school aristocracies but that caught the imagination of the 
educated, younger generation of Javanese elite, including Soepomo. These tensions, 
psychological wars, and struggles within the native circle took place in Soepomo’s 
proximity. In 1919 he was finishing his HBS in Surakarta, and between 1920 and 
1923, when Mangoenkoesomo criticized Javanese Principalities at the Volksraad, he 
was studying in Batavia. Mangoenkoesoemo’s position was so controversial that the 
young Soepomo was certainly aware of its serious challenge against the royal houses’ 
legitimacy. This is affirmed by the fact that Soepomo was an important official in the 
Jong Java movement in Batavia. 
I do not go into depth here about the conditions at the Batavia Rechtsschool 
and Leiden University United Faculty of Law and Letters that helped to shape 
Soepomo’s outlook, as they were explored in chapter 1. Suffice it to say that his 
Rechtsschool and Leiden years must have infused him with a deep sense of autonomy, 
                                                 
15 In his campaign, Mangoenkoesoemo courageously faced the vehement counterattacks by royalists in 
the Volksraad. To silence Mangoenkoesoemo, Prince Mangkunegara Prang Wedana, the crown prince 
of the Mangkunegara royal house, appealed to the Dutch official to clarify the potential role reserved 
for the Surakarta royal houses in the future autonomous Indies, to which the government representative, 
W. Muurling, announced in the Volksraad, “Whoever tries to undermine the authority and the position 
of the self-governing principalities of Java, the government sets itself against” (Shiraishi 1990, 181).  
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which was enhanced by observing the growing nationalist sentiments among 
Indonesian students.16 Radicalization of Indonesian Leidenaars caused concern among 
the Dutch conservatives who accused the Leiden ethicist professor, Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven, of being responsible for the radicalization of the students (Poeze 1986). 
Soepomo wrote his dissertation on agrarian reorganization in Surakarta at the 
height of criticism against van Vollenhoven and using van Vollenhoven’s construct of 
adat law on land rights as a point of departure. A charismatic professor and a staunch 
supporter of Ethical Policy, van Vollenhoven was unceasing in his effort to secure 
beschikkingsrecht for the natives despite all the controversy, and by his intellectual 
leadership to stop “progressive expansion of Western law in the colony” (Otto and 
Pompe 1989, 245). His intellectual work challenged the conventional wisdom that the 
implementation of European law in the colonies would benefit the native population 
(Otto and Pompe 1989).17 
Constructing Native Land Rights Using Adat Law 
In the Dutch East Indies, adat law on land rights was a subset of adat law, a 
non-statutory law that consisted of customary law and, in some parts, Islamic law, and 
included “decisions of the judge containing legal principles in the milieu in which he 
delivers judgment” (Soepomo 1953, 218). Each ethnic group had its adat law that 
                                                 
16 Much has been written on the nationalist awakening among Indonesian students in the Netherlands. 
For detailed analysis, see Miert (2003), Noer (2002), Rivai (2000), Hatta (2002), Poeze (1986), and 
Sastroamidjojo (1979), among others.  
17 Even though his disposition toward native welfare was positive, when Indonesian students in the 
Netherlands became more animated in their nationalist endeavor, van Vollenhoven stopped coming to 
the gathering of Perhimpoenan Indonesia (Indonesian student association in the Netherlands) and 
distanced himself from Indonesian nationalist arguments (Burns 2004; Laman Trip-de Beaufort 1956). 
This, however, failed to erase the high regard his Indonesian students held for him. More than two 
decades later, Soepomo still expressed deep respect for van Vollenhoven (Soepomo 1953). Ali 
Sastroamidjojo, a Leiden student who was also a PI activist—later he served as Indonesia’s prime 
minister—wrote an account that reveals the respectful relations between the native student and the 
professor: although he was under arrest, he was allowed to take his Master’s exam, and the attitude and 
actions of the examiners, van Vollenhoven among them, “were completely scholarly” (1979, 33). 
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regulated land rights and distribution. Trying to understand the Native’s proprietary 
system, the Dutch began collecting data about adat rulings on land rights in the late 
19th century. The information was used to write agrarian law for the colony. They 
compiled the rich findings in Eindresume,18 an enormous data repository that informed 
Cornelis van Vollenhoven’s magnum opus on adat law. Van Vollenhoven gave adat 
law a formal structure through his influential publications, lectures, and the training of 
legal scholars at Leiden, all of which helped create adat law as a new sub-discipline in 
the Dutch corpus of legal study. Soepomo’s dissertation was written in conversation 
with van Vollenhoven’s construct of adat land rights and the colonial agrarian policy. 
The Invention of Adat Law 
Although Snouck Hurgronje was the first person to introduce the term adat law 
(adatrecht) in his advice to the Director of Justice in the Netherlands Indies 
(Hurgronje 1957), it was van Vollenhoven who developed it into a legitimate branch 
of legal studies in the Netherlands and the East Indies. A full professor at the Faculty 
of Law, Leiden University, in 1901 at the age of 26 (Laman Trip-de Beaufort 1956) 
and a long-time colleague and close friend of Snouck Hurgronje, van Vollenhoven 
became familiar with the adat question early in his career when he served as the 
secretary for the Commission for Adat Law of the Royal Institute of Indonesian 
Linguistics and Ethnology at The Hague, where Hurgronje was chairman. As a legal 
scholar, van Vollenhoven was deeply influenced by the great seventeenth-century 
Dutch jurist Hugo de Groot, who resisted Justinian code in the Netherlands, and by 
                                                 
18 This finding was prepared by the Commission of Inquiry on land rights and land use practices in 
Java, Madura, and the Outer Islands. 
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Von Savigny, a German legal theorist known for his doctrine of organic law (Burns 
2004).19 
In his effort to establish adat land rights in colonial discourse, van Vollenhoven 
faced major obstacles, one of which was waged by G.J. Nolst Trenite.20 Aside of his 
advice on an amendment of article 62 Regeringsreglement 1854, Nolst Trenite also 
prepared a document in 1912 titled “The right of the State to land in the directly-
governed Outer Possessions of the Netherlands East Indies.”21 Known also as 
Domeinnota, this document was attached as an appendix in the colony’s Agrarian 
Regulation for Sumatra’s West Coast in 1916 (Burns 2004, 21). Nolst Trenite’s 
argument challenged van Vollenhoven’s rejection of domain theory, which the latter 
first expressed in his 1909 book Miskenningen van het Adatrecht. It was also Nolst 
Trenite who prepared a position paper in the Indies Association of Jurists of 1929 that 
argued that the state was the master of all land without exception (Burns 2004). Over 
time, he became van Vollenhoven’s most persistent opponent. 
Van Vollenhoven and the Leiden school’s stance on adat land rights remained 
a thorny issue among both liberal and conservative Dutch. To balance the ethical 
leanings of the Leiden Faculty of Law, a new school of Indology was founded at the 
                                                 
19 Hugo de Groot resisted the imposition of Justinian Code in the Netherlands by the courts of the 
United Provinces. The universalism of Roman Law stood in contrast to Grotius’s conviction that 
indigenous communities had innate rights to their own set of law, as was clearly expressed in his book 
Mare Liberum:  
Java, Sumatra, the Moluccas have their own kings, public institutions, laws and rights and they 
have had them always. One is not entitled to deprive these infidels of their will and princely 
power because they do not believe. Indeed it is even heresy to assume that the infidels should 
not be master of their goods, for it is no less theft and robbery to deprive them of their goods 
than it would be if a Christian were concerned. (Quoted in Hooker 1978b, 71)  
Von Savigny—on the other hand—argues that there was no making of law, only evolution, “that could 
only take place within the native community—the nation. Law—the genuine law—should be thought 
of, at its beginning, as a bud, growing out of the stem of communal culture” (Burns 2004, 232). 
20 See also chapter 2 about van Vollenhoven and the Nolst Trenite debate on Domain Declaration.  
21 In Dutch: Het recht van den Staat op den grond in de rechtstreeks bestuurde Buitenbezittingen van 
Nederlandsch-Indie. 
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University of Utrecht in 1913, financed by “petroleum money” collected by big 
businesses of the day and the ultra-imperial loyalists (Burns 2004, 77). The school 
later recruited Nolst Trenite as one of its key faculty members, and by doing so 
launched the famous Utrecht vs. Leiden debate on the legal system in the colony. The 
debate between the liberal- and conservative-leaning Dutch policymakers hung on two 
issues: first, on a critical legal argument of domain right; and second, on the general 
policy to promote welfare among colonial subjects.22 The debate was to have profound 
consequences for adat law on land rights. Otto and Pompe describe the debate as 
follows: 
The main legal issue was whether the Indonesian communities 
(rechtsgemeenschappen) should have a right of disposal (beschikkingsrecht) 
over land that excluded Western property rights and staatsdomein (the doctrine 
that all property rights are ultimately derived from state ownership). In more 
general terms, the position of adat law within the colonial legal system was at 
issue. (1989, 247) 
This institutional polarization showcases the inner cracks in colonial discourse and the 
tensions between key factions on the issue of native land rights.23 
Van Vollenhoven’s Basic Structure of Adat Land Rights 
Van Vollenhoven laid the base for his construction of adat law in Het 
Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië Vol.1 (1931), Miskenningen van het Adatrecht 
                                                 
22 Burns (2004) provides a detailed analysis of the Utrecht-Leiden polemic in his book The Leiden 
Legacy (2004). Aside from the legal issue, the debate stems from Utrecht’s concern with Leiden’s 
approach vis-à-vis the native students that “bred a rebellious spirit towards Netherlands authority and a 
hostile spirit towards major capital undertakings in Indie” (79; see also Poeze 1989).  
23 The debate continued well into the 1930s until van Vollenhoven’s death, and the issue remains 
unresolved until now. With van Vollenhoven’s death in 1933, Leiden University lost its influential 
defender of adat law. Van Vollenhoven’s protégé, Barendt ter Haar, a professor of adat law in Batavia 
Rechtshoogeschool, died in Auschwitz in 1939 when he went back to the Netherlands for the first time 
after 14 years. World War II and Indonesia’s independence deflated interest in the Netherlands on adat 
law (Pompe 1993). 
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(1909, 1926), and Indonesier en zijn Grond (1919).24 The struggle to introduce the 
native episteme is recorded in van Vollenhoven’s Het Adatrecht (1981), in which he 
urged his audience to acknowledge the local episteme as an alternative to the West’s 
in providing a reference to understand the native milieu: 
He who turns from the law of the Netherlands to the law of the Dutch East 
Indies enters a new world. He has learned to visualize law as a body of rules 
codified in statutes and decrees . . . How different in the Indies! . . . Viewed 
through the eyes of a codist the legal inventory of the Indies presents a jumble, 
an incomplete, inadequate and untidy whole; but when explored by one whose 
desire for knowledge and explanation of the living law on earth is inspired by 
the very diversity of its past and present manifestations, this same inventory 
becomes an inexhaustible source of instruction. (Vollenhoven 1981, 1–2) 
In this statement, van Vollenhoven admonished the colonizer’s rigid tendency 
to cling to his own cognitive world that denied him the possibility of understanding a 
foreign legal system. His response to a discussion in the Dutch Tweedekamer reflects 
his position regarding the native’s alternative episteme. He said, “Adat law is held in 
contempt; but this is in great measure because it is very difficult to enter into another 
person’s way of thinking” (Vollenhoven in Burns 2004, 14). He suggested that this 
local episteme had the potential to mature like that of the West: 
We have only pointed out that people ignorant of adat law have time and again, 
and without using any standard of comparison, arrived at the preconceived 
conclusion that only European law could be fully-fledged law, and that adat 
law must of necessity be inadequate and inferior. (Vollenhoven 1981, 26) 
With this conviction, van Vollenhoven established his project to construct the 
basic structure of adat law on land rights in terms that could be understood by his 
fellow Dutchmen. 
                                                 
24 Originally a pamphlet van Vollenhoven prepared to stop the amendment of article on land rights in 
Dutch East Indies constitution in 1919.  
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Van Vollenhoven’s construct of adat law on native land rights consists of four 
basic fundamental principles. First, the Netherlands could not use domain-theory to 
claim domain right over the East Indies or to enforce legal security. To van 
Vollenhoven, the domain declaration “is an unsympathetic misconstruction, 
historically indefensible, and theoretically a source of misconception” (1909, 30). 
Further, domain-theory is in contradiction with Article 75 clause 3 and Article 62 
clauses 5 and 6 of Regeeringsreglement 1854. Van Vollenhoven’s rejection of state 
ownership encompasses the indigenous state, and in this position, he was at odds with 
Raffles,25 who introduced a land rent system based on the assumption that “the 
sovereign had been the sole owner of all lands” (Boomgaard 1989, 2). In contrast, van 
Vollenhoven’s construct of native land rights relies heavily on the premise that the 
native sovereign had no original right to land (Vollenhoven 1931, 504 and 685). I 
suggest this was a necessary negation to “restore” the people’s right to land. 
Second, for van Vollenhoven the local community had a legal entity 
nonexistent in European categories. He termed it rechtsgemeenschap, or jural 
community (Sonius1981, xlii), which was marked by a distinct legal competence to 
exercise right of allocation over land, or beschikkingsrecht.26 Beschikkingsrecht—
formed from the two words beschikking (disposal) and recht (law)—is van 
Vollenhoven’s attempt to capture the native concept of land property known as hak 
ulayat (Vollenhoven 1909, 19). He encountered the challenge of establishing the 
native signified within a European system of difference; he acknowledged that the 
term was ambiguous and obscure, and he fumbled in its translation; he realized that 
                                                 
25 Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles was the British Lieutenant-Governor who served during the 
interregnum in the Dutch East Indies between 1811 and 1816. 
26 Beschikking represents layers of the signified. One signified is the concept of ordenen and regelen 
(administer, regulate). When used with the preposition over, beschikking over represents the signified of 
the concept bezitten or tot zijn dienst hebben (‘disposal over’ or ‘power to decide about’). Recht, on the 
other hand, is relatively more straightforward: it represents the concept of law and rights. 
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the Dutch legal universe could not fully comprehend hak ulayat because when used in 
reference to property, the word “beschikking over” suggests a principle of alienation, a 
characteristic that van Vollenhoven strongly denied to exist in hak ulayat. 
Third, acknowledging the poverty of the Dutch episteme to fully comprehend 
beschikkingsrecht, van Vollenhoven spelled out six characteristics to help define this 
native land rights concept: 
i. The jural community and its members may make free use of virgin land 
within its area. The land may be brought into cultivation; it may be used to 
found a village; it may be used for gleaning, etc. 
ii. Others may do the same there only with permission of the jural community: 
lacking that permission, they commit an offence. 
iii. For such use, outsiders must always pay some charge or give a gratuity in 
tribute: members of the community may sometimes have to make such 
payments. 
iv. The jural community retains to greater or lesser degree the right to 
intervene in questions concerning land already under cultivation within its 
area. 
v. Should there be no other party from whom recovery can be made, the jural 
community is accountable for whatever transpires within its area. 
vi. The jural community cannot alienate this, its right of allocation, in 
perpetuity. (Burns 2004, 18)27 
The sixth characteristic is particularly significant because van Vollenhoven stressed 
these characteristics in many of his writings (1909, 1919), and argued that Western 
researchers’ misunderstanding of adat land rights stemmed from an inability to grasp 
the inalienability principle in hak ulayat (1919, 7–9). 
Finally, Beschikkingsrecht, or the right of allocation, lies in the sphere of 
privaatrecht, or private law, law that regulated relations between citizen, not 
publiekrecht, or public-constitutional law, which refers to all law regulating the 
relations between the state and its citizens. Privaat- or civielrecht was meant to protect 
                                                 
27 In Dutch, this is written as “en dat is niet het minst merkwaardige—zij kan dit haar recht niet blijvend 
vervreemden” (Vollenhoven 1909, 20). 
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citizens in their personal transactions from interference by the government, with the 
idea of protecting freedom of contract and property rights from the government’s 
meddling. 
Agrarian Reorganization in Surakarta, 1912–1924, through the Eyes of a Native 
Scholar 
Soepomo’s doctoral dissertation, The Reorganization of the Agrarian System in 
the Region of Surakarta,28 dissects the agrarian reform in Surakarta that was triggered 
by a wave of legal reforms in the Dutch East Indies between 1912 and 1924. Since the 
Mangkunegaran, the junior royal house in Surakarta, had partially abolished its 
apanage system in 1870, the mandated reorganization meant it only needed to abolish 
fourteen remaining apanages in its jurisdiction. Kasunanan, on the other hand, 
completed its reorganization between 1917 and 1924. The reorganization severed the 
feudal apanage system in four steps: by abolishing the apanage system, by creating a 
new form of village and village administration that took over the traditional role of the 
bekels, by defining the peasants’ right to land more clearly, and finally, by revising 
commercial land lease regulation in Surakarta (see Map 3 and Map 4). 
Writing about the reorganization gave Soepomo insights into the relational 
transformation between the peasants and the Principalities, known in Dutch as the 
Vorstenlanden. By juxtaposing the old with the new tenure system, Soepomo was able 
to interrogate colonial debates on native land rights,29 debates that reflect ruptures 
between the capitalists and the legal-ethicists whose credo influenced the 
reorganization. Shiraishi describes this credo as follows: 
                                                 
28 In Dutch: De Reorganisatie van het Agrarisch Stelsel in het Geweest Soerakarta. 
29 Despite its strategic thrust, it was unclear whether Soepomo had chosen the dissertation topic himself, 
as van Vollenhoven traditionally assigned research topics for his students (Pompe 1993). 
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In the Ethical era, the idea that the people should be free from the bond of the 
land, and that there should be a separation between the usufruct of the land and 
the command over the labor of people who live on the land, became 
indisputable; and in the light of this idea the agrarian situation in the 
Vorstenlanden increasingly came to be seen as a “medieval” system, a carry-
over of the nineteenth century Cultuurstelsel. (1990, p. 18) 
 
Map 3. Java in the 1920s. 
Map courtesy of The Age in Motion, Shiraishi 1990. Used by permission of the 
publisher, Cornell University Press. 
The agrarian reorganization in Surakarta was fiercely debated by diverse 
factions of Dutch society in the Motherland and in the colony, precisely because at this 
site debate about domain declaration and Native rights to land was no longer abstract, 
but had major consequences for accessibility to land and labor in the Principality. 
Disagreements between the ethicists and capitalists, and between liberals and 
conservatives, were very visible and illustrated the ambivalent character of the 
colonial agrarian regime. 
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Map 4. Residency of Surakarta, 1920s. 
Map courtesy of The Age in Motion, Shiraishi 1990. Used by permission of the 
publisher, Cornell University Press. 
Soepomo divided his dissertation into two main sections: The first three 
chapters describe the pre-colonial apanage system in Surakarta and the accompanying 
rights and obligations of the local community to the apanage holders. The remaining 
three analyze the objectives and mechanisms of the reorganization, its impact on the 
relations between peasants-Principalities and peasants-agricultural plantations, and the 
legal consequences of the commercial land lease system in the region. With this two-
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pronged approach, Soepomo’s dissertation emerges as an extensive study of both 
indigenous and colonial law on land rights, critical in its assessment of tensions and 
ruptures in this particular discourse. 
In this chapter, I focus only on the second half of Soepomo’s dissertation, 
aiming to render visible the autonomy of a colonial subject, whose thinking and being 
in the world were shaped partially by training in the Dutch legal tradition and partially 
by being raised with Javanese ethics. I first elaborate the transformation processes that 
Soepomo explains in his chapter 4. Afterwards, I dissect Soepomo’s analysis of the 
reorganization’s impact of the reorganization on the network of relations. In this 
section of his dissertation Soepomo exposes the hypocritical colonial discourse of 
progress, explicates the struggles among the Dutch factions in the metropole and the 
colony, and demonstrates instances where the Vorsten indiscriminately emulated the 
Indies government policies that were detrimental to the peasantry. Finally, I bring to 
the foreground Soepomo’s analysis of the reorganization’s impacts on the commercial 
land lease system, which he elaborates in his final chapter. Soepomo writes in 
unambiguous terms about how the new system had unfairly burdened the peasants and 
how the native Vorsten officials and Dutch colonial bureaucrats shared a role in 
maintaining a regime that essentially siphoned off the peasants’ surplus. 
Building an Argument: Four Processes in Surakarta Agrarian Reorganization 
To transform the indigenous agrarian system to “fit with the progress of 
society,” the colonial government intervened in four stages: abolishing the apanage 
system, transforming traditional villages into administrative units, unambiguously 
defining peasants’ rights over land, and revising commercial land lease regulation. 
Soepomo describes each of these key stages in chapter 4 of his dissertation, paying 
close attention to contradictions and ruptures that emerged. Soepomo’s reactions to the 
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contradictions were so neutral that it appears as if he is defending the government’s 
policy on Surakarta. It is only towards the end of his dissertation that Soepomo’s 
seemingly agnostic position becomes explicable. 
Javanese Ethics at Play 
The Dutch domination of the Vorstenlanden court was common knowledge 
since it was the princes who, in the mid-18th century, called the officers of the Dutch 
East Indies Company to intervene in the bloody rivalries that had plagued the Javanese 
landscape for decades (Ricklefs 1974). It was fascinating, then, to observe the political 
theatre in the early 20th century when the Dutch denied its dominant role in the 
reorganization, insisting that the Vorstenlanden had acted as independent and equal 
partners in the agrarian reorganization process. 
Soepomo accepts Surakarta’s need for an agrarian reorganization. As he 
demonstrates earlier in his thesis, the traditional apanage system was vulnerable to 
abuse, hence the necessity of fundamental reform, since it “no longer fits with the 
context of the period” (Soepomo 1927, 48). Yet, he qualifies his approval by promptly 
asking a double-edged question: “Have the Vorsten wanted the reorganization 
themselves?” (Soepomo 1927, 48). It was the Member of Parliament Vliegen who 
originally asked this question to the then Minister of the Colonies, De Waal Malefijt. 
But instead of quoting Vliegen directly, Soepomo appropriates the question and 
presents it in his own words, effectively amplifying the tensions in the paragraph. 
Almost instantly, Soepomo tones down the tension by quoting Malefijt’s own 
response: 
 . . . the Minister answered ‘not only were we guaranteed of that’ (of the 
cooperation from the Sunan [of Surakarta] and of the Sultan [of Yogyakarta]. 
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Of the two princes [the junior royal houses]30, nothing was mentioned), ‘but 
also that the reform is considered to be the act of the Vorstenlanden 
themselves’ and that the Dutch ‘did not make this step public before we met 
with the Susuhunan and the Sultan where both gave their approval to the 
presented plan.’ (1927, 48) 
Soepomo then switches back to his own voice: 
Is that a correct reflection of what happened, or is the Encyclopaedie van 
Nederlandsch Indie . . . correct, that the reform regulations were practically 
imposed upon the principalities, in place of being discussed by them or [in 
other words] led by the principalities themselves? (1927, 49; original italics) 
The italics in “imposed” (opgelegd) and “discussed” (overlegd) are Soepomo’s own. 
Framed with the earlier question, “Have the Vorsten wanted the reorganization 
themselves?” the italicization of these words enables Soepomo not only to express his 
skepticism in a subtle, impassive way, but also to juxtapose two opposing colonial 
positions, one in the Encyclopaedie of the Netherlands Indies and the other in the 
Memorandum of Explanation for the Indies budget 1912 (hereafter shortened to “the 
Memorandum”). To neutralize his “attacks,” Soepomo quickly quotes the 
Memorandum, which argues that the concerned native government officials “have not 
brought in any principle objections” (49). These italics are also Soepomo’s own, but 
the lack of context makes it difficult to conclude whether he is emphasizing skepticism 
or expressing support for the argument that would have absolved Malefijt. I propose 
that these italics are meant to obscure Soepomo’s position on the imposition of the 
reorganization in order to maintain “objectivity.” Wrapping up, Soepomo 
acknowledges the Vorstenlanden’s eventual support for implementing the agrarian 
reorganization, a support which, he carefully notes, was reprinted in several colonial 
documents. Still, he carefully refrains from giving his personal opinion. 
                                                 
30 The Mangkunagaran and Paku Alaman royal houses.  
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This play of attack and retreat, amplifying tension and instant neutralization, is 
puzzling. It is as if Soepomo cannot make up his mind about the kind of intervention 
he intends to make. I suggest that this is a case of Soepomo’s Javanese ethics at play 
in the midst of a thoroughly European intellectual exercise. No Javanese gentleman 
would degrade himself to an unmeasured and uncontrolled conduct that may lead to 
open conflict. Harmoni must be maintained; attacks must be balanced with retreat 
(Magnis-Suseno 1988). By deploying this play of attack and retreat, Soepomo 
maintains an appearance of respect regardless of his interior mental state and, despite 
his critical views of the reorganization, achieves a degree of halusness, the quality in 
Javanese etiquette which is “in itself a sign of Power, since halusness is achieved only 
by the concentration of energy” (Anderson 1990, 51). 
Soepomo keeps returning to this question-and-answer style in his dissertation. 
He uses it in ways that allow him to address sensitive, even controversial questions in 
a dispassionate manner while retaining the effect of second-guessing Dutch policies. 
As he narrates the first process of the transformation, he asks, “What was the motive 
behind the abolition of the apanage system?” (Soepomo 1927, 50). Despite the 
promising possibility in the question, Soepomo’s answer is rather simplistic. He cites 
three colonial sources with no apparent interest in challenging them. The first argues 
that the abolition of the apanage system was needed “because the working of it in each 
respect is pernicious (verderfelijk) [to society]” (50).31 It reflects the ethicist ideology 
that permeates the mood of the period: the idea of people bound to land was 
considered baneful, feudalistic, and poisonous for a society seeking progress. The 
second motive he cites also echoes this ethic: The apanage system’s nature “is not 
consistent with orderly social condition” (50).32 This statement pushed to the surface 
                                                 
31 Soepomo cites the Bijlage B Handelingen Staten-Generaal 1911-1912 38 for this motive. 
32 Soepomo quotes Het Koloniaal Verslag van 1917 for this motive. 
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the colonial desire for order and discipline, as practiced widely by other colonial 
powers during that period.33 For the third motive, Soepomo cites van Vollenhoven, 
who considered abolition of the apanage system to be “imperative for selflessness 
(onzelfzuchtigheid) in the state” (p. 50).34 Other than presenting these motives 
verbatim, Soepomo refrains from offering his own interpretation and from speculating 
about other possible motives.35 Only later in Soepomo’s dissertation does it become 
clear that this casual indifference is a strategic response. 
Four Stages of the Reorganization 
The first key process to transformation was the abolition of the apanage 
system. Although seemingly steered by the royal houses, the abolition of the apanage 
system was a thoroughly colonial project. It was the epitome of power to colonize, as 
it ensured “the spread of a political order that inscribes in the social world a new 
conception of space, new forms of personhood, and a new means of manufacturing the 
experience of the real” (Mitchell 1991, ix). However, I suggest that Soepomo also saw 
it as an opportunity to purge certain elements from a traditional system that were 
largely manipulative and exploitative. 
The abolition of the apanage system was closely tied to the second key process 
in the transformation: the formation of villages as administrative units to replace the 
traditional bekel system. Soepomo emphasizes the enthusiasm among colonial 
policymakers to revive the native system (volkswezen) in the Principalities. This 
enthusiasm manifested in a statement in the Memorandum of Explanation for the 1912 
                                                 
33 See Mitchell 1991 for colonial order and discipline in Egypt. 
34 Soepomo quotes van Vollenhoven’s article “Het onbaatzuchtige in recht en staat,” 1919, 11. 
35 Curiously, Soepomo does not touch upon any motives from the native perspective, despite the fact 
that the Mangkunagaran Royal House had started their own land reform by abolishing part of their 
apanage system as early as 1870. 
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budget, where the colonial government deemed establishing villages for rural 
peasantries a necessary condition for progress, a cornerstone for reform in the 
Principalities, which the royal houses were powerless to resist. Succumbing to the 
government demand, the two royal houses issued pranatans, regulations of the 
Vorsten, which laid out the principles for village formation to guarantee that the newly 
formed villages were carved out in an “appropriate manner.” The principles were: a) 
As far as possible, a village must have natural boundaries; and b) Lands allocated for 
each village should be able to support between 80 and 150 koeli kenceng.36 This aimed 
at ensuring efficient and satisfactory supervision by newly formed village officials; c) 
The salary land for village officials and pension land for former bekels must be located 
within the desa boundary where they live; d) All koeli kenceng must be given equal 
amounts of usufruct land, regardless of the quality or the productivity of the land, and 
the land should be located in the village where they live; and e) The land given to koeli 
kenceng in areas that were leased to the Dutch for agricultural estate purposes should 
be divided into two equal parts: one for peasant agriculture such as rice, and the other 
for the cultivation of commercial crops such as sugar cane or tobacco. 
Using these principles, by the completion of the reorganization, the Kasunanan 
had created 1,226 villages and the Mangkunegaran 738. A newly formed village was 
run by a team of village officials consisting of a lurah (village headman), a carik 
(village scribe), a modin (village religious official), a kamitua (deputy village head), 
an ulu-ulu (official in charge of water distribution and management), and a kebayan 
(village messenger). Each received allotted land commensurate with their hierarchy: 
4.5 bouw for the village headman, 2.25 bouw for the scribe, and 1.0 bouw each for the 
deputy village head, the religious official, the official in charge of water distribution 
                                                 
36 Koeli kenceng are villagers who are entitled to usufruct rights to paddy fields and housing plots, or 
either of the two, and carry the full rights and responsibilities that come with these rights, 
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and management, and the messenger. In place of the dismissed bekels, these village 
officials now exercised the right of allocation for salary land for village officials, 
pension land given to dismissed bekels as compensation, village treasury land to 
support village administrative expenses, and the village communal land to the koeli 
kenceng.37 
The principles that guided the formation of villages made the Javanese 
landscape more legible and transparent to the colonizers’ eyes. Ensuring natural 
boundaries for each village facilitated easier mapping and territorialization in the 
Vorstenlanden. By keeping access to land only within one’s village—be it land for the 
peasant, the village head and official, or the dismissed bekels—the colonial 
government secured not only discipline, but also easier surveillance for their economic 
and political interests. Pushing for a new village formation solved the nagging 
problem of a chaotic apanage system that even the royal houses had failed to rectify. 
Most important of all, it was an ingenious solution to overcome the land shortage 
problem for agricultural estates. Soepomo notices the dual legal system imposed in the 
Vorstenlanden. Lands leased to commercial agricultural enterprises were released 
from the royal houses’ legal jurisdiction and were subjected to the Indies Land Lease 
Regulation (Grondhuurreglement) decreed in Staatsblad 1918 no. 20 (Soepomo 1927, 
53). This legal ruling, and the grim consequences it imposed on the native populations, 
was the core of Soepomo’s analysis in the last chapter of his dissertation. 
The third process in the transformation was the effort to define more clearly 
the peasants’ right over land. Soepomo responds to this process by asking a double-
edged question, which essentially problematizes the colonial’s “benevolence”: “What 
has moved the [Dutch] government to give the Principalities’ people better rights on 
                                                 
37 It was these dismissed bekels who played an active part in mobilizing peasant demonstrations in 
Surakarta, which caused the imprisonment of Haji Mochammad Misbach of Insulinde Surakarta.  
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land than had the royal houses themselves?” (Soepomo 1927, 54). Following this 
question, he carefully lays out the government explanation of such “benevolent” 
interests. According to the 1912 Memorandum of Explanation, the government 
recognized the Vorsten as the absolute owner of the land. However, the government 
considered the peasants to have very limited rights as tenants of paddy fields and, in 
return for corvee labor, as users of their housing plots. Legally, then, the peasants only 
had a terminable contractual right of agricultural land and a very weak right of 
housing plots. The government wanted to strengthen these rights to provide the 
peasants with a “more independent place in society” (meer zelfstandige plaats in de 
samenleving), an ideal that echoed the creed of Ethical Policy. In this reorganization, 
the government split the bundle of rights to land into several distinct rights: The 
domain right, the highest form of Dutch property structure eigendom, was assigned to 
the Vorsten; the property right (bezitrecht) of fields to the village; and the usufruct 
right (gebruiksrecht) of the village communal land to the village residents, allocated 
by the newly formed village officials (Soepomo 1927, 55). Soepomo concludes, “thus, 
we are seeing a similar construction [of legal system] to that in the Dutch-governed 
areas in Central Java: in place of landsdomain we will get Vorstendomein, and upon 
that a ‘communal property’ of the village with fixed shareholders” (1927, 54). 
The fourth and final process in the transition involved the revision of 
commercial land lease regulation. Observing this process, Soepomo points out how the 
reorganization introduced “free leasing of land and free labor” (1927, 57). With the 
new system, agricultural estates could only acquire land by free lease from the people, 
as was the case in the areas directly under the Dutch control in Java and Madura. The 
same system applied to labor in agricultural factories such as sugar factories: labor 
was acquired on the “free” labor market instead of through a forced system as in the 
cultuurstelsel period. 
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Although very critical of certain tensions and ruptures in the discourse, 
Soepomo’s observation of the Dutch agrarian policies in the Vorstenlanden appears 
neutral. But had the colonized become thoroughly reshaped into a “double” of the 
colonizer in thought, worldview, instinct, desire, and expectation? If there is autonomy 
at all, a capacity for critical reflection, how and in what ways does Soepomo realize it? 
At this stage, I read Soepomo’s main objective as to lay out information and processes 
that function as building blocks for a substantial intervention presented later in his 
dissertation. 
Exposing Colonial Hidden Agenda 
In chapter 4 of his dissertation, Soepomo uses words that demonstrate more 
explicitly his capacity for critical reflection upon a specific set of colonial arguments; 
he is very critical of the royal houses and the government. Against the Vorsten, 
Soepomo criticized their emulation of the Dutch domain declaration—an attempt 
without precedence in Javanese tradition. Soepomo also addresses their acquiescence 
in adopting Dutch corvee labor regulations, something he argues they could have 
resisted. Against the Dutch, Soepomo questions their ambiguous reactions to the 
mandates of Ethical Policy This ambiguity emerged in the re-categorization of the 
Principalities residents, which was spatially designed to fulfill the need of plantations 
for land and labor. Soepomo also criticizes the Dutch demands that the Vorsten follow 
the corvee labor ordinance implemented earlier in the Dutch-governed areas. In this 
section of Soepomo’s dissertation, resistance surfaces and complicity recedes. 
Soepomo starts his fifth chapter by underscoring that the Vorsten were not 
legally bound to follow certain colonial legal rulings: 
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If we wish to examine whether and in how far the reorganization has created 
village community38 then we need to establish first and foremost that article 71 
Regeeringsreglement ( . . . including the Javanese native municipal ordinance 
St. 1906 no. 83 that is based on this article, and St. 1907 no. 212 concerning 
the election of village heads . . . ) in relation to article 27, paragraph 2 
Regeeringsreglement, is not applicable to the Vorstenlanden. (1927, 60, 
emphasis added).39 
In this passage, Soepomo reminds his audience that although nominal, the 
Vorstenlanden possessed a kind of autonomy nonetheless. Within this nominal 
autonomy, the Vorstenlanden had its own legal system—the pranatans—that it could 
have deployed to support legal arguments crucial to protect its interests, that is, by 
using the pranatans to contextualize the debate about agrarian reorganization in its 
own terms. But while the Vorsten had an opportunity to resist the 
Regeeringsreglement, they failed to exploit it. By identifying this fact, Soepomo 
creates a space to argue against the Dutch demand for the Vorsten to model their 
agrarian reorganization after the experience in the Dutch-governed area. He writes, 
Moreover we need keep in mind [the fact] that—according to the 
Memorandum of Explanation for Indies Budget 1912 about the 
reorganization—the conditions in the Dutch-governed area surrounding [the 
Vorsten] will serve as a model, but with the avoidance of as much as possible 
“common recognized faults.” Consequently, in these discussions, each time we 
make comparison we will naturally prioritize comparing with reorganization in 
                                                 
38 Creation of uniform village and village administrative officials was one of the four transitional 
processes to the new agrarian system.  
39 This paragraph is one of the most difficult to translate due to the heavy legal references and Dutch 
language penchant for multiple sub-clauses. For the sake of comparison, I am quoting the paragraph in 
Dutch here:  
Willen wij nagaan, of en in hoeverre de reorganisatie dorpsgemeenten in het leven heeft 
geroepen, dan dien te worden vooropgesteld, dat artikel 71 regeeringsregelement (nu artikel 
128 Indische staatsregelilng) met de daarop gegronde Javasche inlandsche 
gemeenteordonanntie St. 1906 no. 83 en met St. 1907 no. 212 betreffende de verkiezing van 
desahoofden, in verband met artikel 27, lid 2 regeeringsreglement (nu artikel 21, lid 2 Indische 
staatsregeling) niet op de Vorstenlanden toepasselijk zijn. (Soepomo 1927, 60) 
Soepomo made a note of the new regulation that replaced the 1854 Regeeringreglement, that iss the 
1924 Indische Staatsregeling, which was not in effect during the process of reorganization. 
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Yogyakarta, and [only after that] with the village conditions in Java outside the 
Vorstenlanden. (1927, 60; emphasis added) 
Soepomo’s use of quotation marks in “common recognized faults” (algemeen 
erkende fouten) draws attention to the imperfections of the colonizers’ supposedly 
superior system. The underlined words give his argument the pretext of prioritizing 
Yogyakarta—and not the Dutch-governed area—as a benchmark to compare 
Surakarta’s reorganization experience, precisely because they share similar 
characteristics as native principalities. Making this claim explicit is crucial for the 
arguments he builds later in his dissertation. 
My exposition below follows Soepomo’s double criticism: one of the 
Principalities and the other of the colonial government. 
Critiquing the Principalities’ Mimicry 
Agricultural reorganization in Surakarta created paradoxical effects: on the one 
hand, it weakened the authority of the Vorstenlanden as Dutch officials gained a more 
substantial role in plantation administration; on the other hand, it brought the Vorsten 
directly into contact with their subjects by way of newly formed village officials. Such 
a paradox led the latter to mimic Dutch policies, most prominently in two areas: first 
by proclaiming a domain declaration, which practically led the Principalities to abolish 
the villagers’ right to wastelands; and second, by allowing plantations to demand 
corvee labor from the peasants, a policy implemented at Dutch insistence. 
Losing Rights to Wastelands 
Before the reorganization, peasants in Surakarta possessed specific rights to 
claim wastelands (woestegronden). Article 44 of Angger Sepuluh, Surakarta’s 
Constitution, stated that whenever someone opened wastelands or forest, or worked 
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hills and swamplands into housing plots or farmyards, nobody could protest within 
three years after the first stage of reclaiming. After the three-year term, to argue as 
illegal the land already claimed by a villager was prohibited. Based on this article, 
Soepomo concludes that opening wastelands in Surakarta had led to particular rights 
to land albeit still under the umbrella of the apanage system (Soepomo 1927, 76).40 
After the reorganization, the Vorsten declared its own version of 
domeinverklaring, effectively erasing the remaining protection of the villagers’ 
traditional right to wastelands. Soepomo stresses that such explicit domain declaration 
(uitdrukkelijke domeinverklaring) had not existed in Surakarta’s legal code (1927, 79). 
He attributes this alienation to the Principality’s eagerness to mimic the Dutch 1870 
domain declaration: 
Outside the explicit regulation of the pranatans, it is explainable that the 
government in the Vorstenlanden is not willing to relinquish wastelands into 
communal possession. This is because the government outside the region since 
1874 has been trying [in a very deliberate way] to restrict the agrarian rights of 
the village [only] to its aggregate of bouw fields, grazing land, and residential 
areas. (1927, 61, emphasis added)41 
There is a sense of irony in the way Soepomo addresses the colonial 
government as “the government outside the region” (de regering buiten de gewesten). 
By doing so, Soepomo puts the Vorsten at the center of the discourse, addressing the 
colonial government only in relation to the Vorsten, a subtle act of dismissal; yet it 
                                                 
40 If an apanage holder claim wastelands himself, he needs no consent from another authority. If the 
bekel did the claiming, his responsibility towards the apanage holder depends on whether they choose 
the maron system or the madjegan system. The village residents in Surakarta and Jogjakarta had few 
rights over forest products, because the principalities had contracted their forest out to the interregnum 
government in 1812. In Mangkunegara, however, the peasantry had the right to take out timber from the 
forest with a pass from the patih; they could bring their livestock to the forest, and take out grass in 
assigned parcels; and they could also collect fruit, alang-alang (imperata), glagah, and rattan. 
41 Soepomo credits this argument to Cornelis van Vollenhoven’s statement in Adat Law in the 
Netherlands Indies, part I, p. 515.  
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was precisely after this “government outside our region” that the Vorsten had been 
trying to emulate itself. 
Options to open and claim lands were still available to villagers. As a matter of 
fact, Surakarta legal codes mandated a regulation to protect this right, but the Vorsten 
kept delaying issuing the regulation, practically denying the last option to reclaim 
what used to be the villagers’ rightful wastelands. Soepomo laments, 
The right of the people to reclaim, which is mentioned and recognized in 
article 44 of the Angger Sepuluh . . . is maintained by the reorganization. 
According to Artikel 7 of Rb. 1917 no. 33 (Kasunanan) and Rb. 1917 no. 14 
(Mangkunegaran), the reclaiming right (termed “wawenang njitak sawah” and 
“nandoering boemi oro-oro”) should be regulated by separate pranatan, yet 
until today the pranatan is still a long time in coming (zich laten wachten). 
(1927, p. 79) 
Rights to Agricultural Land 
Soepomo held the view that apanage holders never gained tenurial rights of 
lands entrusted to them by the royal houses. Before the reorganization, tenurial claims 
by apanage holders were one-sided, strengthened only by gradual legal usurpation 
(rechtsaanmatiging). The apanage holders took over the best paddy fields and other 
fields that the peasants opened from virgin lands by manipulating various payment 
structures at their disposal (Soepomo 1927, 25). To a certain extent, a koeli kenceng 
had rights on village agricultural land, depending on whether the bekel used the 
madjeg system or the maron system. In the madjeg system a koeli kenceng had relative 
freedom to decide what crop to cultivate, and he could work his entire allotted land, 
provided he fulfilled the obligatory tax and corvee labor. As long as he did not arouse 
the displeasure of the royal houses, the apanage holder, or the bekel, for example by 
letting the land lie fallow, a koeli kenceng had relatively secure access to land 
(Soepomo 1927, 26). 
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The reorganization in Surakarta brought massive changes in property and 
social relations among village residents. Bekelships, characterized by personal, dyadic 
relationships between apanage holders, bekels, and koelis, were transformed into what 
Shiraishi (1990) terms a “territorial corporation” managed by village administrations 
as its “board of directors” with koeli kenceng as “shareholders” of village communal 
lands. Categories of residents became spatialized in the way the peasants’ status was 
linked to claims to their village communal land. 
There were now four categories of peasants: koeli, pengindoeng, norokaryo, 
and the rest, which included women, children, elderly, and the disabled handicapped. 
The koeli category was divided into two groups. The first was koeli kenceng: peasants 
who were entitled to usufruct rights to paddy fields and housing plots, or either of the 
two, and carried the full rights and responsibilities that come with usufruct rights; the 
second was koeli gundul: peasants who had lost their farmyard or housing plots; the 
third and fourth were pengindoeng, or co-residents, people with their own separate 
housing that was situated in other koeli’s allotted land, and norokaryo, able-bodied 
men who were outside the previous three groups. 
After the reorganization, land came under the direct jurisdiction of the 
Vorsten.42 The abolition of the apanage system resulted in the transfer of authority on 
right of allocation from the bekels to the newly appointed village officials (some of 
whom were recruited from previously dismissed bekels), in effect keeping this 
traditional right at the village level. Soepomo calls this form of rights 
dorpsbeschikkingsrecht, or the village right of allocation. Recall that one of the 
principles in setting new villages in agricultural estate areas is that the koeli kenceng 
                                                 
42 Legally, however, their power was limited by law: The Vorsten could only set aside and allocate 
agricultural land by expropriating the land for public interest use, which requires compensation to the 
koelis whose farms are taken over, and using their authority specified in Rijksbesluit 1917 No. 34 
(Kasunanan), and Rijkbesluit 1917 no. 15 (Mangkunagaran) (Soepomo 1927, 81). 
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was obliged to split his allotted land into two halves: one half to be worked as usual, 
and the other to be made available to plantations and to be planted with commercial 
crops per plantations’ instructions, earning him wages and rent. This principle was 
particularly contentious since the peasant had to make his land available at any period 
demanded by the agricultural estates that leased the land from the royal houses, 
regardless of whether that was in the middle of his own planting cycle. At any time, he 
could work only half of his alloted land. If the benefit the koeli kenceng received in 
wages and rent was smaller than the income he could have accrued by planting rice or 
other traditional crops, conflict could arise. Thus the welfare promised by agricultural 
reorganization remained dim. 
The colonial government justified this rolling system by arguing that the lands 
were “communal property” (communal bezit), effectively negating the village’s right 
of allocation. Soepomo offers an alternative perspective. He considers these lands to 
be under the jurisdiction of the village, dorpsbeschikkingsrecht,. It includes the 
authority to manage village land not distributed for villagers’ use; the rights to manage 
pension land that becomes available due either to death or to an official’s dismissal; 
and the authority to allocate housing plots, grazing land, and cemetery plots. All these, 
Soepomo argues, are the distinguishing characteristics of dorpsbeschikkingsrecht 
(Soepomo 1927, 81–83). If previously koelis could abandon their farmyard—if they 
felt they could not tolerate the tax burden—or move to other bekelships or open 
wastelands with the permission of related bekels, the options were now nonexistent. 
Soepomo demonstrates in this section of his dissertation how the Kasunanan 
mimic the Dutch legal maneuver of domain declaration. After Kasunanan’s own 
domeinverklaring, the wastelands was now reclaimed by the Vorsten; the peasants’ 
option to claim was practically eliminated by the lack of mandated regulation; the 
village head lacked the flexibility to assign village communal land to a stranger. Thus, 
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ironically, instead of liberating the peasants from the shackles of land as colonial 
discourse claimed, the reorganization made village residents even more bound to the 
land. 
It was important for Soepomo to assert the existence of dorpsbeschikkingsrecht 
for three reasons: First, the introduction of the village-corporation was essentially a 
governance reform. What was feudal, traditional, and personal could now be 
transformed into a rational, modern system. Attaching the adat-based 
beschikkingsrecht onto the modern village structure was an experiment intended to 
create a hybrid system whereby an indigenous institution was amalgamated with a 
village-corporation system. In this way, village rights of allocation were an intellectual 
building block for Soepomo, which he kept returning to in his future contemplation of 
adat law and adat communities in postindependent Indonesia.43 Second, with the 
official establishment of villages, the idea of the jural community 
(rechtsgemeenschap) could now be attached to a concrete form of village-corporation, 
which exercised the right of allocation (beschikkingsrecht). Third, with the village 
right of allocation (dorpsbeschikkingsrecht), villages presumably could decide 
whether they wanted to lease their land to commercial plantations. However, this was 
not the case, especially since the Vorsten had declared their domain rights. 
Although the reorganization introduced characteristics of modern municipality 
to otherwise traditional and feudal villages (manifested in its new village officials, its 
own properties, and its own koeli shareholders), these characteristics failed to 
encourage the self-governing capacity implicitly mandated by Ethical Policy and 
explicitly stated by the Indies government, particularly because the Vorsten bypassed 
                                                 
43 An example of his continued contemplation on the topic is demonstrated in an essay he wrote for a 
conference on South East Asia in Washington, D.C., in 1953 titled “The Future of Adat Law in the 
Construction of Indonesia” (Soepomo 1953).  
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the villages’ new authority by imposing corvee labor on the villagers. Soepomo had 
the following to say: 
it is not to be anticipated, that the Vorsten regulations bring about any sense of 
self-government upon the villages. Even in Yogyakarta and Dutch-governed 
areas, there is no self-government in the village. . . . At the most in Solo 
villages, village residents can speak about the distribution of the corvee labor, 
yet this concern was also to be addressed under the supervision of government 
officials. . . . (1927, 76) 
And he continues, 
The newly formed villages however have not in the least self-command 
(eigenmeesterschap): the little autonomy which the Vorsten regulations 
(pranatans) have granted the villages were decimated through the legal and 
illegal interference of the Vorstenlanden officials. (1927, 77; emphasis added) 
Soepomo uses unambiguous terms in his criticism of the Vorsten officials’ role in 
curtailing village self-governance, which was promised along with the reorganization. 
He cites and supports another scholar’s claim that the reorganization was a half-
hearted endeavor: 
Rightly so, Adam had claimed that the Vorsten regulations (pranatans) have 
granted the villages with so much authority, that they have self-command 
(eigenmeesterschap) given with one hand, and withdrawn with another [by the 
Vorstenlanden officials]. (1927, 81)  
These paragraphs demonstrate that Soepomo was perfectly capable of 
deliberate self-transformation. He was a part of the Surakarta aristocracy, yet in his 
open criticism of the Principalities’ practices that emulated the Dutch’s policies in the 
Dutch-governed areas at the expense of the peasants’ welfare, he distanced himself 
from the circle of power. He put a pause in his role as the “relayer of power” and 
questioned the given epistemic reference (Allen 2008). He was beyond romanticizing 
the adat-based agrarian system and traditions, and in doing so, did not exactly mirror 
van Vollenhoven’s views. 
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Exposing Colonial Hypocrisy 
Contrary to the Dutch claim, agrarian reorganization had not liberated the 
peasants from being bound to the land. Earlier in his dissertation, Soepomo 
demonstrates how the government demanded that the Vorstenlanden adopt its version 
of corvee regulation, to which the Vorstens acquiesced even though it contradicted the 
government’s own discourse of progress and liberation. Before the reorganization, the 
villagers had to perform three kinds of corvee labor: services for village maintenance 
such as village roads, dams, and bridges; corvee labor for the Vorst; and corvee labor 
for the apanage holders, which included domestic services for the bekel. After the land 
reform, the corvee labor expanded to include work for agricultural estates 
(landbouwondernemers) authorized by the Vorst. This service required the villagers to 
maintain the irrigation system on which sugar plantations were heavily dependent. 
Soepomo continues, 
Artikel 46 Indische Staatsregeling prescribed [for Dutch-governed areas] that 
in each region the nature and duration of the personal services, to which the 
people are subject to, the cases wherein, and the ways and conditions whereby 
they can be demanded, must be regulated by the Governor General, in 
agreement with the existing needs, institutions and necessities. The regulations 
about the individual services in each region are revised by the Governor 
General every five years with the objective to gradually reduce it, in 
accordance with general interest. In practice, people assume that under 
personal services in the said article, it meant only corvee labor, and that the 
village services, since it is a municipal institution, are regulated by article 128, 
lid 3 Indische Staatsregeling. (1927, 110) 
Soepomo stresses, however, that after the reorganization “These services were not 
abolished, and indeed these work burdens were gradually converted into a burden in 
money, which came to mean ‘head tax’” (Soepomo 1927, 111). 
Comparing practices in Surakarta with the Dutch-governed area, Soepomo 
comments: 
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 . . . we have described the situation of the corvee labor in the Kasunanan after 
the reorganization. Both concerning the linkage of (compulsory) service to 
usufruct rights and concerning the nature and duration of the service, [the 
regulations in the Kasunanan] have imitated the situations in the surrounding 
area [i.e. Dutch-governed area]. (1927, 116) 
Irony is evident in this paragraph. Even though the Staatsregeling No. 76 did 
not apply to the Vorstenlanden, several instances demonstrate the Vorstenlanden’s 
willingness to fulfill Dutch demands, which, again ironically, failed to bring the 
Vorsten closer to modernity and progress. Soepomo underlines this fact in a striking 
paragraph: 
Now what is remarkable is that: the corvee obligation in the Government’s 
area rests upon the usufruct holders and is a replication of the regulation 
regarding royal services in the Mataram Kingdom. The latter simply united the 
ancient division in the village with its corvee services, according to which the 
core villagers, the holder of usufruct rights to agricultural land and housing 
plots, are obligated to do village services. In a roundabout manner, one finds 
again in the Kasunanan’s regulation on corvee labor the old class regulation of 
ancient Javanese villages. (1927, 117 emphases added) 
With these statements, Soepomo thoroughly punctures and deflates the 
colonizers’ claim that progress could be achieved through agrarian reorganization. 
Earlier in the dissertation, Soepomo quoted three colonial sources to explain the 
motive behind the abolition of the apanage system: “because the working of it in each 
respect is poisonous (verderfelijk) [to the society]”; not “consistent with orderly social 
condition”; and “necessary for selflessness in the state.” Colonial discourse posits the 
necessity of the reorganization because the feudal system “no longer fits with progress 
and modernity.” In practice, the colonial-style reform was actually pushing Surakarta 
back several hundred years by borrowing from the old Mataram kingdom a feudal 
system that relied on the “old class regulation of ancient Javanese villages.” 
Similar retrogression materialized in the form of the demand for corvee labor 
for commercial plantations located in the Vorstenlanden. In theory, peasants should no 
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longer be bound to the land as in the apanage system, but in practice the bondage 
became even tighter. To earn usufruct rights to agricultural land and housing plots, 
peasants were still obliged to provide corvee labor to the Vorsten and to sell their labor 
to the commercial plantations owned by Europeans or by the Vorsten itself: 
The obligation of the population to perform the forced farming work for the 
European plantations is embodied in Rb. 1917 no. 34 (Kasoenanan) and Rb. 
1917 no. 16 (Mangkunegaran), and further specified for the Kasoenanan in Rb. 
1919 no. 5 and for the Mangkunegaran in Rb. 1919 no. 8. The State gazette 
that is last mentioned implies that [corvee service] is to be regulated through 
Vorsten’s patih44 in agreement with the [Dutch] Resident and for as far and as 
long as necessary in consideration with the conditions of the land rent 
regulation St. 1918 no. 20. The village officials—at the first notification or on 
behalf of the Vorsten Patih—have to take care of making available the labor of 
those who are entitled to usufruct rights of agricultural land for the use of the 
[commercial] agricultural enterprises, upon whom the right of [demand] for 
such work is granted by the Vorst. (Soepomo 1927, 120; emphases added) 
Compulsory agricultural estate work was precisely the peasants’ ticket to 
gaining usufruct rights to village land. The village officials’ main occupation was to 
ensure that the villagers’ labor was available whenever the agricultural estate’s work 
demanded it. The inability of a villager to perform corvee labor was threatened with a 
fine of a hundred gulden at the most, detention for three months, or revocation of his 
allotted land (Soepomo 1927, p. 120). 
As he analyzes the consequences of agrarian reform in Surakarta, Soepomo 
emerges as a confident scholar comfortable in his critical observation of events; he 
starts gazing back at the colonizers’ claims and presents several concrete examples of 
the risk in mirroring Dutch policies in the Gouvernementsstreken and in implementing 
them in the Vorstenlanden. Per the Regeeringsreglement 1854, the Vorsten did not 
have to follow the government’s legal demands to the letter, yet they did so to claim 
                                                 
44 Prime Minister. 
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domain rights, implement corvee labor, and incorporate the maintenance of irrigation 
systems into the people’s corvee structure. Echoing Dr. Tjiptomangoenkoesomo’s 
attack on the Vorsten in 1917, Soepomo demonstrates how the pauperization of 
Surakarta’s subjects was the doing of the Vorsten themselves. 
The Peasants’ Double Burden: Legal and Empirical Consequences of the 
Reorganization 
In the sixth and final chapter of his dissertation, Soepomo details the Land 
Lease Regulation (Grondhuurreglement) stated in Staatsblad45 St. 1918 no. 20, now 
enforced for land leased to agricultural estates in the Principalities. Addressing the 
legal consequences of the reorganization helped Soepomo expose the ruptures, 
slippages, and contradictions between the empirical events in the colony and the 
progress claimed by the Dutch. Soepomo interprets three aspects regulated by the 
Land Lease Regulation: the legal subject of land rent agreement, its legal object, and 
its form and formality. 
More fascinating than these legal analyses, however, are the explicit criticisms 
Soepomo wages against the government and the royal houses. Against the colonial 
government, he reveals how the reorganization effectively favored agricultural estate 
operators by guaranteeing them legal incentives to secure land access, which included 
land cultivated by the natives long protected by Agrarian Law 1870; by making 
available the peasants’ labor to work the plantations; and by supporting the 
maintenance of the operator’s irrigation system by guaranteeing the peasants’ labor 
and full cooperation of colonial officials. Against the Vorsten, Soepomo protests their 
emulation of the Dutch policies, at times imposing unnecessary and more unjust 
                                                 
45 Staatsblad is the legal document for Netherland’s East Indies. The Vorstenlanden’s legal documents 
are Rijksbesluit, and bound only for the Vorstenlanden area. 
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policies than what took place in the Dutch-governed areas. Colonial legal discourse 
was a discursive conquest of native epistemology and ways of seeing. Even when 
native episteme such as adat law, jural communities, and rights of allocation were 
already introduced into the European legal reference, the unequal status of the two 
laws made it imperative to exert struggle at the more dominant level: European 
colonial law. It is at this level that Soepomo wages his struggle. 
The basis for a new agricultural land tenure system for Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta was stated in Land Lease Regulation St. 1918 No. 20. It regulated the legal 
transition of existing plantations to the new reorganized system and outlined new 
provisions for commercial land lease in the Vorstenlanden. Included in the St. 1918 
no. 20 were the new rights and obligations of the agricultural estate managers who had 
renounced the rights stated in old lease contracts. For plantations that were not 
reorganized, the old land lease contracts remained valid, but were not extendable for 
longer than the period specified by the head of the regional government. 
Soepomo points out how the converted plantations were doubly guaranteed by 
the conversion resolution of the Vorst, a rule based on article 8 of the Land Lease 
Regulation. First, by giving up the previous lease, which varied between ten, twenty, 
and thirty years, agricultural estate operators acquired a fifty-year period lease for land 
they needed to operate for as long as their business existed. Second, during the first 
five years after the conversion they had the right to dispose of the peasants’ labor for 
cultivation (cultuurarbeid). Soepomo underlines this: 
This decision has a public-law consequence in the sense that the state ensures 
the enjoyment for the agricultural estate operator of the necessary agricultural 
lands and that the state still takes on the responsibility that villages make these 
lands available at the appropriate planting period. The right of the agricultural 
estate managers towards the lands is thus not derived from a civil-law 
agreement, yet it is one of a particular nature, [namely] a “concession” as the 
official explanation of the land lease regulation calls it. Such right is for 
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practical reasons, namely to facilitate [plantations] in acquiring loans. This is 
made clear in St. 1918 no. 21. . . . (1927, 123) 
Public-law transactions in land for agricultural estates were transactions 
between private enterprise and “the state.” The agrarian estates effectively became the 
stewards of lands granted to them by “the state”: they were legally responsible for it, 
authorized to demand that the villagers make the leased lands available at appropriate 
periods, and the villagers were to follow the estates’ designation as if they represented 
the government. This fact stood in stark contrast to Soepomo’s earlier narrative about 
the government’s reason for doing “more than the Vorsten had already done to the 
population.” Soepomo asked the following question earlier: “What has moved the 
[Dutch] government to give the Vorstenlanden people better rights on land (rechten 
van den grond) than had the Vorsten themselves?” (1927, 54). He answered this with 
the government’s claim that it wanted to strengthen these rights to provide peasants 
with a “more independent place in society” (meer zelfstandige plaats in de 
samenleving), an ideal that echoes the creed of Ethic politics. By guaranteeing the 
plantations’ right to dispose of the peasants’ labor for cultivation (cultuurarbeid), the 
government made this honorable objective an empty discourse. Strengthening the right 
of the local communities was only an intermediate process on the way to the main 
objective: to facilitate easy access to land for Dutch agricultural estates. 
The Indies government granted three incentives to encourage agricultural 
estate expansion in the Vorstenlanden: legal incentives to secure access to land, the 
right of disposal of villagers’ labor for agricultural estate work, and support in 
maintaining irrigation systems. 
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Legal Incentives for Agricultural Estate Security 
Soepomo clearly states that the colonial government’s fifty-year lease 
guarantee demonstrated that it was bowing down to agricultural estate managers who 
had demanded since 1864 a legal certainty to the land they worked on (1927, 123). He 
asks, “Isn’t 50 years too long?” and then narrates how Carpentier Alting, the Director 
of the Binnenlands Bestuur at the time, acknowledged at a People’s Council session 
that it was indeed long but was still significantly shorter than the seventy-year period 
demanded by agricultural estate operators. The Indies government decided to settle for 
fifty years, reasoning that commercial plantations would deliver great benefits to the 
people. The continued existence of the agricultural estates and industries was in the 
people’s interest (Soepomo 1927, 124).46 Although fifty years was indeed long, 
[Carpentier Alting] said people are requested to observe that the land is not 
owned by the people, but by the royal house, who in fact leases out the land to 
the agricultural estate operators. (1927, 124) 
This must have been difficult for Soepomo, who by now understood that the royal 
houses’ domain declaration was intended to legalize leasing of lands to Dutch 
agricultural estates. By declaring domain rights, acknowledged by the Indies 
government, the royal houses became the legal owner of all lands within its 
boundaries.47 
In return for the lease, plantations would pay annual compensation to the 
lessor, the amount of which was determined by the kind of land they leased. For lands 
they leased from villagers in alternate planting periods, the lands the Vorsten had 
                                                 
46 This position was clearly in contrast with the earlier conservative position against private plantations, 
arguing that it would bring more damage to native communities without a clear individual property 
regime.  
47 Beyond land lease, the Indies government protected commercial agricultural estate investments in the 
Vorstenlanden by creating a regulation to perpetually secure their buildings and establishments. This is 
stated in the Gouvernementsbesluit of 10 April 1918 no. 26 bijblad no. 9005. 
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allocated to the koeli kencengs through village heads, agricultural estate operators 
would pay in the amount determined by the head of the regional government in 
consultation with the prince or his minister, at the suggestion given to him by the 
established Lease Commission. This commission consisted of equal numbers of 
European and Indonesian officials and nonofficials (such as agricultural estates or 
managers of agricultural enterprises) (Soepomo 1927, 125). The minimum price was 
to be revised every ten years as needed. In fact, it was extremely inadequate given the 
speed of inflation during the World War I years. 
The Right of Disposal over Peasants’ Labor 
As mentioned several times in Soepomo’s dissertation, agrarian reorganization 
in the Vorstenlanden created a “free” labor system, a system to replace the 
cultuurstelsel cultivation system. By “free” it meant that the peasants’ labor was 
compensated with a minimum wage set by the government and the Sunan or his 
minister. It was to be no lower than the average wage of similar work in the areas 
surrounding the plantations. Soepomo finds hypocrisy in this policy: 
The agricultural estate operators are guaranteed labor of the people for five 
years. The government found it necessary to guarantee these, in order to give 
the existing plantations—at least initially—the certainty that the manual labor, 
without which they cannot accomplish their task, will not be lacking. The 
agricultural estate operators requested that labor be guaranteed for ten years. 
But the government only gave five years because they deemed that coerced 
labor for a longer than the decided period . . . cannot be justified in relation to 
the speedy progress of the development of the Indonesian society. (1927, 128) 
He continues in clear, unambiguous terms to express his opinion on the matter: 
In my opinion any coerced labor for the benefit of the private sector—
regardless of how short the duration—is condemnable (afkeurenswaardig), and 
a five-year agricultural estate labor obligation for the benefit of private 
agricultural estates does not belong in a civilized society. (hoort niet in een 
beschaafde samenleving thuis). (1927, 128; emphasis added) 
 175 
Let us briefly look back at seemingly neutral statements Soepomo makes 
earlier in response to the Dutch policies in the colony. Soepomo cites three reasons the 
government used to justify agrarian reorganization in Surakarta, all of which claimed a 
commitment for progress for the natives. He specifically cites the Bijlage B 
Handelingen Staten-Generaal 1911-1912 38, which suggested that the abolition of the 
apanage system was needed “because the working of it in each respect is poisonous 
(verderfelijk) [to the society]” (50). In Het Koloniaal Verslag of 1917, the nature of 
the traditional apanage system was considered “not consistent with orderly social 
condition” (50). Quoting these colonial discourses verbatim allows Soepomo to wait 
until he comes to his last chapter to puncture these arguments. Using evidence from 
the colonizers’ own discourse, he demonstrates how agrarian reform, more precisely 
the abolition of the apanage system, ended up a means to accommodate capitalists’ 
demands. Indeed, “purchasing” usufruct rights with obligatory five-year agricultural 
estate work for the benefit of private plantations “does not belong in a civilized 
society” (Soepomo 1927, 128). With irony, Soepomo continues, 
It is the village officials who must provide workers to the reorganized 
plantation, for as long as and as far as decided by the government officials. 
Further, we have seen there also that only in the authorized agricultural estate 
cultivation are compulsory (cultuurdienstplichtig zijn); that noncompliance 
with compulsory cultivation work is threatened with a liberty penalty 
(vrijheidsstraf) or fine; and that in case of relapse, the bouw field of the culprit 
can be withdrawn by the village officials. (1927, 129) 
Instead of liberty from the bond of land, the peasants were now bound to work at the 
Dutch agricultural estates. The peasants were deprived of the options to withdraw 
from such a “free labor market” system; noncompliance was punishable with the 
vrijheidsstraf—a liberty penalty. Recall Soepomo reiterating the Dutch claim that in 
the government’s territory, 
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 . . . since 1 January 1920 the forced cultivation system that started compulsory 
cultivation labor (cultuurdiensten) were practically abolished with the 
disappearance of the Government coffee plantation, the only remaining 
agricultural estate using the cultuurstelsel system. (Soepomo 1927, 97) 
In reality, forced cultivation had disappeared in name only; agrarian 
reorganization was precisely the tool to enable its extension by commercial private 
plantations. 
Corvee Labor to Maintain Irrigation System 
Article 12 of the Land Lease Regulation granted agricultural estate operators 
the right to allocate water for irrigation, manufacturing, and other purposes to the same 
extent and under the same condition as the pre-reorganization period. Unfortunately, 
this law does not address the irrigation system that was privately built by the 
agricultural entrepreneurs. Soepomo observes, 
The maintenance of these water works and water distribution are completely in 
the hands of the agricultural estate operators. The water board established 
between 1907 and 1910 in Surabaya was no public institution. Their authority 
was purely advisory in nature. Now that the reorganization established villages 
and with it stronger rights to land, the government found that the people should 
not remain dependent on the agricultural estate operators with regard to water 
for their fields. (1927, 130) 
To solve the problem, he suggests transforming the private management of 
irrigation systems into public institutions. Irrigation systems that benefited only the 
agricultural estate operators should stay private to prevent shifting the maintenance 
burden to the public or, more precisely, the peasants. The management of irrigation 
systems that benefited the public must remain with the government with the cost 
levied on the public. Once the irrigation systems became public institutions, the 
Vorsten could lawfully charge fees and impose taxes and penalties (Soepomo 1927, 
130–131). The public-private issue that surfaces here still rings true for the 
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contemporary period, and so is the challenge faced: “The composition of the water 
system council is however such that their agricultural estate operators can never be 
overpowered” (Soepomo 1927, 133). As an example, the Dengkeng irrigation system 
had 34 agricultural estate representatives versus 29 government and 2 non-government 
members. It was difficult for the people’s representative to speak up because they 
would be overpowered by members who were appointed by the Dutch Resident. 
The Royal House’s Initiatives 
In the last chapter of the dissertation, Soepomo points out a characteristic of 
the Surakarta royal house’s fawning emulation of the Dutch policies. According to 
article 5b and 5c of the Land Lease Regulation (Grondhuurreglement), land lease 
contracts could only take place between a European agricultural industry as lessee and 
a village—the entity that exercises right of allocation—or the royal house as the 
lessor. Who was eligible to become an agriculture entrepreneur in the principalities? 
Article 3 of the Land Lease Regulation has an answer: 
1. Nederland’s subjects, for as long as they belonged to the European 
category48 
2. Europeans, who were residents of Netherlands Indies 
3. Partnerships, established in the Netherlands or in the Indies, composed of 
and managed by Europeans. (Soepomo 1927, 133) 
Based on this regulation, Foreign Orientals and native Indonesians, the other two 
population groups in the colony, were barred from initiating an agricultural enterprise 
unless they petitioned to become European legal subjecta, or unless they were a 
Vorsten’s subjects. This restrictive regulation was absent in the Dutch-governed area. 
Soepomo continues, 
                                                 
48 In this period, any individuals in the East Indies could petition to become European before the law.  
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For the Vorstenlanden the government recognizes that those conditions do no 
longer in fact fit with an arrangement which breaks with the past and which is 
destined to establish the agricultural industry on the ground principle of 
freedom. The Vorsten nevertheless preserve the old system on the argument 
that the political and economic conditions in the Principalities do not permit an 
alternative arrangement for the time being. (1927, 134) 
Soepomo cannot hide his frustration: 
Where the [Dutch] government follows the village land regulations in the 
Dutch-governed area, one should ask the question why she does not do it in the 
free Vorsten domain? What objection would there be to also implement the 
land lease (erfpacht) institution in the Vorstenlanden? (1927, 134) 
To which he concludes, 
In conclusion, one needs to observe that other than in the Dutch-governed area, 
the agricultural authorities in the villages are not authorized to lease their own 
fields to the European agricultural entrepreneurs. (1927, 134) 
The effort to modernize and strengthen the villages turned out to be nothing 
more than lip service. The Vorsten were unwilling to allow villages to emerge as fully 
modern institutions. Whatever liberating policy the Vorsten officials introduced, they 
were cancelled out by the same institution through regressive policies in other areas. 
But since the Land Lease Regulation was a legal product of the Indies government, 
Soepomo’s frustration was directed at both the Vorsten and the government. 
Indeed, in the final paragraphs of his dissertation Soepomo comes to realize the 
hollow discourse of agrarian reorganization and the inadequacy of relying on adat 
institutions to protect impoverished peasants. As he gazes back on the realities of the 
Surakarta agrarian reorganization, he realizes the betrayal by the Principality when it 
emulated the colonial government’s domeinverklaring at the expense of the Javanese 
peasants. At the same time, he is skeptical of the colonial claim of the peasants’ 
liberation from medieval practices through agrarian reorganization, when in reality the 
model for corvee labor practices replicated the archaic system of the Sultanate of 
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Mataram period. All this gazing culminated in a paragraph in which Soepomo, using 
precise words tinged with repulsion, expresses a rejection of the colonial discourse of 
progress: 
coerced labor for the benefit of the private sector—regardless of how short the 
duration—is condemnable (afkeurenswaardig), and a five-year agricultural 
estate labor obligation for the benefit of private agricultural estates does not 
belong in a civilized society (hoort niet in een beschaafde samenleving thuis). 
(1927, 128, emphasis added) 
In Soepomo’s dissertation, one observes a native scholar who was capable of 
critically assessing the tensions and ruptures within colonial discourse on adat land 
rights. The complex and contested relations in colonial knowledge produced by such 
discourse made it impossible to maintain a clear opposition, especially so since a 
range of indigenous categories was involved. Thus, deciding whether a native scholar 
such as Soepomo was an active native requires more than simply tracing his epistemic 
contribution. It is equally imperative to assess his efficacy in resisting the hegemonic 
nature of the hybrid discourse deployed by colonial and indigenous institutions. 
Conclusion 
Soepomo was an example of a colonized elite whose way of thinking-and-
being was shaped by heterogeneous colonial and indigenous discourses. Historical 
events such as Mangoenkoesomo’s challenge to the Surakarta Principality influenced 
his outlook further. For a colonized subject, to cast a two-way gaze requires references 
other than that contained within colonial discourse. In the case of Soepomo, his 
alternative universe was provided by Javanese ethics. Multiple universal references 
allow a native scholar to wage multiple forms of resistance, some of which would be 
undetectable from a European frame of reference. It becomes important, then, for a 
scholar to investigate forms of native subjectivity to understand distinctive expressions 
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of resistance. Soepomo was, after all, a Javanese lower aristocrat raised during a 
specific historical conjuncture, that is, the rise of imagined communities and the 
advent of the Ethical Policy. Appreciating Javanese ethics as a part of Soepomo’s 
complex subjectivity is crucial for understanding the strategies he deployed to perform 
his critical agency, strategies at times so subtle they are misunderstood as 
submissiveness and acquiescence to the dominant discourse. On the other hand, his 
training at the Batavia Rechtsschool, which prided itself for pounding the values of 
integrity, independence, and impartiality into its students, inescapably shaped his 
sense of justice. Thus, to perceive Soepomo as a complete Other from the colonizers 
elides the nuanced process of identification and disavowal. 
The unique combination of discourses that shaped his subjectivity is 
discernible in Soepomo’s expressions of autonomy, here understood as the capacity 
for critical reflection and deliberate self-transformation. In the strategy of “attack and 
retreat,” one detects Javanese ethics at play. Without compromising the ethics of 
hormat (respect) and harmoni (conflict aversion), Soepomo expressed his critical 
readings of the agrarian reorganization in Surakarta. The strategy of “attack and 
retreat” quickly followed by the restoring of balance was ubiquitous in Soepomo’s 
dissertation, even more so if the first part of his dissertation—omitted in this chapter—
is considered. The strategy allowed him to address sensitive questions without 
appearing to be cynical or skeptical. This is demonstrated, for example, in his question 
about the Dutch motive for the reorganization. Another example can be seen when he 
asked a question pregnant with possibility: “What has moved the government to give 
the Principalities’ people better rights on land than had the royal houses themselves?” 
(Soepomo 1927, 54). This multi-interpretable question was quickly followed by a 
matter-of-fact list of reasons that portrayed the government rosily as an arbiter of 
social justice. Only when we borrow the lens of the Javanese ethics of hormat and 
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harmony do the benign sentences come into sharper relief and demonstrate a unique 
form of agency informed by particular subjectivity. 
Although Soepomo was a Javanese subject of the Surakarta Principality—at 
the time of writing his dissertation he was engaged to be married to a niece of the 
Sultan of Surakarta—his position hardly prevented him from casting a critical gaze 
upon oppressive agrarian practices of the Principality. Soepomo openly and explicitly 
criticized the Principality’s act of domain declaration, an act that had no precedent in 
Surakarta legal tradition, an act that mimicked the Dutch domain declaration of the 
whole archipelago, at the expense of the peasants. With the domain declaration, the 
peasants in Surakarta no longer had the right to reclaim virgin lands (regardless of 
whether they still existed at the time); every inch of land in Surakarta became the 
domain of the Principality. The adoption of Dutch corvee labor regulations by the 
Principality also did not escape Soepomo’s scrutiny. 
The colonial government was not safe from Soepomo’s critical examination. 
He utterly punctured the claim that the reorganization was implemented to bring 
progress to the native population in Surakarta. He pointed out how the new corvee 
obligation that followed a model in the directly governed area was simply an adoption 
of an ancient system used by the Mataram kingdom in the 17th century. He wrote, “In 
a roundabout manner, one finds again in the Kasunanan’s regulation on corvee labor 
the old class regulation of ancient Javanese villages” (1927, 117). He found the 
demand for corvee labor a retrogression and a complete betrayal of the promise of 
progress, a promise that was to be fulfilled by breaking the chain that bound the 
peasants to land and to obligatory services. 
The best illustrations of Soepomo’s direct form of criticism appear in the last 
part of his dissertation, where he dissected legal and empirical consequences of the 
reorganization. The reorganization essentially provided a window for the colonial 
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government to insert legal incentives to agricultural estates operating in the 
Principality and to guarantee peasants’ labor for five years. Of each of these 
“violations” of the earlier promise for progress, Soepomo expressed his disapproval in 
unambiguous terms: “coerced labor for the benefit of the private sector . . . is 
condemnable” and the obligation to provide five years of services to private 
agricultural estates “does not belong in a civilized society” (Soepomo 1927, 128). 
Soepomo’s dissertation demonstrates his autonomy in the way he took up in 
transformative way the relations of subjection hidden in a discourse that seemingly 
championed progress for the native peasants. Using indigenous cognitive reference 
allows us a closer reading of Soepomo’s dissertation that renders visible forms of 
agency which otherwise remain undetected. Through his dissertation Soepomo 
realized the ideal of his training at the Batavia Rechtsschool, which aimed to train 
native lawyers who possessed integrity, independence, and impartiality (Gedenkboek 
1929, 40). 
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CHAPTER 4: 
(Un)Making a Colonial State: 
How Native Scholars Made and Unmade a Colonial State through Academic 
Texts 
Introduction 
The production of legal knowledge served as an important legitimating 
narrative in colonial state formation. Far from being unidirectional, the production of 
legal knowledge was a collaborative, mutually constitutive process whereby native 
subjects, as part of the colonial state-system,1 shared equally important roles with 
Europeans. Yet, colonial historiography tends to present native subjects in two 
extremes: either in full submission to or in diametrical opposition to the colonial state-
system (Zachernuk 2000).  
In this chapter, I interrogate colonial state formation by dissecting the 
seemingly clear-cut boundary between the state and its native subjects. To do so, I 
draw on the works of Indonesian scholars cum judges about native land rights 
published in the influential Indies Journal of Law (Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht, 
ITR) between 1929 and 1931. Here, I examine the role of these native scholars in 
creating legal knowledge in their own vision, paying close attention to the ways in 
which they extended particular forms of property relations while contesting others. 
Situating these academic texts within the socio-political context of the time, I highlight 
the porous boundary between colonial state-system and native subjects in the process 
of state formation. I suggest that these scholars, in their unique position of being 
natives yet trained in colonial law in the metropole, scholars yet part of the colonial 
judicial system, played unique roles in colonial state-making. By way of their 
                                                 
1 I borrow the term “state-system” from Abrams (1988) to avoid reifying “the state.” Abrams defines 
the state-system as “a palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centered in government and 
more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society” (58). 
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discursive intervention, they at once extended and contested the force of the colonial 
state-system. 
In the following sections, I will start by theorizing colonial state formation, 
borrowing Hansen and Stepputat’s concept of symbolic language of stateness (2001), 
Comaroff’s proposition of law as the vernacular language of a colonial state (1998), 
and Roseberry’s common discursive framework (1994) as my theoretical bases. This 
will be followed by a brief narrative of institutional and discursive frameworks that 
shaped the administration of justice on native land rights. To understand the context of 
the native scholars’ works in colonial legal discourse and governance, I will situate the 
legal journal where they published their works in terms of its position among the legal 
community in the colony. After establishing these contexts, I will then examine one 
article by Wirjono Prodjodikoro and two by Soepomo that appeared in the journal 
between 1929 and 1931, reading them against socio-historical events that shaped the 
period. I will conclude by proposing that the role of native intellectuals in colonial 
state formation is more ambiguous than what had been conventionally assigned to 
them. 
Colonial State Formation and the Symbolic Language of Stateness 
The legislation of the Agrarian Law of 1870 and the declaration of domain 
right was a watershed for colonial state formation in the Netherlands East Indies. First, 
through the Agrarian Law of 1870, the Dutch parliament and the colonial 
administrators established the discursive presence of “the state” on matters related to 
land tenure and property relations. Second, by claiming state proprietorship of land, 
colonial administrators reconfigured property relations between the natives and the 
state: the natives then came to possess only perpetual usufruct rights to state land, 
never full ownership of it. Third, in setting the Agrarian Law of 1870 as a reference 
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for land-related law, a foundational element to facilitate modern agricultural 
enterprises, colonial administrators created an appearance of legitimacy for legal 
decisions regarding land. In short, the Agrarian Law of 1870 represented a symbolic 
language of stateness, an arsenal of governance and authority deployed through the 
institutionalization of law and legal discourse to conjure the imagination of the state as 
the authoritative center that is capable of issuing “the last judgment” (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001, 8). 
Before proceeding further, a brief layout of the theoretical construct that 
informs this chapter is needed: The construction of a modern state is a continuous 
process that takes place through the deployment of various practical and symbolic 
techniques of governance called the “language of stateness” (Hansen and Stepputat 
2001). An essential form of one symbolic language of stateness is the 
institutionalization of law and legal discourses that establishes the authority of the 
state and sustains the state’s discursive presence in the consciousness of the 
population. It was law that held colonial state-forms together and made them appear 
united and coherent (Comaroff 1998). In this light, state formation here is thus 
understood as the practices and processes through which state agents project a specific 
center that possesses the ultimate authority in society (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; 
Joseph and Nugent 1994; Abrams 1988), with the objective to create and reproduce an 
image of a genuine presence of the entity of the state. State formation, however, needs 
to be understood in the context of the resistance and struggle against which it is 
formed (Joseph and Nugent 1994; Corrigan and Sayer 1985), and discursive 
intervention provoked a discursive resistance. In the Metropole and in the colony, the 
discursive resistance emerged in the sphere of knowledge production. 
At the turn of the century, a sense of indebtedness towards and responsibility 
for the natives permeated the zeitgeist and shaped not only the political direction as 
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evident in Ethical Policy, but also the intellectual orientation in the academia. At 
Leiden University United Faculty of Law and Letters that trained colonial officials, the 
spirit materialized in an empathetic commitment to understand the natives in order to 
help improve their welfare. An avenue to this spirit materialized in the study the 
native’s customary or adat law. As a chaired professor on adat law, Cornelis van 
Vollenhoven championed the teaching of adat law and made it an important part of the 
curriculum. Other Indies scholars created a foundation for the research and 
dissemination of knowledge on adat, Adatrechtstichting (Fasseur 1993; Otto and 
Pompe 1989). Soon Leiden University cemented its reputation as the intellectual 
center for the study of adat and adat law.  
Led by the charismatic van Vollenhoven, Leiden scholars developed a unique 
intellectual perspective on adat law. They adhered to Von Savigny’s principle of 
organic law2 and rejected the imposition of positivistic European legal thought upon 
the natives, arguing that law should burst forth from the dynamic of the people it 
serves and should reflect the people’s own cultural character (Burns 2004; Otto and 
Pompe 1989; Eikema Hommes 1979). On the issue of the native’s land, the Leiden 
school of adat law, henceforth referred to as the “Adat Law school,” rejected the 
colonial domain principle on the basis that the natives and their jural communities 
possessed the rights of allocation from time immemorial that could not be negated by 
a mere legal declaration by the colonial government (Vollenhoven 1919). Because of 
their opposition to the government’s main legal narrative, the colonial administrators 
largely considered the Adat Law school to be a thorn in the flesh. Yet, the influence of 
the school prevailed in the colony through Leiden graduates who served in the colonial 
offices. 
                                                 
2 The Leiden adat law school traces its intellectual genealogy to Von Savigny’s historical school of 
thought. For a discussion of this school of legal thought, see Eikema Hommes (1979).  
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The discursive opening that the Leiden scholars created on native land rights 
made possible a form of intervention to the symbolic language of stateness embodied 
in colonial agrarian laws, even after the influence of Ethical Policy had waned. By the 
late 1920s, the progressive spirit of yesteryear had dissipated, and the political 
leanings in the colony had returned to conservatism (Lindblad 2002; Cribb 1994; 
Benda 1966). Yet, the legacy of the Adat Law school remained: in the administration 
of law, in the legal discourse among jurists, and in the Indies legal journal, the jural 
community and right of allocation remained indispensable concepts that defined the 
legal discourse in the colony. Their staying power was sustained by Leiden alumnae 
who assumed various posts in the colony as lawyers, teachers, colonial officials, and 
members of the Volksraad. 
The first Native lawyers trained in the metropole belonged to this group. Sent 
to study at Leiden under the government scholarship program, these Native lawyers 
returned to serve in the colonial judicial system.3 Most started their careers as 
chairmen of the landraad,4 the court for the native population that had its seat in the 
capital of each regency. They administered law, made legal decisions, and set legal 
traditions for the native population on behalf of the colonial government. Among them 
were individuals who contributed to conversations about legal matters through 
newspapers, cultural bulletins, and, more importantly, legal journals, drawing topics 
from their daily encounters with cases in court. They borrowed the Adat Law school 
discursive framework in their engagement with colonial legal discourse, especially 
discourse on native land rights. They were at once judges and scholars; they played 
their part as state agents while also exercising their intellectual capacity; they made 
                                                 
3 Forty-two out of 189 graduates of the Rechtsschool earned their master’s degree at Leiden, seven 
finished with a doctorate; however, not all of them went with the government’s scholarship. 
4 In later years, Rechtshoogeschool graduates would also start their career at, if not close to, the top 
position at a landraad.  
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law as part of the state-system and at the same time bore the consequences of their 
legal decisions as native subjects.5 In short, they took part in constructing the colonial 
state through the symbolic language of stateness. Their situatedness, however, resists 
the neatly drawn boundary between colonial state and colonial subject. It invites an 
examination of the persistent binary categories of colonial “state” and native subject. 
Institutional and Discursive Framework on Native Land Rights 
The administration of law in the Indies implemented the principle of separation 
following the classification of its inhabitants (see Appendix A). Except in semi-
autonomous areas, the state-system administered Government6 justice 
(gouvernementsrechtspraak) through three separate courts: a court for Europeans, a 
court for Natives and Foreign Orientals, and a court for all groups for criminal cases.7 
Europeans were subject to European civil codes (Burgerlijk Wetboek), while Natives 
and Foreign Orientals were subject to their respective customary and adat law. 
Ordinary court for Europeans was administered in the Residency Court that had its 
seat in the residency capital. Raad van Justitie reviewed Residency Court decisions in 
cases of appeal, while final decisions rested with the Supreme Court, the 
Hooggerechtshof. 
For the Natives and Foreign Orientals, the landraad at the regency capital 
served as the ordinary court to hear and try all civil and criminal matters. A 
government civil servant trained in law chaired the landraad and led a team that 
                                                 
5 This will become apparent in the discussion on Prodjodikoro’s essay.  
6 Henceforth I use the word Government with a capital G to denote the colonial government as a 
specific network of institutions and practices that dealt with administration of justice and with adat land 
rights, and that actively conjured the imagination of the state. See Appendix B for a diagrammatic view 
of the Netherlands East Indies governance structure in the late 1920s. The state-systems discussed in the 
dissertation are marked with dotted patterns. 
7 The classification was not strictly based on race. Individuals could petition to be assimilated to 
European groups and hence submit to European civil codes.  
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included the regent and several prominent Native chiefs. A registrar was responsible 
for recording cases and maintaining correspondence with higher courts (Massier 2008, 
80 fn 13). In addition to this team was a native law clerk (rechtskundige) assigned as 
an official seconded to the landraad with a career path that in principle could lead to 
the position of chairman. Appeals of landraad decisions were reviewed first by the 
European Residency Court before going to the Raad van Justitie and finally the 
Supreme Court (Massier 2008, 80 fn 13). 
In the semi-autonomous areas, indigenous justice (inheemsche rechtspraak) 
administered law for all civil and criminal cases with a regent or patih presiding over 
the native court. Massier describes the complex system and its affiliation to 
Government justice as follows: 
In addition to this indigenous justice, native judges presided over two 
institutions that came under the auspices of government justice, being the 
districtsgerecht (district court) and the regentschapsgerecht (regency court). 
The district head and the regent (or patih), respectively, functioned as sole 
judges, assisted by native counselors, a penghulu (state-paid religious official) 
(in the case of the regency court) and a jaksa. Their jurisdiction was confined 
to small claims and petty crimes committed by Natives only. Court decisions 
made in civil cases heard by the district court could be appealed at the regency 
court while review of the regent’s decision would be undertaken by the 
landraad (Katwijk and Dekker 1993a:28–29). (2008, 83 n. 12)8 
Because adat law remained the law administered by the landraad, legal 
decisions could suffer if and when the chairman was not well versed in the 
particularities and intricacies of adat law. The frequent transfer of the landraad 
chairman exacerbated the situation, as it limited his immersion in local adat dynamics. 
He would have to rely on translators and mediators who were familiar with local adat 
law, roles usually fulfilled by the registrar and the native chief members of the team. 
                                                 
8 For cases that involved subjects belonging to different classifications, interracial law (intergentiel 
recht) would apply, while for interracial commercial transactions, European civil codes would be 
followed (Darmawi 1973). 
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Even so, because of the frequency of incorrect translations, there was no guarantee 
that decisions would be made with the utmost recognition of local legal consciousness.  
Such complexity prompted several initiatives to unify the legal system and to 
create a common civil law, but all of them failed. The proponents pointed out that a 
common law would enable the indigenous inhabitants to participate in increasingly 
commercialized agriculture and in internal trade (Hooker 1978a, 191). The Adat Law 
school scholars and jurists rejected the initiative (Hooker 1978a). They disapproved of 
the fast-paced imposition of European positivistic legal tradition upon the native 
population, and suggested a more gradual process such as via codification in the case 
of van Vollenhoven, and via jurisprudence and judge-made law in the case of Barend 
ter Haar. 
As narrated earlier in Chapter 2, G.J. Nolst Trenite, a one-time legal adviser to 
the East Indies agricultural department, and Cornelis van Vollenhoven, the charismatic 
adat law professor at Leiden University, took a contrarian position regarding native 
rights on land. Whereas Trenite proposed loosening the legal protection of native land 
rights for agricultural estate expansion, van Vollenhoven argued that fallow and virgin 
land was not “free land” as Europeans understood it, but land under the jurisdiction of 
jural communities in the villages that exercised rights of allocation.9 The debate 
continued in the colony between Nolst Trenite and van Vollenhoven’s protégés 
Barend ter Haar and J.H.A. Logemann until the late 1920s10 (Burns 2004; Otto and 
Pompe 1989; Nolst Trenite 1929; Logemann and Haar 1929). 
                                                 
9 Van Vollenhoven was also a prolific writer in Dutch newspapers. Around this time, he published 
several articles on the topic of native land rights. See Verspreide Geschriften 3rd volume (Vollenhoven 
1934). 
10 Nolst Trenite eventually gained supporters from among the industrialists in the Netherlands and was 
granted a chaired professorship in the Faculty of Indology at the University of Utrecht, a new 
establishment sponsored by the Dutch industries to compete with Leiden’s United Faculty of Law and 
Letters (Burns 2004). 
 191 
At a first glance, the debate seems like an ideal example of a struggle for 
hegemony, understood here not merely as a shared ideology but as “a common 
material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon, 
social orders characterized by domination” (Roseberry 1994, 361). To Roseberry, 
hegemony is a process whereby the state and community interact and eventually co-
develop “a common discursive framework,” a language that was at once sanctioned by 
the state to express control and appropriated by non-state entities to wage contestation. 
The debate between the Adat Law school proponents and Nolst Trenite, who 
ultimately represented the Dutch industrial lobby (Burns 2004), seems to represent a 
struggle to become “the” common discursive framework for native land rights. In 
practice, the debate’s discursive dynamic deviates slightly from Roseberry’s theory. 
While Roseberry maintains the state as an important entity in the contestation, the 
state in this debate was absent, while the actors appeared distant from the state. One 
proponent was a university professor and his protégé, while the other was a staff 
member of a state-centered institution widely supported by the Dutch industry who 
eventually became an academic at the University of Utrecht. While the state blurred 
into the background, the state-systems in the form of the Governor General, the Raad 
van Indie, and the influential Department of Interior—the Binnenlands Bestuur—
remained passive. Only the parliament members in Netherlands expressed tacit 
approval of van Vollenhoven’s native land rights argument by dropping the proposed 
amendment. I suggest that in this implied approval of van Vollenhoven argument, the 
state-system did not so much authorize Adat Law School discursive framework as 
tolerate it. 
In deploying the concept of the right of disposal and the jural community, van 
Vollenhoven and the Adat Law school challenged the intrusion of European law into 
agrarian matters in the colony (Burns 2004; Logemann and Haar 1927; Vollenhoven 
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1919). The native population, he argued, deserved to regulate their property relations 
using their own property rights regime. Opening a free market for land transaction 
would be detrimental to the welfare of the natives as they would be defenseless against 
the predatory market of land and labor.11 Arguably, van Vollenhoven’s theoretical 
construct that found its legal backing in Article 62 of the Regeeringsreglement 1854 
contributed to putting a brake on capital intrusion and massive land takeover in the 
colony. His construction of native land rights and adat community continued to inform 
later works on adat land rights. It gained currency as a parallel common discursive 
framework to which even the powerful, conservative Binnenlands Bestuur officials 
had to pay attention. In the colony, van Vollenhoven protégés, Indonesian and 
Europeans, would continue his struggle through numerous avenues, one of the most 
important of which was the legal treatises they published in the scholarly journal the 
Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht (The Indies Journal of Law). 
Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht 
The Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht (ITR) was an influential flagship 
publication of the Netherlands-Indies Lawyers Association12 that was re-established in 
1913. Re-launched in 1915 from a previous publication, Recht in Nederlandsch Indie, 
ITR was intended to serve the Association’s objective to provide its members with the 
means to study jurisprudence (rechtswetenschap), especially in Netherlands-Indies 
lawmaking (wetgeving), and the administration of justice (rechtspraak) (Katwijk and 
                                                 
11 Van Vollenhoven argued that the entire system of native legal consciousness should be allowed to 
undergo its own evolution, which eventually will lead to a final, advanced form of individual land rights 
akin to Dutch’s eigendom system (1919).  
12 De Nederlands-Indische Juristen-Vereeniging. Membership in the association was open to lawyers 
with doctoral and master’s degrees (gepromoveerde and afstudeerde), rechtskundigen, and notaries, 
with an annual membership fee that included free subscription to ITR. Non-members could buy the 
journal at a price not less than the annual membership fee (Katwijk and Dekker 1992).  
 193 
Dekker 1992). It was distributed free to all paying members, 286 in January 1915, 
seven of whom were native law clerks. The Association’s bylaws called for two 
editors, one each from the judiciary and bar, in order to ensure the comprehensive 
coverage of legal issues that mattered most to both professions.13 With an initial 
readership shy of 300, ITR might not have been the largest academic journal in the 
East Indies, but it was influential considering the stature and position of its members 
in society. It was also influential in the way it became mandatory reading for certain 
courses at Leiden University United Faculty of Law and Letters and at the Batavia 
Rechtshoogeschool (Jaarboekje 1928). 
ITR consisted of two sections: one section featured essays on legal matters 
(verhandelingen) and the other published comments on actual cases in the 
administration of justice (geannotteerde rechtspraak). The former frequently 
published essays, which contained such a wealth of information that they became 
informal guidelines to help judges navigate their way in the administration of justice, 
especially when it involved complicated interracial law or adat law. The section for 
the administration of justice, on the other hand, published expert commentaries on 
legal decisions the editors deemed important for the study of law in the colony. 
Through these means, ITR shaped the legal consciousness in the colony, and as a 
reference publication, it maintained a capacity to both amplify and curtail the 
Government’s discourse on legal matters. 
Among the topics discussed in the ITR publication between 1926 and 1942 
were the native property rights regime, which expanded the pioneering works of van 
Vollenhoven and the scholars of the Adat Law school. The topic of agrarian 
reorganization in the Javanese Principalities in Central Java was of particular interest 
                                                 
13 Two Dutchmen served at its first editors: H.G.P. Duyfjes, registrar at the Netherlands Indies Supreme 
Court (Hooggerechtshof), and A.H. van Ophuysen, an advocate and attorney in Batavia (Katwijk and 
Dekker 1992).  
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due to the entangled administration of Government justice (gouvernment-rechtspraak) 
and indigenous justice (inheemsche rechtspraak) courtesy of the semi-autonomous 
status of the Principalities.14 The editors of ITR published three articles on the agrarian 
reorganization in the Principalities between 1929 and 1931 written by two 
Indonesians, Wirjono Prodjodikoro and Soepomo, a master’s and a doctoral graduate 
of Leiden University, United Faculty of Law and Letters in 1926 and 1927, 
respectively. 
Prodjodikoro and Soepomo belonged to the same cohort at the Rechtsschool 
and studied at Leiden at the time when Perhimpunan Indonesia, the nationalistic 
Indonesian student association in the Netherlands, was solidifying its non-cooperative 
stance towards the Dutch colonial administration. After graduating, both returned to 
serve in the Government judicial system, where they started their careers in the top 
positions in the landraad. By 1930, Prodjodikoro had served as official seconded to the 
chairman of the Landraads in Klaten and Boyolali (1926–1927), as extraordinary 
chairman seconded to the chairman of the Landraad in Makassar (1928–1929), and 
finally as chairman of the Landraad in Poerworedjo and Koetoardjo (1929–1930).15 
Meanwhile, by 1931 Soepomo had served as official seconded to the chairman of the 
Landraad in Yogyakarta (1927–1928), chairman of the Landraad in Yogyakarta 
(1928–1930), and, starting in 1930, as official seconded to the Ministry of Justice to 
implement research on the private law of the indigenous population.16 Experience as 
                                                 
14 The Javanese principalities (Vorstenlanden) in Central Java were semi-autonomous areas that 
consisted of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Surakarta was the home of the Kasunanan and the 
Mangkunegaran royal houses, ruled respectively by the Sunan and the Mangkunegara. Yogyakarta was 
the home of Kasultanan, led by the Sultan, with a small area carved out for the minor royal house of the 
Paku Alaman. Considered to be the center of Javanese civilization and culture, Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta in the early 20th century hosted and were home to scholars, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and 
planters as well nascent radicals from all racial backgrounds (Shiraishi 1990, Sears 1996, Bosma and 
Raben 2008). 
15 Stamboek van Meester Wirjono Prodjodikoro, ANRI. 
16 Curriculum Vitae of Soepomo in the archive of M. Yamin, ANRI. 
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landraad personnel equipped Prodjodikoro and Soepomo with a mastery of the 
common discursive framework as well as cognizance of the symbolic language of 
stateness, which they demonstrate in their ITR articles. 
Symbolic Language of Stateness in the Hands of Native Scholars 
Starting in the mid-19th century many patuhs began to lease their apanage to 
Dutch planters (Bosma and Raben 2008). But patuhs’ continued demands for higher 
rents, combined with pressure for long-term security from foreign investors, sent the 
planters to the Residents in Yogyakarta and Surakarta to ask for protection from the 
patuhs’ arbitrary demands. At the same time, the central Government in Batavia was 
reluctant to respond to these requests, lest they end up rocking the boat (Haspel 1985). 
However, eventually they relented. The negotiations between planters, Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta Residents, officials at the Binnenlands Bestuur, and the Principalities’ 
administrators started in 1909. Full implementation of the reorganization began in 
1912 and finished only in 1926 (Haspel 1985). 
By the time Soepomo and Prodjodikoro published their articles in ITR, the 
reorganization had been finalized and had transformed the agrarian system in 
Surakarta and Yogyakarta. It replaced the apanage system with a newly formed village 
system; it introduced village administration to take over the traditional role of bekels; 
it defined the peasants’ right to land more clearly; and it revised land lease regulation 
addressed at Dutch agricultural enterprises. The articles by Soepomo and Prodjodikoro 
assessed the impacts of the reorganization on their contemporary society. Born and 
raised in Surakarta, Soepomo and Prodjodikoro produced legal knowledge about the 
Principalities from double perspectives: from the perspective of knowledgeable 
indigenous individuals and, having served in landraad, also from the perspective of 
state agents. 
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Wirjono Prodjodikoro 1930: A Struggle with Marginalization  
The underlying theme of Wirjono Prodjodikoro’s article Het een en ander over 
het adatvermogensrecht der Indonesier in het gewest Surakarta17 revolves around the 
marginalization of Surakarta’s remaining sovereignty. That the sovereignty of the 
Principalities had long been circumscribed18 was an accepted fact among educated 
elites, but continued marginalization of the Principalities had irked Javanese 
nationalists. In Boedi Oetomo congresses in the early 1920s, many members expressed 
dissatisfaction with the intensified Dutch intrusion in Surakarta and Yogyakarta 
internal affairs (Larson 1987) and the half-hearted attempt to emancipate native 
officials.19 Prodjodikoro’s article reflected this rising sentiment and explored the 
circumscription through three rubrics of law: jurisdiction, legal subject, and adat 
property law. Convinced that effective command of each of these rubrics reflected the 
level of sovereignty of semi-autonomous regions,20 Prodjodikoro demonstrated that 
this was not to be the case with Surakarta. 
Prodjodikoro asserted that legal subjects21 (rechtssubjecten) in Surakarta were 
a flimsy category subject to the colonial government’s whim. For decades, the 
Government had categorized Indonesians from outside of the Principalities as Foreign 
Orientals22 with the consequence that European civil codes applied to them for 
                                                 
17 A Few Things about the Adat Property Law in the Regions of Surakarta. 
18 Their status as vassals required them to maintain passive legation duty by attending regular reception 
of Dutch Residents in the Principalities (Resink 1976). 
19 Soepomo’s keynote speech at the opening of Boedi Oetomo’s 1927-1928 congress. In his speech, 
Soepomo expressed his skepticism regarding the Government’s ontvoogding program, that is, the 
program to emancipate the native administration corps (Inlandsch Bestuur).  
20 Because the territorial jurisdiction for Surakarta was relatively established, Prodjodikoro wrote only 
summary paragraphs about it. 
21 Dismissive of the jurisdiction (he wrote only three short paragraphs about it, most likely because the 
Principalities jurisdiction was more or less stable), Prodjodikoro focused his article on the remaining 
two rubrics.  
22 St. 1855 No. 79 article 9. 
 197 
property law (vermogensrecht), testamentary inheritance law (testamentair erfrecht), 
evidentiary law (bewijsrecht) and qualification (bevoegdheid). In 1912,23 when the 
Government eliminated this category, it created a legal limbo for non-local natives 
living in Surakarta. It was unclear which adat law would be applicable to them, 
leaving a complicated question that was neither easy nor short to answer 
(Prodjodikoro 1930, 109). Particularly in the case of property rights and commercial 
transactions (vermogensrecht), Prodjodikoro concluded that non-local natives had no 
option but to go along with the locally applicable adat law that, fortunately, he 
stressed, provided adequate security. 
Because of the Government’s indifference, legal subjects in Surakarta were 
informally grouped into three categories: 1) Sunan’s subjects (onderhoorigen), 
encompassing all Indonesians who were established in the Kasunanan area of 
Surakarta, and Indonesians who originated from the Kasunanan but resided in the 
Mangkunegaran area; 2) Mangkunegaran’s subjects, which included all Indonesians 
who were established in the Mangkunegaran area of Surakarta, and Indonesians who 
originated in the Mangkunegaran area but temporarily resided in the Kasunanan area; 
3) Government’s subjects, which included all remaining Indonesians originating from 
outside Surakarta but who temporarily resided in the Surakarta area (Prodjodikoro 
1930, 110). 
The colonial Government re-categorized subjects in Surakarta when they 
introduced a new law decreed in St. 1921 No 566. In this law, Indonesians who were 
employed by the Government (Landsdienaren) were re-categorized as “the subject of 
the state” (Landsonderhoorigen), or more precisely the subject of the Government.24 
                                                 
23 St. 1912 No. 451. See Resink 1976 pp. 464-465 for a brief explanation of legal relations between the 
Principalities and the colonial government.  
24 In legal terms this means that Government employees such as Prodjodikoro and Soepomo themselves 
would be tried at the government’s landraad, instead of the native court, should they become 
defendants in a legal case.  
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This decision, Prodjodikoro reported, created a furor among Surakarta’s leaders, who 
deemed it ungrounded. A member of the Volksraad from Surakarta, Mr. 
Dwidjosewojo, protested this move and filed a motion to repeal the code in the 
Volksraad session of 1921. It was flatly rejected by Mr. Schippers, the director of the 
Binnenlands Bestuur, who invoked a principle that the Government had adopted at one 
time whereby “the [colonial] state’s employees, wherever established, are the subject 
of the [colonial] government (Landsonderhoorigen).” Prodjodikoro was skeptical of 
Schippers’s argument, and wrote, 
Does the Government mean to say that they would not tolerate a departure 
from a one-time adopted principle, without the need to find, that first an 
investigation is carried out on the possibility of locally different conditions? If 
that is so, then it seems to me [it is] a questionable proposition. Mr. 
Dwidjosewojo had already pointed out in the objection, that through St. 1921 
No. 566 a great injustice was created, that now a much greater number of 
persons who live in the semi-autonomous area, on the one hand shall enjoy the 
security and other regulation [offered by] the semi-autonomous area, but on the 
other are indeed free from regulations and obligations imposed by the semi-
autonomous administrators, and that in addition, all the tax imposed on them 
flow into the (colonial) Government treasury. (1930, 111) 
This skepticism of the Government’s legal decision reflected the increasing 
assertiveness among Surakarta’s elites vis-à-vis the Dutch. They learned to distrust the 
colonial government after the annexation of the semi-autonomous kingdom of 
Karangasem in Bali in 1922 and the new contract between the Dutch and the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta in 1921 (Larson 1987). In a circle meeting in 1926, Surakarta’s elites 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the Government ordinance that revoked certain 
native law court jurisdiction and legal powers in the Kasunanan (Larson 1987). 
Presumably Prodjodikoro was aware of these developments. The Government’s 
defense using the exterritoriality principle irked him, and he retorted, 
This argument of the government seems at first sight adequate, but in my 
opinion it does not amount to much. What’s important is this: how far does 
 199 
exterritoriality go? Also the argument borrowed from Bijblad 9385 p. 247, that 
persons employed by the government may be considered the true 
representatives of the government, is far from convincing. Is it correct to 
maintain that a switchman of the Indies State Railway could be considered “the 
true representative of the government”? The matter—in my opinion—is 
perceived by the government from too much a theoretical point of view, 
whereby no sufficient concern is given to the practical difficulty the regulation 
causes. (1930, 112) 
Here, Prodjodikoro problematized the Government’s move to reconfigure 
native subjects into categories that benefited the Government. Ordinarily, natives in 
Surakarta were subjects of the Sunan or the Mangkunegaran and paid taxes according 
to Surakarta’s legal codes, but with the new law, any natives employed by the 
Government were to pay taxes to the colonial government, not to the Native 
Sovereign. Prodjodikoro considered this an unfair, arbitrary move and contested the 
categorization that doubly disadvantaged Surakarta, both materially through loss of 
taxes and discursively through an implied disesteem of its sovereignty. 
The Government’s move represented by the Binnenlands Bestuur demonstrates 
subject formation as the twin side of state formation (Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 
2005). The colonial state-system needed to mold subjects into a form of abstraction 
and simplification that represented the reality it aimed to control. By categorizing the 
subjects this way, the colonial state-system achieved a legible frame making 
management and domination possible. Redefining native employees as the subjects of 
the Government would presumably ensure loyalty, either voluntary or coerced. 
In addition to depriving Surakarta of its legal subjects, the Government 
marginalized it even more by intruding on its indigenous administration of justice 
(inheemsche rechtspraak) on property and land rights. Adat law in Surakarta followed 
a different thought world from the European law. Rights and obligations in Surakarta, 
“are perceived by adat law from the standpoint of the object with which [individuals] 
have a relationship, and towards this object rights and obligations are refracted” 
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(Prodjodikoro 1930, 112, emphasis added). The Surakarta legal thought world 
acknowledged two main forms of property: land and water, reflecting the agricultural 
character of the population. Movable objects such as houses and crops were grouped 
under these two forms. It was this legal thought world that brought Surakarta a special 
court called Balemangoe, which heard and tried issues of land disputes. 
Putting a legal object at the center of the administration of justice was in 
contrast with European tradition that focused on the subject: regardless of the object in 
dispute, the trial would take place in the court applicable to the subject. Prodjodikoro 
noted how Surakarta indigenous administration of justice had undergone a long 
process of marginalization that started as early as 1847, when Balemangoe was 
abolished by the Government through the decree of St. 1847 No. 30. It was further 
weakened by the Sunan’s decision in 189425 that removed from the jurisdiction of the 
Surakarta court of justice decisions concerning land and the bekel system. The Regent 
was now able to resolve land disputes in his capacity as a government official, with his 
decision requiring consent from the royal officials. The final decision, however, still 
had to be approved by the Dutch Resident (Prodjodikoro 1930). 
Prodjodikoro’s account reflects how the colonial state-system penetrated the 
indigenous administration of justice for land disputes, more intensively so after 1894 
when owners/managers of agricultural estates in Surakarta began demanding a more 
“reliable legal security,” which led to the agrarian reorganization and eventually to a 
full transfer of land conflicts under the jurisdiction of the landraad (Haspell 1985). 
Another blow to the indigenous administration of justice was imposed by the 
executive order (dawoeh) of the Sunan’s Royal Administrative Office in March 21, 
1905. This order, presumably intended to elucidate the 1894 regulation, listed the 
types of disputes that had to be resolved using the executive authority. It included 
                                                 
25 Soenanpranatans May 31, 1894 No. 92. 
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disputes regarding land rights (bezitrecht), land pawning (gade ginade boemi), or the 
leasing of land (tebas tinebas boemi).26 Prodjodikoro wryly noted, 
One may now with Mr. Thieme, Prof. Mr. Ter Haar, and Mr. Soepomo27 
dispute the fact of the legality of the said Sunanspranatan of 31st May 1894 
and the dawuh of the Soenan’s royal administrator of March 21st 1905. The 
fact that those semi-autonomous [region] regulations exist and are still being 
followed in practice until today, in connection with what we have mentioned 
under section II and III, does seem to convince [us] that Surakarta adat law 
views the land (and also water) as unmistakably distinct legal objects from 
other remaining legal objects. (1931, 113)28 
It would be off the mark to take the colonial Government as the only party 
involved in the marginalization of indigenous administration of justice (inheemsche 
rechtspraak). European scholars were also culpable for similar offenses. In the last 
paragraphs of his article, Prodjodikoro narrated what he deemed a flattening of the 
native legal thought world. In the adat law literature dominated by Dutch scholars, he 
found that every immovable object (those not categorized as land, water, houses, or 
crops) was grouped into schuldenrecht (debt law) as opposed to grondenrecht (land 
law). Dissatisfied with these categorizations, Prodjodikoro insisted that categories 
between Javanese and European legal thought were not necessarily interchangeable. 
He marked, 
                                                 
26 In the case of water as a legal object that establishes property relations among the Surakartan natives, 
Prodjodikoro described the institutions that managed water issues in Surakarta, which was regulated by 
articles 45 and 61 of the Surakarta legal code Angger Goenoeng.  
27 Prodjodikoro provided full references for the works of each person he cited in his article. They are 
Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht vol. 109 (1918) pp. 1-14 for Mr. Thieme, Adatrechtbundel 23 p. 201 
for Prof. ter Haar, and De Reorganisatie van het Agrarisch stelsel in het geweest Soerakarta, 
Soepomo’s dissertatiaon for his doctoral degree Leiden.  
28 Prodjodikoro added the following observation on houses and crops as legal objects:  
Of two other legal objects, house and crops, one can doubt whether they can—in the adat 
system—be equated with land or whether they belong to another category of legal objects, 
which for convenience may be designated movable property, or belong to neither one nor the 
other, but constitute a separate category. It appears to us, that in Surakarta they belong (very 
well) to the category of land. (1930, 114) 
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A Javanese term for schuldenrecht (debt law) is not known. The term oetang 
kapipotang used by Prof. van Vollenhoven and ascertained by Holleman for 
Toeloeng-Agoeng is in my opinion too restrictive. In my opinion, it is difficult 
to bring transactions such as rent [huur/sewo], safekeeping [bewaargeving/ 
titip], and mandate [lastgeving/kongkon], under this term (i.e. oetang 
kapipoetang). . . . [In Surakarta’s legal code Angger Goenoeng] nowhere it is 
shown that the potang pipotang [was] used as a generic term for “debt 
law.”(Prodjodikoro 1930: 115) 
To Prodjodikoro, many distinct terms in Javanese, such as potang pipotang, gade 
ginade, silih silihan, hadoel toekoe, titip tinipan, as mentioned in Article 64 of 
Surakarta’s legal code Angger Goenoeng, hardly pointed to the term potang pipotang 
as a generic term for debt law. The term prakoro poro padoe, on the other hand, was 
too broad, since it also included disputes concerning family and inheritance. 
In his critical assessment of adat law literature developed by its architect 
himself, scholars, and his prominent student, Prodjodikoro attempted to demonstrate 
an inimical discursive dynamic whereby limiting terms and categories imposed by 
Eurocentric interpretation of Surakarta adat law flattened the dimensions of property 
relations. It ignored nuances in the indigenous legal consciousness, which took its cues 
from the particular social structure and relations involved. In fact, Prodjodikoro 
actually echoed van Vollenhoven’s advice to European jurists to acknowledge the 
local episteme as legitimate and parallel to Europeans’ in order to understand the 
native milieu on its own terms (Vollenhoven 1919). Prodjodikoro’s short diversion to 
critique van Vollenhoven can easily be mistaken as trivial, a minor difference between 
two academics who essentially belonged to the same school of thought. However, this 
“minor” difference becomes salient when read in the context of colonial conditions, 
first because it demonstrates a native intellectual’s independent capacity to deliberate 
(Zachernuk 2000), a precondition for agency, and second because of what was at stake 
in the micro-relations of power in the entangled world of colonial academia (Bremen 
and Ben-Ari 2005). Anecdotes such as this urge one to rethink literatures that 
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downplay the intellectual independence of native scholars in light of their charismatic 
European professors. 
Yet, a key question remains: in what way was Prodjodikoro’s article an 
expression of state formation? As stated earlier, state formation needs to be understood 
in the context of the resistance and struggle it is formed against (Joseph and Nugent 
1994; Corrigan and Sayer 1985). Through his article, Prodjodikoro expressed a two-
pronged rejection of colonial state formation: first, he rejected the continued 
marginalization of Surakarta sovereignty, and second, he rejected the flattening of 
native legal thought. He disapproved of landraad intrusion into land conflicts and 
disputes, despite the fact that he himself was the landraad chairman in Poerworedjo 
and Koetoardjo at that time.29 Borrowing the symbolic language of stateness, 
Prodjodikoro quietly waged his contest against the colonial state, in this case the 
Binnenlands Bestuur, that conjured the practices and processes of marginalization 
through legal discourse, as realized in St. 1921 No. 566. The fact that Prodjodikoro 
himself was part of the state-system as a landraad chairman demonstrates Abrams’s 
argument (1988) that “the state” is never a coherent entity, but rather a cacophony of 
contesting interests. 
Prodjodikoro ends his essay on a contemplative note: 
In total absence of any Javanese name that indicates schuldenright (debt law), 
we should not need to be immediately surprised. We have but to remember 
that, for example, for the word dragen (carry) in the larger sense no collective 
name exists in Javanese. People talk of njoeggi (carry on the head), mikoeI 
(carry on the shoulder), gendong (carry on the back), tjangking (carry with the 
hand). (1930, 116) 
                                                 
29 Stamboek van Meester Wirjono Prodjodikoro, ANRI. 
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Soepomo 1929: Reinterpreting Supreme Court Ruling 
Agrarian reorganization swept through the whole region of the Principalities, 
including their urbanized capitals, Solo and Yogyakarta, where land use and land 
classification were different from the rural areas. Soepomo’s work Adatgrondenrecht 
ter hoofdplaats Jogja na de Reorganisatie (Adat land right in the capital of Jogja after 
the reorganization) complemented an earlier publication by Barend ter Haar in 
Adatrechtbundels volume 22, 1923, that laid out nine categories of land in the capital 
of Yogyakarta (also named Yogyakarta) prior to the reorganization. In this article, 
Soepomo examined the status of land rights in Yogyakarta after the reorganization. He 
carefully recorded all relevant aspects of land rights in the capital, and he described 
various codes introduced between 1918 and 1925 that dealt with lands not affected by 
the reorganization; and he discussed different procedures for Indonesians who wished 
to acquire the European right to build (opstalrecht). His most valuable analysis, 
however, was on the different impacts of the reorganization on urbanized and rural 
areas of the capital, specifically on the nature of ownership. 
The agrarian reorganization shaped different land categories differently. Out of 
nine categories of land described in ter Haar’s article, three were untouched by the 
reorganization,30 and six underwent substantial changes. They are: 1) land used as 
payment for the Principality’s official salary (ambtelijke gebruiksrecht or tanah 
golongan); 2) land used by extended family of the royal house (tanah kasentanan); 3) 
land used by the regent; 4) orchards located outside the city center (kebonan); 5) 
properties of wong cilik,31 literally “little people,” falling outside the other categories; 
                                                 
30 The three included 1) land used directly by the Sultan himself; 2) land used by the colonial 
government such as the Resident’s house, military forts, and so on; and 3) land given to Chinese or 
Europeans under the European property ownership form such as eigendom or building rights 
(opstalrecht). 
31 From wong cilik, a Javanese term for poor people that included peasants, day laborers, and the urban 
poor. This term was popular during the rise of nationalism in the late colonial period.  
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and 6) rice fields managed by bekels. With the Royal Decree Rb. 1925 No. 23, the 
Kasultanan relinquished its control of the first four, previously managed under the 
bekel system, to the people who had worked and lived on the land for generations. 
They became the effective owner of these lands. 
To the fifth category, properties of wong cilik, the reorganization introduced a 
legal framework for ownership, granting the people inheritable usufruct rights (erfelijk 
gebruiksrecht) under the native property rights regime, a significant improvement 
from the arbitrary apanage system. The same change affected the sixth category, rice 
fields previously managed by bekels. After the Kasultanan abolished the apanage 
system and dismissed all patuh in 1914, the stewardship of the rice fields returned 
temporarily to the Kasultanan. Bekels were retained until 1925, when the Kasultanan 
ceded the rights to the entitled peasants who had worked the rice fields for 
generations. Understanding the legal consequences of these changes, Soepomo was 
firm in his belief that agrarian reorganization introduced a claim for the wong cilik by 
granting them a proper legal framework to secure ownership. 
To Soepomo, the most profound impact of the reorganization was the 
elimination of the complicated legal relations. Gone were the arbitrary rules decided 
by the whims of the patuhs, bekels, or regents. In their place was the modern property 
relations regulated by law that laid out rights and obligations, guaranteeing secure 
ownership. Contemporary accounts record a more complicated day-to-day peasant’s 
experience than what Soepomo narrated in his article (Pranoto 1991; Shiraishi 1990; 
Larson 1987). However, in his subjective experience, Soepomo considered that a clear 
legal framework offered the wong cilik recourse to court, even to landraad, should they 
find their use rights unfairly challenged. For Soepomo, such legal security was 
superior to the management of land under the traditional apanage system (Soepomo 
1929, 5). 
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The urbanized section of Yogyakarta was divided into kampungs,32 
administrative divisions with no presence of a jural community as in the rural areas. 
Native lands in these kampungs were owned independently from the control of the 
community: the buying or selling of land required no community approval. 
Consequently, native-owned land rights in the urbanized area was more amenable to 
evolving into individual rights. When the Kasultanan transferred ownership of urban 
land to the entitled inhabitants, it created a new form of ownership that Soepomo 
called Eastern eigendom, a concept proposed by van Vollenhoven (1919). Eastern 
eigendom arguably offered stronger legal security than inheritable use rights because it 
was a more complete individual ownership that the Principality acknowledged as long 
as the native owners underwent a process of claiming, verifying, registering, and 
obtaining a form of written proof called a land register. 
Soepomo carefully documented the process through which a plot of urban land 
could be transferred from inheritable-use right status to Eastern eigendom status. It 
consisted of measuring the plot, mapping the block-wise parcel, recording it in the 
land registration office, and having the record kept in the land registration office. He 
writes: 
The land under the native land rights regime is measured and mapped block-
wise and recorded in land registers (grondregisters). . . . 33 The records are 
kept and maintained by the land-registration office established at the 
capital . . . 34 Selling, either under-the-table (dilijerake, doltinoekoe), or 
execution (dilelangake), gift (diriläake, dilintirake), and exchange (diidjolake) 
of lands possessed under native rights of disposal can only be carried out for 
individuals who are the subject of semi-autonomous areas35 or to Indonesian 
                                                 
32 Kampungs in this sense were villages that had become so urbanized that jural communities no longer 
played a role in people’s daily lives.  
33 Royal Decree Rb. 1926 No. 13 jo. No. 24 (Kasultanan) and Rb. 1925 No. 36 jo. Rb. 1926 No. 13 
(Pakoealaman). 
34 Rb. 1926 No. 32 (KasuItanan) and in Rb. 1927 No. 8 (Pakoealaman). 
35 In this case, subjects of Yogyakarta Principalities. 
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institutions of public or religious nature. . . . 36 For a transaction to be valid, a 
transfer to the name of the assignee (rechtverkrijgende) had to be reported in 
the land register (grondregister). Pawning (sende; panggade) of land under the 
native property rights regime acquires the force of law (Rechtskracht) only 
through the making of a record at the land register. . . . 37 Without transfer or 
recording in the land register, there is no alienation or pawning agreement. 
This article, which prescribes under which terms the said transfer or recording 
must be done in the land register, is unambiguous—as is evident from its 
redaction—about the idea that alienation or pawning has taken place and that 
subsequent transactions should later be registered! (1929, 7) 
In this passage, Soepomo essentially narrates a process of state formation in 
the Kasultanan. The series of activities to register Eastern eigendom necessitated the 
presence of a state agent, that is, a land register official, and required a certain form of 
legal subject. To own a piece of land in Yogyakarta one had to be a legal subject of the 
Sultan (or the Pakualaman royal house). “The state” materially emerged in the form of 
land register personnel and land cadaster staff, and continually reproduced its presence 
through the recording of land transfer each time land changed hands. The passage 
pointed out to the ITR readership that Yogyakarta as a state was in the process of 
“modernizing;” it was a state capable of progressing to a “modern” management of 
land that favored individual-oriented ownership. Indeed, the reorganization had 
introduced the land register system into the native property rights regime. 
The situation was different for areas in urbanized Yogyakarta that still retained 
their rural character. Soepomo wrote, 
Transactions of land that is still under village rights of disposal, thus land 
under “usufruct rights,” take place in the presence of the village meeting. In 
addition, the agreement is recorded in the village register, but the recording 
possesses only administrative significance. If a transaction of land with 
“usufruct right” status takes place without the foreknowledge of the village 
officials or of the village meeting, then it is peteng. In other words, the 
                                                 
36 Rb. 1926 No. 1 jo. Rb. 1927 No 13 Kasultanan and Rb. 1925 No. 32 jo. Rb. 1926 No. 24 
Pakoealaman. 
37 Rb. 1926 No. 1 KasuItanan en Rb. 1925 No. 32 Pakoealaman. 
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transaction is not complete; its fulfillment shall not be enforced in court. (1929, 
8) 
In this essay, Soepomo meticulously documents the result of the reorganization 
in Yogyakarta, especially the process to change the native form of ownership into 
Eastern eigendom. This document has to be read against the reality of the 
administration of justice in the Government’s landraad. Before 1910, most landraad 
chairmen could not speak the native language, were the only Dutch-speaking officials, 
and most likely were the only ones versed in law. They served a short stint in each 
landraad, about 2 to 3 years, before being shipped off to another landraad. Their short 
service period and their lack of local language mastery made it difficult for them to 
understand the local adat dynamic, which often led to disastrous court decisions 
(Massier 2008). By the 1930s, the situation had improved due to the presence of native 
law clerks and Indonesian lawyers who graduated from Leiden, and who acted as 
interlocutors between non-Indonesian landraad chairmen and the locals. Even so, this 
was no guarantee of an intimate knowledge of the nuances of local adat law. 
Contextualized in this way, Soepomo’s attention to detail reflects a concern for 
a possible disconnect between landraad personnel and local dynamic on land rights 
that might lead to disastrous decisions. Having these details recorded and archived in 
the ITR, Soepomo seemed to believe that the landraad would not unknowingly commit 
injustice against “the little people” who took the trouble to register their land claim. In 
fact, with his article as a reference, landraad personnel would have been able to advise 
the little people about acquiring proper legal documentation to secure their property.38 
With such conviction, it is hardly surprising that Soepomo supported the newly 
                                                 
38 Soepomo was more explicit about this advising role of the landraad chairman in his 1931 article in 
ITR, where he mentioned that in his capacity as landraad chairman of Yogyakarta, people often 
consulted him on matters regarding inheritable use rights.  
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introduced land registry system in Yogyakarta and dismissed the skepticism of this 
European influence in the native system. He argued, 
Although the land registry was introduced through European influence, what is 
important here is native property right on land; and this right does and remains 
a right that belongs in the adat law, such [that] the question of proof over 
native property right in relation to the regulations of the adat law should be 
evaluated. The current adat law does not recognize the distinction of the 
positive and negative [legal] system; it recognizes no strong formal regulation 
with regard to the evidence and in the adat process requires only a satisfactory 
ruling by the judge. (1929, 9) 
Adat law, Soepomo acknowledged, was unfamiliar with objective proof of 
ownership. It traditionally relied on the discretion of the judge in cases that required 
proof. Introducing a land register system would dampen the possibility of arbitrary 
judge decisions, thus protecting the “little people” who had no power to tip the judge’s 
decision in their favor. 
In the mainstream colonial legal discourse, the native property rights regime 
continued to be considered inferior to the European model due to its lack of an 
individual ownership structure in parallel with the Dutch eigendom right. Earlier in his 
works, van Vollenhoven downplayed the presence of individual ownership in the 
native system (1931). However, in his later writing he acknowledged the possibility of 
the native system of proprietary rights evolving into one that acknowledged individual 
rights, which he termed Eastern eigendomsrecht (Vollenhoven 1919). As he analyzed 
adat law on land in urban and rural Yogyakarta, Soepomo re-introduced van 
Vollenhoven’s Eastern eigendomsrecht. In theory, Eastern eigendomrecht would 
provide stronger legal security than the inheritable usufruct right because it was a full 
individual ownership right. In citing Eastern eigendomrecht Soepomo demonstrated 
the capacity of a communal-oriented native property rights regime to evolve into a 
regime that also acknowledges full individual rights. He did so not by comparing 
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properties in two different chronological periods, which would have required him to 
invoke abstract examples, but by comparing properties in two different geographical 
settings, rural and urban, materially existing at the same time. This demonstration 
gives credence to van Vollenhoven’s conviction of the capacity of native property 
rights to transform to individual forms of ownership (Vollenhoven 1919, 10–11). 
Unfortunately, the construct of Eastern eigendomsrecht, a form of native 
property ownership supported by the land register office and endorsed by the 
Yogyakarta Principality, lacked the legal support of the Supreme Court, as Soepomo 
remarked: 
With regard to the Indies eigendom document (Indische eigendomsakte), by its 
judgment of January 5, 1911 (RNI 96, p. 535, 546 and 556), the Supreme 
Court has taken a standpoint that the deed does not provide the presumption of 
[European] eigendom. (Soepomo 1929, 8) 
Here the contestation between the Adat Law school and the mainstream legal 
discourse in the colony becomes more transparent. In De Indonesier en zijn grond, van 
Vollenhoven had expressed his incredulity that the Dutch legal system could refuse to 
accommodate a native property rights system that was undergoing a process to 
“mature,” a process of evolving towards individual-oriented rights (1919, 10, 63–4). 
By 1929, ten years after this plea, and eighteen years after the Supreme Court decree 
in 1911, the refusal remained.39 
Soepomo was undeterred by the decree. Even though the Supreme Court 
proclaimed that the native land register had no evidentiary value, as long as it was 
widely accepted by the community, Soepomo saw no reason why it could not serve its 
purpose as a proof of ownership. Reinterpreting the Supreme Court’s decision, he 
                                                 
39 Such systematic control to keep native property rights inferior vis-à-vis Europeans’ was not news. It 
was widely understood as the Government’s attempt to keep land off the market, broker transactions 
between Natives and Europeans or Foreign Orientals, and skim off to the Government’s coffer the 
differentiated price between Native price and free market prices for land (Tauchid 1952). 
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prescribed in his own vision of what a landraad chairman needed to do when a 
conflict arose. 
What concerns the Government judge, particularly the landraad in Jogja, on 
the matter of evidence, [is that] he is to consider native regulation, and the 
relevant question to consider hereby is whether or not the land register is an 
authentic deed.  
The answer is affirmative [that it is an authentic document], but the 
concern here is [that it is] an authentic official (ambtelijke) document, which 
none of the [disputing] parties are entitled to and of which the material 
evidentiary value is thoroughly at the discretion of the judge.  
Take into account, however, the regulation about the land registration; 
the objective that it intends, that is, legal security about the free native property 
right . . . the activities that are related to the land registration, such as the 
block-wise survey of the land and so forth, and the guarantee, which the 
registration rules place upon the registration staff by entering the land and the 
rightful claimant [into the land registry ledger]. Considering all of this, the land 
register should have a great evidentiary value to convince the judge, much 
greater than what elsewhere [is fulfilled] with land rent register and land rent 
note. The practice by the Landraad in Jogja is then also this: that he who refers 
to the land register [as proof] is released from having to provide further proof, 
and the opponent has to provide counter proof. (Soepomo 1929, 9, emphasis 
added) 
In this passage Soepomo effectively argues that a landraad judge should worry 
less about European law and more about adat law. Implied in this paragraph is an 
encouragement to overlook the Supreme Court decree that proclaimed a native land 
register did not have a legal evidentiary value. More important was what the native 
population deemed to be the value of the land register. Moreover, adat law recognized 
no positive law, but relied more on the decision of the judge. Soepomo reminded his 
readers that the procedure involved in producing a land register was so extensive that 
it warranted being taken seriously. It was extensive enough that Soepomo was 
confident to endorse it against other evidence valid elsewhere, evidence such as the 
land rent register and the land rent note. 
With this argument, Soepomo established the role of judges in Yogyakarta in 
response to regulations and institutions introduced by the agrarian reorganization. 
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Using his extensive theoretical and empirical knowledge, Soepomo prescribed the 
stages for a judge in considering cases of disputes regarding land under the native 
property rights regime. His detailed record of the steps to convert land not under the 
control of jural communities into Eastern eigendomrecht became a reference on which 
any landraad judge could fall back. By reinterpreting the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
acknowledge the evidentiary value (bewijskracht) of the land register, which would 
have kept the native property rights regime perpetually inferior to the European model, 
he assured his readers and landraad personnel that this land register did have value and 
could be used as the basis for legal decisions in land conflicts. 
In contrast to the changes and processes in the urbanized section, the rural 
areas in the capital of Yogyakarta followed the same transformation path as the rural 
areas outside the capital where the bekel system was terminated. With the royal 
decrees Rb. 1918 No 16 KasoeItanan and Rb. 1918 No 18 Pakoealaman, the 
Principalities transferred the ownership of the land to the three villages, which then 
exercised the right of disposal. The village members became ‘shareholders’ of the land 
under the stewardship of the village, and exercised inheritable use rights on their 
allotted land. Soepomo described the new system as follows, 
The “inheritable use right” of the villagers is nothing other than a native 
property right, which in character is not dissimilar from the said free native 
property right. It is only that [the former] is trapped (bekneld) in the village 
right of disposal (dorpsbeschikkingrecht), although according to Rb. 1925 no. 
23 (Kasoeltanan) and Rb. 1925 No. 25 (Pakoealaman) the village members 
could petition the Principality at any time to remove this crushing binding 
(knellende band), and thus elevate their unfree land into a free native property 
right land.  
The owners of land in the kaloerahans inside the capital of Yogyakarta, 
as well as those in [the kaloerahans]40 outside the capital, are authorized [to 
carry out] all transaction over their land the same way as the owners of the free 
                                                 
40 Kaloerahan was the smallest administration unit in Yogyakarta that still contained a jural 
community, as opposed to a kampung that lacked a jural community.  
 213 
native property right in the capital. Their transaction, however, requires the 
cooperation of the village meeting, which can raise objection against the 
proposed transaction.  
The land registers [system] is not applicable to the unfree native land in 
the jural community of the kaloerahans, but those entitled to the land could 
acquire a kohier in which their names and the related land are registered.  
The kohier is an authentic official document, whose material 
evidentiary power [depends] upon the independent discretion of the judge. 
While this kohier is based on less technical safeguards than the land register, it 
nevertheless performs the tasks mentioned in the land issues appealed before 
the Landraad in Yogyakarta, and also had a strong position [as proof of 
ownership]. (Soepomo 1929, 12) 
In this passage, Soepomo essentially offers his interpretation of legal rulings 
decreed by the Principality, and prescribes operationalization of the rulings for the 
benefit of the landraad personnel in Yogyakarta. 
Soepomo’s article embodies the symbolic language of stateness in a rather 
unpredictable way. On the one hand, the article conjures the imagination of the state. It 
exposes readers, jurists, and lawyers, even Volksraad members, to the impact of the 
agrarian organization in Yogyakarta on the administration of justice. It provides a 
reference for legal decisions regarding native land rights, especially for the landraad in 
Yogyakarta, but more generally for legal officials in the colony. Further, in the way 
the article documents the relation between native subjects and the colonial state-
system, that is, the landraad and the Supreme Court, Soepomo not only reifies but also 
sustains the appearance of a coherent colonial state which, through landraad decisions, 
has the final say over land issues. Soepomo also endorses the new land register system 
in Yogyakarta, which, in its own way, renders the presence of the Yogyakarta 
Principality as “the state” to its subjects materially and to ITR readers ideationally. 
On the other hand, Soepomo’s reinterpretation of the Supreme Court ruling 
that denied the evidentiary value of Eastern eigendom (or, as expressed in the 1911 
wording, Inlandsch eigendomsakte) very subtly punctured the appearance of the 
colonial state as a coherent entity that authorizes. The fact was, in cases of land 
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disputes, Soepomo authorized the evidentiary value of the native land register since all 
the activities surrounding its issuance bear enough weight to maintain the land 
register’s relative value. The land register might have not lived up to the Supreme 
Court’s Eurocentric demands, but among its most important stakeholders, that is, the 
Yogyakarta subjects and those involved in transactions with them, it had its own 
significant value. 
Soepomo 1931: Village System as State Formation 
Soepomo’s 1931 article Verslag omtrent het onderzoek naar het 
adatgrondenerfrecht in het gewest Jogjakarta buiten de hoofdplaats (Report on the 
Research into the Adat Land Inheritance Law in the Yogyakarta Region Outside the 
Capital) was the result of field research in rural Yogyakarta. Endorsed by the Assistant 
Resident and the Government official seconded to the assistant for agricultural issues, 
a commission was created to research the impact of agrarian reorganization on land 
inheritance practices among koelis41 in rural Yogyakarta.42 Using a method laid out in 
the inaugural publication of Adatrechtbundel in 1910, twice to three times a month the 
commission visited Yogyakarta’s sub-districts and held question-and-answer sessions 
with all village heads and older koelis from the area. They asked “concrete questions” 
to obtain “specific responses” so that the research could discover adat law in its actual 
implementation, not its ideal prescription. From these sessions Soepomo acquired 
detailed information about land rights inheritance practices among koelis post-
reorganization. 
                                                 
41 Koelis, or coolies, was a specific term used in Central Java for peasants who work the land under 
usufruct rights. There was a distinct hierarchy of koelis, with the koeli kenceng as the highest in rank 
and having the most secure access to land use.  
42 The commission consisted of Soepomo as the rapporteur, the controlleur for agrarian issues, and the 
head of the land registration office, all of whom were Indonesians. 
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At the time of the research in 1929, Soepomo was the chairman of the landraad 
in Yogyakarta. By the time he published the article, he was an official seconded to the 
Department of Justice (Department van Justitie), tasked with researching adat law in 
various regions of Java.43 By then, the progressive spirit inspired by the Ethical Policy 
remained only as a remnant of the past. The Communist rebellion in 1926–1927 had 
soured colonial officials toward progressive efforts to improve the welfare of the 
native population. Conservatism among Binnenlands Bestuur corps had intensified, 
and there was an increased resistance to initiatives that aimed to elevate adat law 
(Doel 1994; Benda 1966). 
Consistent with his 1929 ITR article, Soepomo firmly believed that the 
agrarian reorganization in Yogyakarta and Surakarta necessitated knowledgeable and 
decisive judges in anticipation of conflicts on land claims. Such fundamental changes 
in land ownership structure had caused confusion about what was legal and illegal 
under the new regulations. Many individuals had turned to the landraad in Yogyakarta, 
specifically to Soepomo in his capacity as the chairman, to seek clarification of the 
inheritance law of usufruct right (Soepomo 1931). Lack of clear guidelines from the 
Principalities made things worse, such that “it becomes more important to decide 
whether [particular] rights existed before the reorganization, and if yes, in what way, 
or whether the inheritable land right was thoroughly the same, or if it had changed in 
certain situations” (Soepomo 1931, 1). Judges had to be knowledgeable and decisive, 
Soepomo emphasized, especially because land conflicts had fallen within landraad 
jurisdiction ever since Balemangoe, the Principality’s traditional court for land 
conflicts, had been eliminated, while the Islamic court and the Islamic penghulu 
                                                 
43 Curriculum Vitae of Soepomo in the archive of M. Yamin, ANRI. His tenure resulted in several 
reports on adat law in Central Java (written by M.M. Djojodigoeno and R. Tirtawinata, who were 
Soepomo’s staff at the Landraad in Yogyakarta), and adat private law of West Java and Batavia 
(written by Soepomo himself). 
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(jurist) were not authorized to resolve them. Soepomo made clear that “It is therefore 
the foremost duty of [landraad] to research what the adat law prescribed with respect 
to land inheritance” (1931, 2). With this legal situation in mind, he prepared the report 
to serve “as a guide to resolving disputes concerning land inheritance in Yogyakarta” 
(1931, 2). 
Faithful to his stated objective, Soepomo documented numerous aspects of 
inheritable land use rights before and after the reorganization. He recorded the 
nomenclature of land distribution in its native terms: whether the land was under 
apanage or directly used by the Royal House; whether the apanage land was managed 
using the native system (kedjawenstreken), assigned as land for a bekel’s in-kind 
salary, or leased out to Dutch agricultural estates (ondernemingen); and whether the 
same terms were used for the same land use in the different districts. Soepomo also 
recorded the relationship between patuhs and bekels, the various roles of bekels in 
ensuring stability in and maximizing productivity of their assigned lands, and the 
nomenclature of bekels. He was careful to explain the divisions of land down to the 
smallest unit assigned to koelis, called pekoelen, and the related terms for different 
kind of koelis and their respective obligations and rights. Most importantly, Soepomo 
registered various services (dienst) and forced labor (verplichtingen) that koelis had to 
fulfill in order to maintain the right to use a plot of land, services and forced labor that 
were orders of magnitude heavier if the assigned plot was part of land leased to Dutch 
agricultural estates. 
In the area managed with the native system, koelis were expected to provide 
free labor to the Principality (pegawejan negori) for holiday festivities, and free labor 
to do night watch in the village (pegawejan rondo). In agricultural estates, koelis had 
to satisfy heavier demands: on top of obligatory services for holiday festivities and 
village security, they had to fix roads, dams, and bridges and offered services to the 
 217 
agricultural estates, such as night watch, maintenance of estate facilities, and guarding 
cane fields in sugar plantations, totaling about a hundred days in a year (Pranoto 
1991). Before the reorganization, retaining the right to cultivate land in agricultural 
estates demanded such heavy labor of the koelis that they frequently abandoned their 
assigned land. Soepomo reported this practice before the reorganization: 
In areas where land is leased to Dutch planters, the forced labor was much 
harder than in the land under direct management of the Royal House 
(maossan-dalem) and in areas managed in the native system 
(kedjawènstreken). The krigan or kerig service in the agricultural estates, 
especially, demanded so much of the koelis such that—and it sounds like a 
paradox—the land use right [there] is not particularly desirable for acquisition 
[by koelis]. The abandonment of land by those concerned, because they were 
no longer able to perform the service, was the order of the day. It was 
subsequently the bekel’s task, on the threat of dismissal, to set up a new [koeli] 
over the abandoned land within 40 to 60 days. The agricultural estates were in 
need of labor, after all. One less [koeli] in essence means one less free worker. 
In that sense, for all the trouble he had, the bekel . . . was providing for his 
master. Therefore, in the estate area the [the koeli system] also put the 
emphasis on the performance of services. He who performed the kerig services 
was considered to be the [legitimate] koelis. . . . So unwanted was the land, 
especially paddy fields in the agricultural estate area, that the bekel struggled to 
find someone who was willing, that is to say, who was prepared to receive a 
piece of property and sawah as gifts. (1931, 13) 
Based on this detailed assessment koelis’ heavy workload in agricultural estates under 
the apanage system, it is understandable for Soepomo to conclude that the elimination 
of the apanage system improved the koelis’ welfare. 
Soepomo’s research has shown that despite the fundamental change in 
ownership structure, agrarian reorganization did not transform the system of 
inheritance among peasants.44 The reorganization eliminated only the apanage system 
                                                 
44 According to Soepomo, prior to the agrarian reorganization the principles of inheritance in 
Yogyakarta had a malleable character infused with the spirit of roekoenan, or amicable settlement, 
among survivors of the deceased under the mediation of the bekel. A set of principles guided the 
settlement, which followed one of eight possible scenarios based on the composition of the surviving 
family members, their residential status, and whether land was in a kedjawen or plantation area. The 
eight scenarios are: if it included a widow and grown sons and daughters; if the oldest son already had a 
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and replaced it with a village system. Through the royal decrees of Rb. 1918 No. 16 
(Kasultanan) and Rb. 1918 No. 18 (Pakoealaman), the Yogyakarta Principality broke 
the grip of the apanage system and the demanding service of backbreaking labor. The 
new village system considered the villagers to be “shareholders” of the village 
“corporation.” They acquired allotted village lands distributed by village officials, and 
were entitled to bequeath their use right to their descendants, using the same adat law 
of inheritance applicable during the pre-reorganization period. Soepomo concluded 
that essentially the reorganization had bound ownership of land to the village (1931, 
34). 
Soepomo was consistent in his support of the agrarian reorganization. He 
wrote positively about the protection of the wong cilik granted by the reorganization: 
The essential difference between the situation before and after the 
reorganization is that while before the reorganization inadequate or non-
performance of obligatory services could result in the dismissal of the 
koelischap [koeli system] and might have caused loss of land use rights, after 
the reorganization such negligence would never lead to loss of rights. The 
village corporation (desagemeente) created by the reorganization did not have 
the authority to use koeli’s neglect of duty or other antisocial behavior (e.g. 
committing a crime) as grounds for denying access to land. The only sanction 
against non-performance of services is criminal punishment (imprisonment of 
not more than three days or a fine of not more than six dollars) to be found in 
Rb. 1918 No.19 (Kasoeltanan) and Rb. 1918 No. 22 (Pakoealaman). (1931, 41) 
In this passage one detects the bases of Soepomo’s approval of the 
reorganization. First, in Soepomo’s understanding, the reorganization had drastically 
reduced required labor for the koelis to maintain usufruct right. By putting land tenure 
                                                                                                                                            
pekoelen; if the oldest son was away from the village/kabekelen; if the widow did not have grown 
children; if the widow only had an excluded daughter; if the couple did not have children; if there was 
an adopted son; and if there was neither widow nor children. Soepomo documents these scenarios in 
detail, making careful records of specific rules in the plantation area such as cases of fleeing koelis and 
of refusal of surviving members to continue the deceased’s claim on land. Again he underlines the 
demanding and back-breaking forced labor required to stake a claim for use right in the plantation area 
(1931). 
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under a proper legal framework, the reorganization had theoretically terminated 
arbitrary punishment in cases of koelis’ failure to fulfill the required services and 
forced labor. The reorganization had also provided the koelis with a form of legal 
certainty. Soepomo mentioned a rather interesting argument for the reorganization’s 
positive impact: he remarked how land in the agricultural estates regained their 
attractiveness to koelis, especially because the competing demand for services and 
forced labor by bekels and patuhs was eliminated. This remark has to be read against 
the reaction of the Dutch planters to the idea of reorganization. The planters wanted 
control of rent prices, but were reluctant to support the elimination of the apanage 
system since it guaranteed delivery of free labor (Haspel 1985). Only after being 
convinced that the new system would still guarantee access to labor were they willing 
to go along with the plan. Here, in his capacity as a state agent, Soepomo was 
marketing the benefit of reorganization to planters, that it would be less difficult now 
to get workers to toil the land for them: 
The performance of services is, since the reorganization, no longer an essential 
element in land ownership (see Chapter I, p. 13). Leaving the village does not 
lead to loss of land, unless the person clearly reveals his intention to give up 
his rights to the land . . . These conditions grant legal certainty on his land and 
it is for this reason, and by the fact that his obligations are generally lighter 
than before the reorganization, that to the villagers the land is again a valuable 
and desirable object, and the vanished attachment for the land in the 
agricultural estates during the apanage system era is now fortunately returned. 
(1931, 41) 
Soepomo summed up the article with the following paragraphs: 
On the content of [the inheritance ruling] the law’s impact . . . is very small. 
Rb. 1918 No. 16 (Kasultanan) and Rb. 1918 No. 18 (Pakoealaman) indeed rule 
that the property is inheritable, and call the right on land an “inheritable 
usufruct right,” but how precisely it is inherited is not mentioned in the 
pranatans [the Principality law code] or other pranatans. The [Principality’s] 
lawmakers thus had not understood the existing indigenous tradition. In 
contrast, the reorganization had thoroughly transformed the forms and 
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formality in the observation of the inheritance of land by the abolition of the 
bekel system and the influence of the former bekels in land issues. . . . (1931, 
42) 
Although Soepomo’s detailed account is relatively accurate, it might have 
painted a less complicated picture of the koelis’ condition post reorganization.45 
Numerous contemporary accounts have demonstrated the hardships and difficulties 
koelis still had to undergo after the reorganization (Pranoto 1991; Shiraishi 1990). 
However, I suggest that his thorough documentation of the state of the koelis post 
reorganization is valuable not so much in the presence or absence of “truth” or factual 
correctness as it is in its value as guidelines for colonial judicial staff in dealing with 
land disputes. Not only was Soepomo’s account detailed, but also it was equipped with 
relatively accurate legal references that lent credence to his legal prescriptions. Now 
that his article had carefully documented the adat law on land inheritance as well as 
rulings in the Principalities, landraad chairmen and personnel could return to it as a 
reference for decision making. Others, such as judges, jurists, members of the Indies 
Association of Jurists, law students and general readers of ITR could now understand 
better the adat law system in regulating inheritance of land use rights. The value of 
this documentation cannot be underestimated. In its role as a guideline and repository 
of knowledge on adat law, Soepomo’s article was at once sustaining colonial state 
formation and challenging the rising conservatism that observed everything related to 
acknowledging adat land rights as an unjustifiable project. 
The research and its result in the article was part of a continued attempt to 
investigate and create a native legal tradition parallel to that of the Dutch. At this time 
in the early 1930s, the influence of the Ethicists and the Adat Law scholars in the East 
                                                 
45 There is a wealth of literature on the fate and social conditions of coolies in the Principalities that 
successfully demonstrates the continued social inequality even after the reorganization. See more in 
Shiraishi 1990, Pranoto 1991. For koelis in Java in general, see Elson 1994 and Breman 1978.  
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Indies had declined. Their protégés, now serving in various official posts, were 
increasingly beleaguered by the pressures of conservative Binnenlands Bestuur 
ranking officers (Burns 2004; Doel 1994; Fasseur 1993). In this light, Soepomo’s 
implicit instructions for the landraad chairman in Yogyakarta emerges as an attempt to 
sustain pro wong cilik changes introduced by the agrarian reorganization. 
Soepomo’s 1931 article can easily be dismissed as a routine report of an 
inconspicuous native judge about changes and continuities in the colonial state, or as a 
bureaucratic attempt to gain visibility over the land tenure structure in Yogyakarta. 
Indeed, Soepomo did record the structure of land rights before and after the 
reorganization, detailed the fate of koelis after the introduction of the desa system, and 
documented various forms of inheritance to land use right, all activities that qualify as 
“descriptive legal anthropology” (White 2005). Yet, the situatedness of this article, 
that it was published in a highly respected legal journal considered to be a repository 
of the latest legal discourse in the colony, a legal journal read by practitioners, and 
even law students, signals a much deeper meaning than a mere “descriptive” essay. As 
Soepomo explicitly stated in the beginning of his article, his aim was to provide a 
guideline for judges in Yogyakarta to make legal decisions in an increasingly complex 
legal terrain, especially after the massive transformation introduced by the agrarian 
reorganization. Clearly, his goal was to encourage particular practices and processes 
that project a presence of an authoritative core. Indeed, this article was a part of 
colonial state formation carried out by a native subject. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I interrogate colonial state formation by examining the 
seemingly clear-cut boundary between the state and its native subjects. The chapter 
examines micro processes of colonial state formation, specifically discursive 
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interventions by native scholars cum jurists expressed in academic texts published in 
the Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht. 
One article by Wirjono Prodjodikoro and two by Soepomo invariably 
responded to as well as exercised the symbolic language of stateness. As Roseberry 
proposes, hegemony is “a common discursive framework” whereby discursive means 
serve contradictory interests: as a medium for cognition and control by “the state” on 
the one hand and as an apparatus for contestation by non-state entities on the other. 
The discursive framework built around the idea of adat land rights in the Indies 
diverges from this understanding. Adat land rights never fully became a “common 
discursive framework” despite the apparent victory in the Dutch parliament and the 
rising interest to study adat and adat law after the enactment of St. 1925 No. 447, 
which officially introduced the dual legal system in the colony (Katwijk and Dekker 
1992). Rather, adat land rights became a parallel framework tolerated by the state-
system while the more oppressive framework that favored large access to land by 
agricultural corporations retained its dominance. Many agents within the state-system 
utilized the “parallel discursive framework” of adat land rights, including state agents 
of native origins such as Soepomo and Wirjono Prodjodikoro who deployed it in their 
discursive interventions. 
Analyses of academic texts by Soepomo and Wirjono Prodjodikoro reveal a 
dynamic more ambiguous than the trajectory that would have occurred under strict 
readings of Hansen-Stepputat and Roseberry. As state agents, both Prodjodikoro and 
Soepomo evoked colonial state institutions and the institutions’ utterances that 
strengthened the imagination of the state’s presence and authority. However, they 
differed from each other in the expression of their interventions.  
Despite his position as a landraad chairman, Prodjodikoro did not shy away 
from being critical of the colonial government’s project of subject formation. He uses 
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unambiguous words and terms in his disapproval of the Binnenlands Bestuur’s move 
in defending the Government ruling in St. 1921 No. 566, which classified native 
employees of the Government as Government subjects—depriving Surakarta of its 
sovereignty and tax base. He bemoaned the loss of native judicial institutions such as 
Balemangoe, regretted the intrusion of colonial bureaucrats and administration of 
justice into adat property law (vermogensrecht), and protested van Vollenhoven’s 
limiting construct of debt law (schuldenrecht) as a blanket term for various nuanced 
categories of property in Surakarta’s legal thought world. 
Compared with Prodjodikoro, Soepomo was more ambiguous in his discursive 
intervention. He strengthened the imagination of the colonial state as guarantor of 
rights when he affirmed the role of the landraad as the leading institution for 
researching adat land rights and adat inheritance codes post-reorganization, and as the 
proper judicial institution for resolving land conflicts in Yogyakarta. His support for 
agrarian reorganization reflected his firm belief that a formal legal framework 
benefited the little people in seeking redress should a dispute about land ownership 
take place. His support lent credence to the colonial administration of justice as a 
better option for protecting and securing native rights to land. At the same time, 
however, Soepomo punctured this image of the colonial state when he—among his 
other acts—reinterpreted the Supreme Court’s ruling that negated the evidentiary 
value (bewijskracht) of the Eastern eigendom land register (Indisch eigendomakte). He 
escalated this rupture in his prescription of landraad judges’s role when evaluating 
land registers issued by the Principality’s land register office. 
In their individual ways, Soepomo and Prodjodikoro engaged the colonial 
state’s symbolic language. In their unique position as both colonial state agents and 
native subjects, they deployed the symbolic language of stateness to create legal 
knowledge in their own vision and to extend particular forms of property relations. 
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To demonstrate these interventions, I examined academic articles less as 
representations of truth or factual correctness than as subjective experiences 
strategically situated to amplify the authors’ quiet contestation of the dominant 
narrative. Academic texts offer a window to understand how colonial subjects and 
native intellectuals play their role within a parallel discursive framework, and how 
they at once help sustain and fracture the appearance of “the state.” It is telling that the 
articles were published in an academic journal, one that was peer-reviewed (at least by 
the editors) and addressed to the highly educated elites among European, Foreign 
Oriental, and Native inhabitants of the colony in whom the state’s mythical quality 
was already entrenched. Their imagination of the state and the state’s legal authority 
over the inhabitants was already established, which makes Prodjodikoro’s and 
Soepomo’s attempts even more potent. 
“The state” is a perceived entity continuously in the process of being 
constituted and contested. State formation, thus, is inherently historical. The question 
that emerges now is, what is colonial in colonial state formation? From the discussion 
in this chapter, I propose one element that characterizes colonial state formation: it 
involves practices and processes of legal segregation based on racial classification 
regardless of the intention of the segregation, whether benevolent or otherwise. This 
process includes submission of the native legal thought world under European 
categories by force and by persuasion, even in cases where the legal scholars 
empathized with the plight of the natives. It also includes the submission of the native 
administration of justice into the European system. All of these practices reflect a 
particular form of hegemony. 
Yet, hegemony is never totalizing. Native scholars cum judges have taken 
indispensable roles in colonial state formation through their agency in the state-
system. Their role emerges to be more ambiguous than what had been conventionally 
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assigned to them. Through their discursive intervention, they at once extended and 
contested the force of colonial state formation. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
We, Too, Want Land: 
Indo-Europeans and Their Quest for Land Rights 
The welfare of the Eurasians and the Dutch 
can only be served if instead of racial sentiment, 
considerations of humanity are taken as a basis. 
And Eurasians shall [acquire] full rights to property in this land, 
which has indeed become their country, 
if they let go of their relationship with the Netherlands 
—Agus Salim, in Pemandangan, 
in Indisch Press Overzicht 10 October 1936 
Introduction 
A Eurasian population was a natural consequence of a colonial society like the 
Dutch East Indies, but not all Eurasians were the same. The colonial authorities legally 
recognized a subset of them as European, they call themselves Indo-Europeans.1 
Because of their European legal status, the Alienation Prohibition decreed in St. 1875 
No. 179 applied to them; Indo-Europeans were prohibited from buying land from the 
Native population. This law proved to be a great disadvantage when Indo-Europeans 
could no longer rely on government employment because of competition from 
educated Indonesians and Chinese. When jobs on agricultural plantations became 
scarce after the Great Depression hit the Indies in 1930, Indo-European leaders 
decided that their people’s future lay in small agricultural enterprises. To farm, they 
needed a way to acquire and cultivate land economically. So in 1930 the Indo-
European Association (Indo-Europeesche Vereeniging, IEV) controversially requested 
                                                 
1 In general, literature on Indo-Europeans use the term Eurasians and and Indo-Europeans 
interchangeably. Here I exclusively use the term Indo-European to differentiate this group from 
Eurasians in general. 
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a review of the Alienation Prohibition to allow them certain forms of land ownership, 
a privilege that had been reserved exclusively for the Native population. 
In this chapter I follow the struggle of Indo-Europeans to acquire a form of 
land ownership rights in the Dutch East Indies for housing and livelihood purposes. 
Indo-Europeans claimed they were as much landskinderen (children of the land) as the 
Natives and thus had “an inherent right” to own land. This claim signaled a departure 
from the legally sanctioned identity as Europeans into one that reflected their own 
view of their personhood. The demand outraged many Indonesian leaders and resulted 
in heated debates in the Volksraad and other public fora. Among Indonesians 
themselves, the question of who could claim rights to land struck a chord and 
generated a strong sense of nationhood. 
I argue that in the act of claiming rights to land, Indo-Europeans attempted to 
create an identity separate from the one sanctioned by law, and by doing so, they 
exercised the practices that resulted in isolation and identification effects. At the same 
time, they used both effects as a point of departure and a point of contestation in 
shaping colonial agrarian laws for their benefit. The struggle of Indo-Europeans 
renders visible how subjects and law in late-colonial Indonesia were reciprocally 
constituted, and how the two influenced the evolution of the colonial agrarian regime. 
It illustrates my overarching argument that state effects are instigated not by a 
particular state apparatus, but by series of discursive battles carried out by identifiable 
human agents. It was individuals who, singularly or as part of a wider interconnected 
state system, set into motion isolation and identification effects and rendered the 
illusory state a concrete entity with the authority to arbitrate. 
In tracing the ensuing battles between Indo-Europeans and Indonesian leaders 
in the Volksraad in other fora, I aim to illuminate contestations of colonial practices 
that propagated isolation and identification effects through land entitlement. It is 
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through these effects that the presence of the illusory state was both constituted and 
felt (Trouillot 2001). I deploy isolation and identification effects as conceptual tools to 
avoid the trap of seeking sites of “the state” or forms of encounter with “the state.” I 
refer to isolation effects as “the production of a particular kind of subject as an 
atomized member of a public” and identification effects as “the capacity to develop a 
shared conviction that ‘we are all in the same boat’ and therefore to interpellate 
subjects as homogenous members of various imagined communities” (Trouillot 2001, 
131–132). In both definitions Trouillot avoids assigning an explicit agent that 
represents a central government or a state entity precisely because “the state” is a set 
of processes with no institutional fixity. 
I build my case using archival and printed materials: transcriptions of the 
Volksraad sessions, articles from Indonesian- and Dutch-language newspapers 
published in Indonesia and in the Netherlands, the Indo-European Association’s 
publication, findings of the Spit Commission—the commission tasked to resolve Indo-
European demands for land rights—the archive of the Binnenlands Bestuur from the 
Netherland’s national archive, and the archive of Mohammad Jamin, found in Arsip 
Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI). Juxtaposing arguments and counter arguments 
among the entire spectrum of the colonial society regarding subject classification and 
the designated forms of land rights for each, I call attention to the representation of 
self by the subject itself and to the everyday making of identification and isolation 
effects. 
Indo-Europeans: The Subjects Defined 
The Eurasian population was an integral part of the Indies society. During the 
East Indies Company era, Eurasians made up the majority of the colonizers’ society 
with their own intricate Indisch mestizo culture (Taylor 1983, Bosma and Raben 
 229 
2008). They remained small in number due to a limited influx of Europeans to the 
colony. When the Suez Canal eased travel between the Netherlands and the Indies, 
new immigrants from the metropole resulted in a significant increase of the Eurasian 
population. By 1930, at around 134,000 people, they made up around 56 percent of the 
population classified as Europeans (Veur 1960). Along with the influx of “fresh 
European blood,” the Indisch culture and lifestyle—noted mostly by concubinage—
were frowned upon; the newly arrived Dutch population re-introduced a lifestyle 
morally attuned to that of the Motherland. 
The colonial government introduced racial classification in the colony in 
article 109 of the Regeringsreglement 1854. It differentiated Europeans and those 
assimilated to European status (gelijkgesteld) from the Natives and their equal, which 
included Chinese and Arabs and other Foreign Orientals. Revised in 1906 and enacted 
in 1920,2 the law categorized all populations in the Indies as subjects (onderdanen), 
but granted citizenship (ingezetenen) only to Europeans and those assimilated as 
Europeans. A Eurasian needed only “recognition” by his or her European father to 
become legally European. Eurasians descended from a European woman married to a 
non-European man were ineligible for European status. A non-European woman 
married to a European man would be absorbed into European society regardless of her 
origin and race. 
In late-colonial Dutch East Indies, unrecognized Eurasians would disappear 
from the “civilized” European circle into the Native or Foreign Oriental population, 
losing all privileges that accompanied a European status such as subsidies and 
guaranteed access to European schools. The sense of white-race superiority and the 
widespread condescending attitude towards the natives put the Indo-European 
                                                 
2 It was amended again in 1925 in the Indisch Staatsregeling, a new constitution for the colony that 
replaced the Constitutional Regulation of 1854. 
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community in constant fear of “being lost” in the native society, never to be recovered. 
This “vulnerability” remained the underlying motive for many of Indo-Europeans’ 
political and social maneuvers. 
Racial purity marked the social hierarchy within the Indies’ European society. 
On top of the ladder were European trekkers, Dutch persons who came to the colony 
to work as expatriates and who would return to the Motherland upon retirement. They 
were highly educated and mostly worked in government offices. European blijvers of 
pure blood populated the second place. They included Dutch persons who came to the 
colony to pursue a livelihood and to remain in the Indies. The Ledeboers in chapter 2, 
for example, considered themselves blijvers.3 Indo-Europeans filled the next tier and 
made the largest part of the European blijvers in the colony. As blijvers, Indo-
Europeans were Dutch citizens (ingezetenen) submitted to Dutch legal jurisdiction. 
Blijvers in general had more invested interests in the autonomy of the Dutch East 
Indies. 
Indo-Europeans traditionally relied on government jobs for their livelihood. In 
1930, 47.3 percent of employed Indonesian-born Europeans worked in the civil 
service, the railway and tramway, and the telegraph and telephone services, while 10.4 
percent worked in independent occupations (Veur 1954). Unfortunately, the privileged 
European status did not necessarily translate into a European standard of living. Only 
ten percent of Indonesian-born European wage earners earned more than the estimated 
minimum wage to maintain a European lifestyle (Veur 1954)4. As the availability of 
                                                 
3 From two autochthonous women, Bernard Ledeboers had a son and a daughter who were recognized 
as Europeans. Adriaan Ledeboer married Sophia Julia Borgen, who was born in Makassar, Celebes, and 
was most likely a Eurasian herself. http://www.chabot.demon.nl/genealog/chabot04/333.html last 
accessed March 8, 2012.  
4 Veur set $1200 a year (presumably at the 1960 value, but he did not explain how he came up with the 
number) as a minimum salary on which a family could maintain a European lifestyle. The income 
statistics for 1925 reveal startling information: About 37,500 wage earners, or 45.5 percent of the total 
number of “European” wage earners, earned between $1200 and $800 a year. More than 25,000, or 30.5 
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Western education increased for native elites, the Indo-European community found 
fierce competition for government jobs (Blumberger 1939). The situation hardly 
improved when the Great Depression that hit the Indies in 1930 dried up employment 
on agricultural plantations (Stoler 1985).5 As the 20th century progressed, Indo-
Europeans found themselves increasingly impoverished, exacerbating the fear of 
“becoming native.” This prompted a search for means of livelihood that could sustain 
the lifestyle appropriate to their status. Finally, in 1930 the leaders of the Indo-
European Association IEV decided that small agriculture enterprise (kleine landbouw) 
offered them an opportunity to solve the pauperization problem. But the path to land 
ownership was tortuous. 
Colonial law introduced to the Indies population a new category of persons 
delineated by race and legal identity. One’s legal identity defined one’s entitlement to 
resources, most importantly to land rights. As Europeans, Indo-Europeans were bound 
to rulings for Europeans laid out in agrarian laws, including the prohibition of sale and 
permanent transfer of land from a Native as enacted in the Alienation Prohibition of 
St. 1875 No. 179.6 Tightly controlled mechanisms for exceptions indeed existed with 
severe legal consequences if ignored. The Raad van Indie—the Council of Indies—
issued the mechanism in 1870 in an executive order registered as Bijblad 3020. Non-
Natives were allowed six avenues by which to control land. Ranging in ownership 
intensity, they were eigendom, heritable leasehold right (erfpacht), building right 
(opstal), rent right (huur), use right for business uses (gebruik), and loan right 
                                                                                                                                            
percent, of these wage earners earned between $800 and $400 a year, and more than 13,000, or 15.9 
percent, received less than $400 a year.  
5 Veur (1968) described many causes that gradually pushed the Indo-Europeans down the social ladder 
of Europeans, but the Great Depressions hit them hardest.  
6 Permanent transfer here refers to transferring the land permanently from the Native legal realm into 
Dutch eigendom.  
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(bruikleen). Of the six, Europeans highly coveted the first two because of the near-
absolute status of disposal and the guaranteed security in case of conflicts. 
The European Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) detailed further this access to 
land. Article 570 of the European Civil Code defined eigendom as the right to free 
enjoyment of an object and to dispose of it in the absolute manner pursuant to legal 
regulations. The government strictly controlled this right: only small pieces of land no 
more than 10 bouws (71,000 m2) were allowed for eigendom and only for expanding 
towns and villages or to set up work or industrial establishments. The limited acreage 
practically prevented land under eigendom from being utilized as an agricultural estate 
or from being concentrated into massive landholdings. Article 720 of the Civil Code 
defined leasehold rights (erfpacht) as the rights to full enjoyment of one and other 
claims of immovable goods. This right was to be recognized almost as an eigendom 
following an annual payment, either in cash, products, or yields from the land. The 
government grouped erfpacht rights into three: leasehold rights for large-scale 
plantations, leasehold rights for country estates, and leasehold rights for small-scale 
agriculture (erfpacht voor kleine landbouw). The last was the right that the Indo-
European community tried to change.7  
The government dedicated leasehold rights for small-scale agriculture 
(erfpacht voor klein landbouw) as a safety net for its citizens:8 Only impoverished 
(minvermogend) Europeans and charity organizations were eligible for no more than 
25 and 50 bouws, respectively. The land should be intended strictly for agriculture or 
horticulture, and the tax was set at no more than f 1,- per bouw per year, while 
                                                 
7 Verslag Commissie voor het Grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen, Sumier overzicht, 14, n.d. 
8 This rights was regulated in St. 1904 No. 326, which was amended in St. 1905 No. 153, St. 1908 No. 
263 (the regulations Bernard Ledeboer referred to when acquiring a land lease in Banjoewangi), St. 
1923 No. 358, St. 1924 No. 578, St. 1925 No. 144 and 433, and St. 1926 No. 376 (Verslag Commissie 
voor het Grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen, Sumier Overzicht, 16, n.d.). 
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administrative costs and other expenses to issue the certificate could be exempted in 
special cases of need. Further, a holder could keep the land for a maximum of twenty-
five years and could mortgage it for loans. With this generosity came strict 
requirements. The rights to the leasehold expired if the leaseholder carried over the 
rights after the end of its term without permission from the regional government; if the 
land was divided due to death or other reasons, including putting the land on a 
sharecropping agreement with the Native; and if the leaseholder failed to fulfill 
obligations to the government.9 The leasehold for small-scale agriculture was actually 
quite generous in providing an alternative livelihood for impoverished Europeans, yet 
the IEV found their members unable to cope with the allegedly exorbitant costs to 
acquire this right and with the strict regulations they were to follow. 
IEV and the Desire for Land 
The Indo-European Association (Indo-Europeesch Verbond, IEV) was founded 
in 1919 as a reaction to increasing competition for jobs (Blumberger 1939).10 It aimed 
to advance the moral, social, intellectual, and economic development of the Indo-
Europeans in the Dutch East Indies, whom it defined as: 
a. All residents in the Dutch East Indies, of Indies-born [pure-blooded] 
Europeans or Eurasians, and their descendants; 
b. All residents of the Dutch East Indies of European blood, who have children 
born in the Dutch East Indies, or [Europeans] married to individuals who are 
Indo-European according to point (a). (Blumberger 1939, 51) 
                                                 
9 Verslag Commissie voor het Grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen, Sumier Overzicht, 17, n.d. 
10 IEV was not the first initiative at civic organizing by an Indo-European. In 1912, Douwes Dekker 
initiated Indische Partij—later transformed into Nationaal-Indische Partij/Sarekat Hindia—with Dr. 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo and Soewardi Soerjaningrat and inspired by revolutionary-nationalist 
sentiment. It did not attract interest from mainstream Indo-Europeans. For a succinct account of other 
initiatives by Indo-Europeans, see Blumberger 1939.  
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This all-inclusive definition made eligible for membership any Europeans with the 
slightest connection to Indo-Europeans, or Europeans who were long-term Indies 
residents with children born in the colony. In special circumstances the executive 
board could waive membership requirements where deemed necessary. Although 
claiming to be a neutral organization, IEV stood against any initiative that threatened 
the interests of its members. It also opposed any violent acts against the Dutch 
authorities, practically putting it squarely against “extremist” organizations, by which 
it meant left-leaning organizations ran by Dutch trekkers and blijvers (Blumberger 
1939). In Indies’s political spectrum, IEV leaned to the right. 
Although the founders claimed they had no intention of steering IEV into a 
political party, by a twist of fate IEV entered the Volksraad in 1921. With members 
and chapters growing fast—10,000 members and 60 chapters by 1924—IEV gained 
six seats in the Volksraad by 1930, the most of any party.11 Unfortunately they 
wielded little influence. IEV’s political objective to create a united front for all 
Europeans received only a lukewarm response from full-blooded Europeans, who 
suspected IEV’s aspiration to ascend the colonial society ladder on their backs (Kroef 
1953). 
The years leading up to 1930 were marked by very active movements among 
Indies’ political activists. The Communists seceded from Sarekat Islam after years of 
infiltration, set up the peasant-based organization Sarekat Rakjat, and moved on to 
take over control of trade and labor unions. In 1926, they staged a rebellion that was 
                                                 
11 The establishment of IEV established a new history in the political life of the Dutch East Indies. 
When they joined the Volksraad, there were already a handful of political parties populating the 
Council, such as the Dutch Indian Liberal Federation (established late 1916), the Indian Social 
Democratic Party (September 1917), the Christian-Ethical Party (September 1917; by end of 1930 
renamed the Christian Political Party), the Indies Catholic Party (November 1918), and the Political and 
Economic Association (January 1919). But these parties focused on promoting the interests of the 
Dutch East Indies in general, and not so much on the special interests of the Indo-European population 
(Blumberger 1939). 
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easily crushed by the government. Shaken by the first large-scale rebellion, the 
colonial government adopted harsh tactics in controlling political activities in the 
Indies and among members of Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI)—the Indies student 
organization—in the Netherlands. In 1927, returnee members of PI established Partai 
Nasional Indonesia (PNI) under the chairmanship of Ir. (Ingenieur) Soekarno. Among 
key members of the party was Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, and 
Mr. Soenario. The party aimed for complete independence for Indonesia and decided 
to adopt a “non-cooperative” stance vis-à-vis the colonial government. PNI grew 
exponentially and became a very powerful nationalist organization in the Indies. 
Worried by nationalist sentiment gaining steam, the government arrested PNI leaders 
in 1929, put them on trial, and sentenced them to several years’ imprisonment. Some 
were sent to remote areas of the Indies. A year before, students and ethnic-based youth 
organizations held a “Youth Congress” that resulted in a proclamation of nationhood 
unified by one nation, one language, and one homeland: Indonesia. These movements 
were only marks of wider activism in the Indies that raised a strong sense of awareness 
of “imagined community” among the Native population. People began addressing 
themselves as “Indonesian” and adopted the identity of being Indonesian. Then the 
Great Depression happened. 
The Great Depression hit the Indies in 1930, leading to a scarcity of jobs for 
Indo-Europeans. Increasingly desperate, IEV pushed for farming opportunity for its 
members and made its splash in the Volksraad. On July 18, 1930, N. Beets, an IEV 
representative in the Volksraad, gave a long, passionate speech about the fate of the 
impoverished Indo-Europeans caused by the Great Depression (Volksraad 
Handelingen 1929/1930, 319). He narrated a story of an Aceh war veteran who 
attempted to cultivate a small plot of leasehold land (kleine landbouw erfpacht) to 
support his Native wife and five children. Starting in 1921, this man’s leasehold was 
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slightly under 10 bouws. He planted the land with 4500 kapok saplings, 200 vanilla 
orchids, 2 bouws of feed grass, 1 bouws of cassava, and 2.5 bouws of paddy fields. As 
a small farmer with leasehold rights, he was eligible for a line of credit, from which he 
withdrew 2000 guilders to help pay for the cultivation. Illness and the pressure to 
supplement his income forced the man to be away from his land to find work, leaving 
the land in the care of his Native mother-in-law and his young family. While working 
as a supervisor to lay rail tracks in Aceh, the man received a letter in October 1927 
terminating his leasehold. The government accused him of putting the land under a 
sharecropping arrangement with a native, an arrangement prohibited for the leasehold 
and a cause for lease termination. The government rejected his proposal to pay back 
his debt after the land brought some yields, and in March of 1930, ordered him to pay 
back his loan. When he finally managed to extricate himself from the work in Aceh 
and returned to recover the land from his mother-in-law, he found that the land had 
already been auctioned off and that the new Native owner, the local village head, had 
put it into a sharecropping arrangement with ten native workers. All his hard work—
kapok trees, paddy fields, cassava fields, and vanilla orchids—had disappeared. The 
enthusiastic attempt to settle as a farmer was deflated by the government’s rulings 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1930/1931, 319–320). 
Beets narrated this story as an illustration of the difficulty Indo-Europeans 
faced in managing a small leasehold farm. The conditions for heritable leaseholds for 
small farms were too prohibitive for most Indo-Europeans. Few had any experience in 
farming, and there were few avenues to gain experience. The prohibition on 
sharecropping arrangements with the native population limited their survival strategy, 
especially when they were starting to learn how to run a farm while juggling other 
employment to supplement a meager income. The twenty-five-bouw limit for small 
farms was too small to allow for a profitable enterprise. If only Indo-Europeans could 
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own land and work it with no limitations like Native landholders, the potential of 
small agriculture leaseholds could be unleashed. With this reasoning, IEV argued for 
relaxing the regulations. 
Beets claimed that Indo-Europeans were entitled to certain rights to land in the 
colony because they were landskinderen, children of the land. Considering that 
numerous government positions long reserved for Indo-Europeans were made 
available to Indonesians, it was simply fair for them to benefit from the land, just as 
Indonesians did. Beets assured other members of the Volksraad that there was no 
threat posed by Indo-Europeans to Native farmers if they gained access to land, not 
only because they were small in number, but also because they lacked large amounts 
of capital. IEV’s request for a form of land rights was mainly aimed at providing its 
members with a decent livelihood. If their request was granted, Indo-Europeans as a 
community were committed to respecting Native land rights and would continue to 
carry out obligations imposed on landholders as prescribed by native adat rulings 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1930/1931, 320). 
Beets also asked for the removal of “being impoverished” as a condition for 
acquiring a small farm leasehold, particularly for Indo-Europeans. He proposed that 
the government withdraw the Alienation Prohibition (Volksraad Handelingen 
1930/1931, 320), a very pillar of the colonial agrarian laws. A very bold suggestion, if 
approved, the new ruling would radically alter the racially structured agrarian law and 
regulations. To temper its demand, IEV proposed that only Indo-Europeans born in the 
colony be allowed to have ownership rights. He pleaded for Native members of the 
Volksraad to be sympathetic to the plight of Indo-Europeans. 
In summary, IEV expressed their demand for land rights in three specific 
requests: first, they requested a form of land rights for housing and livelihood for their 
members. Although they were yet to specify what the form would be, they indicated 
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that they wanted a freedom similar to that of Native landholders, who could farm out 
their land in a sharecropping scheme. Second, they asked that the condition of 
leasehold for small farms be relaxed, allowing Indo-Europeans to access rights 
regardless of their economic status. Finally, they asked for the cancellation of the 
Alienation Prohibition. 
The director of the Binnenlands Bestuur, F.H. Muhlenfeld, was skeptical of 
Beets’s and IEV’s motives. In a surprisingly explicit manner, he accused IEV ‘s 
proposal of seeking to skirt the sharecropping prohibition for small-agriculture 
leaseholders. If the Indo-Europeans acquired the right to land in forms they proposed, 
they would no longer need to adhere to such rulings. The government could not 
concede to this demand because “sharecropping was in many cases the most 
advantageous method of exploitation for a landowner, often to the detriment of the 
sharecropper and the public interest” (Volksraad Handelingen 1930/1931, 1275). This 
response portrayed the government as an impartial arbiter: it was committed to 
protecting the Native population from being deprived of its land rights and for being 
abused in sharecropping arrangements. The image was further burnished when, 
despite his sharp rebuke and to the surprise of many Volksraad members, Muhlenfeld 
agreed to set up a commission that would look into IEV’s demand. 
The debate in the Volksraad scarcely escaped public scrutiny. Within a couple 
of days a comment appeared in a Malay-speaking newspaper, Revue Politik. The 
author, a man named Tabrani, empathized with the Indo-Europeans’ plight and 
personally had no objections to their request. However, he rejected this request for 
land rights if and for as long as Indo-Europeans considered themselves part of the 
Dutch population, preferring to remain strangers to Indonesians: 
Their request for land rights is logical, but more logical is our duty to reject the 
request, as long as the Indos consider themselves strangers, and so for us [they 
are]. If they are willing to become Indonesian citizens (staatburgers), then we 
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are obliged to put their claims into serious consideration. These land rights are 
key to our existence and our prosperity. Watch that those rights are not 
transferred to foreign hands! (Revue Politik, in Overzicht van de Inlandsche en 
Maleisch-Chineesch Pers, henceforth IPO, August 23, 1930, 341) 
In this essay Tabrani invited Indo-Europeans to become “Indonesian citizens,” 
to be no longer “strangers to us.” Wanting to have a slice of the land as landskinderen 
but rejecting membership of the larger extended family of cousins, Indo-Europeans 
only prodded Indonesians to respond to “the call of duty” to defend their rights from 
being wrested away by “foreigners.” This essay marked the beginning of a tug of war 
between Indo-Europeans and their Indonesian cousins. The former insisted on the 
“same but different” position, presenting itself as belonging to an identity that many 
Indonesians found politically unacceptable. 
Gradually Indonesians became aware of the Indo-Europeans’ demand and 
began to express their views in the press. One reaction expressed incredulousness that 
Indo-Europeans seemed to think the other racial groups in the colony would simply sit 
back in response to such demand. The author was also skeptical of Indo-Europeans’ 
zest for farming (Swara Publik, in IPO February 14, 1931). Another predicted that the 
issue of Native land rights, well discussed in the progressive Indies bulletin De Stuw 
and in the IEV bulletin Onze Stem, would continue to grip the East Indies (Pewarta 
Surabaya, in IPO April 24, 1931). 
Despite dissenting Indonesian public opinion, on June 15, 1931, the 
government set up a commission tasked with inquiring after IEV’s request, named the 
Commission for the Land Rights of Indo-Europeans (De Commissie voor het 
grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen), popularly known as Commissie Spit after its 
chairman, H.J. Spit.12 Its members consisted solely of pureblooded Dutch men.13 The 
                                                 
12 Spit graduated with a doctoral degree from Leiden University in 1911, under the tutelage of Cornelis 
van Vollenhoven. He came to the East Indies the year after. As a trekker, he had a stellar career in the 
Department of justice, serving as landraad chairman and then secretary of the department. He served in 
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Commission was to answer the question “whether in accordance with the current 
principles of agricultural policy and the social position of Indo-Europeans it will be 
possible and desirable to make additional provisions relating to land for these 
population group, and if yes, what.”14 
The government’s move to establish this commission upset many Indonesians. 
Shortly after the announcement, Boedi Oetomo, the Javanese nationalist organization, 
published an article about the risk of a Pandora’s box: if the Indo-Europeans’ request 
was approved, Chinese and Arabs would also demand the very same right, threatening 
the already precarious land possessions among the Native population. Boedi Oetomo 
pointed out that the government had already constrained Indonesian options in 
commodity agriculture. Indonesians may plant sugarcane, but could neither establish 
sugar factories with machines of more than 10 horsepower nor attain land area of 
greater than twenty-five bouws. “Therefore we will,” wrote the author, “not let our 
land be divided in this way by foreigners” (Boedi Oetomo, in IPO August 22, 1931, 
347). 
As soon as the Volksraad began its 1931/1932 session, a number of its 
members expressed their dismay, including Mohammad Thamrin, an esteemed 
member from Batavia and a key figure in the Nationalist Faction in the Volksraad. 
Empathizing with the Indo-Europeans’ need for an alternative source of livelihood and 
right to land, Thamrin was nevertheless skeptical about its practicality. He underlined 
the racial divide between European and non-European that complicated the matter, 
                                                                                                                                            
various commissions in the department, the most famous being the Commission for the Land Rights of 
Indo-Europeans. http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/lemmata/bwn2/spit last accessed 
March 4th, 2012.  
13 Among the members who served at different times were Dr. J.W. Meyer Ranneft; J.C. de Vos, a 
resident assisted to the Governor of West Java; Prof. Dr. R.D. Kollewijn, a professor at the Batavia 
College of Law; Dr. J.W. de Stoppelaar, Dr. W. Hoven (The Spit Commission, nd). 
14 Verslag Commissie voor het Grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen, Deel 3, Eindconclusies, nd  
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stressing that the right of allocation (beschikkingsrecht) attributed to the Native 
population was a moral and natural right. It was a right inherent in the very nature of 
the Natives’ indigeneity; it was not a privilege granted by the government. Thamrin 
tried to set the record straight: 
However, in the course of centuries this right of disposal was repeatedly and 
heavily questioned, the fiercest by the so-called domain declaration of the 
government, which, according to Professor van Vollenhoven, is the biggest 
injustice imposed upon the native population in the present time. Although the 
people’s right has been repeatedly assaulted, the disposal-, use-, occupy- and 
cultivation-rights to a certain extent continue to subsist, albeit modestly and 
under aggravated circumstances. Due to the domain declaration, it has become 
possible to satisfy other populations’ hunger for land, fulfilled by the 
establishing and granting of other [forms of] rights to non-Native groups, such 
as property rights (eigendomsrechten), leasehold rights (erfpachtsrechten), 
agrarian rights (agrarische rechten) and rights to the small agricultural land 
(kleinen landbouw erfpachtsrechten). Through these other [forms] of rights 
thus the special position of the Natives as legitimate and genuine owners, as 
indigenous people, hence the exclusive owners of land in the course of time, 
has been put to an end, so that of the many forms of rights that used to belong 
to indigenous population, what remains is only the heritable individual lease 
rights (erfelijk individueele bezitsrecht), essentially no more than a right to 
occupy, and which when compared with the previous forms of rights, imposed 
very onerous stipulations. I hereby once again underline that the moral and 
natural right to land for a population group is a consequence of being 
indigenous. (Volksraad Handelingen 1931/1932, 807–808, emphasis added) 
In this speech, Thamrin deflated the government’s discourse that projected 
rights to land as a right granted by an entity of a state to its subjects. Instead, Thamrin 
pointed out that rights to land was a natural and moral right inherent in the personhood 
of a Native subject. The government claim in Domain Declaration muddied the fact of 
who the real owner of land was in the colony. 
Further in his speech, Thamrin questioned IEV’s all-inclusive definition of 
“Indo-Europeans” and challenged them to clarify the eligibility to be Indo-European in 
the case of land rights. The current definition practically made eligible as members 
full-blooded Europeans with the flimsiest connection to a Native or Indo-European. 
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Such a loose definition could easily be abused by Europeans to acquire land 
ownership. Thamrin’s rejection of Indo-Europeans’ claim was based not only on the 
racial boundary but also on the practicality of implementing the rights. He said, 
I recognize indeed, as I have said, that rights to land is a certain moral right for 
those who were born here as part of the indigenous population, but the 
question is whether that process is practical. What is essentially the case? The 
Indo-European group is constitutionally classified under Europeans, and 
although one would be categorized as Indo-European based on having been 
born here and be granted a certain right to land, the fact that the Indo-European 
group is constitutionally not separated from the European group meant 
granting land rights to the Indo-European could also result in granting land 
rights to Europeans and those equated with them. The consequences of this for 
our group are unacceptable because of the limited land availability in Java and 
the great increase in the Native population, as the last census demonstrates. 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1931/1932, 810) 
The fluidity of legal identity between Indo-Europeans and Europeans was 
worrisome to Indonesian leaders. If approved, what was the exclusive privilege of the 
Native population would be accessible to others, and would deprive many Indonesians 
of their rightful claim. To Indonesian leaders and intellectuals, not only did claiming 
both privileges exude greed, but it also exuded betrayal to Indonesians’ struggle to 
gain a stronger footing in the colonial society. 
Thamrin continued, 
Certainly there is a part of the IEV group who feels like a child of the land and 
a certain theoretical entitlement to the nation’s land (nationalen bodem), but as 
long the group identifies itself, or is identified with other groups [full-blooded 
Dutch], which theoretically cannot assert this right, it means a surrender of this 
right. For a genuine children of the land, it is inexcusable. A defensive attitude 
on our part in this matter should not be attributed to a non-sympathetic attitude 
toward the IEV, but should rather be seen as self-defense. (Volksraad 
Handelingen 1931/1932, 810) 
All along the debate for Indo-European land rights, the colonial government 
remained a passive actor and continued to portray itself as an impartial arbiter. 
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Muhlenfeld, the director of Binnenlands Bestuur, said that the members of the Spit 
Commission were independent and open-minded individuals who held no stakes in 
their future decision on land rights. And the reason the government had to establish 
this commission was that “the executive body cannot revoke the rights of the 
indigenous population,” addressing the Indo-Europeans of the supremacy of law on 
this fundamental rights of the Natives. It also addressed the concerns of the Indonesian 
leaders, expecting them not to speculate about what position it would take. The 
government trusted the Spit Commission to be neutral and unbiased in its deliberation 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1931/1932, 1076). 
The Spit Commission 
The Indo-European demand for land rights put the colonial government in an 
awkward position. On the one hand, they needed to demonstrate sympathy with the 
plight of the Indo-Europeans; on the other hand, allowing IEV to acquire what had 
been a privilege of the Native population would open a flood of demands from the 
Chinese and Arab populations. A confrontation with peasants in Surakarta Principality 
caused by a land rights issue was still fresh in the government’s memory (Shiraisihi 
1990). At the same time, the Native population’s nerves were still raw from the 
capture and exile of the Indonesian nationalist leaders Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir. 
Another flare-up with an explosive racial element was the last thing the government 
needed in a time of tension and vigilance. Consequently, the colonial government had 
an interest in maintaining an impression of impartiality and fairness in this struggle, 
and the Spit Commission understood this urgency. 
Quite surprisingly, the Spit Commission carried out its inquiry in an open and 
relatively participatory manner. It held meetings with Governors, Dutch Residents, 
and Native Regents; carried out listening sessions with agricultural and forestry 
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officials from Java and Madura;15 sent surveys to Binnenlands Bestuur officials and 
regional heads of the Outer Islands and to European leaseholders of small farmers in 
the Indies.16 Most interestingly, it advertised in numerous newspapers a call for 
feedback from the general public and civil associations.17 In the first round of inquiry, 
European and Native officials aired their skepticism about the feasibility of the Indo-
Europeans’ demand. Dutch Residents and Native Regents in West Java rejected IEV’s 
request in light of the social and political tension in the region.18 The listening sessions 
held with agricultural and forestry officials from Java and Madura resulted in the same 
sentiment. The voices of the European leaseholders of small farms, however, were not 
shared with the public, although the Committee received 320 surveys back from 500 
sent out, enough to draw a conclusion.19 
Responses from Indonesians came in stages. The earlier ones arrived from the 
West Coast of Sumatra, where several women’s associations, responding to the 
Commission’s invitation, held public meetings in Padang and Padang Pandjang. The 
meetings passed motions from voting members to reject IEV’s demand (Bintang 
Timoer, in IPO October 31, 1931). The reaction from Java came slower than from 
                                                 
15 Anonymous, “Grondrechten voor Indo-Europeanen,” Het Vaderland, November 19, 1931, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010013830%3Ampeg21%3Ap010%3Aa0211 
(accessed March 18, 2012). 
16 Anonymous, “Gronrechten voor Europeanen: Overvloed van Studie-materiaal,” Sumatra Post, 
September 29, 1932, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010361722%3Ampeg21%3Ap005%3Aa0074 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
17 Anonymous, “Grondrechten voor Indo-Europeanen,” Het Vaderland, November 30, 1931 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010013848%3Ampeg21%3Ap010%3Aa0257 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
18 Anonymous, “Grondrechten voor Indo-Europeanen,” Het Vaderland, November 30, 1931 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010013848%3Ampeg21%3Ap010%3Aa0257 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
19 Anonymous, “Grondrechten voor Europeanen,” Het Vaderland, October 24, 1932, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010014402%3Ampeg21%3Ap008%3Aa0203 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
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West Sumatra considering the distance from Batavia, because numerous nationalist 
and native organizations in Java followed the position of the Union of Political 
Associations of the Indonesian People (Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik 
Kebangsaan Indonesia, PPPKI), which had principally objected to the formation of 
the Spit Commission (Bintang Timoer, in IPO October 31, 1931).20 Individual 
responses began to trickle in during October of the same year. An essay in 
Darmokondo, the official publication of Boedi Oetomo, stated that the request from 
the Indo-Europeans sounded like a death knell for Indonesians, as land was a matter of 
life and death to them. The author urged for a united front among Indonesians to 
protest against this request. Echoing Thamrin, he demanded an unambiguous 
definition of “Indo-European,” and he urged the press and Indonesian associations to 
carry out the task (Darmokondo, in IPO November 7, 1931). Undoubtedly, the Spit 
Commission’s encouragement to the Indies population to voice their opinion sparked 
debates in public fora and in many associations’ and organizations’ meetings. 
Indonesian, Dutch, and Chinese newspapers21widely reported these conversations. 
Political organizations and their youth wings, independent women’s association, and 
religious and civic organizations held discussions and voted on positions. 
Responses continued to flood in during the next four years until the Spit 
Commission announced its summary of findings in 1935. Although the general 
reactions from Indonesians were negative, there were nuances in the responses, 
ranging from resentment to mild empathy, that reflected the ambiguous relationship 
between the Native population and their Indo-European cousins. 
                                                 
20 Anonymous, “Grondrechten voor Indo-Europeanen,” Het Vaderland, November 30, 1931 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010013848%3Ampeg21%3Ap010%3Aa0257 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
21 In fact, many Chinese newspapers are published in tandem with Indonesian ones, such as the 
influential Sin Tit Po, but my language limitation prevented me from accessing them.  
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General resentment of IEV’s demand was widespread among Indonesians 
because Indo-Europeans already enjoyed generous benefits from the government. 
Further demand for the right to own was seen as a sinister attempt to take over what 
was traditionally the exclusive right of the Native population. Weak though it might be 
when compared with the Dutch eigendom right, the Native land rights and property 
regime nevertheless had withstood various assaults by the colonizers, as Thamrin 
described in the Volksraad debate. Land was the only asset most Indonesians could 
own, whereas Indo-Europeans enjoyed enviable benefits from the government. An 
article in Swara Katholiek, an official publication of Indonesian Catholics, described 
the generous assistance enjoyed by “impoverished Indo-Europeans.” Indo-Europeans 
were allowed to lease small parcel of lands for agriculture (kleine landbouw 
erfpachtsrecht) up to 25 bouws at an extremely low rent of 10 cents per bouw per 
year, a figure unimaginable for impoverished Indonesians. The author pointed out an 
example in the Djember area of East Java. For pauperized Europeans, the government 
exempted tax. Further, their children were free to attend European schools, a privilege 
highly coveted by all population groups. If living in a village, they were exempted 
from obligatory village services without being deprived of the full benefit of services 
provided by the village. Not a few of this leasehold rights were managed under 
sharecropping arrangements with local natives (Swara Katholiek, in IPO March 17, 
1934). These generous benefits did not escape Indonesians’ attention. 
Seeing the demand mainly as greed and not as a means for survival, 
Indonesians rejected it. Chapters of the Catholic Youth Organization, PPKD, in Blitar 
and Magelang rejected the idea of granting land rights to Indo-Europeans, arguing it 
would disrupt the economic, social, and political stability of the Native population 
(Swara Tama, in IPO February 13, 1932). For many Indo-Europeans, this rejection 
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was unexpected and disappointing, because the Catholic community in the Indies 
counted numerous Indo-European as its members. 
Although many voiced strong rejection, not a few Indonesians expressed a 
more nuanced outlook on the case. An essay published in a North Sumatra newspaper 
empathized with the plight of Indo-Europeans. The author claimed to have nothing 
against their request for land rights, but Indo-Europeans’ vehement identification with 
the Dutch had offended his sensibility. To make their demand for land rights 
legitimate, the author invited Indo-Europeans to identify themselves as one of many 
ethnic groups of the Indies and to become an official part of “Indonesia” (Lentera, in 
IPO November 7, 1931). An author identified as “Hercules” shared a similar sentiment 
in Swara Katholiek. He claimed he had no objection if Indo-Europeans gained some 
form of land rights as long as they were equated with Indonesians in their legal status. 
He demanded that they co-operate with the nationalist front to fight for Indonesian 
independence (Swara Katholiek, in IPO January 30, 1932). Yet another author in the 
same newspaper pointed out the importance of the land question in the context of race 
relations. Indo-Europeans belong to the “Masters” (overheerschers), and they must be 
consistent with their decision with all its consequences (Swara Katholiek, in IPO 
February 13, 1932).22 An article in Pewarta Deli echoed this position. The author 
would approve Indo-Europeans’ demands if they share the same obligations imposed 
on Indonesians. The author urged the “real landskinderen” to vigorously defend their 
rights, which had already been acknowledged by law (in IPO October 15, 1932). 
The series of responses by Indonesians reflected a continuous calling to Indo-
Europeans to identify with Indonesians, to become “one of us,” implying the former’s 
                                                 
22 Indo-Europeans and their Dutch supporters were understandably disappointed by the position of the 
Indonesian Catholic and Christian, as expressed by de heer Ruiter, a member of the central committee 
of the Christian Staatkundige Partij, known to be a center-right party, who said that it was a pity to find 
that the question of the Indo-Europeans’ plight for land rights was not amplified by the Indonesian 
Christians. 
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eagerness to share the identity, yet IEV leaders stubbornly insisted on keeping the 
group a part of the European population. In the IEV congress in 1934, Chairman De 
Hoog restated IEV’s commitment to the Nederlanders: “Indo’s Nederlanders zijn en 
willen blijven”—Indo-Europeans are Dutch and will remain so. Such defiance 
attracted mocking responses. An essay by an Indonesian author acknowledged that 
IEV’s position was understandable as there were no better alternative: “Today, the 
Dutch have the power, and to rally to the side of the party in power is a very safe bet”; 
nevertheless, “the question for Indo-Europeans was whether the full-blooded, purebred 
Dutch-trekkers recognized them as 100% Dutch as the name ‘Indo’ itself signified a 
difference with ‘European’ (Pemandangan, in IPO April 7, 1934, 205). The author 
alleged that De Hoogs’s position was not necessarily shared by poor Indo-Europeans, 
and he urged the latter to take note of IEV leaders’ declaration.  
In questioning the law, Indo-Europeans attempted to remake their identity as 
Europeans who—in contrast to agrarian laws—had a legitimate claim to land due to 
their blood ties to the colony. Being prevented from owning land and having an anchor 
in the Indies was for Indo-Europeans an existentialist threat, since most of them had 
not stepped on the Netherlands soil and knew only the Indies as their home. Being 
“European” in the strictest legal sense of the term isolated them from the wider 
spectrum of their perceived real identity, and they waged this struggle to wriggle out 
of the state’s isolation effect. On the surface, their struggle for land did project strong 
economical motives, but on a deeper scrutiny it was also an attempt to reject the rigid 
identity imposed on them and to redefine it on their own terms. In turn, Indonesians 
appeared to have sensed this deeper search, but instead of entertaining IEV’s proposal 
to be acknowledged as both landskinderen and Europeans, Indonesians called upon 
them to identify fully with the nation. There was indeed a chorus of invitation to Indo-
Europeans to identify with the “poorer cousins” whose plight was even more desperate 
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than theirs. Indo-Europeans’ insistence on being the “Other” was deemed the key deal 
breaker in sharing the rights to land. Understandably, it stoked Indonesians’ 
resentment. 
Identity, thus, was not a one-way trajectory. For an identity to establish, it 
required sanctions not only by a set of state institutions, but also by fellow social 
actors. In this case, Indo-Europeans’ proposed “new” identity hinged on the approval 
of the Indonesian population, albeit implicitly. There was an intriguing sense of 
confidence among Indonesians that their unwillingness to share land rights with Indo-
Europeans would be warranted by the colonial government, not so much out of the 
latter’s sympathy with Indonesians’ plight as out of loyalty to their symbolic language 
of legal cultures. Thamrin, for example, in his defense of Native land rights, 
interpellated the concept of natural and moral rights and the underlying principle of 
colonial agrarian laws to cajole the government not to deprive Native population of 
their rightful claim to land. Naturally, it was a flimsy claim upon the colonial 
administrators, yet strong enough to be played against them if they were to hold intact 
other colonial structures legitimized by legal languages. IEV themselves felt insecure 
of the government’s support. At IEV 15th congress, the chairman De Hoog lamented 
the government’s treatment of Indo-Europeans as worse when compared with 
Indonesian “extremists.” Identity in colonial conditions defined entitlement to 
resources, and naturally there were always struggles among social actors to claim an 
identity that brought about the most benefits. But it was not a straightforward event 
decided by a single state-centered entity. 
If Indonesian-language newspapers focused on reporting Indonesian reactions, 
the Dutch-language newspapers in the East Indies and in the Netherlands appeared 
distant: they limited their reports on the factual progress of the Spit Commission’s 
work. They relayed news from Batavia when the Commission made clear they would 
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not abandon the Alienation Prohibition, which signaled what could be expected in the 
Commission’s future recommendation.23 They applauded the Commission’s legal brief 
publication that explained principles of the Agrarian Law and its derivative rules and 
regulations, which defined forms of land rights available to Europeans.24 Other than 
these polite responses, Dutch-language newspapers kept their distance from the 
debate. 
The Spit Commission Summary Findings 
After a three-year delay, the Commission finally announced a summary of its 
findings in February 1935.25 The Commission understood they needed to break the 
status quo. They acknowledged the Indo-Europeans’ desire to be connected to the 
Indies, which was to be represented symbolically by ownership to land, and to acquire 
land rights for housing and economic livelihood. At the same time, they understood 
the objection to such a demand, that the unlimited possibility of acquiring land rights 
by non-Natives posed the danger of Natives’ dispossession. It would very likely 
disrupt practices of adat law that intimately interwove land rights to socio-cultural 
relations. The Spit Commission designed their recommendations based on four 
principles: 1) There was a real need for an economical means for impoverished Indo-
Europeans to acquire land for housing and livelihood opportunities; 2) an 
accommodation of this need was desperately needed for social and political reasons; 
3) the interests of the Native population had to be protected, taking full account of adat 
                                                 
23 Verslag Commissie voor het Grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen, n.d. 
24 Anonymous, “Grondrechten voor Europeanen,” Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlands Indies, 
April 16, 1934, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010230075%3Ampeg21%3Ap001%3Aa0012 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
25 The full final report came out only in mid-1936. It consisted of three sections with a summary 
overview of the agrarian regulation (wetgeving) and ten appendices.  
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laws and economic and political concerns connected to any accommodation to the 
Indo-European demands; and 4) lifting the Alienation Prohibition was “absolutely out 
of the question,”26 and this prohibition in principal had to be preserved in the Agrarian 
Regime. Thus, any solutions including acquisition of land for Indo-European 
agricultural purposes, “should be found strictly within the limits given by adat law and 
economic consideration.”27  
The Commission tried their very best to accommodate both needs as reflected 
in their recommendation. Based on the principles, the Commission quashed the 
allegation that Indo-Europeans were unqualified to initiate small and medium-sized 
agricultural enterprises, a notion widely spread among skeptics. However, it warned 
against future legal provisions being redacted to encourage an artificial peasantry; 
instead, legislative provisions should be designed to enable Indo-European blijvers to 
actually own land so that they could engage in small or medium-scale farming. 
Moreover, the Commission clarified that their conclusions should apply not only to 
Indo-Europeans blijvers, but also to full-blooded European blijvers of Dutch 
nationality. 
With the principles established as a guideline, the Spit Commission specified 
five recommendations to the government in response to the Indo-Europeans’ three 
requests28: providing land for housing and work opportunities; providing land or 
agricultural purposes; establishing small leasehold regulations (kleine erfpacht 
bepalingen); revising the redaction of the Alienation Prohibition; and miscellaneous 
issues of no relevance here. In the recommendation, the Spit Commission responded 
                                                 
26 Verslag Commissie voor het Grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen, Deel 3, 2, nd. 
27 Verslag Commissie voor het Grondbezit van Indo-Europeanen, Deel 3, 2, nd. 
28 Indo-Europeans’ demands regarding land rights encompassed three specific areas: a form of land 
rights for housing and livelihood for its members; a relaxing of the condition for acquiring leasehold for 
small farms into one that allowed Indo-Europeans to access the rights regardless of their economic 
status; and removal of the Alienation Prohibition.  
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to two of the Indo-Europeans’ demands, but flatly rejected the proposal to remove the 
Alienation Prohibition. 
In the first two recommendations, the Commission suggested an optimization 
of two exceptions laid out in the Indische Staatsregeling 1925 Article 51, which was a 
recent revision of the Agrarian Law of 1870. These exceptions allowed the alienating 
of land for housing/work purposes and for small agricultural purposes. Utilizing these 
exceptions made possible a form of land rights for Indo-Europeans without creating 
new regulations that might clash with the principles of existing agrarian laws. In 
tandem with this law, the Commission recommended using adat law as the legal 
reference in alienation transactions: land alienation should strictly follow the rulings of 
adat law; after a transfer, land should remain under adat law jurisdiction; alienation 
was not allowed in land prohibited by adat law from being transferred; all taxes and 
obligations valid under adat law such as land taxes and Native pawning (inlandsche 
verponding) and other burdens related to property ownership should remain; the right 
should be susceptible to conversion to agricultural eigendom rights or Western 
eigendom rights in cases where it is possible for Natives to do so; and further 
alienation by the entitled-European to a non-Native should be prohibited, with the 
exception of a European-blijver who was a Dutch subject. 
The Commission recommended that these provisions be strictly aimed at 
impoverished Indo-Europeans. Land for housing should not exceed half a bouw 
(0.3548 hectares) and land for agricultural purposes, five bouws (3.548 hectares), 
excluding the part for housing. If the land was situated within a Native community, it 
should not exceed five percent of the paddy fields area; in the case of dry land the size 
should not exceed a limit set by local authorities. This set ratio of Indo-Europeans in a 
Native community was apparently intended to curb racial tensions. In substance, these 
first two recommendations responded positively to the Indo-Europeans’ requests for a 
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kind of land rights. Although they stopped short of granting full ownership to land, the 
recommendations retained a window for full conversion to agricultural eigendom 
rights in the rare case a Native could do so. 
For the third recommendation, the Spit Commission suggested revisions to 
eligibility and assistance for the small leasehold (kleine erfpacht) requirements.29 They 
proposed expanding eligibility to include Europeans of “small means” (minder 
bemiddeld), a category one notch higher than the impoverished one (minvermogend). 
In a way, this recommendation responded positively to IEV’s request for a relaxing of 
the criteria, but not so far as to include all Indo-Europeans regardless of their 
economic status. Further, the Commission proposed scrapping the land credit policy, 
to be replaced by an increased lease period from twenty-five to seventy-five years. 
This legal option should be available only to European-blijvers and Indo-Europeans of 
full blood who were also Dutch subjects (onderdanen). Revocation rules were to be 
tightened: permission could be revoked if land was being used differently from the 
stated intention. To minimize conflict with local community, there was a set maximum 
land allowed for Europeans living within a Native municipality (gemeente), 5% of 
total land for paddy fields and a certain limit set by local authorities. The Spit 
Commission also recommended a tax higher than f 1,- per bouw for larger land 
holdings and a retribution for native municipality fund. To anticipate the population 
density in Java, they suggested procuring land in the Outer Islands using the legal 
basis of reclamation rulings in St. 1896 No. 44 and the agrarian regulations. 
In their fourth recommendation, the Spit Commission proposed a revision to 
the redaction of the Alienation Prohibition,30 with the new wording as follows: 
                                                 
29 Staatsblad 1904 No. 326 spelled out the regulation for this. 
30 The original Alienation Prohibition was redacted as follows: “That land use right is not susceptible to 
alienation by Natives to non-Natives, so that all agreements, such as alienation, directly or indirectly 
intended, are legally void” (Indische Staatsblad 1875 No. 179).  
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By law it is declared null and void—and punishable—each legal transaction 
under whatever form, whose objective is to supply/grant to non-Native directly 
or indirectly the disposal over land, upon which Native land rights are 
exercised, as well as over the buildings or crops occurring on the land- except 
in cases prescribed by the authority or by general regulation.31 
I will discuss this proposal in detail in chapter 6. In contrast to IEV’s request, the Spit 
Commission retained the Alienation Prohibition, but redacted it in a way that 
minimized multiple interpretations. 
The Spit Commission’s suggestion to retain land transferred to Indo-Europeans 
and European blijvers under adat law was an intriguing one, although it resonated with 
the IEV’s promise that they would honor adat obligations upon the land if given the 
rights to own it. Keeping the land under adat law meant that the new holders were 
bound to taxes and burdens and social obligations attached to the land per adat law 
regulations. It was a nod to the social role of land among the Native population, which 
was different from the European worldview. Keeping the land under adat law also 
meant that the land could easily revert to Native landholders without too much of a 
legal entanglement such as would bethe case if the land were put into European 
eigendom. In keeping with this suggestion, the Commission proposed that any legal 
conflict be resolved at the Landraad, the Native Court, even if the defendant was 
European. 
                                                 
31 In Dutch: Van rechtswege wordt nietig—en strafbaar—verklaard elke rechtshandeling, onder welken 
vorm ook, die ten doel heeft, een niet-Inlander, rechtstreeks of middellijk, de beschikking te verschaffen 
over gronden, waarop Inlandsche grondrechten worden uitgeoefend—dan wel over de op die gronden 
voorkomende opstallen of beplantingen—anders dan in de gevallen bij of krachtens algemeene 
verordening toegelaten.  
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Reactions to The Spit Commission Findings 
IEV Reacted 
Within two months after the Spit Commission published its recommendations, 
IEV held a congress. Members differed on how to respond, marking a rift in their 
approach to maintaining a relationship with the Native population. The Batavia 
chapter proposed a motion to declare the Spit Commission report “unsatisfactory.” 
They recommended that IEV establish a committee to lead the fight on scholarly and 
political fronts (Onze Stem 1935, 73). The Malang chapter disagreed substantially 
with Batavia. A representative from the Malang chapter, a Mr. Schijfsma, argued that 
only if IEV could effect a revision of the Alienation Prohibition would it create a 
lasting change. The revision should try to unify the racially divided agrarian law. 
Unification, he argued, would prevent predatory land transactions between Natives 
and non-Natives and curb dispossession by the rich Natives of the poor. In this way, 
transforming the indigenous land rights regime would offer both Indo-European and 
Native populations “principled and lasting solutions” for “the salvation of the 
Indigenous society,” a principle “completely in line with our [position for] unified 
colonial politics” (Onze Stem 1935, 74). To Schijfsma, only after these solutions were 
in place would there be the possibility of making indigenous rights accessible to 
Europeans. To move forward with this plan, the Malang chapter decided to accept the 
Spit Commission’s summary finding only as a preliminary solution before a more 
fundamental solution could be carried out, in this case the revision of the Agrarian 
Regime. 
Schijfsma’s proposal was more problematic than it appeared. The keynote 
speaker for the Congress, Mr. Barre, contended that the government would never 
abandon the core principle of its agrarian regime as laid out in the Alienation 
Prohibition, not so much for fear of Native dispossession by the Indo-Europeans as for 
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fear of the threat by the Chinese and Arab populations, who, as moneylenders, had 
amassed large amounts of land from their Native debtors. Barre criticized Schijfsma’s 
unification idea as unspecific, lacking clear direction, and vulnerable to multi-
interpretation to the disadvantage of the Indo-Europeans. Even IEV’s claimed 
willingness to carry out adat obligations attached to land under the Native tenure 
regime was naïve, because it underestimated the socio-cultural consequences for Indo-
Europeans. Managing land under the Native regime, Barre argued, would force Indo-
Europeans to carry out numerous obligatory services, such as services for the village 
and village head; services to maintain public facilities, roads, and gutters; and other 
menial tasks unworthy of their status. He said, 
These are all obligations inherent in the native property rights, because of 
unification of this property right, the European [will be put] directly under the 
native village officials, not under the highest [European] government official 
as it should be. . . . There is no defense against that possibility. He will be 
exposed to incessant harassment from the village officials. (Onze Stem 1935, 
78) 
Instead of unification, Barre recommended that IEV focus its energy on exploring the 
heritability of leasehold rights for small agricultural enterprises (erfpacht voor kleine 
landbouw), which the Spit Commission had recommended be extended to seventy-five 
years. It was a simple solution, and the Spit Commission seemed to pursue a 
breakthrough in that direction. Further, Barre recommended that IEV lobby the 
government to regulate the heritability of this leasehold in the Civil Code (Burgerlijke 
Wetboek), thus securing it for management under European law. Barre was explicit in 
his reluctance to unify with the “great million mass,” as it would threat the very 
existence of the Indo-European group. He said Indo-Europeans should have learned a 
lesson from the unification in education that had marginalized them from government 
jobs in the first place. 
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The proposal to have a unified agrarian law “for the benefit of both Indo-
European and Native populations” reflected a vision of progress in history. In this 
vision, Indo-Europeans felt they shared the burdens of white men in the civilizing 
mission of their Indonesian cousins. But the tendency to identify with the Natives 
through a unified agrarian law was quickly quashed by hardliners who demanded a 
clear boundary and separation from “the million masses.” The latter considered that 
the slightest dilution of their precarious European identity would bring much distress. 
Unification—if only in agrarian rights—with their Native cousins meant dragging 
down the socio-economic status of Indo-Europeans; being put under the authority of a 
Native village head meant severance from proper treatment as Europeans entitled to 
services offered by European officials, a cause of harassment, and a symbolic divorce 
from the larger European society. Such possibility struck them with a primal fear, so 
much so that it amplified the argument that Indo-Europeans should fight against it 
with all their might. 
Volksraad Continued the Heated Debate 
Like IEV, the Volksraad did not wait long to start the debate about the Spit 
Commission’s summary recommendation. As soon as the 1935/1936 sessions opened, 
debates amongst members ensued. 
The Indonesian Nationalist Faction members were very cautious about the 
recommendation. They underlined the privileged status of Indo-Europeans in terms of 
law, legal jurisdiction, employment, and salary levels, and in the State’s guarantee of 
personal rights and education. I.J. Kasimo, a Volksraad member representing 
Indonesian Catholics, contended that allowing Indo-Europeans to have land rights 
made even more unfair the already unjust tax structure. Where a native peasant was to 
pay tax of 10 guilders every three years for two to three bouws of land, an 
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“impoverished” Indo-European farmer working his small agricultural leasehold was 
charged with only 10 to 25 cents tax per bouw per year for up to 25 bouws. In special 
circumstances their ground rent could even be pardoned (Volksraad Handelingen 
1935–1936, 739). Where Indonesian farmers had to resort to moneylenders for cash 
relief, Indo-European small farmers enjoyed generous assistance from the government 
in the form of cultivation credits. 
Kasimo and his colleague Wirjopranoto then proposed a motion to carry out a 
study to compare agricultural burdens between Native and Indo-European farmers to 
complement the Spit Commission’s recommendation and to assist the government in 
its decision making. The study should compare the state of Indonesian and European 
farmers on the basis of their skills, available facilities, subsidies, and taxes in 
monetary terms due to the different nature of Native and Indo-European farming 
techniques. From the Native farmers’ side, it should monetize the burdens of land rent, 
village services attached to their land share such as maintaining of roads and bridges, 
irrigation works, graveyards, and so on. Those should be compared with Indo-
European farmers’ burdens in the form of rents and mortgages. 
The motion outraged Indo-European representatives. They argued that Indo-
European farmers who owned or managed 25 bouws could only be compared with 
upper-class Indonesian landholders with similar acreage to be meaningful. Indo-
European farmers had to shell out money for hidden expenses, most frequently 
demands from the village head, or for compulsory contributions for the maintenance 
of village water pipes, roads, or bridges, and other unsanctioned demands. Wealthy 
Indonesian landholders were very likely exempted from these obligations courtesy of 
their high status in the Native society. Moreover, Indonesian landholders could easily 
recruit koelis to sharecrop their land and receive a share from the harvest relatively 
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effortlessly. This was not the case for Indo-Europeans, who were prohibited by law 
from sharecropping at the risk of the revocation of their leasehold. Beets said, 
And is it then not seen as reasonable and just . . . to ask for the same burdens 
and obstacles for the small European farmer or landowner, burdens which 
people in principle find objectionable, at least in the extent and manner in 
which they are currently imposed by the villagers? [Is it not reasonable] that 
while these Indian Dutchman stand entirely outside the village community and 
will continue to stand like the Javanese [who are alien to the local community] 
in the outer regions . . . for them to want to preserve their own status, a wish 
that surely they are entitled to? (Volksraad Handelingen 1935–1936, 1113–
1114) 
There is an underlying sense of estrangement in this statement, an 
estrangement from the Native population, an alienation, an overwhelming sense of 
Otherness that was only curable by maintaining a connection with Europeans. Beets 
and other IEV members considering maintaining their connection to the European 
population authorized Indo-European farmers to call on European officials should 
native village heads and village officials demand unwarranted payments. There was 
apparently a deep distrust of Native officials, who Indo-Europeans felt were out to 
harass them. It illustrated the disconnect between Indo-Europeans and the Native 
village and villagers with whom they would interact intensely should they gain the 
rights to land, and their discomfort with the village way of life. 
The National Faction in the Volksraad eventually relented after an indirect 
consultation with the Spit Commission. The Commission explained that the motion 
asked more than what they could give, even considering the data they had 
accumulated over four years of work. Further, several studies were already available 
on the topic. After a promise that a general picture of the state of Native and European 
small farming would be included in the final report, Wirjopranoto and Kasimo 
withdrew their motion. 
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Public Reactions  
IEV’s reputation as the greedy cousin continued to reverberate among 
Indonesian intellectuals, leaders and journalists. Resentment still tinged the reactions 
published in Indonesian-language newspapers. A well-known author in North Sumatra 
shared Wirjopranoto and Kasimo’s sentiment against IEV’s eagerness in retaining 
their status as Europeans, which would definitely sustain their privileges and put them 
in the same class as the Masters. Indonesians found it almost a betrayal for the IEV to 
prefer remaining a stranger at a critical conjuncture in Indonesians’ struggle for a more 
independent Indies (Sinar Deli, in IPO February 18, 1936).  
Another article drew attention to IEV’s attempt to secure the constitutional and 
legal position of the Eurasians once and for all. The author underlined the ambivalent 
position of the Indo-Europeans: they felt humiliated if they were categorized as a part 
of the indigenous group, yet they wanted to share rights of the Natives on the 
argument of being landskinderen, the country’s children (Radio, in IPO May 16, 
1936). Another essay reminded readers that even without such provisions, vast swaths 
of land in West Java were already under the control of non-Native groups 
(Pemandangan, in IPO March 21, 1936),32 a fact underscored by another article in 
Sinar Sumatra (in IPO August 1, 1936) which stated that if the government granted 
Indo-Europeans their demand for land rights, such privileges would also become 
accessible to all groups in the colony regardless of their origin, including pure-blooded 
Dutch persons. The author insisted he had nothing against non-Natives who wished to 
stay in the colony, as they had full rights to do so, but the landskinderen, the true 
                                                 
32 As was feared by many, the Chinese in the colony had begun to inquire about the possibility of 
owning land. They had sent their representative, Heer Kan, himself a member of the Volksraad, to an 
audience with the Minister of the Colony in the Netherlands in this quest. This news reached a wide 
audience, and Native leaders reacted to it (Pemandangan, in IPO, 18 Juli 1936). 
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children of the land, should never let the land they inherited from their forefathers be 
taken away by others. 
As the resentment lingered, concrete actions among Indonesians also began to 
emerge. A member of Indonesian nationalist fronts established an initiative called the 
Native Commission for the Study of Land Rights in March 1936. The Commission 
was formed independently of the colonial government, and consisted of three native 
lawyers educated in the Batavia Rechtshoogeschool: Mr. Mohammad Jamin as 
secretary, and Mr. Sjarifoedin and Mr. Dr. Soekamto as second and third secretaries. 
The commission planned to issue a publication on the state of agrarian matters in the 
colony (Pemandangan, in IPO March 28, 1936), which would include a legal report 
on the state of agrarian matters and a report on agrarian politics in the colony. Both 
would be made available to the public. Another initiative for concrete action took 
place outside Batavia. A committee in Semarang, Central Java, was formed in reaction 
to the Chinese Association Chung Hwa Hui’s initiative to gain rights to own land 
following in the footsteps of Indo-Europeans. The Committee vowed to fight the 
granting of land rights to non-Natives and would continue to oppose such initiatives in 
the name of the poor native farmers who were already deprived of land. The 
Committee called on all Indonesians to join the struggle and to contribute on the 
question of which approach was best to fight the actions of the Indo-Europeans and 
the Chung Hwa Hui (Pemandangan, in IPO, July 18, 1936). 
Resentment and rejection notwithstanding, a voice of reason also emerged 
from among the Natives after the publication of the Spit Commission’s summary 
findings. An author in North Sumatra reminded his readers that all population groups 
in the Indies were in the same boat together. Economic hardship befell not only the 
Indo-European population, but also other groups in the Indies, including Indo-Chinese 
and Indo-Arabs, who lived in more dire circumstances. These groups considered the 
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Indies to be their homeland as much as the Indo-Europeans. Therefore, the author 
called for the Spit Commission to be consistent in their recommendation by granting 
the same rights to these groups as the rights they recommended for the Indo-European 
population. This was a rhetorical call; the author knew the government would hesitate 
to do so for fear of massive land transfer out of the Natives’ hands, as was hinted at by 
Barre in a recent IEV congress. The author called for Indonesians to unite in defending 
their land rights because the Native farmers had already had to compete for land 
against large-scale agricultural estates and against the government’s forest reserve 
(The Sinar Deli, in IPO Agustus 1, 1936, 495). In the same tone, another article called 
for the Governor General to be neutral and to protect each and every colonies’ 
population group, not only Indo-Europeans (Tjaja Timoer, in IPO August 15, 1936). 
These calls signaled a recognition among Indonesians that the colonial government 
could be interpellated to be just; they summoned “the state” to respond in its role as 
the ultimate arbiter of justice. 
Along this line of response, Agus Salim—a well-known “extreme nationalist” 
who had a long career with Sarekat Islam—offered a deeper insights into the 
brouhaha. Instead of stoking the resentment, he directed attention to the “theoretical” 
cause of the fight. The government’s politics of divide-and-conquer had caused two 
groups to butt heads who essentially shared an interest and urgency in creating a 
prosperous homeland in the Indies. The reason for the animosity in reality was more 
theoretical than practical. There was no genuine reason for Indonesians to fear 
competition from the Indo-European farmers, since only a few of them would actually 
seek a livelihood in farming. Further, IEV’s request for land rights was not based on 
practical needs, since it could not force any of its members to farm if they not wish to 
do so. Last, the recognition of IEV’s wishes had yet to happen (Pemandangan, in IPO 
September 11, 1936). In a separate article, responding to the heated debate in the 
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Volksraad, Agus Salim again called for calm (Pemandangan, in IPO October 10, 
1936). He advised Indonesians to become acquainted and to pay attention to the Indo-
Europeans’ struggle, because to all appearances Indonesians would probably never 
live separately from them. On the other hand, Agus Salim called for Indo-Europeans 
to shed their racial illusions and image of superiority vis-à-vis the Natives. After all, 
there should be no shame for Indo-Europeans to desire to live like natives, as they 
would have passed for natives unnoticed. But if they had wished to be identified more 
as Natives, it was prevented by their peers and the Dutch intention to watch out for 
“the prestige of Europeans.” Salim concluded that the Indies needed to jettison views, 
regulations, and provisions that were tinted with racial discrimination. Europeans 
could take part in this project by abandoning their racist delusions. He wrote, 
The welfare of the Eurasians and the Dutch can only be served if instead of the 
racial sentiment, considerations of humanity are taken as a basis. And 
Eurasians shall see their ideals realized, i.e., acquisition full rights to property 
in this land, which has indeed become their country, if they let go of their 
relationship with the Netherlands. The welfare and prestige of the Indos cannot 
be served if they do not focus all their attention and interest in this country, and 
do not concentrate all their work towards the advancement of Indonesians. 
(Pemandangan, in IPO October 10, 1936, 651–652) 
In contrast to Indonesian-language newspapers, the Dutch newspapers 
continued to keep a distance from the Indo-European case. They mostly reported 
factual information and progress, and published almost no opinion pieces. It was very 
likely they did not share the anxiety of the Indo-Europeans. They welcomed the 
publication of the Spit Commission’s summary findings,33 while another calmly 
reported the establishing of a commission at the instigation of Mohammad Thamrin, 
                                                 
33 Anonymous, “Grondbezit voor den Indos,” Het Nieuws van den Dag, 23 February, 1935, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010230339%3Ampeg21%3Ap002%3Aa0009 (accessed 
March 18, 2012) 
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the Volksraad member, to study native land rights in Batavia.34 They also reported the 
Chung Hwa Hui inquiry to acquire land rights, following the footsteps of the IEV.35 
When the Spit Commission published its complete report and recommendations, the 
Dutch newspapers diligently reported it, too, and included in their report detailed 
information about the recommendation.36 Het Vaderland also announced the 
administrative procedure that the report needed to go through, and the invitation from 
the Commission for the general public to comment on the matter, including comment 
from the commission that IEV had established.37 
In the midst of enthusiastic debates among various population groups in the 
Indies, the colonial government played their cards well. They portrayed themselves as 
an impartial and just mediator. Reacting to the Spit Commission’s findings and the 
ensuing debates, the Director of Binnenlands Bestuur stated that the government 
would deliver an official opinion to determine its own position. Afterwards, the 
government would decide whether, and if so what kind of, changes in the agrarian 
regulations would be made. They must seek the opinion and approval of the 
government in the Netherlands, in which due diligence would be exercised. The 
government’s hopes set an agenda in the next Volksraad session about which of the 
Spit Commission’s would be executed (Volksraad Handelingen 1936–1937, 1287). 
                                                 
34 Anonymous, “De Grondrechten,” Het Vaderland, March 18, 1935, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010015874%3Ampeg21%3Ap001%3Aa0010 (accessed 
March 18, 2012) 
35 Anonymous, “Nederlandsch-Indie Grondrechten,” Het Vaderland, January 29, 1936 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010016408%3Ampeg21%3Ap014%3Aa0278; Anonymous, 
“De Chineezen en het grondbezit,” Het Vaderland, May 29, 1936, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010016612%3Ampeg21%3Ap008%3Aa0200 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
36 Anonymous, “De Grondrechten voor Indo-Europeanen,” Het Vaderland, July 17,1936, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010016695%3Ampeg21%3Ap002%3Aa0061 (accessed 
March 18, 2012). 
37 Anonymous, “Het Rapport der Commissie Spit,” Het Vaderland, August 4, 1936, 
http://kranten.kb.nl/view/article/id/ddd%3A010230483%3Ampeg21%3Ap001%3Aa0005%28 
(accessed March 18, 2012) 
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Continued Resistance 1937–1939 
The enthusiastic and heated debate that took place between 1930 and 1936 
petered out from 1937 onward. Both Indonesian national front and IEV leaders could 
only sustain the debate in a haphazard way, because other pressing issues took over 
the stage. To bypass the stalemate, IEV sent its representative C.E. Barre to meet the 
Minister of the Colony in the Netherlands to push for a decision about the lease for 
small farmers (kleine erfpacht). Another IEV representative, Doeve, in the Volksraad 
session of 1937/38 urged the government to make a concrete decision about Indo-
European land rights because it had promised a year earlier “to approve the Spit 
Commission’s recommendation within three months” (Volksraad Handelingen 
1937/1938, 616). IEV was most interested in an implementation, not so much in 
further debates. Thamrin, repeating his keynote speech at a recent party congress, 
warned the government not to make a rushed decision regarding the Spit 
Commission’s recommendation. Since it had just been released a year before after five 
years’ work, it would take the general public more time to understand its implications 
(Volksraad Handelingen 1937/1938, 652). By 1938, Doeve gave up pushing for 
answers on the recommended revision of agrarian law for Indo-Europeans. He said, “I 
would prefer removing the shackles which the so-called small-leasehold had imposed 
on us due to disappointing law.” (Volksraad Handelingen 1938/1939, 572). By 
1939/1940, not much was left on the issue of Indo-Europeans land rights. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I follow the struggle of Indo-Europeans to acquire rights to 
land. I argue that in demanding the right to own land, Indo-Europeans created an 
identity separate from the one sanctioned by law, and by doing so, they exercised the 
practices that resulted in isolation and identification effects. 
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Colonial governance was driven by the “production of difference” using the 
vernacular language of law (Comaroff 1998). Among its projects was the creation of a 
new category of personhood based on racial delineation, a category that also regulated 
entitlement to resources. Colonial subjects in the Dutch East Indies were classified 
into Europeans, Foreign Orientals, and Natives; a subject’s legal status defined his or 
her access to land rights. Although land access for non-Natives was available via 
leasehold (erfpacht), absolute ownership to land (eigendom) was strictly regulated and 
controlled, presumably to prevent massive land transfer from Native to non-Native 
populations. Classified as Europeans, impoverished Indo-Europeans found it very 
difficult to benefit from the small leasehold option (kleine erfpacht) available to them. 
So, IEV leaders requested for their members a form of land rights that was more 
flexible and economical to manage. 
Claiming to be landskinderen, IEV sought to differentiate them from 
European-trekkers: Native blood ran in their veins, and they considered the colony a 
permanent home. At the same time, they were not quite “Native,” despite their mixed 
blood. Numerous statements by IEV leaders underscored their sense of alienation from 
their Indonesian cousins. They felt they were strangers in the village setting and were 
consistently left “outside” of the community, thus legitimating their desire to remain 
“European.” Despite their ambivalent position in the colonial society, Indo-Europeans 
felt they were entitled to a certain form of land ownership. They would be 
“Europeans” yet own land as a source of livelihood. And they could foster a new class 
of medium-sized farmers. 
Indonesian leaders and intellectuals vehemently rejected Indo-Europeans’ 
desire to claim the in-between status—one that would conveniently allow them to 
benefit from both sides of the division. Mohammad Thamrin reminded his colleagues 
at the Volksraad that land rights are not a grant from the colonial government; they are 
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an inherent and moral right attached to a Native person. But invented laws had created 
“other forms” of land entitlement that reduced Native ownership to a mere “right to 
occupy.” Indonesian leaders felt threatened not so much by the demand of Indo-
Europeans as by the tentative nature of their identity, which would allegedly be abused 
should the demand be approved by the colonial government. Indonesians claimed they 
were willing to share the exclusive rights to land ownership on the condition that the 
Indo-Europeans give up their European status and integrated with other Indonesians to 
create a united front for a more independent colony (independence was yet to be a 
mainstream discourse). As a matter of fact, Indonesians invited Indo-Europeans to 
become “Indonesian citizens” (staatsburgers), to be no longer “strangers to us.” In this 
sense, Indonesians, too, fought the identification and isolation effects that had 
separated Indo-Europeans from them, effects that were also the results of IEV’s own 
doing. Indonesian identity as a nation thus was enhanced by the differentiation 
markings related to land: True Indonesians possessed rights to land; to claim rights to 
land, one had to “become Indonesian” by giving up their European legal status. 
In their attempt to reclassify themselves as “the same but different,” as 
Europeans with special rights to own land, Indo-Europeans essentially waged an effort 
to remake the law that had classified and defined them in the first place. In their noisy 
rejection, aired in the colonial proto-parliamenta and the vernacular press, 
Indonesians, too, “made the law” by preventing it from happening. Identity and 
personhood were not simply unilateral claims. They depended also on approval by the 
Native population as well as by colonial institutions such as the Binnenlands Bestuur, 
the Department of Justice, the Governor General, and the Minister of Colony in The 
Hague. Indonesians appeared to be quite confident that their rejection of Indo-
Europeans’ request had the ears of the colonial administrators. Several essays 
rhetorically challenged the Spit Commission and the government “to be fair” in also 
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allowing the Chinese and Arab population to acquire similar rights should Indo-
Europeans be granted land rights. 
In this dynamic, we observe how law made the subjects, and how the subjects 
in return also made the law. Indo-Europeans’ struggle was a process to reform law, 
albeit a less successful one compared with Indonesians’ prevention of their becoming 
a certain kind of subject, that is, Europeans with special claims to land rights. It was 
Indo-Europeans and Indonesians who re-made themselves as “particular kinds of 
subjects” after they were formed by law and legal discourses. They re-invented 
themselves both as atomized individuals—creating the isolation effect—and as a part 
of a “homogenous member of certain community”—the identification effect. 
In the battle for personhood, Indo-Europeans, Indonesians, as well as Chinese 
and Arabs interpellated to the “state” to “approve” their particular demands: in the 
Indo-Europeans’ case, land rights; in the Indonesians’ case, fairness and justice and 
rejection of Indo-Europeans’ demand; in the Chinese and Arabs’ case, similar rights to 
own land. In various ways, representatives of each population group called upon the 
Volksraad, the Director of the Binnenlands Bestuur, the Governor General, and even 
the Ministry of the Colonies, all parts of an interrelated network of state systems, to 
heed their demand. At the core of their demand was justice and fairness. And in the 
process, all these state institutions appeared as if they were a solid entity with the 
wisdom and authority to arbitrate social justice. 
The struggle of Indo-Europeans renders visible how subjects and law in late-
colonial Indonesia were reciprocally constituted, and how the two influenced the 
evolution of the colonial Agrarian Regime. Focusing on state effects instead of the 
“state” as an entity renders visible the interconnected network of social actors who 
carried out practices that are that frequently taken to be waged by “the state.” It 
illustrates the ways in which state effects were instigated, not by state apparatuses, but 
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by series of discursive battles carried out by identifiable human agents. It was 
individuals who, singularly or as parts of a wider interconnected state system, set in 
motion isolation and identification effects and rendered the illusory state a concrete 
entity with the authority to arbitrate.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
Rupturing Discourse from Within: 
Subject, Lawmaking, and Colonial State Formation 
Introduction 
In 1936 the Spit Commission finally published its complete recommendation 
regarding the Indo-European community’s demand for land rights. Although the 
Commission agreed there was a need to make land available in a more economical 
manner for Indo-Europeans of limited means, it stopped short of fulfilling the IEV’s 
request to abolish the Alienation Prohibition. In fact, the Commission retained the 
Alienation Prohibition as one of the principles in drawing their recommendations. As a 
compromise, the Commission recommended utilizing legal rulings already laid out in 
agrarian laws. Land for Indo-Europeans, however, would be kept under adat law 
jurisdiction, binding those who use this arrangement to adat obligations attached to the 
land. The recommendation incited deep dissatisfaction within the Indo-European 
community, and the issue remained a thorny topic for years afterwards. During this 
time, a separate but related debate emerged among Batavia legal scholars at the 
triennial congress of the Netherlands Indies Lawyer Association (Indische Juristen 
Vereeniging). 
If in the previous chapter I examine the struggle between Native and Indo-
European communities over the Alienation Prohibition, in this chapter I push my 
interrogation about the same agrarian regulation deeper by dissecting a Native 
scholar’s intervention into the legal practices surrounding the ruling. 
Soepomo carried out his intervention into legal discourse on the Alienation 
Prohibition through an essay written for and presented and defended at the prestigious 
Netherlands Indies Lawyers Association Congress in 1936. His analysis demonstrates 
that the judicial system was inconsistent in carrying out the mandate of the Alienation 
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Prohibition and that the loosely structured wordings of the ruling encouraged a multi-
interpretation that weakened the authority of law. My objective is to render visible 
Soepomo’s capacity for critical reflection and deliberate intervention, with which he 
transformed the possibility of thinking-and-being beyond the existing legal discourse. 
By situating Soepomo’s essay within a wider debate on the Alienation Prohibition, 
waged by members of the Volksraad and professors of the state-sponsored Batavia 
Rechtshoogeschool, the very members of the state system, I illuminate the role of the 
reciprocally formed subject and law in bringing about colonial state formation. 
Subjects in colonial society—the colonized, the colonizer, and those wedged in 
between like the Indo-Europeans—were shaped by densely intertwined threads of 
power relations as much as by positive intersubjective relations (Allen 2008). Contrary 
to the critics of Foucauldian subjects, being an effect of and being embedded in power 
relations do not deny a subject autonomy, understood as the capacity to exert a 
critically deliberated intervention. In fact, Foucault contends that, “to the extent that he 
is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has 
constituted” (Foucault 2003, 29–30; emphasis added). As a relay of power, subjects 
possess the potential to maintain, reproduce, or alter power relations. In the act of 
altering existing relations of power and subjection, in making possible subversive 
transformation of discursive limits that are in essence contingent, a subject exerts his 
or her autonomy and agency. As racially based laws in the colony shaped its subjects, 
and the subjects in turn “ma[d]e the laws” in myriad ways, the trajectory comes full 
circle. In the previous chapters I trace processes of subject formation and lawmaking 
as almost two separate events; here I demonstrate how the two are intertwined in the 
reworking of the colonial agrarian regime. 
The Indies Lawyers Association was an established and respected intellectual 
circle with a history tracing back to the mid-19th century. It called among its members 
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government’s high officials, members of the Volksraad, advocates in private practice 
and, naturally, professors from the Rechtshoogeschool. The Association published the 
Indies Journal of Law (Het Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht, ITR), an important 
journal that shaped legal discourse in the colony and the metropole. The journal 
printed original essays and documented legal cases deemed to be of importance to the 
administration of law in the colony. The ITR was the reference publication for legal 
opinions and precedence: debates at the Volksraad frequently cited sources from the 
ITR; government institutions justified their legal positions using ITR; training of 
Indies lawyers in Leiden United Faculty of Law and Letters and in the Batavia College 
of Law used materials published in the ITR (see chapter 1). As part of the Association, 
the triennial congress also carried the prestige enjoyed by the Association and its 
publication. 
Following a conventional academic fest, the Congress organizers picked three 
topics considered pressing for the administration of law in the colony. Two presenters 
each would report their research, which experts would discuss. One of the three topics 
selected was “Alienation Prohibition of Native Land,” which dissected St. 1875 No. 
179 and its actual implementation. Aside from Soepomo, at that time an Indonesian 
staff at the Department of Justice, a Dutch career judge, W.F.C. van Hattum, was the 
presenter for the topic.1 
The colonial government issued the Alienation Prohibition, decreed in 1875 in 
St. 1875 No. 179 to complement the Agrarian Law of 1870 and the earlier agrarian 
laws contained in the Regeeringsreglement 1854. If the Agrarian Law of 1870 created 
opportunities to invest in agriculture enterprises in the Indies, the Alienation 
                                                 
1 During this tenure, Soepomo supervised the research on adat rights in Central Java carried out by 
M.M. Djojodigoeno and Tirtawinata, and did his own research on adat rights in Batavia West Java. The 
summaries of this research were published in ITR in the 1930s. Prior to this tenure, Soepomo was a 
landraad chairman in Sukohardjo and Yogyakarta respectively, where he carried out research on adat 
land rights in Solo and Yogyakarta post-reorganization (see chapter 3).  
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Prohibition controlled land transfer from Native to non-Natives, which could then be 
passed over to Dutch absolute ownership (eigendom). These two laws hence reflected 
the government’s contradictory objectives in constituting the colonial agrarian regime. 
The precise wording of St. 1875 No. 179 is: 
That usufruct rights of land are not susceptible to alienation by Natives to non-
Natives, so that all agreements, such as alienation, directly or indirectly 
intended, are legally void. (Indische Staatsblad 1875 No. 179; emphasis 
added)2 
The keyword usufruct right of land (gebruiksrecht op grond) reflected the domain 
principle that denied any Native forms of proprietorship as full and absolute. The 
colonial state forms acknowledged ownership under the Dutch eigendom as an 
undisputable form of rights, while land under the Native property rights realm was 
acknowledged only as an inheritable usufruct right. Because the nature of the native 
usufruct right was allegedly “unstable,”3 the colonial government reasoned that the 
Alienation Prohibition was needed to prevent massive land transfer from the Native 
population to Europeans or Foreign Orientals. In this sense, the Alienation Prohibition 
was an important ruling; a faithful interpretation of this ruling by the court of law 
would have protected the native population from predatory land transactions.4 
In connection with the decree and in the spirit of “protecting the Native’s land 
right,” the Raad van Indie, the Council of the Netherlands Indies, an institution that at 
the time governed alongside the Governor General, issued in 1870 an interpretation of 
                                                 
2 In Dutch: dat gebruiksrecht op grond niet vatbaar is voor vervreemding door Inlanders aan niet-
Inlanders, zoodat alle overeenkomsten, die zoodanige vervreemding, rechtstreeks of zijdelings ten doel 
hebben, van rechtswege nietig zijn. 
3 The colonial government was conveniently silent about their role in imprinting “usufruct rights” as the 
highest Native form of property ownership.  
4 Another reason for the Alienation Prohibition, as stated by Minister van Bosse earlier in 1871, was 
that by reserving the land to the natives, the State enjoyed obligatory services from the indigenous 
community as a payment of land rent, such as delivery of coffee beans, provision of labor services, and 
stability (Soepomo 1936, 86). Apparently the government wanted no loss in revenues. 
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the ruling to be implemented by the Binnenlands Bestuur. This executive order is 
known by its registry number, Bijblad 3020. The order laid out a mechanism for an 
officially sanctioned land transfer from Native use rights to non-Native ownership. 
The mechanism is as follows: A non-Native who wished to acquire a piece of land 
under the native property rights realm had to request for the government to 
intermediate the transaction. After a government official drew a “redemption contract” 
(afkoopovereenkomst) with a Native, the land became free from the native use right 
(vrije grond) and its ownership technically returned to the State per domain doctrine. 
The non-Native could then request to buy the land from the government and transfer 
its ownership to European forms of property rights such as full ownership eigendom or 
building rights (opstal), paying both the government and the Native who had given up 
his usufruct right. If the land had belonged to a jural community, the non-Native buyer 
had to compensate the community as well. Land transactions that disregarded this 
mechanism would be considered void; the state would not acknowledge the non-
Native buyer rights to the land, and the Native seller was deemed to have abandoned 
his use rights. As a consequence, the state would wrest the land use rights from the 
Native, and the land would become free state land (vrije landsdomein), that is, land 
free of claims and of asserted rights of both Natives and non-Natives (Bijblad 3020, 
7). If a non-Native attempted to utilize such land, he was considered an illegal 
occupant and would be subject to legally sanctioned punishment. Through Bijblad 
3020, the Raad van Indie authorized the Binnenlands Bestuur to carry out the 
government’s role as intermediary in the case of redemption contracts. This executive 
order was at the heart of the 1936 debate on the Alienation Prohibition. 
In the way it invoked the power of state forms to institute law and legal 
discourse, the debate on Alienation Prohibition strengthened the imagined presence of 
the state (Abrams 1988), and rendered “the state” the ultimate authority to authorize. 
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However, the process was not as straightforward as it appears. As bureaucrats, 
politicians, and scholars questioned particular readings of a legal code and intervened 
to alter them in a direction more in line with their own, they were practically “making 
the law” (Peñalver and Katyal, 2010). They might not always succeed, yet by 
puncturing a rigid reading they introduced wiggle room that created the possibility for 
the law’s evolution. 
We start our survey by casting our eye upon an event that happened elsewhere 
in the colonial governance theatre. 
Opening Gambit: A Volksraad Member’s Protest Against the Alienation 
Prohibition 
Illegal occupation of Natives’ land took various forms and was committed by 
diverse actors: individuals and agricultural corporations, Europeans, Indo-Europeans, 
Chinese and Arabs residents of the Indies—all played a role. Although Native-land 
grabbing and appropriation had been long debated,5 it was only in 1936 that a member 
of the Volksraad questioned a specific form of illegal occupation in connection with 
the Alienation Prohibition. A prominent member of the Volksraad, this member, C.C. 
van Helsdingen, was a Dutch trekker6 with a long and distinguished record of service 
to the colonial government.7 He had come to the Volksraad as a representative of the 
Christiaan Staatskundige Partij, which was strongly influenced by the Ethical Policy. 
                                                 
5 See Burns 2004 for a detailed narrative of domain declaration and debate over adat law between 
Cornelis van Vollenhoven and Nolst Trenite.  
6 Trekker/trekkers (pl) (lit. migrants) was a term used for Dutch expatriate residents in the Indies who 
intended to return to the Netherlands once they retired from the colonial service. In contrast, blijvers 
(lit. stayers) was a term for Dutch and Indo-Europeans who resided permanently in the Indies. 
Naturally, the political and economic interests differed between trekkers and blijvers.  
7 He started his career as an extraordinary chairman for the landraads in Djember, Jogjakarta/Surakarta, 
and Sukabumi, before settling down in Batavia as a teacher at the Rechtsschool. The longest-serving 
teacher in the school—he served from 1912 to 1926—van Helsdingen ended his teaching career as the 
acting director in the last two years of the Rechtsschool before it closed in 1928. He taught nearly every 
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Van Helsdingen asked the government about an emerging cleavage between 
the Binnenlands Bestuur and the judicial system’s position on the Alienation 
Prohibition. He pointed out a recent dissenting stance taken by a landraad chairman, 
who judged that a defendant who had violated the Alienation Prohibition could not be 
prosecuted in the criminal court, because8 
All contracts in violation of the Alienation Prohibition are legally void, such 
that the native cannot lose his rights on the ground and the non-native cannot 
acquire rights on the ground. (Volksraad Handelingen 1936/1937, 
Afdeelingsverslag, 17) 
This verdict boldly challenged the executive order registered in Bijblad 3020, 
where in cases of land alienation, the government could wrest from the Native their 
land use rights and declare the land free state domain. The new legal precedent 
disturbed van Helsdingen because it created a loophole in the implementation of the 
Alienation Prohibition ruling in the way non-Natives could occupy land through a 
straw man with impunity. Although the new verdict contradicted the Raad van Indie’s 
legal interpretation, a position that resonated with his own disdain of the overly 
powerful Binnenlands Bestuur,9 van Helsdingen’s concern seemed to stem from a 
deeper worry that such precedence would weaken the Volksraad’s demand for an 
amendment of the Alienation Prohibition, an amendment that, if accepted, would offer 
a ruling higher in the legal hierarchy than the landraad’s verdict. Responding to Van 
Helsdingen, the Binnenlands Bestuur was adamant that their position based on the 
                                                                                                                                            
single rechtskundige (Native legal clerk) who passed through the school and was arguably the one 
element that connected cohorts of students and teachers across time. Van Helsdingen came to the 
Volksraad as a representative of the Christiaan Staatskundige Partij, which was strongly influenced by 
the Ethical Policy (see more in chapter 1).  
8 The limited data prevent me from tracing the exact case this referred to. I suspect the high profile case 
of Wadoeng West at the Volksraad and the related suspension of criminal charges for illegal occupation 
ordered by the Attorney General (see chapter 5) provided the background for van Helsdingen’s inquiry.  
9 See chapter 1. 
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executive order not only was correct and but was also supported by the judiciary’s 
decisions (Volksraad Handelingen 1936/1937, Memorie van Antwoord, 16). 
The written volleys between the Binnenlands Bestuur and van Helsdingen 
continued in the Volksraad sessions, where van Helsdingen personally expressed his 
displeasure with the new legal precedent he deemed would severely disadvantage the 
Native population. He was disturbed by the Binnenlands Bestuur’s conviction of the 
correctness of their interpretation, which had already been undermined by several 
judicial decisions. He insisted that the Government amend the current regulations10 to 
remove the entire controversy in order to prevent large-scale native dispossession, 
particularly urgent given that after the Depression, many Natives had had to pawn or 
sell their usufruct rights to moneylenders to survive. 
The director of the Binnenlands Bestuur acknowledged van Helsdingen’s 
rebuke in the second Volksraad session on August 19, 1936, claiming that “the 
protection of indigenous land ownership has always been one of the main principles of 
our agrarian laws” (Volksraad Handelingen 1936/1937, 1064). He promised to ensure 
regulations that would prevent Natives’ dispossession. 
Van Helsdingen was not easily convinced. He demanded a thorough review of 
the entire series of regulations and the judiciary position related to the Alienation 
Prohibition before the government proceeded with any decisions. Taking full 
advantage of the exposure, van Helsdingen drew attention to the overly powerful 
position of the Binnenlands Bestuur compared with the judiciary in the hierarchy of 
colonial state agencies, 
I have also delivered an argument about this in Section II, where I pointed out 
the very special privilege the Binnenlands Bestuur occupied compared to that 
of the judiciary. I would therefore again insist that the Government give 
                                                 
10 By regulations, van Helsdingen meant the whole set of rulings related to Alienation Prohibition, 
which included St. 1875 No. 179, St. 1912 No. 177, St. 1918 No. 88, and Bijblad 3020.  
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serious consideration to not proceeding with the decision until the position of 
the judiciary has been seriously reviewed. (Volksraad Handelingen 1936/37, 
1182) 
In raising the issue of the Alienation Prohibition regulations, van Helsdingen 
set up an opening gambit for a debate on the implementation of St. 1875 No. 179. 
Since the Volksraad’s inauguration in 1918, this was the first time a Volksraad 
member had questioned the effectiveness of the Alienation Prohibition’s 
implementation. By problematizing the diverging position between the government 
and the judicial institution, van Helsdingen was able to not only question the authority 
of Binnenlands Bestuur as an executor of Bijblad 3020, as well as the legitimacy of 
the executive order, but also to demand a thorough review of legal products related to 
the Alienation Prohibition. A thorough review of the ruling was precisely what 
Soepomo performed in the Indies Lawyers Congress. 
At the time of these exchanges between van Helsdingen and the Binnenlands 
Bestuur, Soepomo was a staff at the Department of Justice, tasked with carrying out 
research on adat law. It remains a challenge to pinpoint what exactly prompted 
Soepomo to review the Alienation Prohibition; nevertheless, it is a tantalizing 
possibility that he carried it out in collaboration with van Helsdingen to expose the 
loopholes and weaknesses embedded within the decree, especially considering that 
van Helsdingen was the longest-serving teacher at the Rechtsschool and that he had 
taught Soepomo. This possibility notwithstanding, the more urgent question to address 
is one that relates to the ways in which Soepomo’s agency emerged while taking into 
account the context of colonial conditions, power relations, and his position as a staff 
member in the colonial judicial system in the midst of increasing nationalist 
sentiments among Native intellectuals. 
Van Helsdingen’s encounter with the Binnenlands Bestuur illustrates the 
cleavage among various state-centered institutions. There were no uniform 
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interpretation of the Alienation Prohibition among van Helsdingen as a member of the 
Volksraad, the Binnenlands Bestuur, and the judicial system. The asymmetrical power 
relations between the Binnenlands Bestuur and the judicial system had allowed the 
former to impose its reading of the Alienation Prohibition that undermined the judicial 
authority. A judge’s verdict cited by van Helsdingen injected a new precedent into the 
already fragmented take on the Alienation Prohibition: on the one hand, it prevented 
the Native landholder from losing his use rights to land, and on the other, it prevented 
the perpetrator from being criminally charged. . Despite the fragmentary nature of 
these events, their totality signaled a nod to legal language as the pillar that propped 
up the presence of the colonial state. 
Ruptures from Within: Reexamining the Implementation of Alienation 
Prohibition 
In his carefully researched essay, Soepomo demonstrated the inconsistent 
application of the Alienation Prohibition throughout many court verdicts between 
1907 and 1936. His finding led him to the grim conclusion that those legal practices to 
implement the law fell short in meeting its mandate. He argued that in practice, 
no absolute prohibition exists in the alienation of native land rights, nor is such 
[a thing] wanted by the government; St. 1875 No. 179, which is strict and 
absolute in character, is not reflected by the [practice of] law in reality. 
(Soepomo 1936, 144; emphasis added) 
In this sentence, Soepomo used “native land rights” (inlandsche grondrechten) as 
opposed to “native usufruct rights to land” (inlandsche gebruiksrecht op land), the 
official term the government used to refer to Natives’ relationship to land. He used 
unambiguous words in expressing his judgment that the government lacked the 
commitment to implement the Alienation Prohibition. Not only the sentence, but even 
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the choice of words demonstrates a critical assessment of the government as 
represented by the Binnenlands Bestuur. 
Rich in detail, Soepomo’s essay filled full sixty pages in ITR publications. 
Divided into six sections, the essay includes discussion on the history and legal 
character11 of the decree; an interpretation of the keywords used in the decree;12 
reviews of the court decision on land transactions13 related to Alienation Prohibition; a 
special section on a unique form of land transaction known as afkoop, or “redeeming” 
of Native use rights; thirteen transactions Soepomo considered to be in blatant 
disregard of the Alienation Prohibition; and a conclusion. Consequently, my 
exploration here can only capture the key passages that supported Soepomo’s 
argument that the government was actually reluctant to enforce the Alienation 
Prohibition. I do so by focusing on two key themes infused in his essay, that is, by 
following his review of court verdicts on land transactions and by foregrounding his 
dissection of the afkoopconstructie, a form of transactions warranted by Bijblad 3020 
that made possible skirting the Alienation Prohibition. In this way, I hope to do justice 
to making visible Soepomo’s autonomy as a legal scholar of Native origin in a 
colonized condition through the way he contested the government’s tacit assent of 
what he considered to be a breach of the Alienation Prohibition. 
                                                 
11 What was understood as the legal character was the agreement among legal scholars that a non-
Native could exercise land rights that existed in a Native legal realm to which he did not belong, and 
vice versa.  
12 The keywords used were usufruct rights (gebruiksrecht), land (grond), not susceptible to alienation 
(nietvatbaar voor vervreemding), by Native to non-Native (door inlander aan niet-inlander), and 
agreement (overeenkomsten). 
13 The transaction categories included sale under distress/auction (executoriale verkooping), legal 
separation (toescheiding), compulsory purchase for public use (ontegeining ten algemeenen nutte), use 
of straw man (gebruik van stromannen), hypothecation (verpanding), security/collateral in a loan 
(zekerheidsstelling), purchase of trees (verkopen van boomen), and pawning of trees (verpanding van 
boomen). 
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The Breach of the Alienation Prohibition 
To justify the Bijblad 3020, the Raad van Indie used as a legal basis the third 
article in the Agrarian Law of 1870 that did not prohibit the sale of building and 
planting rights of small plots of land by the government, “or sale of land cultivated by 
the Natives or sale of communal land or other land belonging to a Native village as 
long as the Native holders of use rights have voluntarily relinquished their right” 
(Staatsblad 1870 No. 55). Using this article, the Raad van Indie laid out the 
mechanism to transfer native land use rights into the European legal realm known as 
afkoopconstructie, or “redemption transaction,” in the manner described earlier. This 
mechanism was exorbitantly expensive because in addition to redemption payments 
for the Native and the village where the land was located, a non-Native had to pay the 
government triple or quadruple the price he paid to the Native. Unsurprisingly, under-
the-table transactions were rampant. Although it seemed legal, Soepomo considered 
the redemption transaction a deliberately set legal loophole to enable skirting the 
Alienation Prohibition. It was “the routine path through which land under the realm of 
native property rights passed on to the European legal sphere” (Soepomo 1936, 94). 
The redemption transaction was not the only way land transferred from a 
Native to a non-Native; at least eight other legal and illegal forms actually existed.14 
Because many land transactions that ended up in court took one of these forms, the 
judiciary was aware of them, yet verdicts varied and some were inconsistent with the 
Alienation Prohibition. Soepomo reviewed all eight of these transactions, two of 
which I sample here: land pawning (verpanding) and land as collateral for debt 
                                                 
14 Eight of the most popular included sale under distress (executoriale verkooping), legal separation 
(toescheiding), compulsory purchase for public use (ontegeining ten algemeenen nutte), sale using a 
straw man (gebruik van stromannen), land pawning (verpanding), land sale as security/collateral in a 
loan (zekerheidsstelling), purchase of trees (verkopen van boomen), and pawning of trees (verpanding 
van boomen). 
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(zekerheidsstelling), forms of transaction frequently used by the Natives to raise cash 
when no other means was available.15 
Land Pawning (verpanding) 
In the first sample of cases, Soepomo began by asking whether land pawning 
(Indonesian: gadai, gade) fell within the boundary of the Alienation Prohibition.16 He 
noted that in a number of cases, the landraad17 voided pawning of Native land to non-
Natives.18 Soepomo pointed out how between 1875 and 1902 the government officials 
considered pawning of native land not in breach of the Alienation Prohibition. 
Demonstrating the complexity of land pawning, Soepomo cited a number of 
his contemporaries who considered land pawning to non-Natives neither alienation nor 
an act directly prohibited by law. The issue was so delicate that scholars were known 
to have changed their position on whether pawning breached the prohibition, such as 
Barend ter Haar, an established adat law scholar and a professor at the Batavia 
Rechtshoogeschool. Ter Haar considered pawning of native land to non-Natives a 
breach of the Alienation Prohibition only if it was intended for an indirect transfer of 
land use rights. He later recanted his position (ITR 142, 238), when he said that land 
pawning in general was indeed subject to the Alienation Prohibition because “the 
pledgor could let the pawning deadline pass so that even if the pledgee did not intend 
                                                 
15 See Breman 1983 for an in-depth study of land alienation in Cheribon in late-colonial Indonesia, and 
the attempt by colonial officials to control the acquisition of Native land by non-Native money lenders. 
Even though these moneylenders were non-Dutch, Breman held the Dutch accountable for the 
impoverishment of the Natives introduced by the brutal sugar industry and rotational planting. Such 
practices drove already impoverished Natives to pawn off their land in desperation. 
16 I described in detail the mechanism of native land pawning in chapter 5. 
17 The landraad is the government’s court for the native population. The Raad van Justitie was the court 
of appeals for landraad decisions, and the highest level of appeal was provided by the Supreme Court 
(Hooggerechtshof). See also chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the judicial hierarchy in the East 
Indies. 
18 Landraad in Bonthaen in verdict of September 3, 1931 (ITR 135, 343), Raad van Justitie in Surabaya 
of January 1, 1932 (ITR 136, 281). 
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to extend the pawning period, he had to end the pawning agreement and make the 
pledgor a full owner of the pawned land. Such is precisely what the Alienation 
Prohibition sought to avoid” (Soepomo 1936, 112). 
Assessing ter Haar’s position, Soepomo concluded that ter Haar considered the 
Alienation Prohibition of such importance to the public order. The fact that “the only 
possible result of the pledgor’s non-discharge and the ‘passivity’ of the pledgee is a 
virtual conversion [of the transaction] into a ‘lepas’ transfer is enough for [ter Haar] to 
consider the transaction as to be an indirect transfer” (Soepomo 1936, 112, emphasis 
added). 
Soepomo openly disagreed with ter Haar. He argued that in the Native property 
regime, pawning was never understood to be a full transfer of native property rights; 
thus, pawning in normal cases should not be considered an alienation. In pawning, the 
pledgee retained full control of the land, which lasted forever, even when the pledgor 
let the discharge period pass (112). In relation to this argument, verdicts by the 
Landraad in Djambi on December 6, 1934 (ITR 142, 235) and by the Supreme Court 
on October 31, 1901 (ITR 79, 54) had judged such transactions void. To Soepomo, the 
pawning of native land to a non-Native was in direct breach of article 1 in St. 1918 
No. 88,19 which stated that the temporary enjoyment of native land by non-Natives 
could only be obtained in accordance with an ordinance under the umbrella of ratified 
land rent agreement. And indeed, pawning did provide temporary pleasure, fulfilling 
this code (Soepomo 1936, 113–114). Soepomo stressed that adat law did not recognize 
in its nomenclature the Dutch category of sale (verkoop) with the right to repurchase 
(wederinkoop). Adat law understood a sale only as a lepas-transfer, a final, permanent 
transfer of ownership. A transfer with a condition of repurchasing from the buyer upon 
                                                 
19 Land lease ordinance that replaced the previous ordinance issued in 1900 (St. 1900 No. 240), the 
ordinance that informed Bernard Ledeboer in his search for a land lease in Banjoewangi. See more in 
chapter 2.  
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a certain sum of money was not a “lepas-transfer.” No permanent transfer of 
ownership took place; hence it was not an alienation, but a “pawning” (115). Implied 
in this understanding, the original landholder continued to retain his full ownership. 
Security/Collateral in a Loan (zekerheidsstelling) 
Now we move along to the second sample case. In the adat legal system, 
ownership of land and ownership of objects upon or under the land were considered 
two distinct legal objects (Soepomo 1936: 117).20 This particular category had 
triggered complications in legal transactions of land between Natives and non-Natives 
because the prohibition of land alienation excluded the sale of buildings or crops 
standing on the land. Such exclusion essentially created another legal loophole in the 
Alienation Prohibition. In fact, as Soepomo discovered in his research, many verdicts 
on the sale of houses standing on Native land to non-Natives were decided without 
ever mentioning the legal consideration of the Alienation Prohibition. To Soepomo, 
this simply demonstrated the lack of weight of the ruling, such that judges either 
overlooked or deliberately dismissed it (Soepomo 1936, 117). Such verdicts included 
one by the Raad van Justitie of Surabaya on September 22, 1926, and a verdict of 
Raad van Justitie of Padang on March 31, 1932. Verdicts faithful to the ruling of St. 
1875 No. 179 in which the judges considered similar transactions void were 
exemplified by the decision of the Raad van Justitie of Makassar on November 6, 
1925; by the Landraad of Tulungagung on May 30, 1931;21 by the Landraad of 
                                                 
20 Compare this with Prodjodikoro’s exposition in chapter 3 about the adat law orientation to legal 
objects in Surakarta, that is, that courts were established based on legal objects, not on legal subjects. 
21 This was a verdict of the Landraad in Toeloengagoeng in May 1931 (ITR 135, 247), which decided 
that stone houses by their nature should follow the fate of the land, so when a transaction of land and 
houses was not meant as two separate transactions, if the sale of the land was invalidated, the sale of the 
house was of no legal value.  
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Poerwodadi on November 30, 1933;22 and by the Landraad of Padang Sidempuan on 
July 31, 1933.23 
Against this tug of war over the legal interpretation of the ruling, Soepomo 
noticed a gradual divergence from the mandated prohibition that began as early as 
1926. On September 15, 1926, the Raad van Justitie of Surabaya decided that because 
the Alienation Prohibition did not explicitly prohibit the alienation of structures built 
on land owned by a Native to a non-Native, the latter could legally buy a house built 
on a Native land plot without acquiring legal title to the land. The same Raad van 
Justitie veered further away from the Alienation Prohibition in a verdict dated 
November 17, 1926, where it decided that 
By purchasing a house standing on native land, a European acquires the right 
of use of the land, for as long as it is necessary to allow him the enjoyment of 
the house. This law was to remain valid against each succeeding native owner 
of the land; as long as the house is not in any way gone, this right “in so far” is 
subject to “objective” nature. (Soepomo 1936, 119) 
Within a year, an appeal decision by the Supreme Court confirmed the decision by the 
Raad van Justitie of Surabaya, because it 
Protected the European buyer of the house against the legal successor of the 
native owners of the estate, by deciding that since the land was sold, the [new] 
Native property owner had to accept the sale of the land under the condition 
that all obligations [towards the house buyer] should pass with the sale (Case 
of 6 October 1927, T24 127, 12). (Soepomo 1936, 119) 
                                                 
22 This was a verdict of the Landraad in Poerwodadi in November 1933 (ITR 139, 242), that the sale of 
a non-stone house which was not bundled with the yard by a Native to a Chinese was valid, but that the 
demand to vacate the house along with the yard should be denied.  
23 The Landraad in Padangsidempuan said in its verdict of July 1933 (ITR 139, 270) that the sale of a 
house was inseparable from the sale of the house’s estate, so that the sale of a residential house with the 
yard by an Indonesian to a Chinese was in conflict with St. 1875 No. 179. 
24 “T” here is an acronym for the Indies Journal of Law, used as a convention for reference to ITR. 
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A couple years later, the Supreme Court inched even further away from the Alienation 
Prohibition through a verdict on April 2, 1931, in which it decided that through a sale 
to a non-Native, a Native owner of a residential plot with a stone house had yielded 
control of the property to the buyer, and that the Native owner and his successors had 
to allow the land to be occupied by the non-Native person whose house—in which he 
lived—stood upon that land. 
In these verdicts, Soepomo made visible the succeeding arguments in the court 
of law that decided that no violation to the Alienation Prohibition had been committed 
in any of these sales, because the object of the transaction was not the land with native 
rights (inlandsch bezitsrecht) but the house built upon it. These verdicts essentially 
concluded that after the transaction, the new owner had to assume the already existing 
burden on the property, that is, the right of the house buyer to occupy the land 
(Soepomo 1936, 119). 
The Supreme Court decision of April 2, 1931, set a precedent for similar 
verdicts. The Landraad of Kendal on September 6, 1933, split a transaction between a 
native and a non-native into a transaction of a plot of native land and of a house. The 
landraad declared the transaction void but the purchase of the house valid. The 
property took upon itself the burden on behalf of the house buyer, following the 
example given by the Supreme Court. In this manner, the judicial system tacitly 
assented to a means to skirt the alienation. The Raad van Justitie in Surabaya took a 
similar position in its verdict of January 1, 1932, in which it was decided that the 
pledging of a residential plot and a house to an Arab was void as far as the plot was 
concerned but valid as far the house was concerned (Soepomo 1936, 123). 
Through this meticulous line up of cases and verdicts in all their possible 
permutations, Soepomo demonstrated that the judicial institution had only haphazardly 
implemented the Alienation Prohibition mandated by St. 1875 No. 179. Such an 
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inconsistent line of jurisprudence had clearly blurred the boundary between what was 
and what was not in violation of that law. Soepomo concluded that 
Through the redeeming (afkoop) of the native property rights, the non-native 
does not automatically acquire the ownership of the land; he is not entitled to 
occupy the land. Yet in practice the redeemer immediately occupies the land 
and behaves as the master of this land. By doing so, he is guilty of unlawful 
occupation of the State’s free domain, for which he could be criminally 
prosecuted under St. 1912 No. 177. (Soepomo 1936, 136) 
Ironically, the government created yet another loophole to allow this practice 
to continue in the rental regulation of St. 1924 No. 240. With this regulation, a non-
Native buyer of native land could “rent” the land from the government prior to 
officially transferring the legal status of the land to European property rights 
(eigendom) or building rights (opstal). 
In the passages on land pawning and Alienation Prohibition, Soepomo 
demonstrated how different interpretations could emerge. He drew attention to the 
difference between his and ter Haar’s readings of adat law on pawning (gadai) and 
how the overlapping of the Dutch thought world onto a Native legal realm resulted in 
a misunderstanding of the nature of the native transaction of pawning. The result of 
this misunderstanding was the blanket categorization of land pawning as alienation, 
which imposed a very grave consequence on a native landholder when and if Bijblad 
3020 sprang into action. In the same section, Soepomo also drew on actual Raad van 
Justitie verdicts that gradually shifted the jurisprudence into taking the Alienation 
Prohibition less seriously than it should have been considering the “strict and absolute 
characteristic” of the law, such that at one point the Supreme Court also began to 
disregard the Alienation Prohibition. There was, indeed, a growing gap between the 
mandate of the Alienation Prohibition and the actual practice of the law. 
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Dissecting the “Redeeming Transaction” (Afkooptransactie) 
Raad van Indie issued the executive order Bijblad 3020 as a means to regulate 
officially a sanctioned land transfer called a redeeming transaction (afkooptransactie). 
Soepomo observed how this fiction of “redemption” had been taken to support the 
argument that the relinquishing of rights by a Native peasant was not in violation of 
the Alienation Prohibition either directly or indirectly (Soepomo 1936, 127). To 
address this misreading of the law, Soepomo had to disprove that such a form of 
relinquishing existed in adat law. 
Soepomo explained in his article how different adat areas had different laws 
for relinquishing native land rights. A native in East Java relinquished his rights if the 
land was abandoned, neglected, or if he left the village permanently. Even in areas 
where the village’s right of disposal was no longer exercised, the relinquished land 
returned to the village control if there was no one willing to take over the land. There 
were cases in which peasants fled from a village due to the excessive burden of corvee 
labor and no one was willing to take over tilling responsibility (see chapter 3). In these 
cases, adat law acknowledged the relinquishing of land rights, and the land would 
return to village control. The redeeming transaction as spelled out in Bijblad 3020 
utterly denied the village right of allocation, and instead ordered the land to return to 
the government as part of free state domain. To Soepomo, such an outcome was only 
valid for land situated in urban communities that no longer exercised rights of 
allocation due to the absence of a jural community (Soepomo 1936, 128). 
Because adat law was not familiar with the form of land relinquishing defined 
by Bijblad 3020, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in 1931 to ensure that land 
transactions took place transparently, mirroring Bijblad 3020. Soepomo mentioned it 
carefully in his essay: 
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The ruling by the Supreme Court on January 8, 1931 (T 133, 421) stated that 
for the relinquishing of native property rights [for land] to become a free state 
domain, no particular convention is required, and that the [act of] relinquishing 
is to be considered a unilateral act of the entitled owner, which immediately 
impacts him in the following sense: that he loses his rights, and neither the 
Government nor the redeemer are expected to accept his native property rights 
to [still] be in effect. (Soepomo 1936, 128; original italics) 
Such a ruling had no support in law. 
To Soepomo, all the regulations, legal rulings, and the decision by the Supreme 
Court to implement Bijblad 3020 masked an unpalatable reality: Afkooptransactie, the 
redemption transaction, was simply an agreement to buy and sell and in truth felt like 
a purchasing transaction. It troubled Soepomo that he could hardly find a judicial 
decision that categorized the relinquishing of native land through permanent land 
transfer as alienation, a judicial decision that considered such transaction void based 
on the Alienation Prohibition (Soepomo 1936, 129). Instead, he found that the court 
took the formal designation of the agreement to reflect a genuine transaction when it 
was anything but. He contended that “Many judges had deluded themselves by 
considering buying and selling transactions between a native and non-native 
‘redemption of rights’” (Soepomo 1936, 129). Such a decision was made by the 
Landraad in Banyumas in a verdict of March 23, 1931; the Landraad in Serang in a 
verdict of December 17, 1931; and the Raad van Justitie in Batavia in a verdict of 
December 9, 1932. 
In his evaluation of the redemption transaction, Soepomo reviewed four sets of 
cases with verdicts taken by landraad and the higher court, Raad van Justitie. Here, I 
narrate only two sets of cases that clearly demonstrate the day-to-day practice of the 
redemption transaction. 
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First Set of Cases: Buying a House on Native Land 
The first case involved a transaction of a house with an agreement to “buy and 
sell with the right to buy back” (koop en verkoop met recht van wederinkoop), 
complete with the relinquishing of the native use right of the land where the house 
stood. It was frequently the case that where transactions involving the “right to buy 
back” were never completed, the sellers intentionally let the deadline pass without 
redeeming the land. This was a widespread practice by non-Native moneylenders in 
the case of a defaulted loan. In this case, Soepomo concluded that the clause “buy and 
sell with the right to buy back” practically sidestepped the ruling of the Alienation 
Prohibition. The Raad van Justitie in Surabaya on November 17, 1926, declared 
invalid the case of a native relinquishing his usufruct right because the clause included 
in the agreement was not followed by an actual execution of “buyback” 
(wederinkoop). Soepomo approved this decision. However, in the appeal, the Supreme 
Court commuted the verdict, arguing that 
By no means it is required . . . of the party who has practically renounced the 
rights [to land] to actually leave the land in this sense: that he actually should 
vacate the land without being permitted to have a further say with respect to 
this land, [or] in any derivative way to retain some legal relationship to the 
person for whom he has done the renouncing. (Verdict of 6 October 1927, ITR 
127, 12, quoted in Soepomo 1936, 130, emphasis added.) 
Soepomo could not suppress his bemusement, to put it mildly, at the Supreme Court’s 
decision. To him it was akin to mocking the prohibition of native land transfer, 
Does the Supreme Court assume that the [native] right to land had passed over 
to the European [legal realm]? If yes, then this transaction is in essence an 
alienation and consequently is in conflict with St. 1875 No. 179. If one 
assumes that the land through the renunciation of the native right becomes a 
free state domain [as directed by Bijblad 3020], then can the European pass the 
right to the house he bought over to the domain of European property right? 
(Soepomo 1936, 131) 
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In this paragraph Soepomo challenged the interpretation of the law in Bijblad 3020. 
One senses an undertone of frustration, if not a raging grievance, in his measured, 
highly erudite sentences. 
The Supreme Court’s position was soon followed by several verdicts in various 
landraad in the colony, such as the landraad in Makassar in a verdict of November 1, 
1933,25 and a verdict by the landraad of Purworedjo of September 19, 1932 (T 138, p. 
429).26 Here, Soepomo’s frustration came to the surface and was more visible. He 
wondered aloud, 
I ask myself, how can this court of law take the materialization of this as a 
relinquishing of right, where the property owner—by refusing to leave the 
ground—properly demonstrated his unwillingness to let “los” [lepas, 
permanent transfer of rights to take place]. In my opinion, the [native] land 
owner had simply not perform his part to relinquish the land and the 
redeemer—after repayment of the debt of 1300 gulden—could only demand 
the compensation against the non-fulfillment of the obligation. (Soepomo 
1936, 132) 
Soepomo agreed with ter Haar that to allow the renunciation of native rights of a 
residential plot was simply a ploy by the government to let non-Natives buy a house 
standing on native land and to obtain a European title to the plot. 
                                                 
25 Soepomo noted that this decision came about as a result of the Landraad’s observation that the 
Government could enforce eviction of the non-native buyer of a stone house standing on land whose 
native ownership right had been relinquished by the native seller of the house. Thus the Landraad meant 
to allow the land, after the relinquishing, to become free state domain, while the buyer of the house 
forfeited the right to the land. This transaction paved the way for a transfer of legal title to European 
title, because the verdict treated the “sale” of a house with the “right to buy back” (as a) renunciation of 
the Native right of disposal upon the land of the house, and therefore the buyer could request a 
European legal title upon that land (Soepomo 1936, 131). 
26 A native landowner had relinquished his right to land to a Chinese over compensation of f 1300, on 
the condition that if he failed to pay back before a set deadline, the relinquishing of rights would take 
effect. When the landowner failed to repay his debt and refused leave the land, the Chinese buyer took 
an eviction action, which the local Landraad granted (Soepomo 1936, 132). 
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Second Set of Cases: The Government’s Tacit Agreement 
The second set of cases described the actual practice in land transactions as 
prescribed by Bijblad 3020. Bijblad 3020 required the government to act as an 
intermediary when a non-Native acquired a Native’s land to ensure that it passed over 
into European eigendom status. In practice, many redeemers of Native land never 
proceeded to do so, keeping the status of their land in the Native realm indefinitely, 
which was punishable by St. 1918 No. 177. However, a number of court decisions had 
strengthened this executive order. 
In 1916, the Supreme Court decided that a non-Native redeemer could neither 
acquire land under native usufruct rights nor acquire any rights unless he requested 
that the government transfer the land’s legal status to the European property rights 
form (eigendom) (ITR 107, 400). The Raad van Justitie in Surabaya, in a verdict of 
April 13, 1921 (ITR 125, 53), and in Padang, in a verdict of October 28, 1926, 
followed this precedent: a redeemer of Native land use rights acquired no rights on the 
ground. Soepomo judged these decisions correct. However, he observed an oddity in 
the Bijblad 3020 implementation; he noted that there was no regulation that obliged 
the government to force the redeemer to transfer his land, which had then become a 
free state domain, into European eigendom. In cases such as these, he found that the 
court assigned only a right of priority (voorkeurrecht) to the redeemer of land to pass 
over the land into the European legal realm. The Raad van Justitie in Surabaya took 
this stand in their decision of April 13, 1921, in which they support the priority right 
(prioriteitsrecht) of the redeemer, while other verdicts spoke of the pre-emptive right 
(voorkeurrecht) of the redeemer, such as decisions made by the Landraad in 
Banyumas of March 23, 1931 (ITR 134, 665) and that of the Landraad in Serang on 
December 17, 1931 (ITR 138, 385). These decisions were in line with the legal 
interpretation offered by Maassen and Hens, who wrote “that an eigendom application 
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is set aside, if a non-native protest against it on the basis that he is the one who had 
bought the native right and he wanted to have title to the land” (Soepomo 1936, 134). 
In reality, Soepomo pointed out that application to pass land over to a European form 
of property right was very rarely made within the grace period, since the Government 
hardly ever forced the actual execution. As a result, a redeemer would keep his 
preferential rights indefinitely, and he could even pawn or sell the land using rules 
under the Native legal realm (Soepomo 1936, 134). 
In these two sets of cases, we observe how Soepomo exposed the real nature of 
afkoopconstructie, the redemption transaction, as simply a transaction designed to 
skirt the mandate of the Alienation Prohibition. The intricate rulings and regulations 
were not only created by Raad van Indie and enforced by the Binnenlands Bestuur, but 
also strengthened by various hierarchies of the judiciary, and most dishearteningly by 
the Supreme Court. These rulings to Soepomo were no more than masks of the 
hypocrisy of the legal practices. Soepomo was deeply disturbed by judges who 
deluded themselves by accepting the fiction of the redemption transaction. 
Law in Theory vs. Law in Practice: Soepomo Accuses 
Two key issues emerged in Soepomo’s essay: the half-heartedness of the 
government and the judicial system toward implementing the Alienation Prohibition 
mandate, and the impracticality and ambiguity of Bijblad 3020, such that it was being 
continually stepped over. 
As a rechtskundige and a graduate of Leiden University United Faculty of Law 
and Letters, well indoctrinated in the independence of the judicial system, Soepomo 
found it difficult to tolerate these less than stringent legal practices that shredded the 
credibility of the judicial system. The yawning gap between theory and practical 
implementation of the Alienation Prohibition disillusioned Soepomo, especially given 
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that his investigation revealed how both the judiciary and the Binnenlands Bestuur 
were complicit in manipulating the existing loopholes. Soepomo lamented this reality: 
“In practice (the law) recognizes the deliberate transfer of native land to non-native 
with the government’s cooperation, with the understanding that the non-native 
intended to acquire European eigendom rights” (1936, 140). This transfer was 
facilitated through the legal invention called afkoopconstructie, redeeming 
construction, which to Soepomo was nothing more than a contract to buy and sell: “In 
jurisprudence the fiction of redemption is taken as real, in fact it has come to be 
accepted that, in the land transaction between a native and a non-native which the 
judge understood as redemption (afkoop) and acknowledged as valid, the Alienation 
Prohibition is undermined” (1936, 141). 
Soepomo found the hypocritical implementation of the law utterly 
unacceptable. He agreed with van Vollenhoven that the Alienation Prohibition was 
redacted (geredigeerd) in such a way that each word was literally subject to 
conflicting interpretation. Despite the dissent of opinion both in the literature and the 
jurisprudence, 
The standpoint taken by the Court in the verdict of April 2, 1931 . . . regarding 
the native owner of a residential land and a sale of a stone house to a non-
native [meant it was] not treated as conflicting with St. 1875 No. 179. [The 
verdict] only [required that] a trust be established upon the house on that 
land . . . , which the native owner and his successors have to indicate [to future 
residential land buyers] that the land is occupied by an entitled person who 
lived in the house [on that estate]. [The verdict thus] removes the Alienation 
Prohibition with regard to the residential estate with the stone house in all 
sense/denotation. (Soepomo 1936, 142, emphasis added) 
As a solution to the entangled Alienation Prohibition rule, Soepomo suggested 
a revision. Surprisingly, however, instead of proposing his own revision, he endorsed 
the recommended revision written by the Spit Commission, which goes as follows: 
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It will be declared invalid by law, and punishable, each legal transaction under 
whatever form, directly or indirectly, which has the objective to provide land 
for disposal to non-natives, land upon which Native land rights is exercised, or 
on the common grounds on which buildings or plantations, other than in cases 
under general regulation or authorized. (Soepomo 1936, 142)27 
Soepomo endorsed this proposed revision of the law, writing 
This proposal relates to the idea [the Spit Commission] has recommended, to 
allow two exceptions to the Alienation Prohibition, namely to allow alienation 
of native land to Europeans-blijvers within certain and prior authorization of 
the administrators; and [to allow] for Dutch subjects [land] for housing, and for 
agricultural purposes for the former [i.e. European-blijvers]. . . . Indeed, if this 
prohibition is redacted as such, similar to what is proposed by the Commission, 
the controversies discussed above will be removed. . . . The prohibition 
stipulation designed by the Commission speaks of legal acts which aim to 
furnish non-Natives directly or indirectly the disposal over Native lands as well 
existing buildings or plantings upon the land. (Soepomo 1936, 142–143) 
In this way, Soepomo was dancing in tune with C.C. van Helsdingen demand. 
Soepomo continued, 
Circumvention of the ban on transfer with regard to transaction of native land, 
formal sale of the house standing thereon, or the crops thereon to name but a 
few, according to the proposed provision will no longer be possible. (Soepomo 
1936, 143) 
With this revised redaction, numerous illegal transactions to transfer land to non-
Natives would fall within the proposed new prohibition. The pawning of land to non-
Natives would become a prohibited transaction because it furnished the pawn holder 
(pledgor) with the right of disposal over the pawned land. It would also stop the 
                                                 
27 In Dutch: Van rechtswege wordt nieti—en strafbaar—verklaard elke rechtshandeling, onder welken 
vorm ook, die ten doel heeft, een niet-Inlander, rechtsstreeks of middelijk, de beschikking te 
verschaffen over gronden, waarop Inlandsche grondrechten worden uitgeoefend—dan wel over de op 
die gronden voorkomende opstallen of beplantingen—anders dan in gevallen bij of krachtens 
algemeene verordening toegelaten.  
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acquisition of native land via a straw man, a means by which non-Natives acquired 
Native land. 
Soepomo’s endorsement of the work of the Spit Commission tells a story of 
unexpected alliances in the constellation of colonial legal scholars. While Mohammad 
Jamin and his team reacted to the Spit Commission’s recommendation by setting a 
self-appointed commission to investigate the state of Native land rights, Soepomo did 
not hesitate to back the Spit Commission’s finding. However, it was not a wholesale 
endorsement. What he supported was the elimination of loopholes that had allowed the 
circumvention of the Alienation Prohibition. He made his position clear, albeit in a 
rather circumvented way, by writing, 
With the question whether and to what extent the Alienation Prohibition should 
be maintained, I am not engaging with [it here], because that question is of a 
political and socio-economic nature, which is beyond the scope of this report. 
(Soepomo 1936, 144) 
If Soepomo endorsed the ‘cleaner’ and ‘clearer’ redaction of the law per the 
Commission’s proposal, he made explicit his refusal to evaluate the desirability of 
certain exceptions proposed by the commission: 
Consequently, I do not concern myself with the question regarding the 
desirability of the Commission’s . . . proposed exceptions for the Alienation 
Prohibition. [Nevertheless] the study of the legal aspect of this fundamental 
principle of the Indies agrarian politics led me to a conclusion, that in fact there 
exists no absolute Alienation Prohibition on native land rights and such 
(absolutism) is not desired by the Government, [and] that despite St. 1875 No. 
179 bearing a strict and absolute mandate in nature, the law is not reflected in 
the reality. (Soepomo 1936, 144, emphasis added) 
But rather, for Soepomo, what was more pressing was that 
It seems to me—supposing that the current situation remains entrenched—the 
purity and truthfulness of our law desperately needed a thorough review of the 
St. 1875 No. 179 in the following sense: that what is printed there stiupates 
what for many years be applied as law. (Soepomo 1936, 144) 
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In summary, through his essay and speech at the triennial Netherlands Indies 
Lawyers Association, Soepomo made four arguments that punctured the image of a 
benevolent agrarian regime. He pointed out the diverging jurisprudence that cropped 
up in 1926, which was followed by numerous legal decisions by the Landraad, Raad 
van Justitie, and the Supreme Court. He exposed the real nature of afkoopconstructie, 
the redemption transaction, as a transaction deliberately designed to skirt the legal 
demand of the Alienation Prohibition. He protested the hypocrisy and the 
inconsistency of lower-hierarchy orders, in this case the Bijblad 3020 issued by the 
Binnenlands Bestuur that manipulated the loopholes deliberately created in St. 1875 
No. 179. He endorsed the revision of the law created by the Spit Commission, a 
commission viewed with mixed feelings by numerous Indonesians who felt threatened 
by the Indo-Europeans’ demand for land rights. 
In building his case, Soepomo relied on thorough analyses of empirical data: 
verdicts of cases across the archipelago, across time, and across the judicial hierarchy. 
By doing so, he was able to draw a picture of concrete legal practices regarding a law, 
the Alienation Prohibition, designed to meet the contradictory objectives of the 
colonial agrarian regime. His puncturing arguments shed doubt on the carefully 
nurtured image of a benevolent agrarian regime in the colony, one that aimed to 
forward the economy by introducing commercial agricultural estates while protecting 
Native rights to land. An idealist trained in the tradition of the Batavia Rechtsschool, a 
school that claimed to educate independent minds and encourage critical thinking, 
Soepomo drew his strength from the repository of his Rechtsschool—and later Leiden 
University—experiences. However, he did not—or could not?—completely shake off 
the traces of power relations, proved by his safe decision to endorse the Spit 
Commission’s recommended revision for the Alienation Prohibition. Indeed, an 
autonomous subject he was, autonomous enough to exert transformation into the legal 
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discourse of the Alienation Prohibition, but never quite liberated from the entangled 
network of state forms and state institutions. 
The Debate Continued: The Professors Responded 
From among a number of lawyers assigned to critique the essays of Soepomo 
and van Hattum were professors at the Batavia Rechtshoogeschool, J.H.A. Logemann 
and Barren ter Haar. Logemann’s response to Soepomo’s and van Hattum’s 
interpretation of the Alienation Prohibition was so critical that it verged on being 
dismissive of their analyses. He characterized their readings of the Alienation 
Prohibition as breaching a long and solid tradition in the interpretation of the ruling, a 
disconnect from practical realities, a refusal to protect the priority-claim rights, and a 
blame against the government they considered carrying a practice in conflict with the 
system of law (ITR 1936, 447). He insisted that they used too narrow a reading of the 
historical context of related regulations and misunderstood the intention of the 
lawmakers. A more thorough and comprehensive reading of St. 1875 No. 179 that 
took into consideration related regulations, Logemann argued, would have led 
Soepomo and van Hattum to an interpretation consistent with the current jurisprudence 
backed by 60 years of history: that any illegal transaction in breach of the Alienation 
Prohibition would result in the nullity of the transaction and a relinquishing of Native 
rights, upon which land ownership returned to the State. The related regulations 
Logemann referred to included a government regulation on land pawning 
(verpondingsordonnantie) in 1823, a ruling issued in the Constitutional Regulation 
1854 Article 62 sub 2, St. 1861 No. 45, and St. 1912 No. 177. 
From the response printed in the ITR, it was clear that Logemann indulged in a 
didactic response to these young scholars. He took his time in narrating the historical 
development of the Alienation Prohibition. From 1823 to 1861, the legal status of all 
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land in non-Native possession had to go under the jurisdiction of Western commercial 
rights (westersche zakelijke rechten). The refusal to conform would lead the 
government to consider the land merely under the rulings of personal right of loan 
(persoonlijk recht van bruikleen), and unlawful occupants of the land would be 
considered “tacit borrowers” (stillzwijgende bruikleener). Under this ruling, non-
Natives could still alienate land from Native use rights. The only way to protect the 
Natives from dispossession was through what Logemann called the “establishment of 
rigorous restrictions” using the apparatus of the Binnenlands Bestuur, in this case by 
reprimanding Residents severely if they had allowed pawning to take place in regions 
designated off-limits to non-Natives. 
Regulations for non-Native land rights changed over time. The Constitutional 
Regulation of 1854 included in Article 62 paragraph 2 a ruling that reflected the 
settlement politics in the East Indies. The government decreed that it could issue the 
European form of land rights only for small parcels of land intended as extensions of 
towns and villages and for land directed for industry. Big parcels for agricultural land 
in rural areas were off-limits. In 1861, the government changed the earlier rulings on 
the legal nature of land under non-Natives’ possession with St. 1861 No. 45. It decreed 
that non-Natives could no longer retain their land under “persoonlijk recht van 
bruikleen”; instead, they had to transfer the land’s legal status to the system of 
Western commercial rights (westersche zakelijke rechten). This meant that there was a 
new arsenal to fight off illegal occupation through fiscal regulations contained in civil 
law (fiscaal civielrechtelijke). Logemann reminded everyone that these avenues to 
fight illegal land occupation were honored from 1861 to 1912, when the government 
decreed a new ruling with St. 1912 No. 177, that said 
Use by non-natives, for any purpose, or use for their benefit to the domain of 
the State owned land, upon which or for which no established rights of others 
are imposed, is prohibited. (Staatsblad 1912, No 177, in Logemann 1936) 
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Logemann considered the increased appreciation of adat law among legal 
scholars to have complicated land rights and land transfer dynamics. He found its most 
awkward expression in the qualification of the Native property right as a commercial 
right (zakelijk recht). The complication was made worse when the Council of the 
Indies (Raad van Indie) found in the doctrine of interracial law that non-Natives could 
not exercise the Natives’ “foreign commercial rights” (“foreign” here seen from the 
point of view of Europeans) upon their citizenship rights (burgerlijk rechten).28 But 
the Minister of the Colonies was reluctant to build on the Raad van Indies’ finding and 
decided to wait until the theory had a solid legal basis. And this took place in 1875 
with St. 1875 No. 179, whereby it was legally explicitly stated that Native land use 
rights were not susceptible to alienation to non-Natives (Logemann 1936, 449). 
Thus, Logemann argued, the objective of St. 1875 No. 179 was none other than 
to pave the way to implement St. 1861 No. 45, that is, to restore the previous condition 
whereby an unlawful occupant of government land (after he removed the rightful 
Native claimant from the land) would have been considered to be sitting on free state 
domain (vrije landsdomein). He reasoned that in this reading the intention of the 
lawmakers was very clear, that after an unlawful occupant removed the rightful native 
claimant and settled himself on the land, he was actually occupying a piece of free 
state domain. The clarity of this intention, according to Logemann, was demonstrated 
in the retaining of this reading of the law until 1912, when the government issued an 
explicit prohibition against non-Natives utilizing land with Native use rights in any 
form. In this manner, an unlawful occupant could be punished under criminal law on 
                                                 
28 Soepomo had already clarified in his earlier paragraphs that there was no objection among legal 
scholars for an individual under a particular legal jurisdiction to exercise a right in another jurisdiction 
so long this right was legally acquired. For example, for a European who inherited land under the native 
legal realm, there was no prohibition against exercising rights regulated under adat law on that land.  
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the basis that illegal alienation of land automatically led to the land becoming a free 
state domain. 
Based on this legal narrative, Logemann concluded that the nullity (nietigheid) 
mandated by St. 1875 No. 179 was only 
Intended to take the transfer of the legal title, that usufruct right 
(gebruiksrecht) is not susceptible to alienation to non-Natives; transfer of that 
right can thus never be attained; agreements with that objective miss the effect, 
namely that effect. (Logemann 1936, 450; original italics) 
Logemann insisted that what was understood as nullity was that whenever 
there is a sale of native use right, the law would consider it a “relinquishing of rights.” 
The agreement would be nullified, and land would automatically be returned to the 
state. Logemann did acknowledge that the wording of St. 1875 No. 179 could be 
clearer; however, its lack of clarity did not forbid “this [particular] interpretation 
especially not when people had sought—as has historically been proved—the essential 
point in the first sense [i.e. that Natives’ use rights were “Not susceptible to” 
alienation], and not in the second [sense, i.e. the wording “So that”)]” (Logemann 
1936, 450). Based on this, Logemann questioned Soepomo and van Hattum’s 
intervention into what he deemed the decades of sound and solid interpretation of the 
rulings. He said, 
Then, when the intention of the lawmaker is clear and decades-long practice 
has created the meaning of living law, is there then a way on the path for the 
judges to suddenly say, I interpret those words differently? (Logemann 1936, 
450) 
With regard to Bijblad 3020, Logemann did not find the executive order to be 
interference from the government. To him, it was more of an attempt to oversee land 
transactions in order to guarantee that the Natives were not deprived of their land 
illegally. Logemann wrote a very charitable view of the government: 
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I expect of the presenters first and foremost to have thought about this 
objection, that the lawmaker had thought about redeeming [land rights] in 
order to sell only under the direct auspices of the administration. Both 
presenters rely on a passage in the supplement of Bijblad 3020. I understand 
they read that passage as such, but it is incorrect. (Logemann 1936, 450) 
In contrast to Soepomo, Logemann interpreted the interference from the government 
as only a secondary objective of Bijblad 3020, which he argued was apparent when 
one consulted the unabridged text. Logemann quoted the words of the Minister of the 
Colonies: 
‘The natives only give up their right or, if they transfer it, then transfer it over 
to the Government . . . The term or the fiction of the regulations is therefore 
that the Government through its officers . . . [make a] contract with the 
natives.” (Logemann 1936, 450) 
He concluded that the practice, which only aimed at examining whether the seller was 
adequately compensated, was thus perfectly legal. Thus the claim that the 
relinquishing of rights could only be recognized as government interference, as waged 
by Soepomo, was unfounded. 
Logemann’s critique of Soepomo’s work demonstrates the tenacity among 
certain legal scholars to stick to interpretation that had withstood the test of time. 
Charging Soepomo with having misunderstood the lawmakers’ intent and with being 
motivated by an intentional to blame the government, Logemann represented this 
reluctance to transform a given discourse, clinging loyally instead to a “solid” 
interpretation, even if this interpretation was largely homogenous and lacked the voice 
of the subjected. The fact of Logemann’s and Soepomo’s diverging interpretations is 
telling of the power relations that shaped their worldviews: although both shared 
similar rigorous educations in law, they came from the opposite ends of the spectrum 
of colonized-colonizer. 
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In contrast to Logemann, ter Haar’s response to Soepomo’s and van Hattum’s 
exposition was rather mild, because both presenters shared with ter Haar the outlook 
that land pawning under customary law should have been included in the Alienation 
Prohibition. In his response, ter Haar used the opportunity mainly to explicate his 
position on adat law land pawning in relation to the Alienation Prohibition, which he 
did by putting into context the historical development of the legal rulings surrounding 
land alienation. By historically contextualizing the rulings, ter Haar suggested, it 
would be clear that pawning of paddy fields fell under the Alienation Prohibition, in 
relation to what was understood as the functions of St. 1875 No. 179. But this had 
been muddled by historical and etymological complications. 
The function of the Alienation Prohibition, ter Haar posited, was to halt 
dispossession caused by the Natives’ own wishes to recklessly sell their land away. If 
previously lawmakers did not consider land pawning under the adat law regime to be 
alienation, the more recent cases showed that land pawning was so closely related to 
alienation that if the earlier understanding of St. 1875 No. 179 was retained (that is, 
that land pawning was not an alienation), the law’s function to halt land dispossession 
would be severely reduced. The confusion about this particular land transaction in adat 
law, ter Haar suggested, stemmed from the challenge of translating between legal 
thought worlds: the word verpanden (pawning) had its roots in the Dutch legal thought 
world but was not necessarily related to adat law’s own concept of gadai. The 
definitive character of adat law’s gadai was the period assigned to the transaction. If 
no period was stated, then the pledgee became the entitled owner of the land 
(grondgerechtigder) and could do as he wished to the land. The pledgor did have a 
right to end the gadai, but it was never obligatory. If a period was stated, and if the 
pledgor let the deadline pass without paying back, then that meant that he definitely 
gave up his right to the land. In ter Haar’s understanding, the land pawning was thus a 
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land transaction with gedjoeald (sale) as the basis, though not yet lepas (complete 
forfeiting of rights). Ter Haar’s thought process about gadai as something that would 
come under the jurisdiction of Alienation Prohibition is as follows: 
The land pawning (grondverpanding) is a land transaction with gedjoeald 
(selling) as the basis, though not yet lepas (complete forfeiting of rights). The 
control of another (person) is established, and the customary law is indifferent 
to whether the previous control will ever be restored. Pawning (verpanding) is 
therefore neither a temporary transfer nor a permanent transfer; both phrases 
are inaccurate. Pawning (verpanding) has nothing to do with concepts such as 
borrowing money, loan debt, valuable security, etc. Therefore, since pawning 
in adat law brings about a land entitlement, of which it is uncertain whether it 
will again be cancelled out, St. 1875–179, in its understood function, opposes 
the transaction. (Haar 1936, 471) 
Ter Haar’s usage of djoeal as a Dutchified past participle gedjoeald, from the 
Malay word meaning “to sell,” and lepas from the Malay word meaning “let go,” 
demonstrates a persistent attempt to elaborate an alien concept from within one’s own 
thought world. To support his argument further, ter Haar cited cases in Semarang, 
Central Java and Minangkabau, West Sumatra where djoeal gade (pawning) and 
djoeal lepas (selling) were mentioned simultaneously, while in contrast sewa (rent) 
and maro (sharecropping) were never included in the category. Ter Haar took this as a 
cue that the former terms signified a permanent transfer while the latter two were 
essentially temporary transactions in the Native legal thought world (Haar 1936, 472). 
Ter Haar understood that djoeal gadai, or pawning, had an important social 
function among Native peasants. Djoeal gadai helped peasants raise cash when no 
other economical means was available and when the person who had not yet agreed to 
the irrevocable transfer of land was required to proceed. Theoretically, with pawning 
the native owner could redeem his land at any time, yet there were many ways that the 
pawning could lapse and land use rights be transferred to the pledgee, that is, through 
lack of evidence of pawning agreements, or by additional request of money, or if due 
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to inflation the initial user allowed the pledgee to take over the land. Based on this, ter 
Haar suggested that djoeal gadai and djoeal lepas should not be considered an 
abnormal or defective form of land transaction. In fact, he argued, “the permanent 
result of the gadai transaction was as socially regular and real as direct transfer and as 
the return of paddy fields to the original owner upon payback” (Haar 1936, 473). 
Ter Haar criticized Soepomo’s and van Hattum’s allegation that lawmakers in 
the 1870s did not want to include pawning under the Alienation Prohibition. Ter Haar 
argued that at that specific time lawmakers understood pawning mainly as a form of 
collateral for debt, a financial transaction, a security for a debt or loan that involved no 
land transaction. Djoeal gadai then was understood as a form of mortgage. The 
lawmakers at that time did not understood the idea of sale with a condition of 
buyback, which was clearly an alienation transaction, and which currently was 
understood as land pawning. Ter Haar cited as an example the definition of the gade 
contract, in which the lawmakers equate the gade with the Dutch financial transaction 
akin to mortgage. In this sense, the lawmakers at that time did not wish to include such 
transactions in the Alienation Prohibition. But in reality, the pawning was a land 
transaction, akin to selling with the right to buy back. And if the lawmakers in the 
1870s had understood the gade as fundamentally a land transaction, ter Haar was 
convinced they would have included it in the Alienation Prohibition (Haar 1936, 473). 
Indeed, ter Haar pointed out, the jurisprudence was such that when pawning was 
understood as sale with the right to buy back, it was voided by the judicial institution, 
for example, 
The Council of Batavia in 1900 T 79 p. 63, the Raad van Justitie of Surabaya 
in 1905 T 85, 449 declared sale with the right of buyback to be in violation of 
St. 1875 No. 179. Compare it to the property transaction between a native and 
an Arab, which the landraad of Jambi in 1932 voided, and which was 
contained in a document titled surat djoeal beli tanah T. 136 b1.32. . . . (Haar 
1936, 473) 
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Ter Haar continued, 
Etymologically there is no objection to calling the gade-transaction alienation. 
There will result a strange claimant on the ground—the whole transaction is 
unknown in the Netherlands—therefore, one must decide on grounds other 
than etymological whether this transaction can be placed under alienation or 
not. (Haar 1936, 474) 
In his response to Soepomo, ter Haar underlined the importance of capturing 
the evolution in the understanding of Native forms of land transactions among colonial 
lawmakers. He found the etymological problem to be the reason native land pawning 
was excluded from the Alienation Prohibition until 1902: the colonial lawmakers 
misunderstood the Native concept of land pawning and used a Dutch word that failed 
to capture the Native signified. Ter Haar explicitly denied any malicious intent on the 
part of the colonial lawmakers. Nevertheless, malicious intent or not, this seemingly 
trivial misunderstanding critically shaped everyday legal practices that Soepomo had 
demonstrated in the meticulously catalogued verdicts. His exposure was a showcase 
for how a small misstep in grasping the Native’s epistemic reference powerfully 
influenced the dynamics of the colonial agrarian regime. 
Despite minor differences, ter Haar essentially agreed with Soepomo in his 
concern about the Binnenlands Bestuur’s intervention in the administration of law on 
land alienation. Ter Haar agreed with Soepomo’s reading, that “The effect of the 
annulled pawning transaction is that non-Natives acquire no right of occupation upon 
the land, and the land thus remains under the rule of the native-owner.” Ter Haar 
corrected Soepomo’s suggestion that ter Haar considered pawning illegal if it was 
meant for indirect transfer. Rather, ter Haar said, “I objected to pawning to non-
Natives not because it is an indirect transfer, but because the transaction itself 
extremely curtails the function of St. 1875 No. 179, and [thus it] must be included 
under alienation” (Haar 1936, 474). Ter Haar concluded, 
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It seems more realistic to me, on the basis of all such possibilities, to say: 
pawning transactions are consequently to be interpreted as alienation because 
they threaten the legal and social function of Sb. 1875–179. (Haar 1936, 474) 
The two respondents could not be more different in their reactions to 
Soepomo’s work. Polite to Logemann’s didactic response, Soepomo nevertheless was 
resolute in his rejection of what he considered the executive body’s intervention into 
the Alienation Prohibition rulings. He wrote, 
It is true that the Alienation Prohibition of 1875 is based on the ancient 
doctrine that a non-Native cannot exercise a Native’s right to land. Yet why—
[I] wonder—does the administration [i.e. Binnenlands Bestuur] construe the 
Alienation Prohibition to be the relinquishing [of Native use rights]? The law 
declares such transaction void, yet stipulates nothing about the consequences 
of the void. (Soepomo 1936, 475) 
Further, Soepomo rejected Logemann’s reading that the void meant in St. 1875 
No. 179 referred to situations in which, when an illegal transaction took place, not 
only was the transaction void, but the use rights of the Natives were also voided by the 
government. This was the result of Bijblad 3020. Soepomo said, 
From an agricultural politics standpoint [I] applaud the doctrine embraced by 
the administration; however, legally, [I] believe, they are not acceptable. From 
a judicial/legal perspective, sale is simply something other than relinquishing. 
(Soepomo1936, 475) 
Soepomo’s rejection was manifold. He expressed his other rejection as 
follows, 
[I] also thank Professor Logemann for the explanation that the lawmaker—
with regard to purchase agreement—accepted the fiction that the government 
was supposed to draw contract [of the redeeming transaction]. [I] believe, 
however, that the acceptance of fiction by the lawmaker deserves no applause. 
The rulings in the Law Gazette should reflect reality as closely as possible. [I] 
consider that based on these grounds, St. 1875 No. 179 must be amended. 
(Soepomo 1936, 475) 
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Soepomo’s relentless critique of Bijblad 3020 and the power of the 
Binnenlands Bestuur echoed the sentiment that teachers at the Batavia Rechtsschool 
pounded into the students, most specifically carried out by C.C. van Helsdingen (see 
chapter 1). His critique was extraordinarily focused on a very specific issue in the 
large constellation of the colonial agrarian regime, and in so doing, revealed the mask 
of an otherwise benevolent-seeming state form. 
To ter Haar, Soepomo was more conciliatory. He agreed with ter Haar’s 
position that in the adat law thought world, djoeal gade, or pawning, was equated with 
djoeal lepas, or sale. He also agreed that due to the social function of the Alienation 
Prohibition, pawning should also come under the jurisdiction of St. 1875 No. 179. 
However, Soepomo had mixed feelings about a linguistic jump, about whether a 
pawning under the European term brings “alienation.” He wrote, 
Whether customary law transactions (handelingen) can be brought under 
European conception is a difficult question. By the problem statement of the 
question of customary law, the Western educated lawyers involuntarily depart 
from European law. The mistaken conclusion they then reach had been pointed 
out by Prof. Ter Haar in his article on “Tijdsverloop.” “Alienation” is a 
Western concept that signifies (inhoudt) “transfer”; pawning in the adat law 
sense does not recognize this European law. If one now asks a question: “Is 
adat law’s pawning an alienation?” then we at once start from a false problem 
statement. Yet in the interpretation of the Alienation Prohibition the question 
cannot be escaped. The answer must then, in my opinion, choose from between 
two possibilities: pawning is alienation, or pawning is not alienation. And with 
that one enters the territory of the politics of law (rechtspolitiek). (Haar 1936, 
476–477) 
[I] believe that what the lawmaker meant by “alienation” in Stbl. 1875 No. 179 
is only permanent transfer (lepas), so “pawning” falls on the outside. However 
given the doubts raised about it, [I] deem it necessary that the lawmaker clearly 
gives their opinion regarding this issue and [I] would like to recommend the 
explicit inclusion of pawning in the prohibition. (Haar 1936, 477; emphasis 
added) 
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In these erudite paragraphs Soepomo demonstrated his intellectual prowess. He 
adeptly illustrated the challenge of switching back and forth from one legal thought 
world to the other. The risk of slippage contained within it had serious consequences 
in the everyday lives of colonial subjects. By signaling the challenge of “the Western 
educated lawyers” who “involuntarily depart from European law” in trying to make 
sense of the Native legal thought world, Soepomo subtly drew attention to the 
irreplaceable value of being immersed organically in the Native legal episteme. In 
short, he elevated the value and relevance of knowledge in the Native legal thought 
world in constructing a legal framework for a colonial agrarian regime. 
If earlier in his essay, Soepomo rejected ter Haar’s inclusion of land pawning 
as falling under the Alienation Prohibition, he finally agreed to it in light of the social 
function of land pawning that ter Haar’s response underlined. His reluctance now 
made sense as he finally expressed his objective to revise the redaction of the 
Alienation Prohibition to explicitly include land pawning in the prohibition. He was 
convinced that a revision that included an explicit prohibition would lead to a uniform 
interpretation of the prohibition, an interpretation that genuinely carried out the 
mandate to protect Native land rights. This position was substantially different from 
that of ter Haar, who seemed to think legal jurisprudence was sufficient. 
Ineffective Intervention? Rulings on St. 1875 No. 179 post 1936 
A year after C.C. van Helsdingen brought the divergent interpretation of law 
within the government, he asked again if the government had made progress on the 
topic (Volksraad Handelingen 1937/1938, Afdeelingsverslag, 17). The government, 
represented by the Binnenlands Bestuur, responded defensively by citing the 
Netherlands Indies Lawyers Congress discussion on the Alienation Prohibition, 
arguing that the jurists had supported its position on the topic: 
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It is already established . . . that through such a transaction [that breaches the 
Alienation Prohibition] the land comes to belong to the domain of the State, 
upon which neither the native nor the non-native has rights. (Volksraad 
Handelingen 1937/1938, Memo van Antwoord, 22) 
Partly urged by the suggestions of the Spit Commission, the Binnenlands Bestuur said 
that it was considering amending the Alienation Prohibition and that it would decide 
its position soon.29 
Van Helsdingen rebuked the government’s claim of being supported by the 
Indies Jurist Congress, as there was no unanimous position regarding the effectiveness 
of the Alienation Prohibition. In fact, Van Helsdingen emphasized, there were a 
number of lawyers—he must have meant Soepomo and van Hattum—who thought 
that the Alienation Prohibition of 1875 could not have the impact as had been claimed 
up till then, and that therefore the government had to review the regulations and 
eliminate the controversy in the speediest manner possible (Volksraad Handelingen 
1937/1938, 635). 
If C.C. van Helsdingen was deeply concerned about the Native’s 
dispossession, a Volksraad member from IEV, Doeve, thought that it was the 
Alienation Prohibition that stalled East Indies’ economic growth. Its prevention of 
small-scale agricultural enterprises in Java managed by the Dutch or Indo-Europeans 
had prevented the Indies economy from flourishing. Had the government implemented 
Dutch property law on land, he suggested, investment from the Netherlands would 
have been fostered and a new class of small and medium-sized agriculture could have 
flourished (Volksraad Handelingen 1937/1938, 615). He suggested the Javanese 
peasants could work as paid laborers in the small to medium-sized agriculture this 
                                                 
29 Pushing back demands for concrete acts seemed to be a habit of the colonial government, as was 
demonstrated in the Wadoeng West case (chapter 2) and the Indo-European demand for land rights 
(chapter 5).  
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policy created, or migrate to the outer islands, after selling their land to Dutch or Indo-
European entrepreneurs. 
A Volksraad member from de Vaderlandsche Club, Jan Verboom,30 quashed 
Doeve’s statement, because 
they would show a mentality that even the word “cynical” could not 
characterize adequately. Not least was said than that the Netherlands East 
Indies would have gone much better had the Natives worked their land as 
coolies for European landowners. Finally it was said that men who would 
remain and without work, ought to disappear into the outer regions, with which 
thus the colonization problem would be solved. (Volksraad Handelingen 
1937/1938, 673) 
Verboom accused Doeve of being merely a pawn of the Indo-European Association, 
whose sole interest was to gain access to Natives’ land. And as a European himself, 
Verboom explicitly stated that he protested this move by Doeve in the strongest 
manner possible (Volksraad Handelingen 1937–1938, 673–674). 
Two years after this debate, the redaction of the Alienation Prohibition in St. 
1875 No. 179 had not been amended or revised (Regeeringsalmanak 1938). The 
suggested revision proposed by the Spit Commission that Soepomo endorsed 
remained on the back burner. 
Conclusion: Colonial State Formation and Legal Rules for Native Land Rights 
The Alienation Prohibition decreed in St. 1875 No. 179 was a law aimed at 
protecting Native use rights from being sold to non-Natives and converted en masse 
                                                 
30 J. Verboom was a co-founder and a moderate leader of the Vaderlandsche club. Under his leadership, 
the Vaderlandsche Club moved from a reactionary to a conservative organization. He became a 
Volksraad member and part of the College van de Gedelegeerden beginning in June 1935. His political 
outlook was surprisingly aligned with that of Cornelis van Vollenhoven in the way it protested against 
uncritical application of Western management concepts. He was known to critique the government’s 
economic policy that worked against the interest of the colony and its indigenous population. 
(http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/lemmata/Index/bwn5/verboom last accessed 
February 20, 2012).  
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into European legal title. It was decreed to complement the Agrarian Law of 1870, and 
as such was a key part of the colonial agrarian regime. The Alienation Prohibition was 
widely regarded as the “benevolent arm” of the colonial agrarian policy, which 
projected the colonial state as an impartial arbiter of justice who took the Native’s 
welfare seriously in its agrarian policy (Soepomo 1936, 87–90). 
The discursive movements surrounding the Alienation Prohibition bring to 
view an example of a micro-process of colonial state formation. The Prohibition was 
but one cog in the larger machine of the colonial agricultural regime. It was vulnerable 
to loosening, strengthening, tweaking by certain social actors in the colony, most 
particularly lawmakers and judicial officers. In this narrative, we observe how the 
individuals who waged the process maintained various levels of connection to state-
centered institutions, from the People’s Council, the Batavia College of Law, the 
judicial system, to the Binnenlands Bestuur, the powerful executive arm of the 
colonial government. As the debate evolved, unusual collaborative moves between 
unlikely allies became visible, while confrontations erupted between state agents who 
should have shared a uniformed front on the issue. The debate created an opportunity 
for parallel moves between C.C. van Helsdingen of the Volksraad and Soepomo of the 
Ministry of Justice to carry out a thorough review of the Alienation Prohibition. 
Soepomo’s review of the ruling had resulted in an intellectual confrontation 
between him and J. H. Logemann, and a crossfire between C.C. van Helsdingen and 
the director of the Binnenlands Bestuur, not to mention a war of words between IEV 
and Vaderlandsche Club representatives in the Volksraad. Indeed, in this debate over 
the Alienation Prohibition, colonial actors of varied backgrounds, each with a certain 
level of connection to state institutions, waged attempts to insert their particular 
reading of the law. Coming from within the state-system’s network, these ruptures 
underlined the fact that behind the appearance of “the Colonial State” as the ultimate 
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arbiter of justice, there was a competition to dominate the discourse. Not only that, the 
ruptures sealed law as the vernacular language that underpins “the colonial state.” The 
twist was, in this case, a Native subject was one of the key players. 
Subjects in colonial conditions, both the colonized and the colonizer, were 
shaped by densely intertwined threads of power relations as much as by positive 
intersubjective relations (Allen 2008). Most of the key individuals involved in this 
debate had a law degree. Undoubtedly, the discipline of law and legal education 
helped shaped their worldview, their thinking-and-being in the world, and their 
instinctive reaction to events. In the case of Soepomo, I argue that the legal education 
he experienced shaped his subjectivity not only via Foucauldian strategic relations, but 
also via intersubjective relations, that is, the relations of mutual recognition and 
support he enjoyed with his teachers and professors (Allen 2008). Granted, one does 
not have a personal testimony of his experience at the Batavia Rechtsschool that 
would confirm this beyond a reasonable doubt, but between the claims of Batavia 
Rechtsschool’s administrators (see chapter 1) and Soepomo’s confidence in the 
authority of law and justice revealed in his 1936 essay, one detects a person who 
enjoyed a nurturing education which had encouraged autonomy and critical reflection. 
Different from his European counterparts, Soepomo was part of the colonized, and 
grew up steeped in Javanese (if not to homogenize it as “Native”) ethics and 
epistemology. He was also a part of a nationalist front in Indonesia, albeit the one that 
was “co-operative” with the colonial regime. As such, his interpretation of the 
Alienation Prohibition differed from Logemann’s, and to some extent from ter Haar’s. 
Yet, it was nevertheless in tune with that of van Helsdingen, who taught him at the 
Batavia Rechtsschool. 
Soepomo’s essay and the subsequent debate with Logemann and ter Haar 
demonstrate a process of lawmaking in a wider sense of the term. Here, one observes a 
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scholar engaging with law, drawing materials from a wealth of empirical data, that is, 
verdicts that reflected daily encounters of colonial subjects with the Alienation 
Prohibition and its interpretation by the judicial system and the Binnenlands Bestuur. 
In questioning the persistent cleavage between the mandate of the law and the reality 
of the legal practices on the ruling, Soepomo contested the claim of the colonial state 
systems regarding the protection of Native land rights. He challenged the boundary 
defined by the colonial Agrarian regime. In Foucauldian parlance, he punctured the 
“epistemic reference.” His contestation of the colonial government’s commitment to 
the Alienation Prohibition was met with discouraging remarks from professors of the 
Batavia College of Law. Logemann considered Soepomo’s interpretation to be wildly 
motivated by a need to blame the government, while ter Haar neutralized his 
skepticism towards colonial lawmakers using the argument of etymology and the 
historical evolution of understanding. These did not deter Soepomo from questioning 
Binnenlands Bestuur’s intervention into the law and from insisting on an amendment 
to guarantee a more faithful implementation of the law’s mandate in the judicial 
system, which was the genuine protection of Native land rights. In these exchanges, 
the law was scrutinized, questioned, challenged, defended, and finally re-made in the 
ways its solid interpretation was ruptured; it made possible seeing the law from a 
different perspective, the perspective of the colonized. 
The “time tested” interpretation of St. 1875 No. 179 was a small cog in a 
machine that was a part of a larger collective of machines that made up the entire 
universe of reference in the colonial discourse. This universe of reference defined and 
limited what one could know, and was entrenched in the deep crevice of a subject’s 
thinking-and-being in the world. At a macro level, it can be overwhelming to pinpoint 
what exactly the “universe of reference” is. But by zooming in on microprocesses and 
microdiscourses such as the Alienation Prohibition in the constellation of the colonial 
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agrarian regime, one renders the machinations identifiable and the cracks more visible. 
Here, we observe how Soepomo offered a new, fresh reading of the Alienation 
Prohibition that suggested a deep cleavage between the mandate and the practice of 
the Alienation Prohibition. He essentially ruptured the old school reading of the law as 
a benevolent protection of the Native’s exclusive rights to own land. In Allen’s words 
(2008), Soepomo transformatively punctured to the existing relations of power and 
subjection. 
The debate over the Alienation Prohibition illustrates the mechanism, the nuts 
and bolts, and the everyday process of colonial state formation. When diverse actors 
interpellated law and legal provisions, they reinforced the presence of the state and 
made its authority visible. But the process is far from straightforward. At the same 
time the state is made to appear as if it was a concrete entity, its authority in issuing 
the ultimate judgment is punctured. This simultaneous process of challenging and 
reifying “the state” made its existence appear in a way akin to a pulse. It became an 
entity whose strength and authority alternately weakened and strengthened, just like a 
pulse. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation interrogates colonial state formation. Among numerous lenses 
one can use to cast an investigative gaze upon colonial state formation—technology, 
border-making, inter-insular postal service, and native education, for example—the 
constitution of the colonial agrarian regime is particularly intriguing because it offers a 
window through which to scrutinize the first-person voice of colonial subjects. Raising 
their voice in various events that helped shaped the agrarian regime, these subjects 
intervened and effectively took part in colonial state-making.  
How was the colonial agrarian regime in the Dutch East Indies constituted? 
What are the ways in which it defined colonial state formation? As we trace the 
operation of subject formation and lawmaking in light of colonial agrarian policy, we 
observe how the agrarian regime could not have been sustained without the 
reciprocally formed subjects and laws. We have seen how colonial laws classified 
subjects into categories and granted them rights accordingly, and how, in turn, subjects 
waged discursive struggles against these laws and attempted to direct them into a 
trajectory more empathetic to their cause. These practices reflect my argument that the 
constitution of the colonial agrarian regime in the Indies involved not only lawmaking, 
but also, and just as important, subject-making. It was human agents having myriad 
forms of association with state institutions who carried out these practices, such that 
assigning a boundary between “state” and “subjects” is hardly tenable. Colonial state 
formation is thus not a uniform process administered by a single entity. Rather, it 
consists of heterogeneous practices that take place through dispersed nodal points 
where power, nestled in the capillaries of the social body, is exercised in virtually one-
on-one confrontations.  
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In this dissertation, I have been concerned less with whether subjects succeed 
in their interventions, where success is marked by concrete and tangible changes in 
what they sought to achieve, than with understanding how law and subjects were 
reciprocally formed, and how they in turn inextricably took part in and influenced the 
constitution of the agrarian regime in the colony. These concerns led to my interest in 
examining what these processes mean to the notions of subjects and autonomy and 
how they illuminate our conception of colonial state formation.  
In their seminal treatise on state formation, Corrigan and Sayer (1985) argued 
that state formation is a cultural revolution. What they meant by cultural revolution is 
that state formation entails a fundamental change in meaning-making, in how people 
make sense of events and in the ways in which people situate themselves in the world. 
The cultural revolution transformed meaning-making from organic processes into ones 
more amenable to “cultural forms . . . of particular centrality to bourgeois civilization” 
(1985, 3).  
In colonial society, law and legal discourse were the vectors that brought about 
the cultural revolution alongside which change took effect. The change in meaning-
making had an impact on everyone—colonized, colonizers, and those wedged in 
between—shaping their subjectivities into forms that fit well within the larger 
framework of the agrarian regime, a regime that reflected the colonial government’s 
doubling project. In this process, law and legal discourse emerged as the elements that 
held colonial state forms together and that projected the presence of the state as the 
ultimate arbiter of justice (Comaroff 1998, Hansen and Stepputat 2001).  
I explore two pillars that constituted the colonial agrarian regime in chapters 1 
and 2. My narrative in chapter 1 demonstrates that subject formation does not take 
place solely as a result of the Foucauldian dynamics of strategic relations. The 
curriculum and pedagogical philosophy deployed by administrators of colonial legal 
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education signal a more complex relationship than simply the “strategic.” There was a 
nod to mutual respect and to nurturing attitude, not something one expects in colonial 
relations marred by racial bias. Acknowledging this deviation brings forth the intricate 
reliefs that help us make sense of complex subject formation. Legal education and 
trainings brought the native students into a shared language about justice with the 
colonizer, and equipped them with the capacity to self-reflect and to engage with 
colonial legal discourse.  
In chapter 2, I show how colonial agrarian laws transformed landscape into 
valuable real estate and how the laws regulated subjects’ relations to land. Yet these 
laws never became stable references, because colonial subjects never ceased engaging 
with them in order to both resist and advance the laws’ attempt to reconfigure social 
relations. We observe this in Bernard Ledeboer’s manifesto booklet, in R.P. Soeroso’s 
protest in the Volksraad, in Wirjono Prodjodikoro’s essay in the Indies Journal of 
Law, in Samingoen’s case helped by Lunel, in van Helsdingen’s demand for a 
thorough review of the Alienation Prohibition, and in the director of the Binnenlands 
Bestuur’s rejection of it. This crisscrossing of contestations against and defenses of the 
agrarian laws represents the reality of lawmaking in the colony. Law, once introduced, 
was never finished or stable. Re-interpretation of law pushed by the subjects was part 
of the law’s evolution.  
These two chapters present the foundational arguments for the subsequent 
chapters, which explore different aspects of colonial state formation that manifested 
through the constitution of the colonial agrarian regime. In chapter 3, I highlight the 
autonomy of a subject expressed in particular forms of agency. In chapter 4, I examine 
how the distinction between colonial subject and colonial “state” was no more than an 
illusory boundary. In chapter 5, I foreground how practices that resulted in isolation 
and identification effects did not emanate from a single, coherent entity, but were 
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waged by a network of social actors. In chapter 6, I present the dynamics between two 
groups of subjects—not so much in diametrical opposition than in a shared discursive 
realm—in making law and in interpellating the illusory state.  
From the literature on agrarian issues in late-colonial Netherlands East Indies, I 
could hear only faint voice of the natives, and of the colonial subjects in general. Most 
research dwells on practical actions in the form of revolts or peasant struggles. By no 
means do I intend to downplay their importance, but focusing on large struggles like 
revolution and small struggles like acts of everyday resistance runs the risk of 
implying that agrarian struggles in the Indies took place only at the practical—never 
the ideational—level, and that fights over agrarian rights were inspired only by 
Marxist ideas. Such a focus obscures the process of deliberation, even muffling the 
voice of the Indonesian intelligentsia regarding land rights. In reality, agrarian 
struggles did take place at the ideational level. Paying close attention to this ideational 
struggle brings more prominently to light the role of the subjects as active agents in 
historical events.  
My project is inspired by the search for a voice, and by the desire to hear the 
voices of subjects in the colony, not only the voices of the native population, but also 
the voices of those wedged in between the colonized and the colonizer. Thus my 
foregrounding of the colonial subjects and the autonomy of their enunciations and 
strategies in everyday making of “the state.” Finding a voice means zooming in on 
microprocesses and allowing the first-person voice to surface from the cacophony of 
colonial legal discourse on land rights. In this way, the subjects come forward as 
multiple embodiments of a process: as autonomous individuals despite being 
constituted by power relations, and as pillars of state-making such that it becomes 
difficult to isolate state from subjects.  
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In thinking about the subject, I found myself struggling to present it in ways 
that are manageable. Earlier in my research, I struggled with the question of how to 
isolate the most dominant factor and the most important network of relations from the 
vast arrays of possibilities that constitute “subjectivity.” Subjectivity is such a 
complex phenomenon and so elusive it that eludes attempts at scrutiny. Ortner acutely 
observes that numerous cultural analyses that borrow the Foucauldian concept of 
subject formation end up analyzing subjects in terms of political locations and political 
identities, which is substantially “different from the question of the formation of 
subjectivities, complex structures of thought, feeling, reflection, and the like, that 
make social beings always more than the occupants of particular positions and the 
holders of particular identities” (2005, 11). And in my quest for theoretical grounding 
that allows the subject to emerge, I have come to an understanding that the term 
"subjectivity" hands the ‘microphone’ back to the "subject." Because of the near 
impossibility of pinning down “subjectivity,” the asymptotic way out was to explore 
the process of subject formation (in this case I limited it to legal education) and to 
make space for the process of deliberation to take center stage.  
How do we foreground the subject? In a research area with a dearth of 
autobiographies from which to cull morsels to reconstruct the subject and the person’s 
way of seeing the world, a partial way out is to allow the first-person voice of the 
subject to be the focus of analysis, using materials where speech and writing are 
abundant. In this project, I do so by using speech transcribed from Volksraad sessions, 
dissertations written by law students, published essays and booklets, and newspaper 
articles—in short, by examining all materials that contain the first-person voice. This 
explains the unusually lengthy quotations here, especially in cases of abstract legal 
argument on land rights issues. Allowing these discursive expressions to come to the 
fore makes possible the linking of the subject to power relations, discourse, and 
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epistemic reference, all of which constituted the subjects in the first place. It also made 
possible the tracing and identifying of their interventions, especially crucial because 
discursive intervention does not always result in tangible, spectacular change.  
Most of the voices heard here are faint when placed in the larger 
historiography of Indonesian agrarian evolution. They come from sources that have 
rarely been accessed despite the relatively easy access to them. They are faint not so 
much because the subjects were whispering, but because the microprocesses they 
expressed had largely escaped our attention and acknowledgement. Then again, do 
colonial subjects’ discursive interventions really matter? Do their voices make a 
difference when the practical result they sought did not take place as the actors had 
wished? Do these voices matter when they were so faint? Surely we would have heard 
about them if they were genuinely important? After the long exposition in this 
dissertation, I have concluded that they do matter, because they are essential in 
explaining larger processes and bigger structures. They render visible the contour of 
agency that made it possible to think about large processes such as state formation in 
other than abstract terms.  
The complex processes of state formation become even more sharply defined 
when we strip the object of our analysis from the illusory, reified state, and allow the 
subject to take center stage. When the subjects’ enunciation and enunciation strategies 
become the focus of our attention, what emerges is a process of state formation that 
does not consist of a continuous stream of domination. What emerges is not so much 
the overwhelming power of the state, but a formation that manifested as pulsating 
beats, one moment contracting, the next expanding; a throbbing dynamic caused by 
successive, discrete pounding, never a continuous, steady stream of power. What 
emerges is a play of power relations in which everyone had and took a role. This is 
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because colonial subjects were always engaged with the network of power relations 
while also taking part as the relays of power.  
Colonial state formation was always in a state of expansion and contraction, 
perhaps not rhythmically, but definitely not moving as a steady stream of domination. 
And I have come to the conclusion that indeed it was laws and legal discourse that 
were the blood that kept the pulse going. It was through the language of law and legal 
discourse that colonial subjects were able to wage their interventions in the 
constitution of an agrarian regime. In this light, law and legal discourse were the 
vernaculars that held colonial state-systems together, making it appear coherent and 
united.  
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APPENDIX A: 
Administration of Justice in the Netherlands East Indies in the 1920s  
 
 
(Source: Massier 2008) 
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APPENDIX B: 
Structure of Governance in the Netherlands East Indies in the Late 1920s  
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